Videos & Media


Danielle Macbeth

"Morality, Tribalism, and Value"


Willem deVries

"Persons and Their Categories"


Jim O'Shea

"Sellars' Kantian Naturalist Metaphysics of Morals"


Stefanie Dach

"Sellars on the intersubjectivity of 'we-intentions'"


Kyle Ferguson

"We-Intentions and How One Reports Them"


Zachary Gabor

"Norm, Nature, and Narrative: Two Strategies in Pursuit of a Synoptic Vision in Sellars and Macbeth"


Preston Stovall

"Shared Intentionality and Discursive Cognition"


Nicholas Tebben

"The Community of Rational Beings"


Heath White

"An Anscombean Critique of Sellars's Practical Philosophy"


Jeremy Koons

"Sellars on External Reasons"


Ronald Loeffler

"Moral We-Intentions as Individualistic We-Attitudes"

Transcripts

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We can't hear you. Yeah.

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How about now. Yeah. What do you do out in Wilmington.

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Thing is, Are you an ethicist are you.

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I've.

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I wrote my dissertation on sellers practical options at random spot practical philosophy, and I've been publishing in loosely that the practical reason and lately free will, area.

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That's very

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great talk by the way thank you very much. Thank you.

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So are you looking at, classes in person in Wilmington, what do they do. Yeah.

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Currently we have a mask mandate which is infuriating to me, but that's why we go

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yeah I taught all last year in a mask and hybrid, I didn't like the hybrid. Yeah, I was completely online last year.

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And I really am looking forward to getting back in the classroom. Yeah, well that's why I decided I would do the hybrid stuff but because I do like the in person but trouble is the students ended up signing was easier just to, you know, zoom in.

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Right, so the people in class kept sort of shrinking and shrinking and.

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And by being split that way I didn't feel like I was getting doing justice to either group.

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So it's very frustrating. Yeah.

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Last year I waited a year too long to retire.

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Last year was a wreck by anybody's anybody's calculation, I think, guys, sorry to interrupt you're really sorry, but it is 115 and just in the interest of staying on schedule let's start with install president, please.

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Yeah, Sure, so he is from UNC Wilmington Wilmington, and he's going to give us a talk of comparing sellers practical philosophy of them, and scope, so we're looking forward to this.

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And leave a TV. Thank you. Alright, well let me try and share my screen here.

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There is that it.

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Okay.

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All right.

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And cracks in the foundation and and school me and critique of sellers practical philosophy Wilfred sellers is best known for his work on the theoretical side of philosophy during the mid 20th century.

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But he thought and wrote about practical topics to, hence this conference.

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At the same time, another well known philosopher worked both sides of the philosophical fence.

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I'll be at with dramatically different starting points, style and results.

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I refer to the GM and scum.

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And as you can see, they really are very close contemporaries, is my contention to her accounts of intention intentional action and practical reasoning are on the whole superior to the ones offered by sellers, a philosopher who wanted to pursue practical

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philosophy and it's largely in vain would therefore do well to take to take account of some of an scones insights.

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And let me add that depending on which aspect of sellers you find attractive.

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You can sort of view the things I'm saying as friendly amendments.

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A insightful commentary, or sharp critique it kind of depends, you know which part of sellers, you you are approaching.

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All right,

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here's a little overview of where I'll go points of disagreement between the two, the content of intentions.

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A connected to that is whether the expression of an intention has a truth value what counts as a cogent argument and practical reasoning, what kinds of practical principles makes sense.

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And what accounts for the inter subjective authority of hypothetical imperatives. That last one is not really an scone that's more me inspired by an icon but will include.

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So first of all, sellers on intention on its expression, one of sellers key insights.

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Is that intentions, can be reasoned about in this he departed from for example errs and motivated sellers wanted to explore the logic of this reasoning, and the notations he invents differ slightly among his publications but so far as possible.

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I'll stick with his latest relevant publication.

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His first step is to create a location to express intentions.

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In English, he writes, I shall do x and in regimented notation, he writes shall bracket. I do X, the expression of an intention is to be distinguished from the description of intentions, I shall do X, when sincere expresses the mental state that I intend

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to do X describes.

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So there's notes that we can also express intentions for state of affairs rather than actions.

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For instance, my intention that my children get a good education to express these his regimented location is Shelby bracket pain.

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But since intentions are at least propensities to action, intentions that P imply and are ultimately grounded in intentions to do X.

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Sellers holds that intentions and does their regimented expressions have no truth values.

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As a result, they cannot be externally negated, one can write shall bracket. I don't do X, but you can't write, not the case that shall I do x.

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Moreover, shall expressions cannot be constituents and larger expressions, there is such a thing as shell.

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One can see what motivates sellers here.

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Shall as opposed to express intentions and it is distinctly unclear what any logically more complex expression would express.

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All this means that according to sellers statements like I will fail the exam or my children will inherit a small fortune are systematically ambiguous as predictions they have a truth value that is if I'm predicting whether I'm going to fail the exam

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or my children are going to inherit.

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That can be true or false my prediction can be true or false, but if I'm intending these things.

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They don't have a truth value. And, and therefore the content is different.

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And this difference is reflected in sellers notation that's why he's part of the reason he invested notation.

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So if we compare and scope and scope begins her famous little book intention.

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We're sellers does with intentions and their expression, that's, that's actually where she starts the book but she finds that a dead end.

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And so she turns instead to an account of intentional actions.

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Her argument is torturous and obscure so infamously, but to summarize, she defines an intentional action and epidemic turns.

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As one where the agent knows, without observation, what she is doing and why a description of an intentional action is just a plain descriptive statement, I am writing a letter or I am giving a talk, for example, the writing of the letter is an intentional

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action according to ask them, just in case the agent doing the writing knows she is writing the letter knows what reason she has for writing it, and knows all this without having to engage in empirical observation to discover it.

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The contrast is with for example, discovering that you are unintentionally ruining the surface of your desk, as the ink bleeds through the paper.

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For an expression of intention is just a statement of what intentional action I will do in the future.

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For example, I will write a letter, the philosophical interest of such statements lies in distinguishing them from what ends come calls early in her book, quote, an estimate of my chances.

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Following victim Stein she explores the idea that expressions of intention are in fact a species of prediction, she drops the subject in conclusively because the issue turns on taxonomic choices about what she has little interest, roughly, you know, do

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you want to call it a belief or not and I think she's just not really interested in that tax on taxonomic question.

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Um, she is clear, however, that expressions of intention have exactly the truth values they seem to, when I say, I will write a letter, my statement is true if and only if, at sometime in the future, I do write a letter.

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Whether expressions of intentions are predictions, and that's what their intentions are beliefs and it's going does not subtle. That's that taxonomic question.

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She just leaves aside.

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She's clear though as her definition of intentional action might have brought out the intentions that one succeeds in acting on our species of knowledge, what she calls following Aristotle and Aquinas practical knowledge.

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The idea crudely Is this my mental state is true if and only if it corresponds to the world.

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This state constitutes knowledge, if it is justified or reliable or non accidental, you know, pick your favorite definition of knowledge.

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There are two ways this can be achieved. I could justifiably or reliably or not accidentally detect how the world is and conform my mental state to it.

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This is contemplative knowledge.

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Or I could justifiably or reliably or non accidentally change the world to conform to my mind and this yields practical knowledge.

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The reasons that would bear on an ordinary belief about the future would be those having to do with its likelihood of being true, but a properly functioning ordinary belief is sensitive evidence.

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The reasons that would bear on intention, however, would be those having to do with whether it was a good idea to make true whether it confirmed my values or helped fulfill my purposes and so on.

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But a properly functioning intention motivates action.

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Since it is supposed to be part of a process of effecting changes in the world.

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Consequently, these different states go wrong in different ways. Now we are speaking of direction of fit.

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If the ordinary beliefs content is false. This reflects a mistake about the world.

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While at the intentions constant intentions content is false reflects a mistake or failure in bringing about the intended result.

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All these differences derived from the fundamental difference in justification, in terms of theoretical versus practical reasons.

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The fundamental difference between an ordinary belief about the future, and an intention is not in the content or the Edit is not a content of the attitude or its truth value.

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But in what gives one reasons to hold it.

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The expression of an intention is identical to the expression of an ordinary belief about the future.

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And they have the same content and scum agrees that both actions and states of affairs can be objects of intention.

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The explanation is relatively straightforward, affecting the world to match the content of my intention will definition really involve an intentional action.

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And so intention is to do such and such, will be the last item and chains of reasoning, and the first in execution.

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Those intentions that do imply intention to, and in some sense intentions to our fundamental on this score sellers and and scum concur

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sellers takes for granted that intentions and beliefs are sharply distinct for and scope, the distinction is real but extrinsic.

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The difference lies and what kind of reasons support them.

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Her view can be given some support by considering cases where the difference between an intention, and an ordinary belief about the future is unclear.

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Consider first acclaim, I will pay off my mortgage before I retire.

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This is eminently predictable.

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Due to my age the security of my job, direct deposit of my paycheck direct withdrawal of my mortgage payment, and the balance on my mortgage.

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If you were going to be betting on this it would be a very good bet.

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It's also something I happen to think is a good idea and I plan on doing it. So this claim has both theoretical and practical justification.

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And it seems to me in determinant between an expression of belief and an expression of intention. It's just, if I, when I say that it just seems unclear to me, and not particularly useful to parse whether I'm expressing a belief or expressing an attention.

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Consider second acclaim for which I have no evidence at all and total inability to bring about my grandchildren will walk on Mars.

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There is no mental trail of just difficult Tory breadcrumbs to follow and I just put it out there to make a philosophical point in this paper, such a claim has neither theoretical nor practical justification and again it seems to me indeterminate between

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an ordinary prediction and an expression of intention.

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Finally considered the example and scope deploys against the views like sellers in the presence of a nurse, a doctor says to a patient nurse will take you to the operating room now.

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And score points out that this one utterance simultaneously functions to express the intention of the doctor informed the patient, and given order to the nurse would ordinarily say that the doctor expressed his intention, and in light of the relevant

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authority relations that is why the nurse received an order.

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We would also say that the patient knew where he was going.

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And he knew it by testimony rather than inference, that is, I think, If the doctor says that in front of the patient.

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He's telling the patient, where he's going.

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The patient is not going through an inference like, oh, the doctor expressed an intention that the nurse Take me to the operating room and she's probably going to follow that order therefore I'm going to wind up in the operating room know the doctor just

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pulled you were you were going.

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Um, there's no clean distinction between the expressions of belief whose function is to describe and expressions of intention with some other function.

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Now if intention and ordinary belief or two intrinsically different kinds of mental state, one of which stood behind each sincere utterance of a future tense indicative statement.

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These indeterminate sees would be impossible, but if intention and ordinary belief are distinguished by an extrinsic property, namely the type of reasons that support them.

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Then we can imagine cases, like the use where the distinction is not sharp.

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Bus when representing intentions for logical purposes, and scam does not mark them with any special notation, the expression of an intention is simply an ordinary future tense indicative statement.

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It also has a truth value.

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The same truth value that the corresponding ordinary beliefs about the future we have.

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As such, there is no problem combining expressions of intention and larger logical complexes.

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I will run a marathon. And then I will throw up is true, if and only if both it's contracts are true. Okay. And this meeting as a compositional function of its parts.

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And this comes views, huge closer to common sense, the ordinary way of expressing one's intention is indeed a future tense indicative statement.

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Such expressions combine and ordinary English with descriptive language. So, for example, I will run a marathon and then throw up. Okay, the first part is, you know, that's it.

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There's an intention behind it and the throwing up is not intentional. but there's no problem combining them as there is on sellers.

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Furthermore, the ordinary test for truth values apply to expressions of intention for example if I say, I will run a marathon, and you say correctly. No you won't.

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Okay.

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You seem to be contradicting me. however what you've expressed is a belief, whereas what I expressed was an intention.

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I'm. After all, I'm hardly in a position to reply you're right without abandoning my prior commitment, all those sellers analyzes my first comment is expressing an intention and my second is expressing a belief, more supportive Lee, you might say I believe

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what you say, which is impossible unless I expressed a proposition. in the first case. Okay.

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Now, I'm not going to say that these problems are sort of insurmountable. You know there's, You know there are logics trying to combine intentions and and you know plans, good stuff with plans and things.

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I just going to say it's really hard, and really technical and as far as answers, and scope is concerned, you don't need to do any of that business okay when you say, I will run a marathon, you're just making a claim about the future.

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The content is exactly what it looks like. It combines exactly what you think it does.

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And what's unique about it is not anything about the content, but simply the sorts of reasons that are behind it.

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Now, all of this, it's unclear I think how deep these errors cut, possibly they are one might say, merely technical and serious philosophical insights might survive them, possibly not.

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The next section will detail, more substantive problems.

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So here we get sellers on practical reason.

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So has developed a notation for intentions because he's interested in developing a logic practical reasoning, regardless of how he characterizes the premises and conclusions of this reasoning notation for example, what, what the premises and conclusions

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are like, what can we say about the influences in sellers you the logic of intentions calls for very few innovations, his main role of influence for intentions SM.

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Okay, that this first roll up here.

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If PMSQ, then it shall be the case that P implies and shall be the case that Q.

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It follows that all the valid patterns of classical logic have an analog and sellers logic of intentions as well. So as explains.

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It is because of this dimension that the logic of purposes and values is largely derivative from the logic of facts, and I'll come to this Soviet here momentarily but will come back.

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As an inference principle for intentions SM fails on two counts unless we are using the word intention stupidly.

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First, I don't need to intend everything my intentions imply. For example, if I declare my intention to meet you tomorrow morning for coffee. For example, by saying, I will meet you for coffee in the morning.

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This implies that the sun will rise tomorrow.

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That's the only way there's a morning.

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But that is not the content have any intention of mine I don't have to intend that.

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But notice, I do have to intend that under s amp. Right.

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Um. Second, common sense recognizes a distinction between intended effects and merely foreseen side effects, suppose I'm on my way to meet you for coffee, by way of a trolley which mid trip goes logo.

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I see it bearing down on five helpless strangers, but I can switch the trolley onto a spur will hit and kill one helpless stranger.

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You're familiar with this problem I assume I switch tracks intentionally say the five and not intentionally kill the one or so common sense tells us.

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On the other hand, SM rules it out, is switching tracks implies killing the one.

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Again, here we go.

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It's switching tracks implies killing the one that an intention to switch tracks implies an intention to kill the one getting this thing, this kind of thing right was important to ask them.

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She's famous for advocating for the intention foresight distinction.

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It's also important to articulating a certain kind of moral prohibition.

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For example, many people believe you should never murder anyone, which is to say you should never intentionally kill an innocent person.

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But if intentionally just means forcibly or even implied by other things I intend plus background conditions.

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Then our trolley driver murders the one helpless victim when he switches tracks.

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Since everyone thinks you ought to switch tracks, we would have to give up the prohibition on murder, and it is not clear what sellers could offer in its place, know that this objection does not turn on the truth of this moral prohibition on against murdering

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nor on its exceptional business, you have a prima facie duty not to murder would raise all the same issues, the objection turns rather on the conceptual possibility of framing the prohibition, or anything like it.

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It's just not clear how to do that under sellers.

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Under sellers approach. And if we can do that I think we have lost something essential to moral thinking and SM is the culprit. Right now sellers in effect doubles down with a second relevant influence principles, so be it.

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And we'll go back here.

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A Shelby fi and P implies Shelby fire NP, and this has the effect of packing all the, all the facts, all the background conditions into the contents of my intention.

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So, once we have that we can use SM to use all the ordinary inference patterns.

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But with intentions and beliefs as sellers rights implications conformed to this principle push in the direction of getting relevant beliefs into the scope of our purposes and intentions.

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So the idea again is to just sort of pack all of our beliefs into what we count as an intention.

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So be it has much the same sort of effect as SM lighting distinctions between intention contents and their causes conditions side effects and background knowledge that all just sort of gets much together, if you're sellers.

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But there is a method to this madness.

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Sellers conceives of choices as simply the comparison of alternatives and the alternatives are understood as states of the world. It is a consequentialist way of understanding choices were the only morally relevant aspect of an action is its effects.

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Indeed sellers is simply borrowing his peculiar understanding of intentions from well known consequentialist situations situate, for example articulated a view of intentional action on what's the difference between intended and really forcing consequences

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was unintelligible.

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And so here's this quote, more or less of all schools I concede would agree that the moral judgments which we pass on actions relate primarily to intentional actions regarded as intentional.

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In other words, he goes on and this is the squirrely part.

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The effects which he foresaw in a willing The act or more strictly his volition, or choice of realizing the effects as foreseen.

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So if you do that, obviously, the distinction between foresight and intention has totally collapsed in evaluating sellers logic of intentions or this point intentions right scare quote intentions, we should be aware that it is not a logic for practical

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reasoning as ordinarily understood and widely conceit. Nor is it neutral between various competing paradigms of ethical thinking.

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Rather, the fundamental structure of consequential ism has been built in.

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Alright,

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so here's an SCA on practical real.

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What is the distinction between practical and theoretical reason.

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Sellers view is that practical reasoning operates on different items, namely intentions, its form however is the same as that of theoretical reasoning.

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As SM shows.

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Here's sellers in the same boat with a number of contemporaries, among them hair casting Ada an arm and stones view is roughly the reverse the premises and conclusions of practical reasoning or ordinarily or ordinary claims about, especially what will

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be the case.

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This form the form of this reasoning. However, what counts as a cogent argument difference.

00:26:00.000 --> 00:26:11.000
The difference traces back to the difference between contemplative and practical knowledge, the justification of contemplative knowledge requires reasons which show some proposition to be true.

00:26:11.000 --> 00:26:26.000
And ideally this connection amounts to a deductible a valid proof practical knowledge on the other hand, requires reasons which show some state of the world to be a good idea, or worth making true attracted.

00:26:26.000 --> 00:26:36.000
This might amount to some action being rationally required or rationally required given some objectives or constraints, etc. But that case is fairly rare.

00:26:36.000 --> 00:26:41.000
Generally speaking, there are a lot of ways to accomplish one's objectives.

00:26:41.000 --> 00:26:49.000
That doesn't mean that the decision to take one of those ways is irrational or requires no thought.

00:26:49.000 --> 00:27:07.000
Suppose a bodybuilder is on a diet regimen that requires a certain amount of protein per day and she has 30 grams short of her goal for the day at dinnertime. She can eat several eggs, or steak or have yogurt or soybeans, or drink a protein shake or several other options or combinations of these options.

00:27:07.000 --> 00:27:13.000
And Scott thanks of reasoning like this as perfectly fine and a perfectly ordinary example of reasoning.

00:27:13.000 --> 00:27:20.000
I will be 30 grams of protein for dinner, the steak has 30 grams of protein so I will eat the steak.

00:27:20.000 --> 00:27:29.000
Now obviously this is not productively valid reasoning. Okay, you would fail your logic test if you provided this as an example a valid argument.

00:27:29.000 --> 00:27:43.000
In fact, if practical reasoning had the same form as theoretical reasoning, this bit would be fallacious. In fact, there's nothing malicious about it and some holes and that just goes to show that the two kinds of reasoning have different forms.

00:27:43.000 --> 00:27:51.000
A lot of practical life is like this. Maybe I want to keep reading serious fiction. That means I have to read some serious fiction.

00:27:51.000 --> 00:28:05.000
I'm hardly going to read all of it, but it does not mean I have to read every piece of serious fiction I come across, nor does it require that there'd be some decision procedure for which pieces of serious fiction I read on one can imagine some attempts

00:28:05.000 --> 00:28:17.000
I'm one can imagine some attempts to save sellers parallelism between practical and theoretical reasoning, one attempt is to say that hey, a lot of theoretical reasoning is non productive.

00:28:17.000 --> 00:28:23.000
So it doesn't harm the parallelism to point out the non productive nature of critical reasoning.

00:28:23.000 --> 00:28:33.000
But this ignores that practical reasoning at least as an outcome conceives it is not merely non productive but is in fact the reverse of the inductive.

00:28:33.000 --> 00:28:38.000
What follows deductive Lee from my premise is a necessary condition.

00:28:38.000 --> 00:28:52.000
What is a good means to a given end on the other hand is a sufficient condition deductive inference moves from particular claims like I will read gravity's rainbow to existential claims, I will read some serious fiction.

00:28:52.000 --> 00:29:00.000
While specifying a specific means to a general end moves in the opposite direction. As an example, on the slide.

00:29:00.000 --> 00:29:07.000
This is because practical reasoning is not an attempt to discover truth, it is an attempt to create them

00:29:07.000 --> 00:29:16.000
another attempt to salvage the parallelism is to say that what follows from an intention strictly speaking really is given by deductible a valid reasoning.

00:29:16.000 --> 00:29:26.000
For example, maybe our bodybuilder can is only able to conclude, something like, I will have this steak or these eggs or this yogurt or that protein shake or blah blah blah.

00:29:26.000 --> 00:29:36.000
Okay. And then the choice of these among these alternatives is viewed as some kind of existentialist arbitrary leap. Okay.

00:29:36.000 --> 00:29:48.000
Um, but as a representation of any agents actual reasoning however this is a pretty big stretch, nobody actually farms those big long disjunctive conclusions.

00:29:48.000 --> 00:29:53.000
And aside from being an implausible account if anyone's thought life, it doesn't count as reasoning.

00:29:53.000 --> 00:30:09.000
All those mental steps from instant means that people actually do take like in the example, or over I don't even know how one would go about listening to oneself, all the possibilities for example, reading serious fiction, there's just too many damn books

00:30:09.000 --> 00:30:25.000
that there are ordinarily several ways to skin a cat, and that choosing among them is practical reasoning is a piece of common sense that sellers view of practical reasoning denies is odd consequence is obscured at least partly again by his sub Rosa consequential

00:30:25.000 --> 00:30:26.000
ism that connection will come out more clearly in the next section.

00:30:26.000 --> 00:30:42.000
that connection will come out more clearly in the next section. One more remark is in order before leaving this topic. The conclusion, I will have this steak for dinner entails a cow will have died for my dinner.

00:30:42.000 --> 00:30:44.000
Now on sellers you a practical reasoning.

00:30:44.000 --> 00:31:02.000
This letter proposition is intended, or intended as packed into my larger intention, precisely because it is entailed on Anselm's competing view that a cow will have died for her dinner is not an object of the bodybuilders intention because it does not

00:31:02.000 --> 00:31:07.000
satisfy any of her name's or purposes.

00:31:07.000 --> 00:31:12.000
I mean I suppose you have a particularly bloodthirsty bodybuilder but they're not common.

00:31:12.000 --> 00:31:21.000
Um, she might well take this consequence to be an overriding reason against eating steak might say that's not a reason to do it but it happens and that's just the way it goes.

00:31:21.000 --> 00:31:29.000
So the difference between seller finance going on the structure of practical reasoning ratifies into their difference about which actions are intentional.

00:31:29.000 --> 00:31:35.000
And on both counts and combs account, looks more plausible to me anyway.

00:31:35.000 --> 00:31:39.000
All right.

00:31:39.000 --> 00:31:44.000
Lastly sellers on the authority of hypothetical imperatives.

00:31:44.000 --> 00:31:54.000
More than once in his over sellers uses the parable of Smith was faced with a heavy object, a stone and a steel rod, that's him on the left.

00:31:54.000 --> 00:32:09.000
Smith is evidently rather dense, but fortunately he is assisted by a team of scientists, yes and entire team who conclude that the only way to lift the object is to lever it up with the rock using the stone as a fulcrum.

00:32:09.000 --> 00:32:19.000
They express this conclusion as if Smith wants to raise the objects. He ought to use the Rog as a lover.

00:32:19.000 --> 00:32:32.000
So he's got several things right about this example. First, wants is misleading What are really logically related here are the actions and that's the intentions of Smith raising the object and Smith using the rod as a lever.

00:32:32.000 --> 00:32:36.000
Second, OT is misleading.

00:32:36.000 --> 00:32:50.000
Since the relation is one of necessity, the better modal word is must finally the consequent does not detach with Motorsports that is we cannot conclude from the fact that Smith wants or intends to raise the object that he ought to or must use the rod

00:32:50.000 --> 00:33:00.000
as a lever. Just pick the best means to an immoral end to see why. For example, if Smith wants to kill Superman he ought to kill him with kryptonite.

00:33:00.000 --> 00:33:10.000
Maybe Smith wants or intends to kill Superman but it doesn't follow that Smith bought to kill Superman with kryptonite or anything else, you shouldn't kill people quit generally.

00:33:10.000 --> 00:33:29.000
The upshot is that sellers regiments the scientists conclusion as Smith raises the object implies Smith uses the rod, as a lever, or in Smith's internal monologue shall rocket, I raised the objects implies shall bracket.

00:33:29.000 --> 00:33:32.000
I use the rod as a lever.

00:33:32.000 --> 00:33:47.000
In this regimented versions The want has been transformed into an action or intention, the modality of ot has been packed into the modality of the implies, and we are free of the temptation to apply the otter the detached consequence.

00:33:47.000 --> 00:33:58.000
So there's purpose in this conceptual excursion is to establish a way for empirical causal connections to be used in practical reasoning with interest objective validity.

00:33:58.000 --> 00:34:01.000
And I had this on the side slide here.

00:34:01.000 --> 00:34:16.000
The idea is that the scientists empirical conclusion which is true for everyone can be directly transposed into the hypothetical imperative, so that it carries an equivalent status, and the quote general hypothetical imperatives are simply the transposition

00:34:16.000 --> 00:34:24.000
into practical discourse of empirical instrumental generalizations. This conclusion.

00:34:24.000 --> 00:34:31.000
Though as at best misleading. It's not wholly wrong but I think it's misleading.

00:34:31.000 --> 00:34:41.000
What the scientists can establish is causal necessity, which for our purposes we can think of is pretty close to a basic necessity.

00:34:41.000 --> 00:34:52.000
What a hypothetical imperative requires is d antic necessity. These are related by a standard principle of the anti logic that Olympic necessity implies the Arctic necessity.

00:34:52.000 --> 00:34:54.000
Okay.

00:34:54.000 --> 00:35:01.000
However, conceptually the two modalities are distinct and this will make a difference here in

00:35:01.000 --> 00:35:16.000
this matters because it is not just Olympic or causal necessity that implies the antic necessity. Suppose Smith consults not just the scientists, but the priests of his tribe who informed him that because the object is holy and the rod is steel and met

00:35:16.000 --> 00:35:26.000
must never touched holy objects. But if he wants to move the object he absolutely must not use the rod as a lever. 10 minutes he just to let you know.

00:35:26.000 --> 00:35:29.000
Thank you.

00:35:29.000 --> 00:35:36.000
We can phrase this injunction as if Smith wants to raise the objects he ought not use the rod as a lover.

00:35:36.000 --> 00:35:41.000
And I stentorian priestly voice there on the right.

00:35:41.000 --> 00:35:50.000
So this is another hypothetical imperative but it's obviously not one that is the transposition into practical discourse of an empirical instrumental generalization.

00:35:50.000 --> 00:36:00.000
In this case the Niantic necessity of a hypothetical imperative derives from what we might call ceremonial necessity, if I can invent a new modality.

00:36:00.000 --> 00:36:11.000
So empirical science is one source of hypothetical imperatives but it's not the only possible source, and so it says given one story about the authority of hypothetical imperatives, but not the full story.

00:36:11.000 --> 00:36:13.000
Why the oversight.

00:36:13.000 --> 00:36:18.000
I can't be sure but I suspect it has to do again with his implicit consequential ism.

00:36:18.000 --> 00:36:20.000
If you evaluate choices.

00:36:20.000 --> 00:36:23.000
Simply in terms of their results.

00:36:23.000 --> 00:36:34.000
And you take empirical science to adequately described the relevant results, then the moral option that Smith's priests embody, namely restrictions on choice that derived from some other source.

00:36:34.000 --> 00:36:41.000
So that demonic possibility is narrower than causal possibility that option will be invisible.

00:36:41.000 --> 00:36:55.000
Let us returned to Smith scientists to explore another avenue of criticism, and the original scenario they discover that the lever is the only way to move the heavy object, and they express this discovery is Smith wants to raise the object you ought to

00:36:55.000 --> 00:36:57.000
use the rod as a lever.

00:36:57.000 --> 00:37:03.000
Now, if the lever is the only way to move the objects, you should use must there instead of thought.

00:37:03.000 --> 00:37:07.000
But let's modify this scenario to make age more literally true.

00:37:07.000 --> 00:37:14.000
I suppose that Smith can move the heavy objects simply by bodily lifting it, but at the cost of a hernia.

00:37:14.000 --> 00:37:30.000
The demonic modalities basically work like this must be means that every permissible option includes p may p means that some permissible option includes PP means that all the best permissible objects include P.

00:37:30.000 --> 00:37:39.000
So now we know that if Smith wants to raise the object he may use the rod as a lover, and a Smith wants to raise the yogic he may lifted bodily.

00:37:39.000 --> 00:37:47.000
But we might plausibly add that as Smith wants to raise the object he ought to use the rod as a lever that would be the best option.

00:37:47.000 --> 00:37:56.000
But to say that using the rod is the best option is to say that it is a better option than bodily lifting the object, better in what way.

00:37:56.000 --> 00:38:01.000
Well, Using the rod is more mechanically efficient and medically safer.

00:38:01.000 --> 00:38:07.000
On the other hand, it might not be as psychologically satisfying, or ritually correct.

00:38:07.000 --> 00:38:13.000
Even if we agree that using the rod is a better option for lifting the object, then inducing a hernia.

00:38:13.000 --> 00:38:18.000
This is not a scientific judgment. It's an evaluative one.

00:38:18.000 --> 00:38:21.000
Now why is this consequence invisible to sellers.

00:38:21.000 --> 00:38:25.000
Part of the reason perhaps lies in his picture of practical reasoning.

00:38:25.000 --> 00:38:35.000
If the structure of practical reasoning has to mirror the structure of theoretical reasoning that only necessary influences will be practical inferences at all.

00:38:35.000 --> 00:38:40.000
Another factor may be once again sellers implicit consequential ism.

00:38:40.000 --> 00:38:50.000
A maximizing form of consequential ism will evaluate any set of options and yield only one of them that then must be undertaken on that picture.

00:38:50.000 --> 00:39:01.000
Many more practical influences will look necessary.

00:39:01.000 --> 00:39:07.000
The upshot is that the authority of hypothetical imperatives cannot be underwritten by the authority of science alone.

00:39:07.000 --> 00:39:15.000
When there are choices to be made among alternative means the choice of how to evaluate these alternatives is not a scientific question.

00:39:15.000 --> 00:39:24.000
Even in the rare case where there's a single causally possible means to some end, there may be more factors to consider than just a scientific question of what is causing the possible.

00:39:24.000 --> 00:39:35.000
And if there are not that too is an evaluative judgment, we've said, okay, the values are wide open. In this case, the modality of hypothetical imperatives is a demonic one.

00:39:35.000 --> 00:39:43.000
And there really is no escape from the need for a form of bionic authority to underwrite them.

00:39:43.000 --> 00:39:48.000
I'm so sorry I should have put this slide up earlier.

00:39:48.000 --> 00:39:51.000
Um,

00:39:51.000 --> 00:39:56.000
so sellers has a story about how we get from causal to Dr. necessity.

00:39:56.000 --> 00:40:02.000
But often, We're not interested in just necessity we're interested in you know what's best.

00:40:02.000 --> 00:40:13.000
And I think some of this is trackable to, again, that sort of consequentialist science friendly viewpoint and he starts from our.

00:40:13.000 --> 00:40:16.000
So let's let me sum up.

00:40:16.000 --> 00:40:26.000
So there's and asked him are in fundamental agreement that intentions can be reasoned about exactly how is more disputed sellers draws the intention belief distinction more sharply than Hanscom.

00:40:26.000 --> 00:40:40.000
And unlike her he holds that expressions of intention have no truth values and scope, I believe has a solid set of arguments here, seeing things her way it allows us to avoid both awkward syntax and representing intentions and implausible claims about

00:40:40.000 --> 00:40:41.000
non composition ality when it comes to expressions of intention.

00:40:41.000 --> 00:40:56.000
composition ality when it comes to expressions of intention. Furthermore, I believe and scone sees the structure of practical reasoning more clearly than sellers does sellers mistakes on his head lead to the eraser have some morally important concepts

00:40:56.000 --> 00:41:12.000
the misrepresentation of what makes for good practical inferences and skills view and contrast preserves more common sense on both counts, these errors I believe stem at least partly from the consequential ism which sellers reveals only toward the end

00:41:12.000 --> 00:41:22.000
I suggest however that is consequential ism is operative much earlier in the practical inferences he recognizes, and in his view about the contents of intentions.

00:41:22.000 --> 00:41:29.000
The same commitments consequential ism lease was failure of his argument for the interest objective validity of hypothetical imperatives. I shouldn't say failure.

00:41:29.000 --> 00:41:32.000
the incompleteness of that argument.

00:41:32.000 --> 00:41:45.000
I do not believe sellers work on practical topics is valueless, I've given it some criticism here, but in particular I've not said anything about we intentions, which is sellers most distinctive contribution in this area and I think a promising one.

00:41:45.000 --> 00:41:52.000
But the answer to me and critique so if practical philosophy reveal significant cracks in its foundation.

00:41:52.000 --> 00:41:56.000
Thank you.

00:41:56.000 --> 00:41:58.000
All right, thank you.

00:41:58.000 --> 00:42:02.000
So now we have time for questions.

00:42:02.000 --> 00:42:15.000
I think these are these clapping, Jeremy looks like clapping. Yeah, okay.

00:42:15.000 --> 00:42:32.000
Yeah, thanks a lot teeth. I really enjoyed that paper, and I'm myself. I have thought not very deeply about sell us attempt to give an account of practical reasoning but so I find much of your critique convincing.

00:42:32.000 --> 00:42:40.000
I would have ever like to ask a question regarding your reconstruction of ends comes few and in spite in particular, This.

00:42:40.000 --> 00:42:44.000
If I understood this piece of practical reasoning about good fiction.

00:42:44.000 --> 00:42:49.000
So first premise of, I guess it's a premise idol read some good fiction.

00:42:49.000 --> 00:42:55.000
Second gravity's Rainbow is good fiction. Therefore, I will read gravity's rainbow.

00:42:55.000 --> 00:42:59.000
And if I understood that's a good piece of reasoning according to ns calm.

00:42:59.000 --> 00:43:06.000
Not a good piece of deductive reasoning, or a good, a good piece of means and reasoning. Yes.

00:43:06.000 --> 00:43:18.000
So, but we can run parallel arguments I've already put some good fiction, now that expresses is an expression of intention, as I understand it, in some sense, right.

00:43:18.000 --> 00:43:24.000
And the conclusion is also an expression of intention I've already gravity's rainbow.

00:43:24.000 --> 00:43:26.000
So, well if it just very.

00:43:26.000 --> 00:43:33.000
The second premise and and the conclusion accordingly so I already.

00:43:33.000 --> 00:43:38.000
Brothers Karamazov is a piece of bread fiction so I will read Brothers Karamazov filled.

00:43:38.000 --> 00:43:56.000
Song of Solomon is a piece of upgrade fiction therefore every Song of Solomon so. So is she saying that all of those are good pieces of of practical reasoning with a with a with a conclusion, expressing an intention, surely are not intending to read all

00:43:56.000 --> 00:44:02.000
that stuff, ya know exactly so you're not.

00:44:02.000 --> 00:44:09.000
And so,

00:44:09.000 --> 00:44:14.000
presumably you couldn't.

00:44:14.000 --> 00:44:33.000
That particular argument is you know your reasoning from a general end to some specific conclusion, right, which has the same kind of logical structure as I've got some, uh, you know, I've got lots of things I could do, I gotta teach an epistemology class

00:44:33.000 --> 00:44:35.000
I got to put together a syllabus.

00:44:35.000 --> 00:44:42.000
You know this is a pretty good syllabus, so I'll do this one. There are any number of syllabi I could put together. Right.

00:44:42.000 --> 00:44:48.000
And so, but obviously I'm not going to create an infinite number of syllables.

00:44:48.000 --> 00:45:04.000
Um, so I think what in school was going to want to say is that look, this is a means to my, or it's an instance of the goal I want to accomplish. All right.

00:45:04.000 --> 00:45:08.000
There are any number of ways I could do it.

00:45:08.000 --> 00:45:14.000
All of which would be good reasoning.

00:45:14.000 --> 00:45:21.000
You know, if we could look at maybe the length of the books or if they're in my area of interest that might affect how you think about it.

00:45:21.000 --> 00:45:42.000
Um, but the fact that I choose this particular argument to reason with or the fact that I arrive at this conclusion this specific conclusion, doesn't mean that I am rationally required to accept all the logically parallel conclusions right.

00:45:42.000 --> 00:45:50.000
I don't just because I'm committed to reading gravity's rainbow. Doesn't mean I'm committed to reading Brothers Karamazov or Moby Dick or whatever.

00:45:50.000 --> 00:46:00.000
So I think the view would be, look, all of those would be decent pieces of practical reasoning. If I went into them.

00:46:00.000 --> 00:46:09.000
But I don't have to do that, I think, I think that's ends comes position, quick follow up then. So, so this conclusion.

00:46:09.000 --> 00:46:17.000
How much hangs on it that it is an expression of intention because if you can't really say that it's an expression of intention.

00:46:17.000 --> 00:46:23.000
Right, otherwise I would, I would tend to read all these books, and I don't want.

00:46:23.000 --> 00:46:34.000
So So is there a way to deny that the conclusion is an expression of intention without doing too much damage to the rest of harmony of reconstructing means and reasoning.

00:46:34.000 --> 00:46:44.000
Now, I think, I think what's going on here is if you start with a model of logic deductive validity.

00:46:44.000 --> 00:46:50.000
Then the premises demand a particular conclusion.

00:46:50.000 --> 00:46:54.000
You know if you accept these promises you you're required to get to this conclusion.

00:46:54.000 --> 00:46:59.000
And I'm just says that's not the way practical reasoning works.

00:46:59.000 --> 00:47:08.000
So, in fact, I might intend to read gravity's rainbow, because it's a way of keeping read serious fiction.

00:47:08.000 --> 00:47:13.000
And that follows from

00:47:13.000 --> 00:47:30.000
the premises I started with, but I'm not required. It doesn't but it does it's not necessary given those premises and I'm not required to also intend everything that would also follow up from those promises.

00:47:30.000 --> 00:47:43.000
Okay.

00:47:43.000 --> 00:47:56.000
Well if there are no questions right now then let me jump in here. Can I ask you, why should sellers have to think that contemplative reasoning is only productive.

00:47:56.000 --> 00:48:09.000
You know he makes this case about material influences and influence and meaning, and he thinks of them as being expressed by subjective conditions and subjective don't have a fantasy and strengthening so that means the material influences are feasible.

00:48:09.000 --> 00:48:21.000
Right. Yes, if it if it were a rain that I would get wet but if it were to rain and I carried an umbrella. I wouldn't get wet so in the middle language that's that's to say the influence is too feasible and so it's not productive So was there a reason

00:48:21.000 --> 00:48:28.000
to think that sellers had to think that because that would be a way of trying from within this larger perspective to say that the two kinds of reasoning or on on.

00:48:28.000 --> 00:48:36.000
Yeah, so I think that's a great point Preston, and that's an oversimplification in my paper which I will fix. Okay.

00:48:36.000 --> 00:48:42.000
Um, no. sellers needn't be committed to.

00:48:42.000 --> 00:49:05.000
You know deductive necessity is the only form of reasoning. However, I think that doesn't actually help too much, and I tried to address that in the paper right, there's a lot of a lot of a lot of theoretical reasoning is in fact non productive You're

00:49:05.000 --> 00:49:06.000
right. Okay.

00:49:06.000 --> 00:49:24.000
But, again, practical reasoning is, according to ask them is like the reverse of theoretical reasoning. So for example, if I intend to keep reading a serious fiction.

00:49:24.000 --> 00:49:28.000
This is an attractive piece of serious fiction gravity's rainbow.

00:49:28.000 --> 00:49:31.000
Hey, I'll read that. Okay.

00:49:31.000 --> 00:49:37.000
Now, that's finding a specific conclusion to a general end.

00:49:37.000 --> 00:49:47.000
Okay, which is upside down from the theoretical piece of reasoning right, a theoretical reasoning would be here I am reading gravity's rainbow.

00:49:47.000 --> 00:49:58.000
It's a piece of serious fiction. Therefore, I'm reading serious fiction right. Yeah, yeah. So I think if you just keep in mind that what else GM says is like look.

00:49:58.000 --> 00:50:09.000
When you're theoretically reasoning you're trying to discover truths and maybe some of that is probabilistic, and some of it is not therefore non productive, or whatever.

00:50:09.000 --> 00:50:18.000
But when you're practically everything you're trying to create truths. And so some of that my reasoning might be probabilistic to.

00:50:18.000 --> 00:50:25.000
But it's not probabilistic in the same way that the theoretical reasoning is right you're trying to make things happen.

00:50:25.000 --> 00:50:33.000
And so that just puts a whole different structure on what your what's going to count as good reasoning.

00:50:33.000 --> 00:50:36.000
Okay, thank you, Jeremy.

00:50:36.000 --> 00:50:40.000
Ronald I take it your hand can go down or are you jumping back in.

00:50:40.000 --> 00:50:43.000
No, no, I can definitely go down, sorry.

00:50:43.000 --> 00:50:47.000
No, Stephanie by the way also have a question. Oh, I didn't see.

00:50:47.000 --> 00:50:49.000
Oh, sorry.

00:50:49.000 --> 00:50:50.000
Stephanie.

00:50:50.000 --> 00:51:00.000
Please, somehow handwriting is not working for me so I just write in the chat when I have a question. And thanks for the talk, I found that really enlightening.

00:51:00.000 --> 00:51:14.000
And I agree with a number of things on you, especially the this idea or this role of science that sellers has for practical reasons that always struck me as like overrated.

00:51:14.000 --> 00:51:31.000
And just by the way that team of scientists that assist Smith. This team includes students of the gods for sellers the explicitly rights that somebody changes something maybe this ritual considerations come into you, but maybe not.

00:51:31.000 --> 00:51:37.000
In any case, I have two questions and the first is, you said that for me.

00:51:37.000 --> 00:51:54.000
Whether I expressed an intention or a belief with through I will do a, for example, that depends on the reasons that I have for that statement say, Yeah, but sellers, as an inferential lyst.

00:51:54.000 --> 00:52:01.000
Wouldn't view these this as extrinsic yeah so inferential if he would say, What reason support.

00:52:01.000 --> 00:52:14.000
This attitude, or the belief that is important for the content. Yeah, so I just want to ask what your thoughts are about that. And then the second point.

00:52:14.000 --> 00:52:27.000
You wanted to say that it would be good for sellers if he could view, the statements like I will do a as indeterminate between expressing beliefs and intentions that would give him more flexibility.

00:52:27.000 --> 00:52:49.000
Yeah, that was something you wanted to say, I think, but I wasn't quite convinced by the examples where you wanted to say yeah these are really indeterminate between expressing a believer in expressing an intention, you had this mortgage example there

00:52:49.000 --> 00:52:44.000
We didn't know anything about the context in which you make these statements yeah and that the context would probably contribute a lot to dis emigrating what is expressed an intention or a belief.

00:52:44.000 --> 00:53:03.000
the Mars example. Yeah, there I have the feeling that these were quite.

00:53:03.000 --> 00:53:10.000
So as long as we don't i don't know anything about the context it's not quite convincing to say that these are really indeterminate.

00:53:10.000 --> 00:53:14.000
And similarly for the doctor example and the nurse example.

00:53:14.000 --> 00:53:29.000
I know that Sanders does not work with these tools with these tools in pragmatics, but still may be, I think we can maybe rally them for defending him here a bit in the doctor example I think you could argue that the doctor when he utters, a nurse will

00:53:29.000 --> 00:53:33.000
take you to ward, I don't know.

00:53:33.000 --> 00:53:49.000
Then, by uttering say, but this one utterance the doctor makes two different speech acts because he has to address these there, the nurse and the patient and these two addresses have two different social roles and that would enabled, the doctor to make

00:53:49.000 --> 00:53:52.000
two different speech at by that one utterance.

00:53:52.000 --> 00:54:10.000
But if there was only one of these addresses, then it would be determined which, which of the speech act he actually makes if it's an expression of an intention or the request, or whether it's just a statement concerning how the future will be.

00:54:10.000 --> 00:54:19.000
Yeah, so Isn't that like again, a question which turns on the pragmatics of that situation.

00:54:19.000 --> 00:54:25.000
Yeah, thank you. Okay. very short question Stephanie Thank you very much.

00:54:25.000 --> 00:54:41.000
So here's the on the first one you said look, sellers as an influential list so if we've got different kinds of reasoning, leading us to this the same this what looks like on the surface like the same content

00:54:41.000 --> 00:54:47.000
should shouldn't he as a consistent inferential list.

00:54:47.000 --> 00:54:51.000
Shouldn't he be.

00:54:51.000 --> 00:54:56.000
Shouldn't he have reason to hold but these are in fact two different contents.

00:54:56.000 --> 00:55:06.000
Yeah, I can see that I can see that in fact I thought about that, and I didn't quite have space to look at it in this paper because it's pretty subtle point.

00:55:06.000 --> 00:55:11.000
But I think yeah that's a good reply on sellers behalf.

00:55:11.000 --> 00:55:19.000
But frankly I think that it's a problem for influential ism.

00:55:19.000 --> 00:55:35.000
Because I think, and scum has a pretty good case that the truth conditions of a statement, don't change, you know, if I say if some students says I will fail the exam tomorrow.

00:55:35.000 --> 00:55:43.000
I'm a student he says that, because I'm don't know the material and student be says, because I'm trying to piss off my parents.

00:55:43.000 --> 00:55:51.000
They're both in some important sense, saying the same thing. They're the truth conditions are the same.

00:55:51.000 --> 00:55:59.000
And you can disagree with them in the same way and they contradict the same other claims and so on.

00:55:59.000 --> 00:56:11.000
So, yeah, I think you could make a case that inferential ism would deliver different contents.

00:56:11.000 --> 00:56:19.000
But if you did make that case I, I guess I think that would be so much the worst for inferential ism, maybe you could I don't know that's a pretty.

00:56:19.000 --> 00:56:23.000
That's how I'm thinking about it right now. I'm not sure that's.

00:56:23.000 --> 00:56:27.000
I'm not sure that's true, but maybe.

00:56:27.000 --> 00:56:37.000
Um, so the second question you said well what if we knew more about the context of these claims.

00:56:37.000 --> 00:56:45.000
We could tell whether they were an expression of intention or an expression of belief.

00:56:45.000 --> 00:56:50.000
So what I tried to do with is

00:56:50.000 --> 00:56:56.000
a come up with situations where

00:56:56.000 --> 00:57:07.000
either both theoretical and practical reasons apply or neither theoretical and practical reasons apply so I think the both cases, the clearest right so I have this mortgage.

00:57:07.000 --> 00:57:15.000
I owe a lot of money on this house but you know in 20 years it will be paid off.

00:57:15.000 --> 00:57:20.000
That's very predictable, given the way my finances are set up.

00:57:20.000 --> 00:57:26.000
On the other hand, I also think it's a great idea, right.

00:57:26.000 --> 00:57:34.000
So, when I say, I'll pay off my mortgage before I retire.

00:57:34.000 --> 00:57:42.000
That has a very clear truth value, you know, I'm going to get to my retirement date and either my mortgage is paid off or not.

00:57:42.000 --> 00:57:45.000
I'm.

00:57:45.000 --> 00:58:02.000
On the other hand, it seems to me that there's a lot of reasons, on the theoretical side, a lot of reasons on the practical side to believe that statement or to assent to it or concur with it.

00:58:02.000 --> 00:58:16.000
And you know you have a couple of options here, you can say there's two things, a belief and an intention back there and somehow they're both expressing into this one statement.

00:58:16.000 --> 00:58:18.000
I'm.

00:58:18.000 --> 00:58:23.000
Or, I think, what else comes gonna say look, you have one mental state.

00:58:23.000 --> 00:58:27.000
The content of, which is.

00:58:27.000 --> 00:58:31.000
I, you know, I will pay off my mortgage before I retired.

00:58:31.000 --> 00:58:34.000
And it's got two different kinds of reasons behind it.

00:58:34.000 --> 00:58:37.000
And that's all you got to say.

00:58:37.000 --> 00:58:39.000
And let me just.

00:58:39.000 --> 00:58:51.000
Another thing you mentioned was the doctor, nurse example, and so let me just be slightly more clear about where I was trying to go with that example and what I think.

00:58:51.000 --> 00:58:56.000
I'm trying to say.

00:58:56.000 --> 00:59:06.000
I'm a little deep for Austin mentions in some place what he's talking about performative what he calls the sacramental fallacy.

00:59:06.000 --> 00:59:26.000
The idea that there's this inner state, which I am expressing when I say, I promise to meet you for coffee or whatever, and Austin pours cold water on that he says look whether you make performative or not has to do with the social context it doesn't

00:59:26.000 --> 00:59:33.000
have anything really to do with your mental state maybe you're lying maybe you're being deceptive and you don't even know what you're saying but you made a promise.

00:59:33.000 --> 00:59:35.000
and that's a social facts.

00:59:35.000 --> 00:59:50.000
And I think, and scum is resisting a similar picture from sellers that there's this internal state intention or belief, and there's this real sharp distinction between the two.

00:59:50.000 --> 01:00:02.000
One of which is the source or the, you know, gets expressed in a statement and ask them to do is look the meaning of the statement, the content of the statement, the content of the state.

01:00:02.000 --> 01:00:07.000
It is what it is. it's a social fact that has a truth value.

01:00:07.000 --> 01:00:10.000
And,

01:00:10.000 --> 01:00:20.000
which stated is is simply determined by its position in a state of theoretical practical reasons, not, not some kind of intrinsic difference.

01:00:20.000 --> 01:00:27.000
I don't know if that's a full answer your questions they were very good. That's the best I can do for now.

01:00:27.000 --> 01:00:31.000
Thank you,

01:00:31.000 --> 01:00:33.000
Jeremy.

01:00:33.000 --> 01:00:47.000
Uh, I'll just keep it quick. I mean I'm, I would say that I'm a semi sympathetic to your argument I mean SM clearly requires that you intend all the consequences of your intentions and so as it stands it's clearly unacceptable.

01:00:47.000 --> 01:01:03.000
I mean sellers is pretty clear that means and reasoning means finding necessary conditions for the satisfaction of your of your ends which is not at all how practical reasoning work so he's just brought me he's clearly just wrong about that.

01:01:03.000 --> 01:01:06.000
I guess I'm more optimistic that this stuff can be fixed.

01:01:06.000 --> 01:01:16.000
You know I think SM can be you know yoked to an intentional with an S logic, but I've written entire pie or some length about this I won't talk about it now.

01:01:16.000 --> 01:01:28.000
And you know I as Preston said you know I think there's this idea of material practical influence that that that kind of parallels the theoretical influence that can be brought brought into service to, so i mean i think that i think that the account can

01:01:28.000 --> 01:01:29.000
be patched up.

01:01:29.000 --> 01:01:42.000
But I but I have a specific question, but you know I think that there are actually some some bits of sellers machinery that makes good sense of have at least some of the examples you give you know so for example the, you know, I will run a marathon and

01:01:42.000 --> 01:01:45.000
and be sick example.

01:01:45.000 --> 01:01:59.000
You know, you mentioned in this context so be it you know i think that's an example where so be it actually makes a ton of sense, actually, because you know you use so be it to get those factual premises within the scope of the operator and and seller

01:01:59.000 --> 01:02:12.000
says well you need to do that in order to, you know, take these factual things into account practical reasoning, you know, and on reasoning about value, he says, you know, shall be like, you know, shall I will go downtown and invite Jones and be happy

01:02:12.000 --> 01:02:27.000
or shall I will go downtown and not invite Jones and not be happy. And obviously some of these are things that he that he intends and some of these things are merely consequences of things that he would be intending and doing, and but but putting that

01:02:27.000 --> 01:02:40.000
but putting the consequences of the things you intend inside the scope of the show operator is an essential part of practical reasoning and so I think that so be it actually actually helps make good sense of those of those kinds of sentences where you

01:02:40.000 --> 01:02:49.000
have like something that's the object of an intention in something that is something that you predict or foresee, or that you're making a factual assertion assertion about.

01:02:49.000 --> 01:02:53.000
So actually think sellers actually as a really good story about stuff like that.

01:02:53.000 --> 01:02:58.000
Okay, let me, let me just think about this and maybe you're right here.

01:02:58.000 --> 01:03:06.000
I'm

01:03:06.000 --> 01:03:09.000
my point.

01:03:09.000 --> 01:03:20.000
Okay, so what you're what you want to say if I'm understanding you correctly, is that look, I might have an intention to run a marathon, and a prediction that I will afterwards be sick.

01:03:20.000 --> 01:03:35.000
And I can use, so be it to combine those in our kind of conjunction, so that I have the compound intention to run a marathon and be sick. Is that what you want to say.

01:03:35.000 --> 01:03:48.000
I mean that's certainly what seller says and then you know you might think, oh I could run a marathon and be sick, or I could not run a marathon and not be sick and those are your options and practical reasoning, and that's that's how so be it gets those

01:03:48.000 --> 01:03:52.000
factual premises into the scope of the shell and that's how practical reasoning works. Alright.

01:03:52.000 --> 01:04:05.000
So I guess the first thing I want to say is, actually that's not going to be the content of intention, you know, I don't, I can predict I'm going to get sick but it's not my intention.

01:04:05.000 --> 01:04:21.000
But I think what what I was getting at earlier was a point about just just semantics, not so much inference but semantics right.

01:04:21.000 --> 01:04:28.000
the

01:04:28.000 --> 01:04:37.000
answer, maybe, maybe, so be it solves this what I wanted to say was that we don't have a good semantics for the conjunction, but if you use the Soviet thing.

01:04:37.000 --> 01:04:42.000
Maybe, maybe we can just use that is that is that your.

01:04:42.000 --> 01:04:50.000
That might work actually, like, like, Okay, thank you.

01:04:50.000 --> 01:04:56.000
Okay, we've got about six minutes, and at least two more questions so as accurate.

01:04:56.000 --> 01:05:18.000
All right, thanks for a really interesting talk. So I want to go back to the case of the intention Koon belief to pay off your mortgage on time that you think and scums account treats favorably, as compared to sellers account.

01:05:18.000 --> 01:05:22.000
Um, so I recall you just saying.

01:05:22.000 --> 01:05:41.000
In response to a question that it's sort of a virtue of the entitlement account, as opposed to the sellers, largely an account that it doesn't require that any statement like this, which can be interpreted as both an expression of belief and an expression

01:05:41.000 --> 01:05:52.000
of intention on expresses. Just one kind of Interstate that has a sort of intrinsic characteristic that makes it have one of these forces or the other.

01:05:52.000 --> 01:05:57.000
It occurred to me that maybe in response to that.

01:05:57.000 --> 01:06:18.000
Sellers is functional ism could help him out. In this respect, because of course like for sellers, the characteristic of a mental state that make it an intention or a belief aren't intrinsic Strictly speaking, they're sort of functional characteristics.

01:06:18.000 --> 01:06:36.000
And isn't it possible that a certain state, of which the expression, right, I'll pay off my mortgage on time could be as it were doing double duty could could have two jobs in your cognitive economy, one of which is to do the kinds of things that beliefs

01:06:36.000 --> 01:06:45.000
do which is to figure in good inferences that help you figure out what's going on and to adapt you to circumstances so they use for coke rationally with them.

01:06:45.000 --> 01:06:51.000
And also the job of bringing in about that you pay off your mortgage on time.

01:06:51.000 --> 01:06:54.000
So,

01:06:54.000 --> 01:06:57.000
yeah so yeah I'm just wondering what you think.

01:06:57.000 --> 01:07:11.000
Yeah no suggestion I think actually asked them would be very friendly to that, I mean, in effect, she says, look, whether it's an intention or a belief has to do with a kind of reasons behind it so that's basically a functional functional approach.

01:07:11.000 --> 01:07:23.000
And I think the reason sellers can't do that is because he wants to say expressions of intention and expressions of belief, have different.

01:07:23.000 --> 01:07:25.000
And the other one doesn't.

01:07:25.000 --> 01:07:29.000
Sorry, you cut out right in the crucial, or at least for me.

01:07:29.000 --> 01:07:39.000
I think and scone would be very friendly to the suggestion you just made. She has basically a functionalist account of

01:07:39.000 --> 01:07:43.000
of the relevant mental states.

01:07:43.000 --> 01:07:59.000
But I think the reason sellers can't do that is because he wants to say categorically different things about intentions and beliefs or expressions of intention of questions, I believe, especially limitations don't have a truth value questions I believe

01:07:59.000 --> 01:08:02.000
do. So which is it.

01:08:02.000 --> 01:08:08.000
I think that's the problem. Okay. Thanks.

01:08:08.000 --> 01:08:11.000
Okay, cool.

01:08:11.000 --> 01:08:29.000
Thanks Preston, and thank you for a great paper so much to think about.

01:08:29.000 --> 01:08:45.000
And I'm sorry if I miss stating your your your claim there but the way I took it was that you're saying sellers account of practical reasoning is impoverished because it doesn't give, because for for one reason it doesn't give us gigantic necessity.

01:08:45.000 --> 01:09:03.000
But in the cases we're thinking about, we're not talking about the right kind of intentions. So we intentions or the intentions that are derived from them so I always thought like the Niantic character is inherited from the universal visibility or the

01:09:03.000 --> 01:09:11.000
inter subjective form of we intentions but in the cases we're looking at. We're not looking, it's not the right kind of intention so Can't we get the Niantic necessity.

01:09:11.000 --> 01:09:23.000
Once we import the right kind of intentions. Well, I mean sellers runs this little argument he runs this little scenario with Smith, and a couple of his pic tempers small differences.

01:09:23.000 --> 01:09:24.000
Yes.

01:09:24.000 --> 01:09:29.000
And what he what he's trying to do is just talk about hypothetical imperatives.

01:09:29.000 --> 01:09:41.000
And, you know, like, you know, you've got this big object and you've. There's only one way to move it right, and so it looks like the scientists can tell you look.

01:09:41.000 --> 01:09:45.000
This thing's only going to get moved with this big lover. Right.

01:09:45.000 --> 01:10:01.000
But how do you get from that empirical claim to the thing that you can use in practical reasoning, which is, if you want to move this object, then you must use this big lever right and as soon as you put the most in there, there's a modality.

01:10:01.000 --> 01:10:11.000
And, you know, it's a, you gotta, which is not exactly what the scientists came up with.

01:10:11.000 --> 01:10:24.000
And I think that the story he tells about the scientist is basically right i mean if there's only one way to move it. Then, we could say, if you're going to move it, then you gotta, you gotta use the lover.

01:10:24.000 --> 01:10:36.000
So, I didn't want to argue that that was like wrong, but it is a step from the claim about the causal space to the claim about the.

01:10:36.000 --> 01:10:43.000
The Niantic or if you prefer Prudential space right, that, that, that modality.

01:10:43.000 --> 01:10:49.000
And there's other ways. There's other ways to get there. Right.

01:10:49.000 --> 01:10:54.000
It could be that there's only one causal way to do things.

01:10:54.000 --> 01:11:05.000
But there's other modalities that we respect to and I mentioned ceremony but you know it could be etiquette right there's only one way to handle some situation politely.

01:11:05.000 --> 01:11:06.000
And you could.

01:11:06.000 --> 01:11:11.000
you can imagine hypothetical imperatives based on that.

01:11:11.000 --> 01:11:22.000
So, my, my point is not that he's like making big mistakes in what he does say but that he doesn't give you the whole picture.

01:11:22.000 --> 01:11:36.000
And as far as the we intentions. He's, uh, he sort of explicitly leaves that for like another section of the papers, This is really about hypothetical imperatives.

01:11:36.000 --> 01:11:46.000
Okay, so that's our time for the first session so I think our last speaker my understanding is there's some kind of a social hour, so

01:11:46.000 --> 01:11:52.000
I guess hand this back over Ronald Ronald or Jeremy if one of you guys who wants to take the lead here.

01:11:52.000 --> 01:11:59.000
I'll take the lead. So yeah, We'd like to invite everybody to stick around.

01:11:59.000 --> 01:12:14.000
We'll do five minute bathroom breaks grab yourself a drink, and then what we thought, and who knows whether this is going to work out what we thought is that we may make some kind of conference day no situation where you find yourself at one end of the

01:12:14.000 --> 01:12:32.000
with a couple of people, some of whom you may know others you don't know. So in five minutes. And just going to open up a couple of breakout rooms and then randomly assign people to rooms, so you will find yourself in the company of three or four participants

01:12:32.000 --> 01:12:35.000
conference rooms will stay open for one hour.

01:12:35.000 --> 01:12:43.000
So unfortunately you can't come back. And that has to do with the latest version of zoom apparently you need to the latest version in order to move around.

01:12:43.000 --> 01:12:54.000
So let's let's try this. And if it doesn't work well, that's an hour of our life and to bed, and they'll try something else. Next time, it's a five minute break.

01:12:54.000 --> 01:13:07.000
Everybody is invited so not just the presenters, but everybody who would like to participate all the all of the tendency when five minutes and we'll go from there.

01:13:07.000 --> 01:13:19.000
Dance come think that expressions of intention always have a truth value. Yeah, what she says is that,

01:13:19.000 --> 01:13:22.000
and school makes very few categorical statement.

01:13:22.000 --> 01:13:25.000
She's really hard to pin down.

01:13:25.000 --> 01:13:40.000
I've heard that, I actually took a course from her once. Yeah, I know that from firsthand what she says is that the standard way to express your intention is a first person future tense indicative statement, I will do blah blah blah.

01:13:40.000 --> 01:13:53.000
And you are just when you are talking when you are describing an intentional action you say I am doing such and such. When you are expressing your intention, you say I will do such and such.

01:13:53.000 --> 01:13:56.000
And that's the sort of normal case.

01:13:56.000 --> 01:14:04.000
That's why I feel comfortable replying that I express a lot of intentions by telling people what to do.

01:14:04.000 --> 01:14:17.000
There's still intentions in mind I intend that you leave or that you hurry up, or that you whatever I say con or get out, or you know whatever, right.

01:14:17.000 --> 01:14:20.000
And those don't have truth values.

01:14:20.000 --> 01:14:23.000
No they don't. That's good.

01:14:23.000 --> 01:14:25.000
But, yeah, okay.

01:14:25.000 --> 01:14:36.000
Come on over here in the, in the margin. Um, yeah.

01:14:36.000 --> 01:14:41.000
Yeah I'm inclined to sound.

01:14:41.000 --> 01:15:02.000
Yeah, I think about that to give it a full answer. Fair enough. Yeah, good to me. Okay, we'll try to try to retract you're not at all I was running saying when we come back, we'll be separated into rooms or will still be in this general rule.

01:15:02.000 --> 01:15:06.000
I wasn't clear DD composition.

01:15:06.000 --> 01:15:08.000
Oh really.

01:15:08.000 --> 01:15:11.000
Yeah, okay.

01:15:11.000 --> 01:15:13.000
We'll see.

01:15:13.000 --> 01:15:19.000
Oh yeah, the Random Play. This is great. Thanks everyone.

01:15:19.000 --> 01:15:28.000
So

01:15:28.000 --> 01:15:37.000
what are we doing some break. Yeah, old folks gotta pee. Yeah. Oh, no.

01:15:37.000 --> 01:15:39.000
Be back.

01:15:39.000 --> 01:15:46.000
Yeah.

01:15:46.000 --> 01:16:16.000
Oh, there you are. I thought Ronald left the meeting I was like how supposed to work.

01:16:51.000 --> 01:17:21.000
Stepping out I'm going to take a break for a few minutes and then I'll come back.

01:17:49.000 --> 01:17:58.000
So if I'm seeing people does this mean I'm in the group with the people I see row there how does this work. Yes, I haven't opened the room, yet.

01:17:58.000 --> 01:17:59.000
Okay, all right.

01:17:59.000 --> 01:18:04.000
It's gonna say I got all the cool people everyone's here.

01:18:04.000 --> 01:18:34.000
See, working on it.

01:18:38.000 --> 01:18:42.000
Okay, how many folks who have your 16.

01:18:42.000 --> 01:18:51.000
How about four rooms of four people

01:18:51.000 --> 01:18:53.000
sign automatically.

01:18:53.000 --> 01:18:57.000
Yeah. All right.

01:18:57.000 --> 01:19:03.000
Enjoy the ride, see everybody take care of everyone.

01:19:03.000 --> 01:19:33.000
Tomorrow morning. All right.

01:20:14.000 --> 01:20:44.000
Jim you're going to be in a room tool with Jeremy and Stephanie and Zach.

02:11:59.000 --> 02:12:29.000
All right, I'm out. Bye bye.

 

 

WEBVTT


00:22:02.000 --> 00:22:16.000
All right. Hi Everyone, please join me in welcoming Nicholas tepid from Coulson University next talk is titled the community of rational beings taken away Nick.

00:22:16.000 --> 00:22:18.000
Alright thanks what.

00:22:18.000 --> 00:22:29.000
Let me share my screen so I got some slides for you.

00:22:29.000 --> 00:22:31.000
All right you guys see that all right.

00:22:31.000 --> 00:22:33.000
Okay.

00:22:33.000 --> 00:22:35.000
So, um, thanks for having me here.

00:22:35.000 --> 00:22:52.000
Like, Zachary said my name is Nick Tevin and from the Towson University, and the talk today is on a community of rational beings. So I'm going to start with an executive summary and sellers ethics which, if there's anybody who doesn't need an executive

00:22:52.000 --> 00:22:57.000
summary of sellers ethics is you folks but bear with me for a minute.

00:22:57.000 --> 00:23:06.000
So sellers wants to show the moral judgments can be both cognitive and motivating and he does this by taking to express intentions on behalf of a group to which one belongs.

00:23:06.000 --> 00:23:11.000
So, they can be motivated because their intentions.

00:23:11.000 --> 00:23:21.000
On behalf of yourself as well as the group you belong to, and their cognitive because they their logical relationships to other intentions that other people, other members of your group have.

00:23:21.000 --> 00:23:36.000
So, if, if I intend for my family to go on vacation and my wife intense for the family to stay home, our intentions on behalf of our family conflict with each other they bury this logical inconsistency with each other so this is how so as managers to

00:23:36.000 --> 00:23:41.000
make moral judgments of cognitive and motivating.

00:23:41.000 --> 00:23:52.000
Um, he also takes it the the the intention expressed by a true moral judgment must be categorically reasonable so sellers ethics is explicitly content.

00:23:52.000 --> 00:23:56.000
And he's if you think that, whatever.

00:23:56.000 --> 00:24:05.000
Tomorrow, facts are they have to be the moral has to be binding on you regardless of your station, it doesn't matter who you are or what you're doing.

00:24:05.000 --> 00:24:19.000
And so an intention, the reflects the moral law has to be one that's reasonable for someone regardless of who they're what they're doing what social station they belong to ask to be and sellers words categorically reasonable.

00:24:19.000 --> 00:24:32.000
And he thinks that actually he tries to show that the moral law requires the one intend to promote the well being of community of which everyone is a member, that is the community of all rational beings so you have to intend to promote the well being

00:24:32.000 --> 00:24:37.000
of this community on behalf of this community itself.

00:24:37.000 --> 00:24:53.000
But the problem that I want to talk about today is there's no force behind any of these claims. So, Um, if sellers sat down and told someone about it or not sort of moral skeptic about this or even just an ordinary person who's asked to make a substantial

00:24:53.000 --> 00:24:55.000
sacrifice on.

00:24:55.000 --> 00:24:57.000
For the sake of ethics.

00:24:57.000 --> 00:25:05.000
They can always do Why should I do that and like the response because it's immoral not you might not cut much ice.

00:25:05.000 --> 00:25:21.000
Um, so I want to talk about the force behind the moral law and ethics. Now, the question why should you follow the moral laws of course an old one, and constant answer to it is that you're essentially a rational being and the moral laws are rational law

00:25:21.000 --> 00:25:30.000
said refused to follow is to deny your essential nature so that's constant answer to the question that I'm considering today.

00:25:30.000 --> 00:25:45.000
Now, sellers ethics, like I said, is explicitly content but he despaired of providing the answer the mirrors cons, he tried to towards the end of science and metaphysics he's started in on an argument to this effect.

00:25:45.000 --> 00:25:55.000
And at some point he says that he basically he can't figure out how to, how to work it out from here and so he says he regards this argument is incomplete.

00:25:55.000 --> 00:26:00.000
So what I want to do is I want to provide such an argument on sellers behalf.

00:26:00.000 --> 00:26:04.000
Um, but my project here is not.

00:26:04.000 --> 00:26:17.000
Um, it's not to finish sellers argument so sellers abandon the argument at the end of science and metaphysics I'm not going to try to finish it. So, my, my project here is not an elaboration and sellers.

00:26:17.000 --> 00:26:20.000
It's not exegetical.

00:26:20.000 --> 00:26:23.000
It is I think my own argument.

00:26:23.000 --> 00:26:27.000
But it's supposed to be recognizably so Lars Ian.

00:26:27.000 --> 00:26:42.000
I think though that the the position that I'm going to sketch out here which is closely based on sellers work is I find it at least independently plausible, so I'm going to try to assume as little a seller of the rest of sellers philosophical picture

00:26:42.000 --> 00:26:56.000
as possible while providing a justification for sourcing ethics. Now the part that I am the part of sellers ethics that I am going to accept is the idea that we are essentially rule following beings.

00:26:56.000 --> 00:27:09.000
So, in language rules and behavior which from 1949 sellers puts us in very Petrescu he says, When God created Adam, he whispered in his ear. In all context of action, you will recognize rules.

00:27:09.000 --> 00:27:24.000
if only the rule to grope for rules to recognize when you cease to recognize rules you will walk on four feet. So what size is telling us here is a he takes what is essential to human nature to the rule following.

00:27:24.000 --> 00:27:41.000
This is what supposed to mirror. Consequently, we're essentially rational beings, and was always talking to rule following a ticket that he means that we will followers were the were the ones whose behavior is produced by reasons and not merely by causes.

00:27:41.000 --> 00:27:55.000
We occupies a position in space of reasons, and our behavior reflects that position. So, this is the part of sellers ethics that I am going to accept who we are essentially real following beings.

00:27:55.000 --> 00:28:07.000
So here's a preview of the arguments I was wanting to show two things. The first is we have to see ourselves as members of the community of all rational beings, all the rational folks are all parts of the same community and we have to recognize ourselves

00:28:07.000 --> 00:28:15.000
as part of that community. And second, we have to intend to promote the well being of the members of that community.

00:28:15.000 --> 00:28:30.000
And I'm going to argue the one into both follow from the fact that we are essentially rule followers, so that essential bit of sellers ethics that would make sense what distinguishes humans from all the other critters in the world is the rule following

00:28:30.000 --> 00:28:41.000
beings I'm going to say that's the basis for the the the ethical picture that sellers is going to develop here, and it's also going to provide us the rationale for complying with the moral law.

00:28:41.000 --> 00:28:54.000
Now to not see oneself as a member of this community or to refuse to intend to promote its members well being involved in nine the are rule follower, if what I've said about wanting to falling from the five to rule followers is true.

00:28:54.000 --> 00:29:07.000
And that's going to mean that it involves denying one's essential nature so the argument that I'm going to give here is supposed to mirror comms, which should make good sense given the connection between content ethics and soul rz nothing's

00:29:07.000 --> 00:29:09.000
now.

00:29:09.000 --> 00:29:26.000
Sellers ethics is a cosmopolitan ethics, so he wants to do is he wants us to present from all of our parochial interests and our local cares, because we're supposed to consider a community not just not of our family or of our nation.

00:29:26.000 --> 00:29:31.000
He wants us to consider a community that includes everyone.

00:29:31.000 --> 00:29:42.000
But the problem here is that however breathtaking hustlers puts in the Cosmopolitan point of view might be our interest parsley are parochial, and our interests are cares mostly or local.

00:29:42.000 --> 00:29:47.000
So the problem for cosmopolitanism really is one of motivation.

00:29:47.000 --> 00:29:50.000
You see this.

00:29:50.000 --> 00:30:02.000
Richard birdie and Michael Sandel both talked about this they talk about how when you, when you zoom out to talk about everybody you end up using thin ethical notions like, right, wrong.

00:30:02.000 --> 00:30:20.000
And the thin ethical notions don't move us, the the notion is that the ethical concepts that move us are the thick ones like betrayal and honor. And these are the kinds of ethical notions that find application in local groups small, you know, small communities

00:30:20.000 --> 00:30:34.000
where you identify closely with everyone in the community. So what I'm going to do my strategy is to build big groups out of small ones, we already identify with small groups, and then I'm going to argue that I'm given the way identify with some group

00:30:34.000 --> 00:30:51.000
or other, we also have to identify with larger ones, and the limit the community that includes everyone. So I'm going to do my best to leverage the, the effect of connection that we have two little groups and show that it should extend out to larger groups

00:30:51.000 --> 00:30:54.000
as well.

00:30:54.000 --> 00:31:06.000
So here's how I'm going to build big groups. I'm going to start by showing that any group which one might belong can be involved in disputes with other groups and, in theory with any other group.

00:31:06.000 --> 00:31:11.000
And I'm going to show that such disputes can be resolved by the giving and taking of reasons.

00:31:11.000 --> 00:31:25.000
So I think that it follows for the fact that we are essentially rule following beings that any sort of dispute can be resolved can, in particular can be resolved rationally, and that if you can resolve a dispute rationally, it means that the parties to

00:31:25.000 --> 00:31:42.000
the dispute, or in some sense a part of a shared community. So if you've got two individuals or two groups of individuals who can resolve the disputes between each other in a rational way there's a sense, which we'll talk about in a minute, in which they're

00:31:42.000 --> 00:31:49.000
both parts of the yet larger community so I'm going to build the big groups by talking about conflicts between smaller groups.

00:31:49.000 --> 00:32:04.000
Now, when a dispute can be to resolve rationally there, the parties the dispute can say that there's something that we do. And then the sense, least they're they're part of a larger group so I take it that there is a group or community at least in a very

00:32:04.000 --> 00:32:14.000
thin sense, if there's a group of people who can all recognize their interactions with each other as structured by the same set of norms.

00:32:14.000 --> 00:32:22.000
Now to say that we do something isn't to say that we invariably do it it's not to say that no one ever violates these norms.

00:32:22.000 --> 00:32:25.000
It's.

00:32:25.000 --> 00:32:33.000
Think about if you criticize someone by saying, you know that they behave rudely and you say, That's not done.

00:32:33.000 --> 00:32:43.000
When you saying that you're not saying that nobody behaves rudely, you're saying that there's a Norman force that they're bound by, or if you say that we don't do that.

00:32:43.000 --> 00:32:54.000
Maybe you say this to a small child, you're not saying that grown ups never do the thing that the small child did you're saying that grown ups are bound by a norm that prohibits this and so are you.

00:32:54.000 --> 00:33:04.000
And by saying that we don't do this, you're saying that the child and the adults who are all bound by this norm are in some sense of part of the same community.

00:33:04.000 --> 00:33:16.000
Now, at the lead I'm going to argue that the parties to dispute to any dispute, or parts of a group that includes everyone with him one could exchange reasons.

00:33:16.000 --> 00:33:22.000
And I'm going to walk through some steps to get there.

00:33:22.000 --> 00:33:34.000
So I'm going to start by talking about local conflicts sellers favorite example of a social group is a whooping crane society. So let's say that Alice is a number of the whooping cranes society and she thinks that they should hold a fundraiser, and Saturday,

00:33:34.000 --> 00:33:48.000
Saturday, Brian, also a member disagrees. He thinks that they should clean up the weapons on Saturday. So here we have two individuals who have a disagreement about what to do, you can in fact you can have these people holding intentions on behalf of

00:33:48.000 --> 00:33:56.000
the whooping crane society, Allison 10s on behalf of the society to hold a fundraiser Brian attends on behalf of the society to clean up the wetlands.

00:33:56.000 --> 00:34:08.000
And there's a way to resolve the dispute maybe the whooping crane society holds a vote and decides to clean up the wetlands So Alice might say okay well the bylaws say that we resolve disputes by voting, that's what we do around here and so she goes along

00:34:08.000 --> 00:34:14.000
with it. So the bylaws of the society are part of what makes the whooping crane society, a group.

00:34:14.000 --> 00:34:28.000
It establishes procedures for deciding for a group of people to collectively decide what to do. And in being bound by it, the people are there for part of a single organization.

00:34:28.000 --> 00:34:39.000
There's other local conflicts maybe the Chamber of Commerce, Cecilia thinks that they should lobby the governor and Saturday, and David also a member of the chamber thinks that they should work on their advertising on Saturday and they're resolved or

00:34:39.000 --> 00:34:56.000
dispute with another procedure so the executive director says okay well I'm decides to lobby the governor and David says okay well how we do things around here is we follow with the governor says, the director says, and so they're going to lobby the governor.

00:34:56.000 --> 00:35:05.000
So again, there's procedures for resolving disputes in the chamber of commerce which tides members together and partners part of what allows the Chamber of Commerce to constitute a community.

00:35:05.000 --> 00:35:19.000
Now, the whooping crane society and the Chamber of Commerce might themselves have a dispute, we can create society wants to preserve the whooping cranes habitat, the Chamber of Commerce wants to develop it.

00:35:19.000 --> 00:35:29.000
And there's ways of resolving their disputes, that would be great society files a lawsuit and loses. Oh well, Alice member of the society says, that's how we do things around here.

00:35:29.000 --> 00:35:36.000
The we here includes both whooping crane society and the Chamber of Commerce, she said we'll try next time.

00:35:36.000 --> 00:35:45.000
So we'll be praying society and the Chamber of Commerce are members of a community, just like their members or members of their communities.

00:35:45.000 --> 00:35:58.000
Because just like there's a way for the members of the small communities to resolve their disputes and hence a set of norms that tie them together. There's likewise the way to resolve disputes between these groups, and hence a set of norms that ties them

00:35:58.000 --> 00:36:01.000
together.

00:36:01.000 --> 00:36:06.000
And so they are if you like a part of a civil society or civil community.

00:36:06.000 --> 00:36:19.000
Um, We so far been talking about procedural resolutions to to disputes, like voting, or the executive director deciding something they're set ways of doing it.

00:36:19.000 --> 00:36:32.000
But it's important and it's going to be crucial for my argument that you can have disputes resolved rationally through the giving and taking of reasons, even if there is no procedure, established in advance for doing it.

00:36:32.000 --> 00:36:38.000
So maybe senator Smith wants to build monorail and Senator Brown wants to cut taxes.

00:36:38.000 --> 00:36:44.000
Maybe they each intend on behalf of the government to do their favorite things.

00:36:44.000 --> 00:36:55.000
And one of the ways that they might resolve this dispute is through compromise in negotiation, maybe Smith offers to cut taxes by less than Brom wants in exchange for a shorter monorail then he wants.

00:36:55.000 --> 00:36:58.000
So making this offer.

00:36:58.000 --> 00:37:09.000
Smith is both changed his normative status and browns, he's given his put himself under some obligations he has the obligation to go along with the monorail of products steps the offer.

00:37:09.000 --> 00:37:20.000
He's given brown some rights Brown has the right to get the shorter monorail, as long as he goes around, along with Smith's tax cuts.

00:37:20.000 --> 00:37:39.000
And there might not be any set procedure in advance about how this practical negotiation is going to go, but it's still a way of resolving their dispute that doesn't rely on force or trickery or coercion, it's still a way of resolving dispute by the giving

00:37:39.000 --> 00:37:51.000
and taking your reasons and so the senators could say, they can sit down and say that's how we do things around here in the Senate, we get we each get some of what we want, but not everything that we want but compromising with other people.

00:37:51.000 --> 00:38:02.000
And so this procedure is ideally, part of what makes the senate of community,

00:38:02.000 --> 00:38:13.000
And so, um, so you can resolve your disputes between by appeal the practical reasons, and not just by appeal to dispute resolution procedures.

00:38:13.000 --> 00:38:30.000
So in general, to resolve at a fork to resolve disputes through force or trickery or so forth rather than by reasons, is to take one's own desires to take precedence over those of others, regardless of whether reasons to in favor of satisfying one's desires.

00:38:30.000 --> 00:38:41.000
So, I'm sellers in various places contrasts a rule following with the following habits.

00:38:41.000 --> 00:38:56.000
indulging one's own desires, is a habitual action in the sense that sellers means that there's the sort of thing that's not informed by reasons.

00:38:56.000 --> 00:39:10.000
So rule followers act in the basis of reasons, they resolve their disputes by giving and giving other people reasons for action reasons for going along with what they're doing, not by forcing them not by tricking them not coercing them.

00:39:10.000 --> 00:39:18.000
Now since we're all rule followers. This means that we can always resolve disputes without recourse to force there's always a rule to follow.

00:39:18.000 --> 00:39:30.000
Now, that should follow from the facts that are the assumption At any rate, that we are essentially rule followers. So given any two groups or even any two individuals there's some way for them to resolve the dispute

00:39:30.000 --> 00:39:33.000
rationally rather than by force.

00:39:33.000 --> 00:39:42.000
And because we could have disputes between any organ, like any arbitrary assortment of people.

00:39:42.000 --> 00:39:54.000
There's going to be some set of rules that's going to be binding on all of us is going to be a cosmopolitan rule. Now the rules don't need to be said in advance and then even before moment, we already talked about why they need to be formalized but they

00:39:54.000 --> 00:40:08.000
can also arise spontaneously human talks about this. Lewis talks about it somewhat later. So he talks about people rolling in a rowboat and the end of matching each other's

00:40:08.000 --> 00:40:18.000
rhythm in line to get themselves across the lake, even though they don't talk about it. They don't say hey, let's roll it. No, so many strokes per minute or something.

00:40:18.000 --> 00:40:24.000
Um, it's just that the end up coordinating with each other in order to achieve their their shared objectives.

00:40:24.000 --> 00:40:31.000
And given the, the arrangement that they've arrived at spontaneously. There is something that we do.

00:40:31.000 --> 00:40:45.000
So if one of them starts running faster the other one can say, hey, that's not how we're doing it, you know, even though we didn't negotiate we didn't talk about how to do a we've arrived at a procedure here for rolling across the lake and you're violating

00:40:45.000 --> 00:40:52.000
it. There's a norm that binds us, I can give you a reason for following the rhythm that I'm following.

00:40:52.000 --> 00:40:58.000
Namely, this is what we've arrived at and Lewis discusses how to do this in game theoretic terms.

00:40:58.000 --> 00:41:08.000
So, on the Cosmopolitan role and need to be a procedural rule negotiation and compromise a rule governed and that they function by the giving and taking reasons rather than by force.

00:41:08.000 --> 00:41:17.000
So whatever the rule that's going to bind everybody is it doesn't have to be procedural and it doesn't have to be formalized and in fact i think is neither one.

00:41:17.000 --> 00:41:34.000
Perhaps the only truly cosmopolitan rule is sellers himself says his rule that tells you to find rules to follow to find some way to let reasons rather theoretical practical, whether procedurally said in advanced or whether arrived at spontaneously, find

00:41:34.000 --> 00:41:43.000
some way to let reasons determine one's actions that is perhaps the only truly cosmopolitan rule.

00:41:43.000 --> 00:41:44.000
And if it is.

00:41:44.000 --> 00:41:47.000
Okay, here we go.

00:41:47.000 --> 00:41:52.000
So we've got some rule that's going, that this going to bind us all together.

00:41:52.000 --> 00:42:01.000
Now, it makes sense for those who are bound by a single rule to talk about what we do and that sense of leads to compromise that they comprise a community.

00:42:01.000 --> 00:42:16.000
There's some sort of practice of behavior coordination that we're all about that they're all bound by, and so they can say this is these are the norms that structure our community.

00:42:16.000 --> 00:42:24.000
And since we're all governed by a cosmopolitan rule we are all at least in this sense, members of a community. We don't resolve our disputes through force.

00:42:24.000 --> 00:42:38.000
Now when somebody does it you can say we don't do that, which again isn't to say that people don't do it. It's to say that there is a set of norms this, that structures all of our behavior or should structure all behavior this set of norms that we're

00:42:38.000 --> 00:42:58.000
all bound by, and you're violating it if you resolve your disputes through force. So I think the community of all rational agents is the community of beings who, who result yeah to resolve their disputes by giving each other reasons, not by force, not

00:42:58.000 --> 00:43:01.000
by trickery not by coercion.

00:43:01.000 --> 00:43:11.000
And so there's at least in this sense of community of rational agents that any rule follower belongs to and since we're all rule followers, we all belong to it.

00:43:11.000 --> 00:43:16.000
Now, I haven't yet shown that we have to attend to the well being of this group.

00:43:16.000 --> 00:43:29.000
So that's what I'm going to talk about now. So all members of a group g have the same interest squad members of g. So, the other interests of the members of the whooping cranes society might vary some people might have

00:43:29.000 --> 00:43:40.000
interest in tennis some people might be interested in baseball some people might have investments others might not so we've got lots of different interests amongst the members of the whooping crane society, but in so far as the members of the society,

00:43:40.000 --> 00:43:44.000
they're interested in protecting the whooping crane.

00:43:44.000 --> 00:43:58.000
So if A and B are both members of the whooping crane society and be have the same interest qua members of the whooping crane society, and insofar as a promotes B's interests quad member of the society, he promotes his own interests as well, because it's

00:43:58.000 --> 00:44:00.000
the same interest.

00:44:00.000 --> 00:44:10.000
More generally, all members of a group have the same interest squad members of that group, actually think sellers discusses the summer.

00:44:10.000 --> 00:44:21.000
So this is going to help us show that, that intending the well being of the community of all rational agents is categorically reasonable

00:44:21.000 --> 00:44:31.000
will get. And so, so we'll get we'll get there in a second. So the intention to promote one's own interests has a kind of logical priority that the intention to promote someone else's interesting usually doesn't.

00:44:31.000 --> 00:44:43.000
So when you're talking about someone else's promoting someone else's interests the question, why do you want that. Now why do you want to promote somebody else's interest seems to have application now the answer to it could be for their sake, or for the

00:44:43.000 --> 00:44:51.000
sake of morality or because it's the right thing to do. I'm not saying that everyone is like

00:44:51.000 --> 00:44:57.000
totally self centered and self interested. I'm saying that the question always makes sense.

00:44:57.000 --> 00:45:06.000
But it doesn't seem to make sense when applied to your own interests, why are you promoted Why are you pursuing your own interests.

00:45:06.000 --> 00:45:21.000
It doesn't seem to get any bite. So there seems to be from a subjective perspective, a reasonableness that adheres to pursuing your own interests that doesn't necessarily attached to pursuing other people's interests.

00:45:21.000 --> 00:45:34.000
But there are exceptions. So, if a member of G intends to promote the interests of other members of Geek Squad members of G, this intention enjoy enjoy the same kind of logical priority is the intention to promote one's own interest, because it's the

00:45:34.000 --> 00:45:40.000
same interest quad members of the group.

00:45:40.000 --> 00:45:50.000
You all have the same interest and so if I'm, if, if you and I are part of the same group, and I intend to promote your interest squad members of that group, and thereby intending to promote my own interests.

00:45:50.000 --> 00:45:59.000
So the intention to promote the well being once fellow group members quad group members and enjoys the same kind of logical statuses the intention to promote one's own well being.

00:45:59.000 --> 00:46:08.000
So, the question why do you want to promote the well being of other members of a group that you belong to quad members of that group doesn't make sense.

00:46:08.000 --> 00:46:16.000
So it isn't a subjective sense of reasonable that don't get sure that it's categorically reasonable there's another step.

00:46:16.000 --> 00:46:32.000
And here it is, it's unreasonable then so is subjectively reasonable but is it objectively reasonable well it's unreasonable to hold this intention, that is the intention to promote the well being of the members of the group that you belong to.

00:46:32.000 --> 00:46:45.000
Only if it's unreasonable to belong to this group, and the group an issue of course is the group of all rational beings the group that has that structures itself around the idea that we resolve disputes, two reasons and not their force.

00:46:45.000 --> 00:46:49.000
Now is it unreasonable to belong to this group. Now of course not.

00:46:49.000 --> 00:46:52.000
You're essentially a rule follower.

00:46:52.000 --> 00:46:58.000
And the group of all rational beings in the group of rule followers you don't have any choice but to belong to the group.

00:46:58.000 --> 00:47:12.000
So it might be unreasonable to promote the interests of groups that you belong to if it's unreasonable to belong to those groups. So if you're a member of the Nazi Party it's unreasonable to promote the interests of your fellow Nazis quantum numbers the

00:47:12.000 --> 00:47:25.000
Nazi party because it's not reasonable to belong to Nazi Party, but it has to be reasonable to belong to the community of all rational beings because you don't have any choice on that one.

00:47:25.000 --> 00:47:31.000
So on it takes stock here disputes between real followers can be resolved rationally that's part of what makes you a rule follower.

00:47:31.000 --> 00:47:43.000
So there's a community of rule followers of which we're all members because part of what we do is we will resolve disputes rationally, and we must intend to promote the interest of the members of this group quad members of this group, because those are

00:47:43.000 --> 00:47:48.000
the same interests that we've got.

00:47:48.000 --> 00:48:06.000
And it's categorically reasonable to belong to this group because we don't have any choice but to belong to it. So from the fact that you're a rule follower, but for the fat from the fact that we're all rule followers, it follows that there's a community

00:48:06.000 --> 00:48:20.000
And we have to intend to prove it by being a rule follower you're committed to intending to promote the well being of members this required members of this group, because those are your own interest and is categorically reasonable to do so because you

00:48:20.000 --> 00:48:23.000
don't have any choice but belong to this group.

00:48:23.000 --> 00:48:34.000
Now, so I want to go back to the question about why should we follow the moral law. Well, according to sellers, the moral law requires two things, we see ourselves as members of the community of all rational beings and we intend to promote the well being

00:48:34.000 --> 00:48:37.000
being of the members of that community.

00:48:37.000 --> 00:48:42.000
Since any dispute between rule followers can be resolved by appeal to reasons.

00:48:42.000 --> 00:48:45.000
All of us rule followers and members of the community.

00:48:45.000 --> 00:48:57.000
That is where members of the community to resolve disputes rationally rather than by force, all members of this group have the same interest club members, and I must attend to promote my own interest and so I must intend to promote their interest club

00:48:57.000 --> 00:49:11.000
members as well. So, as a rule follower I'm committed to promoting the well being of everyone else who's also a rule follower.

00:49:11.000 --> 00:49:26.000
Now you are of course free not to follow the moral law, there's no punishment for not doing it there's no reward for being good, But not following the moral law involves I'm denying the or rule follower.

00:49:26.000 --> 00:49:36.000
And since people are essentially rule followers to fail to follow the moral law for sellers asked for comment is to not to deny your own essential nature.

00:49:36.000 --> 00:49:40.000
And that's not nothing

00:49:40.000 --> 00:49:48.000
to deny your essential nature is to deny the your person in the fullest sense of that word so I think that the force between for behind the moral law.

00:49:48.000 --> 00:50:03.000
The reason why should you follow the moral law comes from the necessity of respecting yourself. If you don't follow the moral law, that is if you don't intend to promote the well being of the community of all rational beings are the numbers that community.

00:50:03.000 --> 00:50:11.000
You're saying, I'm not one of those rule followers, that is I'm not really a person in the way that sellers puts it, I'm one of the ones who walks on fourth.

00:50:11.000 --> 00:50:30.000
And that's what I have for you today. Thank you very much. I uploaded the paper to violence Google Drive folder so you can go read it there if you wish, but thank you everyone.

00:50:30.000 --> 00:50:33.000
All right. Uh, thanks very much Nick.

00:50:33.000 --> 00:50:43.000
It looks like we have plenty of extra time for Q amp A. So, I guess we'll just keep the Q going if, after 25 minutes there's some more questions.

00:50:43.000 --> 00:50:53.000
If you'd like to use the raise hand functionality if you go to the bottom of the screen there's a little participants button and then there will be a blue raise hand button.

00:50:53.000 --> 00:51:14.000
I can call on you and keep track of the queue in that way.

00:51:14.000 --> 00:51:18.000
Carl sex.

00:51:18.000 --> 00:51:25.000
I'm so Hi. Uh, hello everyone, nice to see some familiar faces.

00:51:25.000 --> 00:51:42.000
Um, So I guess there's a particular clip is a particular claim you tried to make, and I couldn't tell it was the premise that you were not going to argue for, there's an argument for that I kind of missed.

00:51:42.000 --> 00:51:56.000
Excuse me. The a good important part of the claim to make the ethics cosmopolitan is the idea that I'm between any two groups.

00:51:56.000 --> 00:52:16.000
Right, it's always possible to resolve disagreement by means of reasoning get it right, not just disagreements. A within a group, but between any two different groups, going to Angel groups that are happened to be in conflict that you can sort of figure

00:52:16.000 --> 00:52:22.000
out how to resolve things peacefully.

00:52:22.000 --> 00:52:25.000
And,

00:52:25.000 --> 00:52:40.000
well, first of all, I guess they might wonder what justifies that move because certainly Imperium is speaking a lot of human history seems to stand against that claim.

00:52:40.000 --> 00:52:46.000
So I guess I might wonder why what's what's what's what's motivating it.

00:52:46.000 --> 00:52:58.000
I would like it to be true I like to be an optimist about human nature. But why is that not just sort of a leap of humanistic faith, What's justifying that Nope.

00:52:58.000 --> 00:53:02.000
So I think it follows from the.

00:53:02.000 --> 00:53:21.000
I hope it's a fact. But I'll treat it as an assumption that we are essentially rule followers, we humans are the kinds of things that can determine what to do, by appeal the reasons not merely by appeal to habits.

00:53:21.000 --> 00:53:37.000
And if that's true and like this, like I said, this is the assumption I'm carrying over from sellers, I want I want the project here to be independently plausible but recognizably so rz and and the sense that the main sense in which is recognizably so

00:53:37.000 --> 00:53:53.000
rz and I think, at any rate, is I'm taking on Solar's commitment to the idea that we are all essentially rule following beings. And if we've got two communities that can't resolve their disputes, by appeal to reasons.

00:53:53.000 --> 00:53:59.000
It means that they have to take it that

00:53:59.000 --> 00:54:03.000
their own desires,

00:54:03.000 --> 00:54:11.000
take priority over the desires of, you know, the group that they're in dispute with.

00:54:11.000 --> 00:54:19.000
And if you do that, you are determining your behavior.

00:54:19.000 --> 00:54:26.000
Non rationally, not by appeal to rules by appeal to mere causes.

00:54:26.000 --> 00:54:29.000
To say that.

00:54:29.000 --> 00:54:37.000
Okay, and so so I take I take it that it follows from the idea that we're essentially rule followers, are we essentially rule followers I didn't argue for that.

00:54:37.000 --> 00:54:39.000
That's the assumption I'm carrying over from sellers.

00:54:39.000 --> 00:54:49.000
Now, to say that we resolve disputes rationally or to say that we can isn't to say that we always do in fact we often don't. Um, but that's not an objection to the idea that we are essentially rule followers just like it's not an injection to a concert

00:54:49.000 --> 00:55:03.000
But that's not an objection to the idea that we are essentially rule followers just like it's not an objection to to concept claim that we're essentially rational beings by pointing out that we often behave irrationally.

00:55:03.000 --> 00:55:07.000
These are, you know, a norm from which we should expect some amount of deviation.

00:55:07.000 --> 00:55:16.000
So, I'm not surprised and I'm not troubled by the fact that we often do resolve our disputes but kill the forest rather than by appeal to rules.

00:55:16.000 --> 00:55:40.000
Um, I think the idea that it that they can be resolved by appeal to two reasons follows from the fact that we're rule followers, something which I haven't argued, and I'm relying on sellers authority here.

00:55:40.000 --> 00:55:44.000
Jeremy Coons.

00:55:44.000 --> 00:56:00.000
Thank you, this was a really interesting paper I really appreciated this, and I appreciate the different way you're trying to go about establishing this conclusion that is obviously central to sellers this entire project here.

00:56:00.000 --> 00:56:13.000
I just, I was reading your paper before hand. And one of the, one of the concerns have. I'm very sympathetic to your to your strategy.

00:56:13.000 --> 00:56:18.000
This idea that that to be a rule follower

00:56:18.000 --> 00:56:31.000
is somehow going to entail that you're that you're, you're a member of the we. But, but I'm just wondering if if some of the dialectical steps you take it.

00:56:31.000 --> 00:56:34.000
I'm here my worry is that you're building.

00:56:34.000 --> 00:56:42.000
From the start, you're building into your argument a conception of rationality that's sort of friendly to your conclusion.

00:56:42.000 --> 00:56:53.000
So, you know i. So, I will certainly grant that people are the to be an agent is to be ruled governed that's what it is to be rational is to be real government.

00:56:53.000 --> 00:57:11.000
But, but, but why why this means that rationality then has to involve a. It seems like there's a couple of steps from there to the idea that rationality has to involve sort of reasoned settling of disputes, because I mean there's there's different there's

00:57:11.000 --> 00:57:25.000
different conceptions of rationality, and I take it that this is one of the reasons why sellers always sets up the dialectic between rational egoism and the moral point of view I mean for the for the Chamber of Commerce to rationally resolve the dispute

00:57:25.000 --> 00:57:35.000
with the whipping cream society they might you know plant articles in the newspaper to discredit the whipping cream society that would be a very rational thing for them to do on a particular conception of rationality.

00:57:35.000 --> 00:57:37.000
Right.

00:57:37.000 --> 00:57:54.000
And so I just, I guess, this idea that well I'm rule following. So now I have to respect the idea that you also are bound by reason I mean, it seems like you know when you're acting in an egoistic way you are acting on reasons you're just acting on the

00:57:54.000 --> 00:58:00.000
wrong set of reasons from the seller's his point of view. That seems to be the prior question.

00:58:00.000 --> 00:58:09.000
Okay, you're acting on some of the reasons, but not all of them. So, If, if the Chamber of Commerce.

00:58:09.000 --> 00:58:24.000
Plans articles discrediting the whooping crane society. They're acting on a proper subset of the reasons that are to be considered in particular the reasons that their own desires give them, and worth, if the group doesn't have desires this objectives

00:58:24.000 --> 00:58:27.000
whatever the the motivating forces for a group.

00:58:27.000 --> 00:58:43.000
Um, but they're ignoring some other reasons, in particular the preferences of the whooping crane society.

00:58:43.000 --> 00:58:42.000
But when sellers is telling us that we are.

00:58:42.000 --> 00:58:58.000
But when sellers is telling us that we are us when sellers, says that God whispers to add them and tell them to follow rules. I don't think he's telling he's saying that Adam should be means as rational I think he's saying that what Adam should do is

00:58:58.000 --> 00:59:07.000
consider all of the everything that's to be said for his course of action when determining what course of action to pursue.

00:59:07.000 --> 00:59:11.000
And so pure means ends reasoning.

00:59:11.000 --> 00:59:23.000
Usually, and certainly in the case of the whooping crane society planning the articles involves ignoring some of the relevant reasons, and so not following rules in the,

00:59:23.000 --> 00:59:29.000
in the sense that I, I think, at any rate sellers and 10s.

00:59:29.000 --> 00:59:30.000
It's.

00:59:30.000 --> 00:59:46.000
Yeah, I think I think that's what I want to say it. if you're just means rational you're ignoring some of the relevant reasons, and so are having your behavior determined by something other than a consideration of everything that's to be said for it.

00:59:46.000 --> 00:59:52.000
Is your behaviors and determined by a proper set of subset of what's to be said for it.

00:59:52.000 --> 01:00:00.000
Which in this case and in most cases I can think of like this means that you are.

01:00:00.000 --> 01:00:08.000
You're acting out of your self interested habit rather than your appreciation of the normative facts as you find them.

01:00:08.000 --> 01:00:18.000
Sellers does build a lot of a lot into the All things considered, that's true.

01:00:18.000 --> 01:00:22.000
All right. Stephanie doc.

01:00:22.000 --> 01:00:23.000
Yeah.

01:00:23.000 --> 01:00:27.000
Thank you and thanks for the talk.

01:00:27.000 --> 01:00:39.000
I have a question on setters and how he comes through the should because your aim was somehow to react to his failed or incomplete argument at the end of science and metaphysics.

01:00:39.000 --> 01:00:52.000
And when you look at his concerns there then you see that there are actually two concerns. The first is, whether there is a community of rational beings, you know, whether we really formed such a community.

01:00:52.000 --> 01:01:09.000
And then the second concern is, if we form such a community then, what kind of well being, it is we are concerned with if it's the well being just say of rational beings quite rational beings as you said, that would be he says, if it's just the epistemic

01:01:09.000 --> 01:01:26.000
the well being, you know we are concerned with. Maybe the well being of rational minds, or something like that. Yeah, or whether it is not only this epistemic well being, but unqualified well being and only then he says, Only if it's unqualified well

01:01:26.000 --> 01:01:27.000
being.

01:01:27.000 --> 01:01:42.000
That includes for example, you have that place in the paper where you say that when you are concerned with the well being of the members of the whooping crane society, then you're just concerned with their well being, or members of that society and up

01:01:42.000 --> 01:01:46.000
with their financial affairs for example. Yep.

01:01:46.000 --> 01:01:55.000
So an unqualified but well being would include all of these aspects so for example the financial financial affairs of rational beings and anything that you can you can imagine.

01:01:55.000 --> 01:02:12.000
Yeah, and he says, If I cannot establish that this is really this unqualified well being, which I, which rational beings would care for each other. Then I cannot establish that this rational, this community of rational beings is really an ethical community,

01:02:12.000 --> 01:02:18.000
but it would be just concerned with the epistemic welfare of of its members.

01:02:18.000 --> 01:02:26.000
I know that the paper was not like aimed primarily at this questions, but do you have any thoughts on that problem.

01:02:26.000 --> 01:02:41.000
Sure, so I'm intending the well being of the community of the members of the community of rational beings quad members that community isn't just intending there epidemic well being.

01:02:41.000 --> 01:02:45.000
You're right, it doesn't it doesn't entail intending their financial well being.

01:02:45.000 --> 01:02:58.000
If, if establishing that we have to attend the well being of the members of this community requires intending their well being in every respect I think that's hopeless because different people have two different people's interests conflict with each other

01:02:58.000 --> 01:03:07.000
and you can't consistently intend to promote you know both of these conflicting interests.

01:03:07.000 --> 01:03:10.000
But so I'm

01:03:10.000 --> 01:03:21.000
rather rational beings aren't just theoretical beings, they have practical concerns and practical interest and I think that's most mostly what I'm interested in here.

01:03:21.000 --> 01:03:28.000
So what is it for things to go well for a rational being called rational being.

01:03:28.000 --> 01:03:42.000
I'm so rational beings are the ones you know the rule followers are the ones whose behavior is determined by considerations of reasons.

01:03:42.000 --> 01:03:57.000
And I take it that things go well for such a being, when their autonomy is respected when they're in a position to look at the reasons for and against their courses of action and determine what to do themselves because they are the rational beings who

01:03:57.000 --> 01:04:01.000
are, who can weigh these reasons.

01:04:01.000 --> 01:04:09.000
So, If what we need is 1010, everybody's well being in every respect no that's hopeless.

01:04:09.000 --> 01:04:29.000
But when things go well for rational beings, or rational being, I think, at any rate, they are their capacity to weigh reasons is itself respected and hence their ability to determine their own behavior on the basis of those reasons, is respected.

01:04:29.000 --> 01:04:32.000
So I think really what what sellers.

01:04:32.000 --> 01:04:47.000
What my elaboration of sellers gets us. It's not even elaboration by Salas you know argument gets us, is something very close to our Comcast us something like the the formulation of human of humanity of the categorical imperative.

01:04:47.000 --> 01:05:00.000
So it's not just epidemic well being, your right is not well being in every respect but as well being in this respect that mattered for constant strikes me matters ethically.

01:05:00.000 --> 01:05:03.000
So if I didn't get everything to sellers wanted okay.

01:05:03.000 --> 01:05:07.000
But I think it's the.

01:05:07.000 --> 01:05:14.000
The important part here.

01:05:14.000 --> 01:05:19.000
Is that fair.

01:05:19.000 --> 01:05:25.000
Okay, a builder Reese.

01:05:25.000 --> 01:05:37.000
Alright, thanks very much. I'm Carl asked the question I was originally bike asked but but to pick up then on his questions more.

01:05:37.000 --> 01:05:42.000
It seems to me that you're also putting a lot of weight on the notion of an essence here.

01:05:42.000 --> 01:05:49.000
Um, and to say that we are essentially rule followers.

01:05:49.000 --> 01:05:52.000
You know I'm a little bit worried about that.

01:05:52.000 --> 01:05:56.000
Not because I think we're not.

01:05:56.000 --> 01:06:04.000
But because I think, saying that, with regard to persons is saying it as we're in a normative mode.

01:06:04.000 --> 01:06:10.000
Right. We have a persons are the beings that are supposed to be.

01:06:10.000 --> 01:06:13.000
rule followers.

01:06:13.000 --> 01:06:16.000
And too often or not.

01:06:16.000 --> 01:06:25.000
So I'm not sure that the claim that we're essentially rule followers is quite going to handle the weight you want to put on it.

01:06:25.000 --> 01:06:31.000
It's not like you know saying that the essence of waters to be H two O.

01:06:31.000 --> 01:06:43.000
That's as a word, you know, an Olympic necessity, whereas the necessity of a person's being a rule follower is is merely idiotic.

01:06:43.000 --> 01:06:47.000
It's I'm worried about that.

01:06:47.000 --> 01:06:49.000
Okay.

01:06:49.000 --> 01:06:55.000
Um.

01:06:55.000 --> 01:07:01.000
How about this.

01:07:01.000 --> 01:07:06.000
Let's talk about baseball baseball my favorite sport.

01:07:06.000 --> 01:07:11.000
And there is in some sense,

01:07:11.000 --> 01:07:15.000
In essence to baseball players,

01:07:15.000 --> 01:07:18.000
bear with me here.

01:07:18.000 --> 01:07:28.000
Their baseball rules they comply with after three strikes that goes out and they go sit down on the bench.

01:07:28.000 --> 01:07:37.000
Could you have a baseball player who stood out who took his third strike and refused to leave the batter's box, I mean I guess

01:07:37.000 --> 01:07:44.000
you could say we don't do that right the I mean some, maybe it's a little kid who's learning how to play baseball. Yes, the third striking doesn't leave.

01:07:44.000 --> 01:07:55.000
And, and the coach says hey Jimmy, come on back and Jimmy says what I'm batting and he says in the coach says no, no, you got your third strike, we don't stay up there after your third strike.

01:07:55.000 --> 01:08:01.000
Um, You know that's essential to being a baseball player.

01:08:01.000 --> 01:08:16.000
Now, to say that so but but it's again a down to kind of necessity right not like you said in the leasing necessity because baseball players sometimes do stand up there for their fourth straight, sometimes they do cork their bats before players cheat.

01:08:16.000 --> 01:08:31.000
And yet it seems to make good sense to say that this is what makes baseball players baseball players and differentiates them from basketball players and from chess players and from all the other sports players.

01:08:31.000 --> 01:08:34.000
And you could say that.

01:08:34.000 --> 01:08:41.000
Maybe we have a convention to convention of baseball players, and all of the baseball players belong here.

01:08:41.000 --> 01:08:54.000
But the the people who belong in this convention, the community of baseball players here aren't just the people who don't, who go and sit down on the bench after the third strike Jimmy gets invited.

01:08:54.000 --> 01:08:57.000
He is a baseball player to even though we violates the rules.

01:08:57.000 --> 01:09:05.000
Because quad baseball player, it's essential to his nature that he's bound by this norm.

01:09:05.000 --> 01:09:10.000
So I think that at least some categories.

01:09:10.000 --> 01:09:17.000
Baseball players persons maybe these are normative categories

01:09:17.000 --> 01:09:37.000
can have is their essence normative necessities, even if the actual things that fall into these categories violate those norms.

01:09:37.000 --> 01:09:39.000
Okay.

01:09:39.000 --> 01:09:46.000
I think I'll slot myself into the queue right now.

01:09:46.000 --> 01:09:49.000
So, I had a question.

01:09:49.000 --> 01:10:02.000
It's a wrinkle that occurred to me in in reading your paper. Um, I don't think I mean this as an objection I don't think it's vitiated into your project at all.

01:10:02.000 --> 01:10:14.000
In fact, I think I wonder if you will agree. I think it may even help you out in responding to the kind of worried that the Carl was raising earlier and q amp a.

01:10:14.000 --> 01:10:28.000
And it has to do with your, your key premise that different groups of people can rationally resolve inter inter group disputes.

01:10:28.000 --> 01:10:35.000
And the fact that it occurred to me in reading this that, well, there's more than one kind of camp.

01:10:35.000 --> 01:10:46.000
Right, so there's sometimes when we talk about people's abilities or what they can do. We're interested in what is sort of immediately available for them to do.

01:10:46.000 --> 01:10:54.000
And then sometimes we're talking in broader terms about what their abilities.

01:10:54.000 --> 01:10:59.000
What the kind of creature they are

01:10:59.000 --> 01:11:09.000
means that they have abilities to do if those abilities are suitably developed, if put in the proper conditions and so on and so forth.

01:11:09.000 --> 01:11:27.000
And so this broader sense of can seems to me to be the one that you want for this premise to be believable right because I'm thinking about let's like to take an example of a card sort of inter group dispute.

01:11:27.000 --> 01:11:45.000
Think about the relationship of people who are, let's say in a more scientifically reliable epidemic community to people who are vaccine skeptics about the covert vaccine or something like that.

01:11:45.000 --> 01:11:49.000
A lot of these people are such that right now.

01:11:49.000 --> 01:12:00.000
It's just as a matter of empirical facts. The way to change their mind is not by reasoning with them, it's just not going to work because they'll, they'll they'll call ends your opponent's all day long.

01:12:00.000 --> 01:12:11.000
Whenever you give them. They won't find it credible and they'll give you something else that they do find credible which to you will be patently on credible.

01:12:11.000 --> 01:12:27.000
Um, so the thought is that I'm not that such people are, you know, not rational beings not capable of reason but just that there are certain kinds of immediate conditions maybe conditions like having to do with social trust and so on, that need to be

01:12:27.000 --> 01:12:37.000
established first beforehand. So, in order that in this more immediate sense, we could resolve a dispute with them by giving and taking of reasons.

01:12:37.000 --> 01:12:57.000
But right now, right right now. Only in this more attenuated sense, could we resolve a dispute by them by giving and taking reasons and what is required right now is, is something that's maybe pre rational that involves establishing a kind of sort of

01:12:57.000 --> 01:13:03.000
pre rational kinds of social bonds which enable people to trust one another.

01:13:03.000 --> 01:13:15.000
Just another thing I was thinking about, in relation to this was the fact that what they tell people to do when they're doing like political organizing going door to door is not to when they find someone who disagrees with them try and debate them but

01:13:15.000 --> 01:13:31.000
rather to listen to them and try to form a kind of a human relationship on the basis of shared experiences, and then get to. Once you've established a kind of relationship of trust maybe giving and taking freezes.

01:13:31.000 --> 01:13:42.000
So I'm wondering if you, you agree with me that we should read this, this can in your key premise in this more attenuated sense of what do you think that distinction is important.

01:13:42.000 --> 01:13:45.000
Yes, actually that's how I intended it.

01:13:45.000 --> 01:13:47.000
That is what I mean.

01:13:47.000 --> 01:13:49.000
And actually I used to do.

01:13:49.000 --> 01:14:13.000
Political canvas and so I'm familiar with the, the necessity to build press yeah you debate somebody who disagrees me about politics he goes nowhere.

01:14:13.000 --> 01:14:16.000
Let on because.

01:14:16.000 --> 01:14:23.000
And I think I really think this is this is crucial for the idea that we can resolve any dispute between two people.

01:14:23.000 --> 01:14:33.000
The, the giving and taking of reasons aren't just theoretical reasons it's not just a matter of convincing somebody that you should be doing that they should go along with what you're doing.

01:14:33.000 --> 01:14:43.000
I really do, and I think it's essential to include practical reasons also so paying somebody to do something as giving them a kind of a practical reason

01:14:43.000 --> 01:14:49.000
or in my example compromising with people's isn't that that is going to count as giving and taking reasons also.

01:14:49.000 --> 01:15:05.000
Um, but yeah, I'm to stay that we can always resolve disputes rationally isn't to say that we can do it right now. It's to say that there's something, there's a part of our essence, in a sense that might be objectionable but i think is okay, given that

01:15:05.000 --> 01:15:17.000
we're talking about a normative category here, there's a part of our essence that if you get to it. Right. you can uncover the this part of yourself.

01:15:17.000 --> 01:15:30.000
You can work things out with other people. So like, I mean, similarly, it's not an objection to content that people are sometimes irrational he can, he can still be right that our essences to be irrational being.

01:15:30.000 --> 01:15:37.000
Even if we recognize that people commit the gamblers fallacy and all sorts of things like that.

01:15:37.000 --> 01:15:56.000
The idea is that there's something in you that can that you can uncover it, or if you can work it out together is going to allow you to work together in a rational way so I'm all I'm saying is I think you're right, that's what that's how I met it.

01:15:56.000 --> 01:16:03.000
Thanks, a tile Fergus.

01:16:03.000 --> 01:16:09.000
Hi, Nicholas. Thanks very much for your paper and your presentation.

01:16:09.000 --> 01:16:19.000
I'm so I'm thinking about a passage that's and towards the end of science and ethics, where it's one of the places where he sellers sites.

01:16:19.000 --> 01:16:23.000
Joseph Butler.

01:16:23.000 --> 01:16:32.000
And I'm thinking that the the story you're telling that's the kind of answer we give to someone in a cool our who's asking why they should do their duty.

01:16:32.000 --> 01:16:45.000
But I'm wondering about the other kind of story that we might tell me here, they gave Adam one thing that's weird about Adams Adams motherless. He was never a child raised by others.

01:16:45.000 --> 01:16:54.000
So there was never this process of acquiring a second nature, where you're brought up by, by other people.

01:16:54.000 --> 01:17:03.000
And seller says that this this concern for other people, is this really precious thing and it's laid down in childhood.

01:17:03.000 --> 01:17:11.000
And it doesn't seem to be a matter of rule following it doesn't seem to be a matter of being rational but it's more effective.

01:17:11.000 --> 01:17:29.000
And I'm wondering what you think about that kind of care and that kind of concern, its role in this story, and whether that counts is room for me.

01:17:29.000 --> 01:17:52.000
So I think it's relevant to rule following insofar as active responses give me reasons for things, which can right so, you know, a reason not to cheat on your wife is the lover so there's an effective response to give you a reason to do things.

01:17:52.000 --> 01:18:00.000
So the so the so this doesn't divorced from your effective responses to your environment or two other people.

01:18:00.000 --> 01:18:07.000
I'm

01:18:07.000 --> 01:18:13.000
one of. Okay, so this might not be satisfied, but let me see.

01:18:13.000 --> 01:18:19.000
The bit about cosmopolitanism in the middle of the paper

01:18:19.000 --> 01:18:35.000
is perhaps not strictly necessary for the rest of for the rest of the argument. So I talked there about how, what we find motivating are like the thick ethical concepts and your connections to, you know, your immediate surroundings.

01:18:35.000 --> 01:18:40.000
I'm not this high level cosmopolitan point of view.

01:18:40.000 --> 01:18:53.000
I think the main argument of the paper goes through without trying to build up big groups from small groups, I think the big. I think the main part of the argument is going to go through even if we just talk, even if you just recognize that any two people

01:18:53.000 --> 01:19:10.000
can disagree with each other, and give them they're all real followers, their disputes can be rationally resolved, what's hot on the cosmopolitanism stuff and talking about the fact that we get the, the effect of heft when we talk about thick ethical

01:19:10.000 --> 01:19:13.000
concepts that come up in local contexts.

01:19:13.000 --> 01:19:18.000
Um, what I wanted to do.

01:19:18.000 --> 01:19:28.000
Yeah, I don't know if this is going to work, but I wanted to do, is I wanted to say that I'm.

01:19:28.000 --> 01:19:48.000
recognizing that you're a part of a group that does tie you in emotionally with other people, that allows you to employ concepts like betrayal and honor and all these thick concepts rationally convinced you to being tied to bigger groups also.

01:19:48.000 --> 01:19:56.000
And so,

01:19:56.000 --> 01:20:02.000
I realized that an effective responses don't necessarily answer to rational considerations.

01:20:02.000 --> 01:20:17.000
But if your response to your close fellows has this emotional component to it. And if being close follows with people commits you to being fellows in some sense to larger groups also,

01:20:17.000 --> 01:20:31.000
you at least should recognize that you should care about them. Also, which you might not right. I'm not saying that you will but I'm saying that you've got a reason to do it.

01:20:31.000 --> 01:20:41.000
Now how you actually get people to do it I don't know talk to a psychologist, but I'm given that big group membership in big groups follows from membership in small groups.

01:20:41.000 --> 01:20:57.000
And given the you have an emotional connection to small groups, you ought to have emotional connection to big groups also.

01:20:57.000 --> 01:21:01.000
Okay. Somebody says is threatening people giving them reasons to do apps.

01:21:01.000 --> 01:21:13.000
I saw that in the chat, I want to talk about that I like, I actually like personally I find the, the difference between offers and threats very fascinating and really hard to parse out.

01:21:13.000 --> 01:21:20.000
Is it giving them a reason well

01:21:20.000 --> 01:21:22.000
okay I guess I want to say a couple things about that.

01:21:22.000 --> 01:21:34.000
One is not necessarily so if you threaten somebody and it gets them to do something just out of pure terror, then it's not giving them a reason. Right, so if you point your gun at me and say your money or your life and I just had you my wallet.

01:21:34.000 --> 01:21:42.000
You're not giving me a reason to do it because I'm just reacting out of terror. On the other hand, I could say, you could say your money or your or your life.

01:21:42.000 --> 01:21:52.000
I could look at this and I can say wow, I don't know how much money is in my wallet, how much would it hurt to get shot and weigh the pros and the cons, is that giving your reason well in that sense.

01:21:52.000 --> 01:21:55.000
Yes, sure.

01:21:55.000 --> 01:22:04.000
But if you are demanding my money of me at gunpoint.

01:22:04.000 --> 01:22:12.000
You are taking your own preferences, to take priority over my preferences,

01:22:12.000 --> 01:22:25.000
without regard for whether or not they should take priority over my preferences. So it's like a degenerate kind of reason giving sure it's a reason but it's a reason that you ought not to offer me, because in doing it you're ignoring some of the things

01:22:25.000 --> 01:22:36.000
that tell against this course of action that is you're not responding to reasons.

01:22:36.000 --> 01:22:41.000
Mark Joseph.

01:22:41.000 --> 01:22:46.000
Thanks. Yeah, and thanks to close for the paper it was, it was really interesting.

01:22:46.000 --> 01:23:03.000
So my question is, is that there. A common form that ethical problems take, is that there may be two groups, one of whom doesn't recognize the other as part of the we are part of the relevant way.

01:23:03.000 --> 01:23:17.000
And so that cuts off the move to a higher more comprehensive we, at which level there may be shared interests that can be used to resolve whatever problem is is is on the table.

01:23:17.000 --> 01:23:35.000
And I'm curious whether whether whether you would discount that as just a, you know, just count that as just a factual mistake. And as a factual mistake, you know not part of the ethical project and so just kind of off to the side.

01:23:35.000 --> 01:23:53.000
Each you know I guess this is a problem, it could be a problem with lots of ethical theories, but it seems to really go to the heart of the structure of your particular theory or the way you you develop a kind of philosophy and point. And I guess, you know, one one

01:23:53.000 --> 01:24:00.000
could, you know, modify the question so maybe it's not so much that the one group doesn't recognize the other group as part of the week.

01:24:00.000 --> 01:24:11.000
It could be that there are a series of Lee's, you know, sort of a stratified with some of which are considered more important than others are more relevant than others.

01:24:11.000 --> 01:24:20.000
And so the the disfavored group may be considered a we, that doesn't really matter in these kinds of questions.

01:24:20.000 --> 01:24:33.000
So that again. The, the, discounting this other group is part of the relevant we cuts off the move to a level at which the ethical dispute can be can be resolved.

01:24:33.000 --> 01:24:45.000
So I think this is an instance of what Zack gamer was talking about earlier. He asked whether the, the claim that we can resolve disputes means we can do it right now.

01:24:45.000 --> 01:24:58.000
Anybody can sit down and resolve them, or whether it means that, given suitable work on their part, they're capable of doing and I said the ladder right that was exactly suggested and I said yes that's right.

01:24:58.000 --> 01:25:10.000
So if we've got one group who doesn't recognize another group as a member of the way they say well those aren't humans right so that dehumanize them.

01:25:10.000 --> 01:25:16.000
That's going to prevent them from sitting down and resolving their disputes rationally right now.

01:25:16.000 --> 01:25:24.000
But if sellers is right there were essentially rule followers, you should be able to hold on.

01:25:24.000 --> 01:25:26.000
Um,

01:25:26.000 --> 01:25:30.000
yeah so

01:25:30.000 --> 01:25:44.000
there may well be some work to do before. Two people or two groups can sit down and resolve their disputes, one of the things they're going to need to do is recognize the others as fellow rule followers.

01:25:44.000 --> 01:25:54.000
You might also need to and that was talking about developing trust with wisdom that might be necessary also.

01:25:54.000 --> 01:26:02.000
So the fact that some groups are willing to write off other groups and say we don't need to take them into consideration.

01:26:02.000 --> 01:26:11.000
That doesn't mean that they can't resolve their disputes rationally or by giving a taking your reasons, it means that there might mean that they're not going to.

01:26:11.000 --> 01:26:15.000
It certainly means they need to do some work before they can do it.

01:26:15.000 --> 01:26:30.000
But if they're apprised of the fact that they and the disfavored group are both rule followers. And if they recognize what follows from the fact that your rule follower, you know, they read my paper.

01:26:30.000 --> 01:26:37.000
They should be able to recognize that they are in a position.

01:26:37.000 --> 01:26:43.000
There's some way that they can work with these people to resolve the dispute, without resorting to force.

01:26:43.000 --> 01:26:50.000
I'm not saying they will I'm not optimistic for them doing it right I'm not pointing to any utopia here.

01:26:50.000 --> 01:27:03.000
But it is expected and not especially problematic that some groups are going to write off other ones because recognizing what follows from your essential nature takes work.

01:27:03.000 --> 01:27:14.000
I mean, so think of it so so so as ethics is supposed to be content, think about what it takes to recognize the categorical imperative right, you have to the derivation is humongous.

01:27:14.000 --> 01:27:26.000
And yet it's supposed, you're supposed to be a self legislator right you give yourself the categorical imperative in the sense that it follows your central nature not in the sense that anybody should be able to sit down and write the groundwork for the

01:27:26.000 --> 01:27:31.000
metaphysics of morals, it took to do that for us.

01:27:31.000 --> 01:27:41.000
And I think you said the same thing for for sellers here.

01:27:41.000 --> 01:27:42.000
All right.

01:27:42.000 --> 01:27:56.000
I think we have time for maybe one more question. Um, I don't see any hands in the chat or in the participants tab I see one bunch of interesting things in the chat, one of which ends with a question mark so I'll read.

01:27:56.000 --> 01:28:09.000
Carol pata pops a question so Carol writes Alister McIntyre seems to go some way towards a similar account, but he also focuses a lot on the ways in which the gulf between groups can't be overcome.

01:28:09.000 --> 01:28:19.000
For him, this depends on ideas of recognizing goods Nicholas's account, are such goals, just failures of rationality.

01:28:19.000 --> 01:28:27.000
Um, all I can say is having read the relevant McIntyre, Sorry,

01:28:27.000 --> 01:28:36.000
but I didn't take notes, I did write it down, because I saw that in there earlier. I'm actually sinking Can you tell me where McIntyre discusses this so that I have.

01:28:36.000 --> 01:28:40.000
I don't have to read all of it.

01:28:40.000 --> 01:28:56.000
So he's got a 2016 book which is it like a summary of his position of all of his philosophy, which I'll put in the chat.

01:28:56.000 --> 01:29:06.000
But, yeah, I'll just get it.

01:29:06.000 --> 01:29:12.000
Ronald I saw your hand go up quickly do you have a quick question. Yeah, actually.

01:29:12.000 --> 01:29:27.000
Ray I understand Carol's question is well it's, there's a possibility I mean I don't know whether that's the way you understand it Carol but that there is not just in compatibility and initial outlooks between moral between communities.

01:29:27.000 --> 01:29:34.000
But in comments for abilities are not in compatibility but in comments for ability.

01:29:34.000 --> 01:29:50.000
And the way I understand Carol's question is whether assuming that this might be possible when I was thinking of Native American tribes versus white settlers thinking out privately only land for example I mean arguably that could be an incumbent stability.

01:29:50.000 --> 01:30:03.000
And whether that would be just a failure of rationality, according to your view, Nick, or bad or there might be something missing in sell us ethics here.

01:30:03.000 --> 01:30:07.000
If there's genuine intimate stability.

01:30:07.000 --> 01:30:15.000
So it's not just a failure of rationality. I think sellers ethics is in trouble.

01:30:15.000 --> 01:30:30.000
I don't know if sellers himself addresses this anywhere but it's, it certainly seems to me like an essential component of of his ethical picture is that there isn't any such thing that it could in principle, principle be worked out.

01:30:30.000 --> 01:30:39.000
I don't know if he's got an argument to that effect or not, I don't have one handy if we, if there is genuine incremental ability then we're in trouble.

01:30:39.000 --> 01:30:51.000
But I think that it's a part of sellers ethics that there isn't.

01:30:51.000 --> 01:30:57.000
All right, uh, on my watch. I think that we have 1110.

01:30:57.000 --> 01:31:06.000
Okay, so I think we'll call it here, and join me in thanking Nick again for an awesome talk and prompting a live discussion.

01:31:06.000 --> 01:31:11.000
Thanks everyone.

01:31:11.000 --> 01:31:41.000
All right, let's take a 10 minute break and then reconvene actually at 1120.

 

 

 

WEBVTT

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Isn't isn't accommodating, he's arguing for the motivational reasons being just couture. Oh, so then he says there's these, these motives, he'll say these reasons, or motos go can be good reasons or conclusively good reasons, or, or prevailing reasons.

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Right. He's worked his way to rejecting, Frank.

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He says Frank and I would object to the internal list that they confuse justification and motivation.

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Financial says he sees this way to responding to that criticism that's how I read it.

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Yeah, I'll have to go back and re look at that essay because I'm certainly open to the possibility to have misread it

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wouldn't be the first time, nor the last I'm sure.

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I thought that was super paper he gave up.

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I mean everyone always says that, but I genuinely thought so.

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Thank you, I appreciate it.

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Thank you.

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I need to go grab one thing really quickly before we start.

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Shall we

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shall we begin.

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Good.

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Okay, well our next speaker, needs no introduction but he's going to get one anyway.

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Ronald Butler is currently at Grand Valley State University, author of a very fine book about Brandon, and

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obviously the one of the leaders of our conference, and he is going to speak to us about moral we intentions as individualistic we attitudes bottles.

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Thank you. He's going to share my screen.

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Can you see it.

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Okay.

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All right.

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Thank you all very much for sticking around for my talk on a Saturday in the middle of the day or in the evening.

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I really appreciate your attendance.

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And so I'm going to focus on the same at my talk is going to have a similar focus as definitely store and Kyle's talk yesterday.

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I'm going to focus on the issue what philosophy and moral v intentions are.

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And in particular, I'm going to be concerned in my talk to give an individualistic account of moral v intentions on sale on behalf on the sale of of science and metaphysics, and by individual ism I simply understand here I mean here that subject may morally

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the intent that P, or by him or herself.

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So this at first blush sounds like a radical discrepancy disagreement with the Jeremy's paper that we just heard about In fact I don't think it is I mean this is a very modest individualistic thesis, I'm not denying that subject my morally be intent that

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that P only against the background of socially shared reasons, without I'm not denying that socially shared norms, okay but it's still possible, and maybe as far as morality is concerned, quite common.

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All are lots of other moms and reasons have to be shaped.

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So as I just indicated I'm focusing mainly on the sellers of science, and metaphysics, and they are he identifies or labels the distinguishing feature of moral the intentions and we intentionally in general as into subjective form.

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So my talk is concerned, maybe even giving an account of inter subjective form that sellers could have adopted the silos of science and metaphysics could have adopted apropos Stephanie's PayPal, I agree with Stephanie, that in later phases office work

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Very well. I'm focusing mainly on the sellers of science and metaphysics.

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So in science and metaphysics selves characterized oh by the way so so what I'm saying, what I'm going to say I hope that this dovetails, I think it dovetails with what what what Kyle proposed in his paper I mean Kyle pounded on into subjective form from

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the perspective of descriptions of the intentions and.

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So the takeaway was that, that, that there are scriptures that I can in can intend as one of us, and and and those descriptions as Christians will be intention, so I think my talk, talk, may doctor with that and illuminate further as what it means so

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intense as one of us.

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as one of us. So again, science and metaphysics the distinguishing feature of moral The intention is into subjective form, and due to this feature, moral v intentions, do two things as sell a suggestion, science and metaphysics they make a claim to categorical

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Sell a suggestion, science and metaphysics they make a claim to categorical reasonableness and other words, they make a claim a certain claim on any rational being to be accepted, or share out, and due to this.

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They allow for genuine interpersonal agreement and disagreement in moral matters. Something that sells things in science and metaphysics cannot be done with I intentions, we cannot genuinely interpersonal we disagree itself is before I intentions.

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So, this is going to be the topic of my paper and here's my thesis regarding into subjective form I'm laying it out and then the second part I'm going to elaborate it motivated and defended against a couple of objection.

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So my thesis is, it's a suggestion on behalf of the cell of mines in fact math, science and metaphysics.

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Is this the interceptor to form of a token model we intention that P consists in the intentions intrinsically involving class date or attitude, as opposed to acquire content for state.

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In normative attitude towards all rational beings.

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All of us jointly to aim to help realize P.

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Couple of preliminaries.

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So I'm going to focus in the thought exclusively on morally intentions rather we is us in the most encompassing sense that covers all rational beings, not focusing on on the intentions regarding more narrow groups here.

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I make an interpretive assumption that I'm not going to defend it mainly the cells of science and metaphysics identifies moral the intentions with moral judgments, so reductive view about moral judgments, calling which moral judgments are morally intentions.

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That's the classical way in which sellers has been interpreted a bad interpretation has recently come on the challenge for example by Stephanie in house 2019 70s paper, she offers on an alternative account of moral judgments, or moral claims.

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And I think precedence account of day on take judgments is incompatible with this ratings, because Selassie and moreover the intentions don't involve the distinction between choosing single mindedly and choosing and differently so so but anyway I'm setting

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all this aside and for the purposes of this paper stick to the classical reductive interpretation here.

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Not a limitation is that I'm going to focus only on the intentions that P intentions that something be the case setting on one side, we intentions to do.

00:10:01.000 --> 00:10:15.000
So I'm focusing only on the Shelby intentions. We intentions. And then one question is how my proposal might extend to intentions to do, and I say nothing about that in that paper.

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My main textual basis as already mentioned the science and metaphysics, is the roadmap.

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In the first part, I recapitalize things Allah says about ordinary intentions, and then also about wishes and desires, as well as beliefs.

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Second part introduces my main proposal, focus on intentions with inter subjective form.

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And then the third part.

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I want to show how this proposal on this proposal, there is a sense in which such intentions, make a certain claim to categorical reasonableness, and therefore allow to for interpret genuine interpersonal agreement or disagreement for part one little

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bit about ordinary intentions vicious desires and beliefs.

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And we felt quite a bit of this already yesterday so,

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yeah, I can go through that relatively briefly. Whoops, my PowerPoint isn't working anymore.

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Okay, here goes.

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So ordinary intentions, I intentions norms of practical reasoning according to sellers tie them to other intentions to action so they are in the space of reasons in the sense that they are tied raised by nuns of reasoning to other intentions and actions.

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So, since they are tied normatively to actions tell us that ordinary intentions actually all intentions, have a conceptual tie to practice, sell us explicates these norms of practical reasoning in his logic of intentions that heats PayPal, focused on

00:12:01.000 --> 00:12:20.000
couple of days ago. And basically, this logic of practical reasoning is a logical means and reasoning. So the logic does tell us that we shouldn't hold a subject shouldn't hold mutually incompatible intentions, or we shouldn't intend mutually incompatible

00:12:20.000 --> 00:12:43.000
gold simultaneously. But beyond that, the logic simply tells us, given that we have set intentions. What else we auto intent. My intent, by way of of means to achieving these ends that are set by the intentions that we already have

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the logic of intentions.

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If self developed in terms of an analysis of statements, expressing intentions of shell statements.

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And so just an example he also if I intend that my kitchen Shelby clean tonight. Sellers would analyze this as this shell square bracket my kitchen dirty clean.

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Rochelle here expresses my token attitude of intending.

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And the shank in the square brackets expresses a content of the, of the intention here, where the content, simply represents a future possible future state of affairs at my kitchen really clean.

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Shell expresses the token attitude of intending.

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So as Kyle pointed out yesterday and elaborated in detail the statements on our descriptions of intentions. I'm not self ascribing an intention here in so far as I make a statement.

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So in other words the shell here, it's not a cognitive predicate denouncing states of intending.

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It's rather more like a, like an indication of force of the statement.

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It expresses the token attitude of intending that I have. So my statement is a first of all the statement regarding the state of my kitchen nada a second oldest statement about what I intend

00:14:09.000 --> 00:14:19.000
little bit about wishes and desires. According to sell it's just a little bit wishes according to sell us consecutive subjects valuing.

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So, When I value, something.

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I wish for it,

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and sell us says that wishes I expressed by would rather would functions, parallel to the shell that expresses intentions just a shell expresses attitudes of intending would expresses attitudes of wishing.

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So for example, if I wished that my kitchen had been clean last night I would express that wish would my kitchen would have been clean last night.

00:14:51.000 --> 00:15:04.000
And of course we have two words here but don't be confused this word here in the square brackets that just indicates that the state of affairs, that's represented in the square brackets is a counterfactual past state of a fails.

00:15:04.000 --> 00:15:17.000
A key would expression, pressing the wishing is that this word here outside the square brackets on the left, expresses my attitudes of which attitude or wishing

00:15:17.000 --> 00:15:23.000
desire seller says, simply wishes that the subject beliefs can be fulfilled.

00:15:23.000 --> 00:15:26.000
So assuming that my kitchen was early last night.

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The wish that I expressed here would be a meal reddish color don't think that I can change past

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wishes, like desires to have a conceptual title practice emphasizes led to rationally constrain agency and our in the space of reasons. Therefore, I mean even, even this, we can even think of this wish regarding the past cleansing of my kitchen is having

00:15:59.000 --> 00:16:11.000
a very indirect title practice in the sense that well if I somehow could travel back in time 24 hours, I could keep that wish, and then relic would be Irish about the future.

00:16:11.000 --> 00:16:16.000
Right, let's say I'm landing yesterday at noon.

00:16:16.000 --> 00:16:26.000
And then it would motivate my action or would Excel motivational force on my action over the motivation motivational force is understood the normal if terms.

00:16:26.000 --> 00:16:44.000
It normally constraints how I ought to act of course the movie overriding other practical reasons for leaving my kitchen dirty, but it at least center as far as power goes leads to action, or should lead to action.

00:16:44.000 --> 00:16:59.000
Salah says nothing about the logic of, as far as I know of practical reasoning regarding wishing wishes, including desire so and it seems like the silence I mean to me indicates I'm making this this interpretive claim very cautiously and reluctantly it

00:16:59.000 --> 00:17:09.000
seems like he thinks that the same logic intelligence of logic that governs intentions also problems wishes and desires.

00:17:09.000 --> 00:17:24.000
I do this very cautiously and I'm be very happy to be enlightened by those of you who know these as these aspects of his work better, because I mean this interpretive claim I mean if sellers made it, maybe as an interpretive claimants All right, but it

00:17:24.000 --> 00:17:25.000
it seems fault.

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This claim.

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There's nothing irrational to hold incompatible wishes. I think there is something irrational about how holding incompatible intentions.

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But anyway, nothing about what I'm going to say hangs on this interpretation.

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Nothing off the core of what I want to say.

00:17:46.000 --> 00:18:01.000
Still assuming this interpretation, we can make a terminological choice here we can just use intention in a generic sense according to which the term covers any cognitive attitude at all that a conceptual type of practice, including wishes and desires.

00:18:01.000 --> 00:18:12.000
So, so we have generic intentions popular sites with a conceptual title practice contrast that its cognitive states that lack such a tie like beliefs and assumptions.

00:18:12.000 --> 00:18:34.000
And then we can modernize intentions in that generic sense into intentions narrowly conceived wishes desires, and so forth. So when in the following when I, when I use intentions without qualification I'm into using this broad sense.

00:18:34.000 --> 00:18:42.000
The key feature of ordinary intention so I intentions, is that they have a limited presence in the space of reasons.

00:18:42.000 --> 00:18:56.000
So Allah says in science and metaphysics that they only hypothetically reasonable or unreasonable. In other words, reasonable or unreasonable relative to the subjects collateral intentions.

00:18:56.000 --> 00:19:02.000
They are never reasonable or unreasonable in their own right.

00:19:02.000 --> 00:19:09.000
As Allah says they'll never categorically or per se, reasonable or unreasonable.

00:19:09.000 --> 00:19:26.000
And I think this picture follows from the fact that the logic of intention is merely an intent, a logic of, it means and reasoning. So, so it only tells us what it is rationally to intend, given that we have sales collateral intention is already something

00:19:26.000 --> 00:19:41.000
something more general aims and it's never rational in its own right, to form an intention so it seems to me that as far as I intention so ordinary intentions are concerned, seller agrees with a human famous union victim that it's not unreasonable to

00:19:41.000 --> 00:19:45.000
prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.

00:19:45.000 --> 00:19:54.000
It's not unreasonable per se, that's my overarching intention to help destroy the whole world as much as I can.

00:19:54.000 --> 00:20:05.000
It's only unreasonable relative to collateral intentions that I may have such as an intention to promote the flourishing of nature of humankind.

00:20:05.000 --> 00:20:17.000
Or, at least, the flourishing of my kin, and the other sentence

00:20:17.000 --> 00:20:20.000
bottle.

00:20:20.000 --> 00:20:35.000
A consequence of this limited presence of ordinary intentions in the face of reasons is that two subject holding mutually incompatible ordinary intentions, if they if they are in such a situation that situation does not implying that any mistake is committed.

00:20:35.000 --> 00:20:40.000
For example, if you intend that my kitchen show they can eat tonight.

00:20:40.000 --> 00:20:43.000
And I intend that cannot be clean.

00:20:43.000 --> 00:20:55.000
Even though our two intentions are incompatible in the sense that both of our goals cannot be achieved, or the contents of the intentions, logically contradict each other.

00:20:55.000 --> 00:21:01.000
Nevertheless, the situation our situation here does not imply that anyone makes any mistake.

00:21:01.000 --> 00:21:09.000
After all your intention, maybe perfectly reasonable relative to your collateral intentions.

00:21:09.000 --> 00:21:13.000
My maybe my maybe perfectly.

00:21:13.000 --> 00:21:16.000
Hypothetically reasonable relative to mine.

00:21:16.000 --> 00:21:25.000
And then there is no further question to be asked which of the two intentions is really reasonable. In other words, reasonable in its own right.

00:21:25.000 --> 00:21:40.000
So, So given, given this our situation here, despite the compatibility or the content of the goals that we have does not imply any mistake is committed by any one of us here.

00:21:40.000 --> 00:21:42.000
So sales.

00:21:42.000 --> 00:21:49.000
Using, I think Stevenson's term calls these situations with mutual incompatible contents.

00:21:49.000 --> 00:21:55.000
Well, no mistake is committed disagreements and attitude.

00:21:55.000 --> 00:22:11.000
So given that the situation implies no mistake for Chiari, it does not impose any obligations on us to reconcile aim so values, not even prime aphasia obligations there's no sense in which we auto adjust our goal to each other, maybe prudent to do it.

00:22:11.000 --> 00:22:17.000
But there's nothing to rationally recommend that we ought to do it.

00:22:17.000 --> 00:22:36.000
In this regard, ordinary intentions contrast it with beliefs beliefs are politically correct or incorrect for saying true or false, and hence two subjects expressing to each other, mutually incompatible beliefs clash logically, in the sense that they

00:22:36.000 --> 00:22:53.000
are situation does imply that a mistake is committed contrast to the parallel situation and I intention so for example if you believe about the future that my kitchen really clean tonight, and I believe that it will not be clean tonight.

00:22:53.000 --> 00:23:00.000
And our situation implies that at least one of those beliefs is mistaken.

00:23:00.000 --> 00:23:17.000
By the way these statements here I'm mean those to be analogous to shell statements so the true is meant here to express the attitude of belief, and the square bracket, bracket of chunks of contents beliefs.

00:23:17.000 --> 00:23:36.000
But not only does the situation here, imply a mistake, but Salah seems to think that the situation, also does empower a prime official obligation on us to resolve the issue regarding the future state of my kitchen.

00:23:36.000 --> 00:23:50.000
So we auto adjust our docs and stick attitudes one way or another, that is what the situation prime FHA obliges us to do, of course, it doesn't apply just all things considered, we may have much more pressing and important things to do that married much

00:23:50.000 --> 00:23:54.000
more intense attention been trying to solve this out here.

00:23:54.000 --> 00:23:57.000
But still the obligations prime aphasia.

00:23:57.000 --> 00:24:11.000
So how can we explain that, according to the cells of science and metaphysics. Well, tell us indicates that he thinks of truth as a special case of categorical reasonableness science metaphysics page to 10.

00:24:11.000 --> 00:24:15.000
So, it seems to think that a proposition.

00:24:15.000 --> 00:24:25.000
If it's true, just because it's true. It makes a certain claim to be a center to any rational being.

00:24:25.000 --> 00:24:39.000
That's what it meant by categorical reasonable that's.

00:24:39.000 --> 00:24:30.000
Now of course, that's not right if we recognize it without a false belief in its own right, abstracting from any epistemic considerations that may speak for that believe although it's false.

00:24:30.000 --> 00:24:52.000
He also suggests two pages earlier that believes themselves in a different sense also come with a claim to categorical reasonableness.

00:24:52.000 --> 00:24:58.000
So in its own right, a false belief doesn't come in, and in any sense with a claim to categorical reasonableness.

00:24:58.000 --> 00:25:11.000
But I suggest the following interpretation of this claim that there's a different sense in which they do come with such a claim. Mainly, they come so from the perspective of the believer, holding the belief, even if its faults.

00:25:11.000 --> 00:25:36.000
And, as well as from the perspective of someone exposed to an expression of that belief one of those true statements here right I mean, from the believer, holding a false belief, but P.

00:25:36.000 --> 00:25:46.000
And hence, something that makes us up and claim on any rational being to be accept that related lead someone exposed to the believers expression of that belief.

00:25:46.000 --> 00:25:49.000
True P.

00:25:49.000 --> 00:26:03.000
Although although, although that believe all may reject that at least the statement advances p to the hero to the addressee as something categorically reasonable because the true expresses the attitude of belief.

00:26:03.000 --> 00:26:14.000
So P is advanced that something true and just categorically reasonable and last statement, makes a certain claim to be assented to on the hero.

00:26:14.000 --> 00:26:20.000
Of course the hero may have all sorts of excellent reasons for rejecting that claim. Still, it comes with a plan.

00:26:20.000 --> 00:26:29.000
So I think if you think of truth and beliefs, along these lines, it follows that a logical pledge such as yours and mine up here.

00:26:29.000 --> 00:26:46.000
That situation if they are they are. It empowers as a prime official obligation on us to adjust our classic attitudes, one way or another, to each other regarding my kitchen.

00:26:46.000 --> 00:26:49.000
All right, pop to intentions within the subjective form.

00:26:49.000 --> 00:26:53.000
That's the main topic of my paper.

00:26:53.000 --> 00:27:06.000
So, so the cells of science and metaphysics, on a classical reading which I follow wants to say that a moral judgment is a certain kind of intention moral judgments are not beliefs.

00:27:06.000 --> 00:27:09.000
They are intentions.

00:27:09.000 --> 00:27:17.000
And so Alice wants to say that because he wants to be a motivational internally stuff SOS SOS and for him. What that means is the.

00:27:17.000 --> 00:27:27.000
He wants a moral judgment to be a cognitive state that has a normative tie to practice. And so it's got to be an intention, not a belief.

00:27:27.000 --> 00:27:37.000
And he also wants to say, Come, that moral intention moral judgments I believe like and potentially giving rise to interpersonal disagreement.

00:27:37.000 --> 00:27:42.000
Unlike ordinary intentions.

00:27:42.000 --> 00:27:57.000
And they do give rise potentially to interpersonal disagreement because moral judgments and Michelle statements expressing them come with a certain claim to categorical reasonableness.

00:27:57.000 --> 00:28:15.000
And so this feature is due to which moral intentions can be the claim to carry on top right corner reasonableness he calls into subjective form that feature do to which we can genuinely into personally disagree.

00:28:15.000 --> 00:28:27.000
So here are a couple of passages, by sellers on into subjective form I have an interpretation, and then an elaboration of that interpretation, those are famous passage just pallets of which I mean at least among us and I'd say it was a monster possible

00:28:27.000 --> 00:28:28.000
in general but thanks, but to dozens of us here they are.

00:28:28.000 --> 00:28:40.000
but and thanks to dozens of us here they are. So from science and metaphysics pages to 2021. He says the following on into subjective form.

00:28:40.000 --> 00:28:50.000
What is to be expected the expressive counterpart of the description. Smith values from a mala moral point of view, blah blah blah blah blah.

00:28:50.000 --> 00:28:53.000
The answer suggests itself.

00:28:53.000 --> 00:29:14.000
We would that blah blah, roughly to value from a moral point of view, is to value as a member of the relevant community, which is fine, as the present argument is concerned, I shall assumed to be mankind, generally, all rational beings.

00:29:14.000 --> 00:29:21.000
Notice at the above sentence which expresses a value and meaning the second one here, we would that

00:29:21.000 --> 00:29:29.000
must not be confused with the plural value, description, the value such and such.

00:29:29.000 --> 00:29:32.000
It is still an individual who is valuing.

00:29:32.000 --> 00:29:36.000
But he is valuing in terms of week.

00:29:36.000 --> 00:29:37.000
And then a little later.

00:29:37.000 --> 00:29:46.000
We may well indeed often do differ in what we value as members of the community that in principle that could be agreement.

00:29:46.000 --> 00:29:52.000
We would that lacks logical privacy of, I would that.

00:29:52.000 --> 00:30:08.000
So I'm taking at least another one related one the are the values which are expressed by ethical statements are universal in three dimensions in their content, and some of the talks yesterday focused on that I'm setting that aside, be in their subjective

00:30:08.000 --> 00:30:20.000
form, I either logical into subjectivity, he would that and then see maybe important later on to in the objectivity, namely that there is in principle a decision procedure with respect to specific ethical statements.

00:30:20.000 --> 00:30:25.000
Anyway, for things we can take away from from that at least.

00:30:25.000 --> 00:30:40.000
First of all, sell us things that into subjective form as a certain field person plural feature, indicated by we rather we include all rational beings, or rational beings, at least for moral the intentions.

00:30:40.000 --> 00:30:56.000
And it's a feature of moral intentions class dates or attitudes, as opposed to content, feature of content, and more about I'm putting those two together, an intrinsic feature of moral intentions class states of attitudes, why is that because Allah says

00:30:56.000 --> 00:31:03.000
that we would that are we shall that expresses that feature.

00:31:03.000 --> 00:31:20.000
And he makes clear in the context of his introduction of shell statements and and the ways he distinguishes shell statements from a description of believes that he takes these kinds of expressions as expressions of attitudes for Surely if sell us for

00:31:20.000 --> 00:31:36.000
that inter subjective form is an is a it is an extra extrinsic feature of moral we intentions, maybe a feature that arises due to having collateral belief or mutual recognition, sell us what I've said so it doesn't.

00:31:36.000 --> 00:31:44.000
So he says it's expressed by the expression that expresses the attitude.

00:31:44.000 --> 00:32:02.000
Lastly, sell us also indicates in those patients passages that we intentions morally intentions are ontological individualistic so that even though they have like that first person plural feature, it's possible for someone to morally we intend all by

00:32:02.000 --> 00:32:08.000
themselves. Now when I will share that with intention.

00:32:08.000 --> 00:32:15.000
As far as I can see Salah does not say much more about what he means by into subjective form and science and metaphysics.

00:32:15.000 --> 00:32:29.000
And I want to offer now an elaboration on his behalf of what he what his suggestion of what it could have meant how he could have elaborated it elaboration really interesting.

00:32:29.000 --> 00:32:35.000
So my proposal exactly is this on behalf of sellers that when one forms a token moral intention that P.

00:32:35.000 --> 00:32:44.000
When ipso facto does two things. First of all, old news on sets p as a goal. Well that's simply because one forms an intention.

00:32:44.000 --> 00:32:57.000
But here's a new bit my that's my proposal, and when one morally intense that P one on not only sets p as a gold mine also it's a fact or treats p, instead of si P.

00:32:57.000 --> 00:33:08.000
As a goal, and we joined the auto realize. Rather we includes all rational beings.

00:33:08.000 --> 00:33:26.000
So in other words, my suggestion is that when one morally be intense that P. One ipso facto takes us up normative attitude towards any rational beings at all, mainly to help realize the very goal that is set by intending it oneself.

00:33:26.000 --> 00:33:37.000
And I'm thinking of this is normative attitudes here as built into the attitude of we intending. So it's a feature of the attitude about the state of attitude of we intended.

00:33:37.000 --> 00:33:47.000
It's not a feature of the content of the intention nor feature of collateral cognitive states, it's built into the cognitive attitude itself normative attitude.

00:33:47.000 --> 00:33:55.000
We got two different kinds of attitudes of intending right that's the mode account so we we get I intending where you said peace employee as a goal.

00:33:55.000 --> 00:34:08.000
And then we intended moral the internal very only not not set it as a goal, but also normatively expect that everybody ought to pursue that goal as well everybody else.

00:34:08.000 --> 00:34:11.000
That's the proposal.

00:34:11.000 --> 00:34:19.000
That's what I propose selves, could have how sellers could have interpreted into subjective form that concept of in the subject before.

00:34:19.000 --> 00:34:32.000
Well if nothing else, I want to say that this proposal a call to the fall features are subjective forms as was mentioned in those clouds first of all it's clearly a first person plural feature that we jointly here.

00:34:32.000 --> 00:34:38.000
Second of all, it's a feature of the intending choir attitude.

00:34:38.000 --> 00:34:48.000
And indeed an intrinsic feature as I just said elaborated right the moment of attitude is built into the attitude of we intending here.

00:34:48.000 --> 00:34:51.000
So its intrinsic in the attitude.

00:34:51.000 --> 00:35:02.000
And then it's also ontological individualistic I don't know whether my proposal strictly implies that but it highly suggest that if Smith morally be intense that P.

00:35:02.000 --> 00:35:04.000
Then on my proposal.

00:35:04.000 --> 00:35:14.000
If so facto treats p as what we jointly ought to help realize Smith ipso facto takes us up normative attitude towards us jointly.

00:35:14.000 --> 00:35:28.000
Of course it does not follow that anyone else. They facto we intense that P as well in other words that anyone else needs this moment of attitude individualistic in that sense.

00:35:28.000 --> 00:35:45.000
Now that proposal raises a ton of questions, some friendly questions about hostile. I mentioned for. In the interest of time I'm only answering here but first one but I want to indicate three other questions maybe, maybe for discussion.

00:35:45.000 --> 00:35:51.000
At the end, and I want to give key bolts of how I how I think I would like to answer those on behalf of sellers.

00:35:51.000 --> 00:36:11.000
So the first objection it's invited vector objection, this guy says a question is, is, well, this proposal appears to miracles. Right How is it possible rhetorical question is to treat PS to be the state of affairs that PS to be realized my ass jointly,

00:36:11.000 --> 00:36:15.000
simply by forming an attitude of intending with the content that P.

00:36:15.000 --> 00:36:24.000
So the object may say well I can, assuming that we have a good account of concepts, including normative concepts.

00:36:24.000 --> 00:36:33.000
It may not be miraculous to explain how we can believe that we jointly or to help realize that P.

00:36:33.000 --> 00:36:42.000
Putting the audience with the content of the belief, on how can I treat unrestricted Lee everybody so obliged simply by taking an attitude.

00:36:42.000 --> 00:36:45.000
That seems like a miracle.

00:36:45.000 --> 00:37:04.000
And my answer to this would be that that's a legitimate objection. Given propositional attitude psychology. And why is that because we are appealing to cognitive attitudes or in at least in the framework of propositional attitude psychology, which we

00:37:04.000 --> 00:37:09.000
are all familiar, and with which we are all fairly comfortable. I take it.

00:37:09.000 --> 00:37:23.000
We constantly appeal to attitudes, as doing these things that are claimed to be mysterious here, in a sense, I agree. Yep, that's a deep question how do we do these things, by taking cognitive attitudes.

00:37:23.000 --> 00:37:32.000
But I want to say, it's not just a deep question regarding my proposal it's a deep question regarding any propositional attitude I mean take take belief.

00:37:32.000 --> 00:37:39.000
So belief is the attitude of holding true, that's the first step into coming up with an account of belief.

00:37:39.000 --> 00:37:48.000
And so how is it possible to treat a proposition as objectively true, just by taking a belief attitude towards it.

00:37:48.000 --> 00:37:52.000
The same kind of deep question, right.

00:37:52.000 --> 00:38:04.000
So I want to say well I'm just appealing to something that be anyway already to be given that we work within the framework of propositional attitude psychology and so that's a legitimate question, it's a legitimate to single out my proposal the on the

00:38:04.000 --> 00:38:22.000
of sellers and try to dismiss it, while at the same time, sticking with propositional attitude psychology. But the challenge here would be challenged to either come up with a clear count of, of the belief attitude, and then show that, that is residual

00:38:22.000 --> 00:38:33.000
mystery in my proposal regarding the intentions, or the challenge would be to come up with an alternative to propositional attitude psychology.

00:38:33.000 --> 00:38:40.000
That's how I would answer that objection, or three more objections are actually questions.

00:38:40.000 --> 00:38:52.000
One objection to questions, and I only mentioned, our using keywords how I would answer them. How should we understand that we intending subjects ends of us jointly.

00:38:52.000 --> 00:39:09.000
We either built into the attitude, how should we understand that and I want to say, simplicity. So it's all five so subject forms of moral the intention.

00:39:09.000 --> 00:39:32.000
We all as the subject sense of all come from, like we are. We joined the order to help realize pi, want to answer this by adopting against bikes normative primitivism, which he develops in the context of weakens the union issues about will following.

00:39:32.000 --> 00:39:49.000
And it briefly the idea is that the sense of all does not come from any antecedent we given moral rules or moral effects, nor does it come from any independent combinations of such facts files objects subject.

00:39:49.000 --> 00:40:05.000
It's the subject is that's in that sense of odd, but it's not fair like explained in terms of moral principles or moral rules are independent moral cognition systems that that sense primitive and against like I would you adopt of you.

00:40:05.000 --> 00:40:10.000
For this project, for.

00:40:10.000 --> 00:40:21.000
Remember I follow the classical interpretation according to which sellers identifies moral v intentions with moral judgments.

00:40:21.000 --> 00:40:31.000
And so this is an objection objection is this that I can morally judge that the board or the populace budget.

00:40:31.000 --> 00:40:41.000
I've been a judge so it's just not the case that I treat unrestricted Lee everybody has obliged to help realize that the board, published the budget.

00:40:41.000 --> 00:40:55.000
Right, I'm not treating people in the past or in the future, or people in faraway places or people in the wrong episode in certain epistemic situations, epistemic or semantic situations so obliged.

00:40:55.000 --> 00:41:08.000
And it seems like my proposal implies that that I do. And so the challenge is that that's. Therefore, my, my proposal is in trouble.

00:41:08.000 --> 00:41:14.000
At least the identification of moral the intentions with moral judgments is in trouble. And perhaps more.

00:41:14.000 --> 00:41:31.000
And so, that's a great objection, a challenge. And in response to that, I would, refine the proposal of what moral intentions and and our subjective form are in a certain way and I'm only giving the keynote Hill, Tom cognitive all right and so we can

00:41:31.000 --> 00:41:37.000
talk about that a little bit later.

00:41:37.000 --> 00:41:42.000
sip of water.

00:41:42.000 --> 00:42:04.000
I wanna say now a little bit about the sense in which a moral v intention. On my proposal makes a claim to categorical reasonableness and elegantly to believe, and hence can give rise to genuine interpersonal agreement and disagreement, let's just recap.

00:42:04.000 --> 00:42:11.000
A subjects moral the intending that P intrinsically involves aspiring a realization of P.

00:42:11.000 --> 00:42:21.000
and crucially, as treating P of what rejoined the auto help realize, this isn't a subject to form.

00:42:21.000 --> 00:42:23.000
Right.

00:42:23.000 --> 00:42:30.000
So due to the subject of form I want to say, on my proposal morally intentions and their expressions to.

00:42:30.000 --> 00:42:41.000
There's a sense in which they do now make a claim to practical categorical reasonableness analogous linked to the way a belief, makes a claim to categorical reasonableness.

00:42:41.000 --> 00:42:49.000
Remember, I mean, a belief and its expression makes a claim to categorical reasonableness in the sense that well from the point of view of a believer.

00:42:49.000 --> 00:42:50.000
He is true.

00:42:50.000 --> 00:43:06.000
And hence, something that ought to be accepted by any rational being or makes a claim to be accepted by any rational being, and from the point of view of someone exposed to a statement expressing of belief content that P as advanced as to enhance in this

00:43:06.000 --> 00:43:17.000
And hence, in this sense, makes us up and claim on the addressee to endorse p by forming the belief itself. I want to say something parallel is going on here.

00:43:17.000 --> 00:43:23.000
The practical category, the claim to practical categorical reasonableness.

00:43:23.000 --> 00:43:45.000
We intention, a moral the intention and expression is this that the content that P is regarded by the be intending subject as something that we jointly ought to help realize, I want to say that that regarding the regarding the regarding of P, as, as practically

00:43:45.000 --> 00:43:57.000
categorically reasonable in the way in which believers, regarding PS true is the regarding of PS theoretically categorically reasonable.

00:43:57.000 --> 00:44:10.000
Similarly, someone exposed to a, an expression of moral v intentions is exposed to the content that PS something that we ought to

00:44:10.000 --> 00:44:15.000
the state of affairs of P is something that we ought to help realize.

00:44:15.000 --> 00:44:23.000
And so in that sense P is advanced that's something that's practically practically categorically reasonable.

00:44:23.000 --> 00:44:36.000
It makes a certain claim to be a center to buy a rational beings, of course the ascent here would not be to form the belief that pn response the ascent would be well to share that normative expectation on us jointly and how do we share it by forming and

00:44:36.000 --> 00:44:47.000
response. The morally intention ourselves. We intending that P ourselves there by treating p as what we jointly or to help realize.

00:44:47.000 --> 00:45:01.000
So, and I want to say that if that is so if more of a intentions that P make a claim to practical categorical reasonableness in that sense then they are apt to be into personally agreed or disagreed with just want to run two examples here so let's focus

00:45:01.000 --> 00:45:03.000
on agreement.

00:45:03.000 --> 00:45:11.000
Take two characters Imani and Sookie and Imani beliefs.

00:45:11.000 --> 00:45:13.000
More.

00:45:13.000 --> 00:45:23.000
Sorry, intense morally we intense, that the ball we land, so it's an old story for us, slightly different cast of characters.

00:45:23.000 --> 00:45:35.000
Now, given the reductive view that moral reenter moral judgments are moral the intention the shell v here, expresses the moral law so Imani

00:45:35.000 --> 00:45:48.000
morally judges that the war auto end. And what does what that means for her that she forms a moral the intention that the water land and Zaki publicly as a freelance in response to him and his statement.

00:45:48.000 --> 00:45:56.000
Yes. So from a man's perspective, let's look at the situation Romanies perspective social we intense, that the wall.

00:45:56.000 --> 00:45:59.000
Auto and

00:45:59.000 --> 00:46:13.000
she's expressed that statement in Sookie in response to that statement the film said, there are indicating publicly shared that your shell set intention from from a manager's perspective.

00:46:13.000 --> 00:46:21.000
Couple of things are going on. First of all, since Imani it's crucial I mean Imani recognizes zucchini as one of us.

00:46:21.000 --> 00:46:23.000
Okay.

00:46:23.000 --> 00:46:38.000
So from a man's perspective due to all of those ingredients. She now regards that the wall will end as jointly aspire to with zucchini, given her own real intention, and its expression and Sookie is public information.

00:46:38.000 --> 00:46:40.000
Mama.

00:46:40.000 --> 00:46:55.000
She now treats the content that the wall will end is jointly regarded baszucki as what we all joined the order to help realize, in other words from a man's point of view that content.

00:46:55.000 --> 00:47:01.000
Is she she recognizes zucchini as joining her in treating that content.

00:47:01.000 --> 00:47:04.000
It's practically categorically reasonable.

00:47:04.000 --> 00:47:09.000
So that's what I suggest is genuine interpersonal agreement

00:47:09.000 --> 00:47:25.000
disagreement briefly say a similar story Imani says, We intense, that the wall or end and expresses it, and Suki rejects it.

00:47:25.000 --> 00:47:36.000
We could very quickly Suki could remain your 12 would be similar, but let's say rejected, thereby.

00:47:36.000 --> 00:47:44.000
So again from a manager's perspective you to have the intention and its expression and so case public descent.

00:47:44.000 --> 00:47:55.000
Well basic the basic idea here is in disagreement, we have now a situation where a normative expectation on unrestricted Lee all of us is issued.

00:47:55.000 --> 00:48:06.000
You to sue keys intention and its expression, and one of us Zaki publicly rejects that normative expectation on on all of us.

00:48:06.000 --> 00:48:09.000
That's the idea behind disagreement.

00:48:09.000 --> 00:48:10.000
Right.

00:48:10.000 --> 00:48:22.000
She Imani treats that the ball shell on our end is what we have at the wall and it's what we joined you realize, and treats this normal of expectations unfulfilled baszucki was one of us.

00:48:22.000 --> 00:48:32.000
So there is a normal expectation on one of us, which is rejected by one of on all of us which is rejected by one of us.

00:48:32.000 --> 00:48:43.000
And so I want to say that that is disagreement about that normative expectation that is issued mainly rather we ought we joined the auto help and the wall.

00:48:43.000 --> 00:48:59.000
And I want to say that analogous to logical classes and beliefs, that's that situation. Regardless, any background, and whatever else is going on regarding any reasons that Imani and zucchini have may may have for their respective

00:48:59.000 --> 00:49:05.000
attitudes regarding the issue, the situation implies that so mistake is

00:49:05.000 --> 00:49:20.000
this analogous lead to I intentions, namely a real intention on all of us is issued, and someone rejects it, or mistake is implied here. Mobile thinks it's a normative expectation, it's strong more strongly and promises the prime official obligation on

00:49:20.000 --> 00:49:28.000
the money and so cool resolve the mistake, what to do with that hanging normative expectation on all of us.

00:49:28.000 --> 00:49:31.000
It's very important for my father's project.

00:49:31.000 --> 00:49:41.000
I want to emphasize it although I emphasizing this only now that the situation under determines how the mistake, or to be resolved.

00:49:41.000 --> 00:49:54.000
Now, three ways in which it can be resolved, either zookeeper gets around to accept the moral the intention or the normative expectation demand is on all of us.

00:49:54.000 --> 00:50:10.000
So then the mistake is dissolved, or Imani gets around to drop tomorrow. Be intention and form the opposite moral the intention that the world will not end.

00:50:10.000 --> 00:50:19.000
Comments comes around Kazuki, then there is consonants in normative expectations, between the two of them all failed me is to just get become agnostic.

00:50:19.000 --> 00:50:33.000
So both sides drop their morally intentions. And so that's another way of getting rid of the normative expectation that has been used to be just withdraw it, but it's crucial that it's under the tournament so the proposal that's not I think implies some

00:50:33.000 --> 00:50:36.000
crazy kind of egocentrism.

00:50:36.000 --> 00:50:54.000
Well, the proposal would imply that everybody ought to come around to the way I see things morally right. I mean, given that the whenever we have this kind of disagreement situation under determines how it ought to go.

00:50:54.000 --> 00:51:08.000
There is no such crazy egocentrism. Now there may still be psychologically speaking egocentrism it's cognitively easier to stick one's own moral judgments and to dismiss someone else's so there's important psychological issues here of why we tend to do

00:51:08.000 --> 00:51:16.000
that. Sticking to our own views, rather than always coming around to the, the, the other, but normatively.

00:51:16.000 --> 00:51:21.000
It's not required that the other come around to my view.

00:51:21.000 --> 00:51:37.000
I know I think I'm already in overtime and but I'm but I'm done just conclusion here so I'm wrapping up is laid out my, my, my elaboration on so let's be half of it might mean by into subject performance science and metaphysics, namely that moral the

00:51:37.000 --> 00:51:49.000
moral judgments choir attitudes involve that implicit normative attitude on us jointly, all of us. That's the heart of a proposal, and that by get agreement or disagreement.

00:51:49.000 --> 00:52:03.000
And actually, thereby moral judgments, or moral v intentions and the statements expressing them become subject of public scrutiny and public inquiry.

00:52:03.000 --> 00:52:14.000
So I've made that proposal, of course the proposal invites a ton of your other question. First of all, how does that relate to intentions to do.

00:52:14.000 --> 00:52:17.000
That's a big question actually.

00:52:17.000 --> 00:52:23.000
I started thinking about that but not much. So, that's the way in which the project needs to be elaborated.

00:52:23.000 --> 00:52:40.000
How does this proposal relate to sell of electric fundamental principle of morality that we all ought to have the overarching moral the intention that each and all of us are to promote the welfare of anyone all of us component so far says nothing about

00:52:40.000 --> 00:52:49.000
that, how does this relate to sell of naturalism harking back to Jim's paper and and Zach's.

00:52:49.000 --> 00:53:03.000
And then how does that relate to other attempts by sellers to account for the intentions, particularly on reasoning about value. And I think Stephanie has basically given the answer that, on reasoning about value doesn't work out, as, as a textural basis

00:53:03.000 --> 00:53:07.000
for motivated my proposal here, my reference.

00:53:07.000 --> 00:53:17.000
Read All right. Thank you Rob and I apologize for not not stepping in earlier, I was looking at the wrong time on a sheet.

00:53:17.000 --> 00:53:26.000
But just raise your hands, or, or, we'll take questions. So Nick I guess your first.

00:53:26.000 --> 00:53:34.000
Hey, thanks, um, I want to hear about cognitive overriding cuz that fourth point there was the first thing that I thought of when you gave your proposal.

00:53:34.000 --> 00:53:48.000
So, tell us about kind of overriding. Yeah, so, so as far as my proposal is concerned, right, the issue is that if I morally be intent that P, for example, that the board shell that the board will publish the budget.

00:53:48.000 --> 00:54:00.000
I implicitly trade anyone unrestricted Leah, everybody has applied to help board realize, help realize that the ball published about that.

00:54:00.000 --> 00:54:02.000
And I want to say that.

00:54:02.000 --> 00:54:19.000
Just as I mean, and this is an analogy. I'm not claiming here, a structural same of some kind of Isom office about an analogy is or just as de facto moral obligations can be overwritten by federal Felber considerations.

00:54:19.000 --> 00:54:35.000
So, the subject treatment of all of us as obliged. Given how moral v intention, can be overwritten by further combinations, about the epistemic situation or the semantic situation of individuals and groups.

00:54:35.000 --> 00:54:41.000
Right. So for example, if I have morally the intent that the board will publish it.

00:54:41.000 --> 00:54:53.000
And so if I say this concept yes I treat people in the past as as as morally obligated to help realize that, but then a component to that as a combination that well they are in the past.

00:54:53.000 --> 00:55:10.000
And that, that overrides it similar with people in other different epistemic situation or him not having the concept of what a ball is etc. So, yeah.

00:55:10.000 --> 00:55:27.000
Preston. Thanks. So, this is just going to be a liner point on something I've been hammering away at for a couple of years, and I appreciate it you flagging like do at the beginning, but that's really, I mean, You know, if you don't make a distinction

00:55:27.000 --> 00:55:37.000
between what ought to be in what Shelby, you get all kinds of problems. I mean, how are you going to count for the strong and the week, what's the distinction between what's permitted and what's obliged.

00:55:37.000 --> 00:55:50.000
And furthermore, The claim that, you know, we shall go to war but we ought not becomes just a straightforward contradiction, which that looks wrong, there's some kind of practical rationality there but it's not contradictory to say it.

00:55:50.000 --> 00:56:02.000
So, this is just a way of encouraging you to take seriously the need to distinguish in a way that's more fine grained and sellers the shared intention, and the bionic mental state.

00:56:02.000 --> 00:56:14.000
My hope would be that, that by looking at the notion of single mindedness, you might tease out ways of making sense of disagreement, because maybe the one is rejecting something that the other is not, and that will be a way of spelling it out.

00:56:14.000 --> 00:56:23.000
That would be my hope but anyway I'm just sort of hammering on the table that look we really got to take seriously that distinction here that seller sort of indicates with his choice attitude, but it doesn't go into enough detail.

00:56:23.000 --> 00:56:40.000
So, that's it. No question just to kind of, you know, seriously. And I don't press and I really do. I have started thinking precisely about that issue so which is actually by I'm not sanguine about this, This reductive interpretation that allows you in

00:56:40.000 --> 00:56:46.000
in order to identify moral judgments with with these what are called moral the intentions.

00:56:46.000 --> 00:56:56.000
So species, the way I think about a species of a genius of practical practical rationality but but they're not identical.

00:56:56.000 --> 00:56:58.000
Stephanie.

00:56:58.000 --> 00:56:59.000
Yeah.

00:56:59.000 --> 00:57:22.000
Thank you. I have two questions. One short one first. On one of your last slides I think, be sure what was one of the last ones. You said that Imani and Suki they disagree about whether we jointly ought to help end the war, and that would seem to indicate

00:57:22.000 --> 00:57:39.000
that this is something propositional right but you're not want to say that if you want to say that's an attitude that we ought to help jointly that the war and so that maybe was just a matter of formulation I'm not sure.

00:57:39.000 --> 00:57:45.000
Yeah, so that's something that, that

00:57:45.000 --> 00:58:02.000
just caught my eye. And then the second question is maybe more serious one. I would like to press you a bit on the circularity issue that be discussed a bit already, because of course your proposal say as a self stunning proposal that that's probably

00:58:02.000 --> 00:58:08.000
something which makes sense. Yeah, but as an interpretation of centers, does that.

00:58:08.000 --> 00:58:26.000
Does it make sense to say that a we intention is an attitude that all of us, or to jointly help realize something yeah but because service wants to give an account of old statements in terms of we intentions.

00:58:26.000 --> 00:58:41.000
And now you reintroduce the art into the intention so that would not seem to be very helpful. As far as services concerns are concerned, and I know that you want to say that okay these all this this art attitude expressed about it in a way intention that

00:58:41.000 --> 00:59:01.000
This this art attitude expressed about it in a way intention that this is a primitive normative attitude like an account but I'm not sure that these primitive attitudes are enough to get you what you want, and because in spurts attitudes that normative

00:59:01.000 --> 00:59:17.000
editors they're really primitive attitudes and just predictively I think that this would be an empirical proposal. Yeah, in thesis Yes, there should be something good, which we all don't verify empirically before we can really build something on it.

00:59:17.000 --> 00:59:38.000
But because we discussed the the issue whether the when you treat us jointly, as people who are obliged to realize something, then you we treat each other, already as ends and not as mere means, yeah.

00:59:38.000 --> 00:59:52.000
Otherwise, maybe we could not use your attitude to distinguish I intentions and we intentions. So this art which you have there in the way intention attitude that seems not to be a very primitive art, it already seems to be quite sophisticated art, like

00:59:52.000 --> 01:00:05.000
seeing others as ends in themselves and that mere means and I'm not sure whether these primitive normative attitudes that you take from Ginsberg can do all this work.

01:00:05.000 --> 01:00:08.000
Thank you.

01:00:08.000 --> 01:00:24.000
Thanks Stephanie regarding your first little point so I do want to say that disagreement here that situation of disagreement is not not mediated by by conceptual representations on the part of the participants of the situation as well as one real disagreement.

01:00:24.000 --> 01:00:32.000
Okay, so I do want to say that the disagreement is just a feature of the attitudes right i mean so the only, only content that is a play is Pete that P.

01:00:32.000 --> 01:00:34.000
on the conceptual content. So that's what I want to say.

01:00:34.000 --> 01:00:41.000
So that's what I want to say. Regarding the circularity issue.

01:00:41.000 --> 01:01:01.000
So normally primitivism just just background right that's the view that you can take a perform in Hannah Ginsberg, that you can take. I mean, Richard she develops that in the context of discussing role following issues can rip and replace with compliant

01:01:01.000 --> 01:01:13.000
literature. And so the idea is that a subject treats fairly basic performance as when she counts 2468 s correct.

01:01:13.000 --> 01:01:30.000
So he takes an attitude of treating treating those performances as correct, and then its key of the primitivism that this treatment by the subject of the performances as correct is not further explained in terms of antecedent are independently given semantic

01:01:30.000 --> 01:01:47.000
given semantic norms, nor in terms of antecedent Lee or independently given combinations, by the subject of any poor punitive semantic non so that's the primitivism it's just to refuse to give any further explanation about the sense of correctness.

01:01:47.000 --> 01:02:05.000
Okay. And so by an elegantly I want to I want to say that the sense of art is primitive in the sense that it's not explained in terms of further antecedent be given moral norms are independently given.

01:02:05.000 --> 01:02:15.000
primitive in that sense. And so, why exactly doesn't give it to me.

01:02:15.000 --> 01:02:21.000
What I want so so I mean tell us that's one to explain the moral art.

01:02:21.000 --> 01:02:37.000
And I'm just going primitive, right, so here's one thing I do want to say I mean, I don't know whether that's what you just had in mind Stephanie but, I mean, ginsburg does not appeal of a sense of us jointly, and I do appeal to that so that's an additional

01:02:37.000 --> 01:02:38.000
bit.

01:02:38.000 --> 01:02:53.000
But, arguably, he implicitly invokes that too. When I treat 246 s correct. Someone could ask well correct for whom, and kinsfolk to answer is presumably not just, I'm not just treating it as correct for me.

01:02:53.000 --> 01:03:12.000
But correct for us speak of our language, although she doesn't make it explicit about as a sense of us, arguably at least implicit in our proposal already, which would mesh with mine, I'm not sure well that addresses the heart of your concern though.

01:03:12.000 --> 01:03:18.000
I'm not sure either but I think we will discuss that further anyway.

01:03:18.000 --> 01:03:19.000
Yeah.

01:03:19.000 --> 01:03:23.000
All right, Danielle.

01:03:23.000 --> 01:03:29.000
Yeah. Thank you, that was, that was really interesting I actually I want to pick up.

01:03:29.000 --> 01:03:37.000
I think I think this is closely connected to Stephanie's first question, because it seems to me that this idea of.

01:03:37.000 --> 01:03:51.000
I mean I'm, I'm really sympathetic to this but I'm a little bit worried about the formulation what we we jointly ought to help realize, and it seems to me that one could agree with the content.

01:03:51.000 --> 01:04:12.000
Um, so, I agree, that, that, that the war should should should be ended. But perhaps I wanted from for personal reasons for I intentions you know like it's it's getting in the way of my business interests.

01:04:12.000 --> 01:04:25.000
So, surely, true, that's true. So, it seems to me that that uh we intention and I want to go back and use the analogy that I use in a question to Stephanie.

01:04:25.000 --> 01:04:46.000
A we intention doesn't just intend that others help realize it, but they do it with a V intention, so it again, if you think of beliefs, I can either just sort of speak from my experience, you know, in my in my own personal experience self concept perceptual

01:04:46.000 --> 01:04:47.000
judgment.

01:04:47.000 --> 01:05:02.000
Two things are conjoined, or I can say no they've been joined in the world. Well, if somebody agrees with me but they don't, they say well yeah it's conjoined in my experience too and I said no no no, that's not that's not enough, you ought to be judging,

01:05:02.000 --> 01:05:06.000
that it is contained in the world.

01:05:06.000 --> 01:05:10.000
And similarly with the intention, it seems to me.

01:05:10.000 --> 01:05:19.000
It's not enough that the person says oh yeah I have that I intention, no no no You, you, you already have a we intention.

01:05:19.000 --> 01:05:33.000
It's so, so I think there could be a disagreement in attitude, even if there was agreement in content and I think that would be a problem for, and I think, I think we jointly just doesn't have.

01:05:33.000 --> 01:05:47.000
I think it needs to capture that extra thing maybe you would disagree with that, but I don't think we jointly does capture that if that's something you think needs to be captured that when I have a we intention.

01:05:47.000 --> 01:05:57.000
Part of the scope of that is anyone ought to so intend in some sense and that means not just the content but also the form.

01:05:57.000 --> 01:06:01.000
I do want to agree with 100%.

01:06:01.000 --> 01:06:15.000
So, it's not enough. If Imani makes a moral faith and I mean expresses her or Moreover the intention that the war to end

01:06:15.000 --> 01:06:27.000
Suki says yes I mean and actually the yes under determines what what's going on in his mind right to me she may just I intend that the ball shell and all she may actually form of the intention.

01:06:27.000 --> 01:06:39.000
So, and now from a man's perspective it's unclear, that the situation is ambiguous and and well for practical purposes it may be good enough.

01:06:39.000 --> 01:06:43.000
But I do want to say that Zaki merely I intense it.

01:06:43.000 --> 01:06:55.000
What she still does not agreements, is the normative expectation issued on unrestricted Lee everybody, and you can agree with that in the practical mode only by forming the intention.

01:06:55.000 --> 01:07:01.000
So, actually if she forms the intention, even though it may not pick up on it, given the situation.

01:07:01.000 --> 01:07:19.000
There is still a normative expectation on us join the left hanging. And so there's still a normative tension it's not not really resolved. And it actually can matter greatly practically, because if it's only intended in a personal mode, if a third person

01:07:19.000 --> 01:07:41.000
comes along and, and, and agrees with Suki, then it would be legitimate for Imani to press that filter awesome, but it would not be legitimate for Soca given how really personal the intention to press a third person to come around them because those egocentric

01:07:41.000 --> 01:07:46.000
so i think i agree with everything.

01:07:46.000 --> 01:07:49.000
Okay. Kyle.

01:07:49.000 --> 01:07:50.000
I Ron.

01:07:50.000 --> 01:08:00.000
Thank you so much for that that was, there's there's a lot to think about there. And I hope it's not unfair for me to ask about.

01:08:00.000 --> 01:08:05.000
We intending to do.

01:08:05.000 --> 01:08:22.000
So I think there's there's sort of a sort of a dilemma here in or sorry, let me let me back up. It seems like we intending to do the actions that are that are in there can be done

01:08:22.000 --> 01:08:26.000
on one zone right there like person performed well actions.

01:08:26.000 --> 01:08:29.000
So if I say,

01:08:29.000 --> 01:08:40.000
We shall any of us, wash our hands before dinner, right like washing my hands, I don't need, I don't need help. I can do that on my own.

01:08:40.000 --> 01:08:44.000
So there's nothing really joined he going on there.

01:08:44.000 --> 01:09:05.000
So, so the the dilemma, I think, is are there we need two different accounts of interest objective form, one for intending that in another for intending to do, or we somehow make the, the joint account which suits, intending that P really well, somehow

01:09:05.000 --> 01:09:10.000
make that work for intending to do but the joining us isn't there.

01:09:10.000 --> 01:09:27.000
And I was, I was thinking that the passage from one of the passages from language rules and behavior that Jim brought up yesterday I think might be helpful for how we can think of we intending to do as involving some joint accomplishment.

01:09:27.000 --> 01:09:36.000
And it's sort of like, even though each of us is washing our hands, what we're jointly producing is like a true descriptive generalization.

01:09:36.000 --> 01:09:39.000
But like the rule.

01:09:39.000 --> 01:09:48.000
When we comply with rule when each of us complies with the rule we're sort of jointly turning it into a true

01:09:48.000 --> 01:09:50.000
descriptive generalization.

01:09:50.000 --> 01:09:53.000
So even though the actions are joint actions.

01:09:53.000 --> 01:09:58.000
There's some, there's some joint achievement.

01:09:58.000 --> 01:10:11.000
At stake or are underway, wondering whether you think the account you gave now might fit in there for turn into account for we intending to do

01:10:11.000 --> 01:10:17.000
good and difficult.

01:10:17.000 --> 01:10:21.000
So he has a cheap shot a cheap way.

01:10:21.000 --> 01:10:27.000
And it. I don't know, I have to read on read things about value again.

01:10:27.000 --> 01:10:45.000
But it's a way out that you rejected yesterday in your paper, namely, it would be the way to just say that intentions to do inferential related to and grounded and we intentions that Pete about I intention sexually the intentions to do and so you'll get

01:10:45.000 --> 01:10:45.000
a difference and influential role and that's all.

01:10:45.000 --> 01:10:51.000
in an influential role and that's all. Okay, that would be the cheap way out.

01:10:51.000 --> 01:11:10.000
I, you, I was really happy that you did you rejected that because I wanted to reject that too. And I'm not sure I can make it world work but but so I intend to wash my hands in five minutes, and my let's let's come up with a better example

01:11:10.000 --> 01:11:16.000
singers singers early 70 people right i mean the child.

01:11:16.000 --> 01:11:21.000
about to drown in a, in a shallow pond and I'm wearing Gucci shoes.

01:11:21.000 --> 01:11:36.000
Of course I ought to wait in to save the child, right. So I intend in the moral vein now to save a child that that's an intention to do and not even conditional because I am already in the condition that that otter trigger the action.

01:11:36.000 --> 01:11:44.000
So I intend to wait in saving the child

01:11:44.000 --> 01:11:49.000
in the inner subjective mode.

01:11:49.000 --> 01:11:53.000
Couldn't that maybe that's also too cheap.

01:11:53.000 --> 01:12:02.000
Couldn't that just be so the content of my intention is that I I weighed in on something like that.

01:12:02.000 --> 01:12:18.000
And we jointly ought to help realize that I weighed in reach it, or to help realize my waiting in. So either of us, well they shouldn't wait in themselves right even, even if they are around but they should support me in that action because it's done,

01:12:18.000 --> 01:12:21.000
it's done in a moral Wayne.

01:12:21.000 --> 01:12:33.000
So the content would be I weighed in everybody ought to help realize my waiting in, when I was.

01:12:33.000 --> 01:12:52.000
I'm sorry I was thinking you're waiting in is a contribution to making it the case that any of us waves in in circumstances like this to contribution to making the rule true.

01:12:52.000 --> 01:12:54.000
Well, we have to intention.

01:12:54.000 --> 01:13:04.000
The intention that anyone ordered all the way in, when seeing a child drowning.

01:13:04.000 --> 01:13:15.000
So, so I also want to want to intent that of course in a moral way right that everybody, or two, or to have that intention to do that conditional one.

01:13:15.000 --> 01:13:20.000
So,

01:13:20.000 --> 01:13:24.000
I have it, and then based on that one.

01:13:24.000 --> 01:13:39.000
I intend to wait in, given that I believe I'm in that circumstances pod my intended to wait in also has itself into subjective form, and the inter subjective form is simply my normative attitude on and respectively everybody, which I can override by.

01:13:39.000 --> 01:13:50.000
Since I'm pretty level right i mean doing overriding on unrestricted everybody to make sure that I read in could not be enough.

01:13:50.000 --> 01:14:04.000
It sounds kind of cheap and crude to me I'm not sure about

01:14:04.000 --> 01:14:07.000
probably

01:14:07.000 --> 01:14:10.000
do a follow up.

01:14:10.000 --> 01:14:20.000
No, I didn't know I just okay well that is the, the last hand raised that I saw we are 13 minutes over time.

01:14:20.000 --> 01:14:29.000
There may be more questions, I will let the organizers of the conference decide what our next steps are.

01:14:29.000 --> 01:14:50.000
I would say I would like to say something that we all have both Ron and Jeremy, a great deal of thanks along with the people from Grand Valley State, and the other sponsors of the conference, and I'm so happy you did this, I do regret that we're not there

01:14:50.000 --> 01:14:56.000
in person but thank you very much for doing this I.

01:14:56.000 --> 01:15:08.000
Kudos to both at all.

01:15:08.000 --> 01:15:09.000
Thank you.

01:15:09.000 --> 01:15:19.000
Well I had, I had prepared 90 seconds of closing remarks I promise to keep it very close,

01:15:19.000 --> 01:15:21.000
or to keep it very short.

01:15:21.000 --> 01:15:25.000
Thank you, Bill. I appreciate that that that does that does mean a lot.

01:15:25.000 --> 01:15:43.000
It was actually about two and a half years ago, Ronald and I were chatting at a different conference, you know back in the before times, and Ronald was the one who suggested to me that we organize a workshop on on Wilfred sellers is practical philosophy,

01:15:43.000 --> 01:15:59.000
and I seemed like a good idea to me so there followed quite a lot of hard work to make this event to reality and of course I'm grateful to Ronald, and everyone else who are, you know, so diligently to realize this goal, but it's one thing to make a workshop

01:15:59.000 --> 01:16:11.000
a reality and it's another thing to make it a success. And I think this workshop has been a success and that is not, that's do not chiefly to us but to to you all the participants.

01:16:11.000 --> 01:16:36.000
Those who wrote such excellent papers and gave such interesting presentations, and to everyone who dialed in from all around the world to participate in the first ever workshop of this kind, that has such great questions to listen to learn and to show

01:16:36.000 --> 01:16:49.000
for your contribution. So with that, we officially closed the first, but we predict. We hope and predict not the last workshop devoted Wilfred sellers as practical philosophy as before.

01:16:49.000 --> 01:16:55.000
Those who want to stay around afterwards and socialize are welcome to do so.

01:16:55.000 --> 01:16:56.000
i.

01:16:56.000 --> 01:17:08.000
After four days of workshop I am finally going to give myself, what I regard as a well deserved whiskey and soda.

01:17:08.000 --> 01:17:25.000
I don't want to say on my part also Hey thanks for exactly echoing what Jeremy that, thank you for hanging around here for base to all of you, many familiar faces, not just the participants many familiar faces and that is key to the success of this really

01:17:25.000 --> 01:17:28.000
ask a lot

01:17:28.000 --> 01:17:34.000
to hang around for four days on zoom and you read it and read it. So, Thank you.

01:17:34.000 --> 01:17:42.000
Well, Shelby Paul's house a drink and then everybody is welcome to say hang out here.

01:17:42.000 --> 01:17:51.000
Everybody, show you that I'm getting myself a beer here middle of five o'clock somewhere.

01:17:51.000 --> 01:17:56.000
Exactly. The sun's over the yard arm somewhere in the world.

01:17:56.000 --> 01:18:26.000
Like in a minute.

01:20:55.000 --> 01:21:03.000
Hey, did you did you today, did you do your PhD at Georgetown.

01:21:03.000 --> 01:21:07.000
Well, you're still muted.

01:21:07.000 --> 01:21:13.000
Yes, I did. Mark laughs I'm Maggie little where my advisors. Oh yeah.

01:21:13.000 --> 01:21:21.000
It's a great department I mean I haven't, I know Mark and some, some of the people there.

01:21:21.000 --> 01:21:27.000
I was an undergrad there in the 80s. Oh wow. It was very different.

01:21:27.000 --> 01:21:41.000
But, Terry Pinkard was there for many years. Yeah, he was, he was still there when I was there. Oh really. Yeah, probably the last guy that apartments we keep wearing suits.

01:21:41.000 --> 01:21:45.000
Wonder how he's doing is he in Chicago, I've no idea.

01:21:45.000 --> 01:21:59.000
Yeah, he left for Northwestern at some Yeah, I don't know if he stayed there I don't know, I think he had some top floor skyscraper overlooking the Great Lake kind of thing going on.

01:21:59.000 --> 01:22:14.000
What years were you at doing your PhD, I graduated in 2002 and I think I rocked it in 9797 to 2002

01:22:14.000 --> 01:22:19.000
is the Wayne Davis was a guy there and.

01:22:19.000 --> 01:22:28.000
Well, there were all kinds of guys Gomez Lobo yeah he was chair, yeah Alfonso Alfonso died a few years back,

01:22:28.000 --> 01:22:31.000
which was, I was sad.

01:22:31.000 --> 01:22:32.000
Yeah.

01:22:32.000 --> 01:22:51.000
Very gentle guy. Yeah, he was, was a wonderful man Jewish Sam was a great place to go. Very nice. Then, Jeremy was Jeremy and I overlapped for a year or two in grad school, oh he did I thought you were going to try to keep that shameful hack fact hidden

01:22:51.000 --> 01:22:56.000
beneath your your.

01:22:56.000 --> 01:23:02.000
But here you are being upfront here's mud in your eye.

01:23:02.000 --> 01:23:14.000
It's nice that the Jesuits managed to accommodate like Mark Lance and his strong political views and Rebecca is there too. Right.

01:23:14.000 --> 01:23:22.000
Yeah, will curl curl is there.

01:23:22.000 --> 01:23:27.000
Yeah. Go ahead, Jim.

01:23:27.000 --> 01:23:35.000
I don't know if I have anything intelligent say about that. Oh yeah it's it's it's a very it's a, ya know it's it's a diverse department in that respect.

01:23:35.000 --> 01:23:41.000
Yeah.

01:23:41.000 --> 01:23:51.000
Yeah, no I quite enjoy I quite enjoy it you know I always I always say that that I really feel like I got really good mentoring there.

01:23:51.000 --> 01:24:05.000
You know I heard I heard stories from from people who would who would you know see their advisor seldom if at all during their dissertation writing process you know I take my, you know, I take it.

01:24:05.000 --> 01:24:19.000
Send it a chapter of my dissertation to mark Lance and then you know a week later, he would have read it and have feedback for me. And so I just I felt like I really had a good know they were they were available they were, they were present.

01:24:19.000 --> 01:24:34.000
It was just, it was a really good experience but not enough he's had a had a similar experience but I feel like they supported us very well. And yeah, like, I've heard horror stories from other people, you know about sort of just getting thrown in the

01:24:34.000 --> 01:24:42.000
deep end, you know, go to the library and come back when you have a dissertation.

01:24:42.000 --> 01:24:44.000
And no it wasn't like that at all.

01:24:44.000 --> 01:24:56.000
It was that they did, they did pretty well by us, I think. Yeah, that's true.

01:24:56.000 --> 01:25:10.000
Um, Rob I had a question or two about your paper that I didn't, I anyway I do you mind if I ask you a couple of questions. No, no one else minds.

01:25:10.000 --> 01:25:23.000
I will the first thing was about the odd. You know you had this question Where does the OT come from, and you wanted to appeal to this primitive art that ginsburg came up with.

01:25:23.000 --> 01:25:36.000
I must have misunderstood something, I thought that your view was that the moral art, expressed the shell sub we have a have a have an intention.

01:25:36.000 --> 01:25:41.000
And so, wouldn't that be the account. I mean wouldn't.

01:25:41.000 --> 01:25:49.000
Now, because I mean I take it that the task is to spell out what the shells shells up we is.

01:25:49.000 --> 01:26:00.000
Okay. And the answer is it's a pretty odd, the answer, it's a it's a normative this normative attitude that is primitive and get in with Todd has more time this ginsburg sense.

01:26:00.000 --> 01:26:02.000
Okay. All right.

01:26:02.000 --> 01:26:09.000
So the other question I had was

01:26:09.000 --> 01:26:21.000
you. I think you gave a good argument that if we have these shared intentions are we intentions, that there can be disagreement about them.

01:26:21.000 --> 01:26:26.000
You know, let's have the war and let's not have the war end.

01:26:26.000 --> 01:26:30.000
But how does it follow that somebody is making a mistake.

01:26:30.000 --> 01:26:43.000
So for example, Let's say I say this was great. Let's all have this conference next year and you say no way it was too much work but it's not.

01:26:43.000 --> 01:26:54.000
We disagree, but I don't think anybody's making a mistake necessarily good. I think that goes back Stephanie to what we talked yesterday faultless disagreement.

01:26:54.000 --> 01:26:56.000
Maybe right i mean.

01:26:56.000 --> 01:27:12.000
So, the V intentions. I don't think they have it for all that I have said anything like truth values and important but that's because I mean in salads, what would be the truth value it would be determined by whether the.

01:27:12.000 --> 01:27:26.000
According to sell off my intention follows from that foundational moral principle that we any of us all to help promote the welfare of any and all of us, right.

01:27:26.000 --> 01:27:30.000
So, but I'm not sure I want to go there even.

01:27:30.000 --> 01:27:41.000
So, so there is a mistake, only in the sense that a normal attitude on a normative expectation on unrestricted Lee everybody is issued.

01:27:41.000 --> 01:27:48.000
And someone doesn't doesn't abide by that normative expectation that's the mistake.

01:27:48.000 --> 01:28:07.000
But there is no truth or faults and so far, it's just an interpersonal situation that obligates us to align our, our moral perspectives to one to one another one way or another, or it doesn't doesn't tell us which of the perspectives is really right.

01:28:07.000 --> 01:28:26.000
So there may be something like a penalty and sense of objectivity in here so so the an analog of objective truth as as what we all converge on at the end of moral inquiry, but but nothing strong of all that I have said, okay, maybe but I want to say is

01:28:26.000 --> 01:28:36.000
that the subject have a sense of objectivity. Are there is no objective standard yet.

01:28:36.000 --> 01:28:50.000
But don't we want to have mistakes if we got morality I mean if someone comes along and tells us that, you know, women are inferior creatures. They don't deserve the rights of real people.

01:28:50.000 --> 01:28:54.000
They are just wrong. I mean, that's a mistake.

01:28:54.000 --> 01:29:03.000
We all want to say that we disagree but but there's not a mistake. No, they're just wrong.

01:29:03.000 --> 01:29:05.000
Well, and I think, I think.

01:29:05.000 --> 01:29:20.000
Battle from the perspective of my proposal that claim can be made whether whether depends on whether my that conception of we intentions I propose could be an adequate grounding for certain kinds of moral principles for example.

01:29:20.000 --> 01:29:22.000
Right.

01:29:22.000 --> 01:29:36.000
And I think that sounds Alice explanatory strategy in science and metaphysics so you start out with giving an account of, have we intention, rather be is unrestricted and then you give some kind of transcendental argument for certain moral principles

01:29:36.000 --> 01:29:41.000
based on that.

01:29:41.000 --> 01:29:49.000
It does his requires this concern for the promoting the common good. Right.

01:29:49.000 --> 01:30:00.000
Which, which he seems to early on treat as a kind of basic concern but then that's the concern that he thinks comes from conceptually from being a part of a community Right, exactly.

01:30:00.000 --> 01:30:03.000
so you could argue bills.

01:30:03.000 --> 01:30:20.000
If you if you went that way I don't know how much you go that way but if you tried to defend sellers on that that the very idea of a community we means promoting it's common good, then you could argue they make a mistake when they're saying that, you

01:30:20.000 --> 01:30:27.000
know, women shouldn't be allowed to do basic things. Exactly.

01:30:27.000 --> 01:30:34.000
What kind of mistake is that because that is it an intellectual error.

01:30:34.000 --> 01:30:53.000
I guess the common good for sellers and maybe this is where the means and stuff comes in, but it's the, the Academy of scientists get around and and figure out what makes for a satisfying life right i mean what makes for promoting the welfare of the community.

01:30:53.000 --> 01:30:54.000
right.

01:30:54.000 --> 01:31:01.000
So that's isn't that's sort of the utilitarian aspect of this view, isn't it.

01:31:01.000 --> 01:31:06.000
I'm sorry I was I was thinking I was thinking of someone who doesn't care.

01:31:06.000 --> 01:31:10.000
Like who doesn't have that concern.

01:31:10.000 --> 01:31:15.000
me a concern is is a weird.

01:31:15.000 --> 01:31:20.000
Yeah, attitude. Right. Yeah.

01:31:20.000 --> 01:31:37.000
I'm sorry I there's that the passage in science and ethics, where it always makes me think, well how content really is sellers here there's sort of this human streak there like almost like sentimentalist.

01:31:37.000 --> 01:31:41.000
But I see that I absolutely agree.

01:31:41.000 --> 01:31:43.000
But then,

01:31:43.000 --> 01:31:58.000
I mean, you know, the logic about paper right. He doesn't have it in the 56 version, he adds the ending to science and ethics to the 62 the ending of the 63 version this.

01:31:58.000 --> 01:32:05.000
You have to grow up with a psychological concern for others for their own sake.

01:32:05.000 --> 01:32:25.000
But then I think as it goes on to science and metaphysics, does the argument slightly change that he thinks he can derive the concern for others not from benevolence as a love of humanity but benevolent but from that connection between being a member

01:32:25.000 --> 01:32:41.000
of a community, and being concerned for its welfare, it seems like it's we were involved in something like that from an earlier more human Ian basic concern for others needing to be there to move morality.

01:32:41.000 --> 01:32:53.000
When you get to the community, argument being connected with the communities welfare are you, you know, it seems to shift in that way, I was thinking.

01:32:53.000 --> 01:33:05.000
Again, then you cited these passages from knowing the better and doing the worse. Yeah. And that, I think that the motive is there still again we have these two systems.

01:33:05.000 --> 01:33:24.000
We can be self interested or we can decide for moral action and this might conflict quite often, and he says, Yeah, there's like the decision that you make with perfect and self interest or morally, that is a revelation about who you are, at that moment

01:33:24.000 --> 01:33:38.000
that doesn't seem to be something rational or something which you could argue out it's about who you are, what character you have. And then you get back to upbringing and things like that so I think this idea.

01:33:38.000 --> 01:33:59.000
it's well that that I thought, you know there's impartial benevolence, to the, to the, go to ball, and how that's motivated and how that links to the we shall, but then there's rational self love as a perfectly good reason to so the one, those are two

01:33:59.000 --> 01:34:17.000
different questions the way he mixes concern for others as benevolence, for all with the we show that's on principle right that's one thing he wrestles with how to, how to, how to explain the moral point of view as motivated by benevolent concerned but

01:34:17.000 --> 01:34:18.000
not have it.

01:34:18.000 --> 01:34:35.000
You know, and he ends up with that, but then the self love tension between that that's then the other thing, which related to Kyle's question. Yeah. What about someone who just isn't motivated sufficiently to do the moral thing then he just says, Well,

01:34:35.000 --> 01:34:47.000
that's basic I mean that's just, you know what I mean, there's the question of concern for others in the moral point of view. And then there's the question between that package and self love.

01:34:47.000 --> 01:34:52.000
And there he just doesn't think there's any Uber argument that's gonna,

01:34:52.000 --> 01:34:58.000
you know, That just shows me.

01:34:58.000 --> 01:35:12.000
That's where I don't think he thinks virtue is knowledge I know Jeremy, we were, I was reading your book and he doesn't essential virtues knowledge because of the thing about what promotes the common good as the Academy of scientists can rally together,

01:35:12.000 --> 01:35:14.000
and if you know that you know.

01:35:14.000 --> 01:35:24.000
But, but a virtuous cells distinguishes in that knowing the better article between right action in the, in the city state.

01:35:24.000 --> 01:35:28.000
That's like comment on right action versus virtue.

01:35:28.000 --> 01:35:44.000
And so I guess for sellers in the end the virtuous person is going to be the one that more often than not, x for a moral motive rather than the just irreducibly competing self love mode.

01:35:44.000 --> 01:35:52.000
Yeah, I think that's right. Yeah.

01:35:52.000 --> 01:36:04.000
And that's a beautifully written passage to. Yeah, I can see like copying.

01:36:04.000 --> 01:36:13.000
That was the benefit of giving a talk to teachers, probably that he actually chilled out, just enough to write a paragraph like that.

01:36:13.000 --> 01:36:15.000
Good, but the old Lyme, Connecticut.

01:36:15.000 --> 01:36:22.000
Yeah, yeah, yeah, there's in the archive I think in the folder for that there's a.

01:36:22.000 --> 01:36:30.000
Someone wrote a summary of the discussion that followed the talk.

01:36:30.000 --> 01:36:42.000
And I'm sorry I don't remember the details but they were kind of like, oh, like I think a lot in the audience, took sellers to be like committed to relativism.

01:36:42.000 --> 01:36:44.000
Interesting.

01:36:44.000 --> 01:36:49.000
So Kylie you're in Pittsburgh, do you go to the archives once a while.

01:36:49.000 --> 01:36:55.000
I used to, I used years ago I would go a lot yeah I went to a couple summers.

01:36:55.000 --> 01:36:59.000
I went there and to good place to get lost.

01:36:59.000 --> 01:37:04.000
So it just kind of a hidden agenda. There's something I want to have someone go look.

01:37:04.000 --> 01:37:07.000
Go look in the art form, you know.

01:37:07.000 --> 01:37:20.000
Yeah, I'm sorry, I found that their responses via email archivists so like during during lockdowns they dug up a couple things.

01:37:20.000 --> 01:37:22.000
And just emailed it to.

01:37:22.000 --> 01:37:24.000
They'll scan it.

01:37:24.000 --> 01:37:30.000
One of the things that I sometimes like sees whether he read something and make notes and in it.

01:37:30.000 --> 01:37:36.000
Not that I'm not all that into that but David Fox, I was kind of curious.

01:37:36.000 --> 01:37:47.000
And then there's been other books like the only one I've ever looked at was his copy of riles concept of mind. It turned out really interesting mark so through it.

01:37:47.000 --> 01:37:51.000
Yeah.

01:37:51.000 --> 01:37:55.000
That's the sort of thing you got to be there and in the area.

01:37:55.000 --> 01:38:05.000
I've never been in the archive. I was glad I was out of Pittsburgh. Yeah, no I haven't either although out ago I used to go up to Pittsburgh every summer because I have a couple of friends up there well you guys.

01:38:05.000 --> 01:38:15.000
Bill and Jim you guys at least know Michael Wolfe and Heath you would know him to, you know, he's at Washington and Jefferson up there and have a friend from.

01:38:15.000 --> 01:38:19.000
We were both American University of Beirut he's also Washington Jefferson.

01:38:19.000 --> 01:38:26.000
I'm sorry I used to just drive up, up there. Every summer, spend a week or two up there.

01:38:26.000 --> 01:38:30.000
Now that, of course, covert is put the kibosh on all that.

01:38:30.000 --> 01:38:33.000
But, you know, maybe starting next summer I can do it again.

01:38:33.000 --> 01:38:39.000
And maybe how to check out the archives while I'm up there.

01:38:39.000 --> 01:38:54.000
It's a it's an ad in nx like off campus but they run a shuttle from its campus out there like once every hour or something. Yeah.

01:38:54.000 --> 01:39:05.000
I thought it was lovely kind that you share the image of the role the postcard, and yeah.

01:39:05.000 --> 01:39:07.000
Right.

01:39:07.000 --> 01:39:13.000
Straight, Straight down. That's the phrase you don't hear much anymore.

01:39:13.000 --> 01:39:22.000
I was in a band. Freshman year college. We call those how straight though.

01:39:22.000 --> 01:39:25.000
Were you any good is the question.

01:39:25.000 --> 01:39:27.000
Not very.

01:39:27.000 --> 01:39:43.000
Okay, okay, the drummer and the bass is really good. I'm not a great guitarist, so people could dance to us that was all we wanted to do. Well now that now that you're retired bill you can pick it back up again.

01:39:43.000 --> 01:39:56.000
I was actually I was one of the things I was thinking about coming out with the band I don't know 70 year old rockers just, you know, although Mick Jagger is what now getting close to 80.

01:39:56.000 --> 01:39:57.000
Yeah.

01:39:57.000 --> 01:40:00.000
They all are Clapton.

01:40:00.000 --> 01:40:09.000
Yeah, they all performing I mean, like, Keith Richards right I'm going to do it until I drop.

01:40:09.000 --> 01:40:12.000
Dylan to it. Right. Yeah. Yeah.

01:40:12.000 --> 01:40:16.000
Why wouldn't give it up.

01:40:16.000 --> 01:40:18.000
Sorry sir.

01:40:18.000 --> 01:40:22.000
Why would you give it up. I mean, in general, if you.

01:40:22.000 --> 01:40:28.000
Well I gave up the band because our equipment guts stolen know how that that'll.

01:40:28.000 --> 01:40:32.000
Our new guitars.

01:40:32.000 --> 01:40:39.000
You remember were on campus at Haverford you had shows.

01:40:39.000 --> 01:40:51.000
While we practice down and one of the new dorms basements and that's where they broke into it and install the equipment.

01:40:51.000 --> 01:40:58.000
You know I'm not sure we ever played out have we played we played one show, we only got a couple of shows in before the stuff was gone.

01:40:58.000 --> 01:41:05.000
We played one show it at Bryn Mawr, I think, was it Denby.

01:41:05.000 --> 01:41:08.000
Um,

01:41:08.000 --> 01:41:16.000
yeah, I'm not sure that we ever played on campus before this equipment was, we didn't, we didn't have all that long. Yeah.

01:41:16.000 --> 01:41:22.000
Before we lost it all and.

01:41:22.000 --> 01:41:34.000
I was one just wondering if the venues had stayed the same or change from your time to my time. I think what you're, I think what you're calling the new dorms are, where a lot of the shows from the on campus spans.

01:41:34.000 --> 01:41:45.000
They have a little in Lunt.

01:41:45.000 --> 01:41:48.000
Yeah.

01:41:48.000 --> 01:41:49.000
Yeah.

01:41:49.000 --> 01:41:59.000
Yeah.

01:41:59.000 --> 01:42:07.000
It was great to spend some time and hang out with some fellow sellers fans. So, thanks everybody.

01:42:07.000 --> 01:42:09.000
Thanks.

01:42:09.000 --> 01:42:10.000
We'll be in touch.

01:42:10.000 --> 01:42:20.000
Just have to make sure that next. Hopefully next summer this goddamn pandemic is over and we can base.

01:42:20.000 --> 01:42:24.000
You know actually touch each other. Yeah.

01:42:24.000 --> 01:42:38.000
And that would be that would be wonderful I'd love to. Would that it and then yeah exactly you know scratch each other's backs Right. Yeah.

01:42:38.000 --> 01:42:49.000
Okay. So is there some thought to have this be a recurring thing Have you given any consideration to when the next one might be or where

01:42:49.000 --> 01:42:55.000
I mean I hadn't given any thought to it till somebody mentioned it a couple of days ago.

01:42:55.000 --> 01:43:13.000
Okay, because it was news to me and so when it came up at the end I thought oh well this might be a regular thing, so I was just curious, on, on sellers, or sellers practical philosophy or what would it be, I take it at sellers practical philosophy.

01:43:13.000 --> 01:43:18.000
I'm just a quick question.

01:43:18.000 --> 01:43:32.000
There's a, there's supposed to be a volume coming out from this conference. Yes. So, roughly, what's the timeline, like, well we, I imagine will revise our essays and send them to you and things like that.

01:43:32.000 --> 01:43:43.000
JOHN Yeah, I haven't spoken about that. I mean, be we're going to write Jeremy and I don't know,

01:43:43.000 --> 01:43:58.000
four weeks six weeks end of September is that is that too early, I mean that's what I haven't spoken with anybody including Jeremy's on. Yeah, I mean I was envisioning giving people you know for six months to revise their, their essay, something like

01:43:58.000 --> 01:44:00.000
that.

01:44:00.000 --> 01:44:09.000
You know, we probably should should touch base with Andrew reckon the next week he's the, he's the Rutledge editor, right been we've been dealing with.

01:44:09.000 --> 01:44:14.000
And, and I was like, it's funny because I was actually thinking about this beforehand.

01:44:14.000 --> 01:44:21.000
Probably sending out an email to all the participants to make sure that everyone's still committed to participating in this volume.

01:44:21.000 --> 01:44:34.000
I mean you know I take it that participation in the seminar in the workshop is like you know sort of tacit permission to do this but I just want to make sure that I was still, still on board with this.

01:44:34.000 --> 01:44:53.000
But yeah, that's the plan you know Andrew Whitman said back in the day that you know we could, we could advertise this workshop, you know as involving, you know, Rutledge having a commitment to publish publish the papers and the volume, do that.

01:44:53.000 --> 01:45:09.000
Oh, yeah. It sounds good to me and I appreciate the, the wider timeframe just because I, I'm going to give. I'm going to work on mine a lot more and tighten up, make a thesis more clear and all I can say is I want to do it but a subset of paper, a few

01:45:09.000 --> 01:45:11.000
months away give somewhere.

01:45:11.000 --> 01:45:20.000
Yeah, well, and this gives people a chance you know if they want to send their if they want to send their essay that other workshop participants and get a little bit of feedback.

01:45:20.000 --> 01:45:27.000
You know I think six months is a good time frame for them for them to do that and get some feedback and do some revisions.

01:45:27.000 --> 01:45:42.000
And we could talk to, we can talk to Andrew about what the time frame for publication is, I know that there were there were some people who were one of the reasons we didn't want to postpone this workshop by the year is that there are some people who

01:45:42.000 --> 01:45:49.000
had considerations about tenure, or being on the job market and needed to get this kind of needed to get this done.

01:45:49.000 --> 01:45:54.000
So, by the way my paper was the only one I had that thought about that it needs more time.

01:45:54.000 --> 01:46:10.000
The other everybody's papers were so good that if there's a tighter frame timeframe I can always make them, you know so yeah I'd love to see, you know, by January would be good, I think, Oh, okay.

01:46:10.000 --> 01:46:12.000
the end of Christmas break maybe.

01:46:12.000 --> 01:46:20.000
Yeah, I'm fine I'm fine with them, mid January, beginning in January stupid but mid January might be good.

01:46:20.000 --> 01:46:24.000
Okay.

01:46:24.000 --> 01:46:37.000
And a lot of things I find new there's new stuff that comes in at the end of the summer because people are you know I'll find that out, and then they come in again. Towards the end of the school year.

01:46:37.000 --> 01:46:45.000
Because I'm working on it all year but, so I think January, mid January will be a great time because you

01:46:45.000 --> 01:46:49.000
sort of slot things in there a bit better. Right.

01:46:49.000 --> 01:46:55.000
That sounds good. Yeah, that sounds good to me to just kind of on the road.

01:46:55.000 --> 01:47:04.000
Exactly. Just don't publish the thing somewhere else, please.

01:47:04.000 --> 01:47:14.000
Well, I gotta run and get some stuff done because I'm about to head out to meet my folks on the cape but I just wanted to say thanks again Ronald and Jeremy This was amazing.

01:47:14.000 --> 01:47:24.000
It was lovely to meet all you guys and it was it was such a pleasure, and I look forward to being in touch. Great to meet you.

01:47:24.000 --> 01:47:25.000
Yeah.

01:47:25.000 --> 01:47:31.000
Well, new yeah yeah I have to go to the, I have to go to the dump.

01:47:31.000 --> 01:47:41.000
Bill just call it the bathroom. Come on.

01:47:41.000 --> 01:47:44.000
I will I will sign off as well.

01:47:44.000 --> 01:47:56.000
rollin Jeremy thank you so much for organizing this, I had a lot of fun. It was the most professional thing I've done and 18 months then it feels good.

01:47:56.000 --> 01:48:01.000
Thank you very much.

01:48:01.000 --> 01:48:03.000
Take care.

01:48:03.000 --> 01:48:04.000
Take care. All right.

01:48:04.000 --> 01:48:10.000
So yeah, I'm gonna go.

01:48:10.000 --> 01:48:15.000
Yeah, so one writing. Yeah, I'd like to see faces.

01:48:15.000 --> 01:48:17.000
But

01:48:17.000 --> 01:48:23.000
yeah, I know that's that's legit.

01:48:23.000 --> 01:48:27.000
How are you, thank you, thank you always nice to have a face to go with the name.

01:48:27.000 --> 01:48:32.000
I have trouble keeping together but it's always nice

01:48:32.000 --> 01:48:34.000
to see you. Yeah.

01:48:34.000 --> 01:48:40.000
So, yeah, I'm gonna take off to go to the

01:48:40.000 --> 01:48:46.000
guys down to well it was great. Thank you.

01:48:46.000 --> 01:48:54.000
I want to say, I thought that this was just, you know, I've done a handful of things during the quarantine that we're online reading groups and conferences.

01:48:54.000 --> 01:49:07.000
This was far and away the best one part of it, obviously, is that, you know, so many of us know each other part of it is the topic, but a big part of it was just the way that it was wrong, it was spaced well, both in terms of like time between talks and

01:49:07.000 --> 01:49:21.000
number of talks per day, I thought that was just perfect. You know I'm looking at this one inhabits Carla in October and this is for me like an emblem for what we do if we have to go online I thought this was really well done so thank you guys.

01:49:21.000 --> 01:49:24.000
Thank you. Thank you, appreciate it.

01:49:24.000 --> 01:49:41.000
Thanks, happy, because the different time zones, other than Cathy leg over in yeah I feel bad about that she always seems to get left out, you know, I was reading group and everything but I mean you just you can't accommodate everybody.

01:49:41.000 --> 01:49:45.000
Well it's recorded so people can can see it. That's true.

01:49:45.000 --> 01:49:54.000
Well, and that's the next thing we're going to do is get to work on, on getting the the recorded talks edited down. We want to get them subtitled.

01:49:54.000 --> 01:50:03.000
And we want to get a put up on YouTube and we have a conference page you want to embed those videos in the conference pearl wow I got I got something lined up to do that for us.

01:50:03.000 --> 01:50:12.000
So yeah so that's that was a goal of ours all along to have these, because we know that some people, you know, can't make it for whatever reason so we want to make these available.

01:50:12.000 --> 01:50:19.000
Yeah, I think that's a cool.

01:50:19.000 --> 01:50:25.000
I just unmute myself, I really enjoy the workshop, very grateful.

01:50:25.000 --> 01:50:31.000
I'm pleased to hear a book will be coming out of this.

01:50:31.000 --> 01:50:41.000
I feel a bit apologize for being fair like a fly on the wall.

01:50:41.000 --> 01:50:48.000
YouTube because I'm based in London, are you to go to the workshop at philosophy in London.

01:50:48.000 --> 01:51:04.000
Oh yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah so I do a lot of your colleagues from America and everywhere else. So, I hope I will be able to see you when you come to London next Monday.

01:51:04.000 --> 01:51:14.000
We're. No, actually, a lot of the talks, make perfect, no paper for the forum. Yes dude philosophy.

01:51:14.000 --> 01:51:30.000
Yeah, exactly. They have this philosophy politics or ethics, some kind of a lot of people working in the philosophy of x and try to try to be a philosophy invited.

01:51:30.000 --> 01:51:44.000
So, yeah, yeah. So I enjoy you the papers very much, although I don't understand everything because I'm not professional philosopher, it's Wilfred sellers nobody understands everything.

01:51:44.000 --> 01:52:00.000
I read a lot of the names

01:52:00.000 --> 01:52:07.000
Educated from your work and your know your personality and all your community.

01:52:07.000 --> 01:52:13.000
Great. We're so glad you could join us thank you

01:52:13.000 --> 01:52:17.000
for this test, just to make sure.

01:52:17.000 --> 01:52:36.000
I have this right, yeah. Better safe than sorry. Sure, sure. One of my favorite sellers conferences ever was at the Institute of philosophy in London, the one that we can build, build a breeze volume on knowledge normal activity.

01:52:36.000 --> 01:52:41.000
That's normal activity, whatever.

01:52:41.000 --> 01:52:45.000
One was the conference you just refer to

01:52:45.000 --> 01:52:46.000
it.

01:52:46.000 --> 01:53:04.000
Let's see, that volume came out 2009 and I think Bill did it very quickly so it could have been mentioned, just before that 2008 seven. Okay. I live in cream was running the show back then I see, so he was the director of them.

01:53:04.000 --> 01:53:11.000
Yeah, but I only became to go there.

01:53:11.000 --> 01:53:17.000
So, so long ago.

01:53:17.000 --> 01:53:22.000
CFO that you pick it up.

01:53:22.000 --> 01:53:34.000
Yeah, I think he thinks the Institute, it was really wonderful and remember someone took a group photo it exists somewhere. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.

01:53:34.000 --> 01:53:39.000
It had McDowell and so on and when they were lining up for the, for the photograph.

01:53:39.000 --> 01:53:47.000
And they were trying to position people right and someone said you want it from sideways on.

01:53:47.000 --> 01:53:48.000
No joke.

01:53:48.000 --> 01:53:51.000
Yeah, there it is Ronald has it.

01:53:51.000 --> 01:53:59.000
Yeah, that's a big issue from sideways on you know.

01:53:59.000 --> 01:54:05.000
Yeah, yeah, yeah. So,

01:54:05.000 --> 01:54:11.000
so, Yeah, I'm the boss, that's why.

01:54:11.000 --> 01:54:16.000
Another time I was the most of the time was

01:54:16.000 --> 01:54:19.000
inconvenient. So, yeah, but anyway.

01:54:19.000 --> 01:54:32.000
Passive participation already, make it a joy. So, yeah, I'm looking forward to reading the book, whenever that's available. Alright, well, we'll, we'll try to get that out as quickly as we can.

01:54:32.000 --> 01:54:44.000
Yeah, well in the next year. Yeah, so that's great. So now I have a question regarding your talk. So

01:54:44.000 --> 01:55:08.000
you talked about all the other things, not just, just know the structure of the.

01:55:08.000 --> 01:55:20.000
the other stuff. Chris is a very instructive, especially yesterday. You mentioned this, This social rules.

01:55:20.000 --> 01:55:25.000
No governing this

01:55:25.000 --> 01:55:47.000
decision making process, that kind of thing is very useful for me, as a someone with law background, you do need, I, I see the analogy between this note, the social rules under the metal vocabulary.

01:55:47.000 --> 01:55:49.000
You Brendan's.

01:55:49.000 --> 01:56:02.000
Some of the papers. Yeah, you call it P call it semantic rules. Oh, matter, no vocabulary of vocabulary.

01:56:02.000 --> 01:56:22.000
This is not the empirical right okay Barry. Yeah. So that's a. So if you're looking for the whose intensity, it is you have to agree with this social or semantic rules.

01:56:22.000 --> 01:56:26.000
That's very true so you cannot.

01:56:26.000 --> 01:56:35.000
Yeah, this is something. Yeah. But anyway, so I also interested in the structure of the reasons of this intention intentions, know the way mode.

01:56:35.000 --> 01:56:47.000
The way mode. Well the object was the opposite of the intention of the way, way intensity. Yeah.

01:56:47.000 --> 01:57:03.000
So, I don't know, it does something they say the pragmatics suit address this structure of the reasons, both in the reasons was in the decisions.

01:57:03.000 --> 01:57:08.000
Targeted or directed by the way intentions.

01:57:08.000 --> 01:57:24.000
So, because, after all, you have to see how you have to consider the substance of the accidents or the decisions you know the to

01:57:24.000 --> 01:57:44.000
research conclusive. And that can be in the handle the charges, right, because, one, two parties disagree on all the party disagree between, I think, remember your someone the messengers between the trade unions and the management.

01:57:44.000 --> 01:58:04.000
Yeah, that was an apple. Yeah, and then you have to look at the other sources of unknown so in the statues in the case law, and eventually the dispute will go to the court and the court will make an adjustment and the cause may may know may open up the

01:58:04.000 --> 01:58:12.000
areas by a trillion on some other concept like, no, fairness reasonable news.

01:58:12.000 --> 01:58:25.000
All other stuff. And then you have to see what is the fairness versus risk on this. And that's what I mean by the substance or structure of the regions.

01:58:25.000 --> 01:58:28.000
So

01:58:28.000 --> 01:58:32.000
that's,

01:58:32.000 --> 01:58:50.000
yeah it's interesting you know i it, I was thinking back to sell you know talking about you know institutions being created by the sort of the sort of joint attitudes, you know like, you know, a border or the institution of property or even, you know,

01:58:50.000 --> 01:59:04.000
complex institutions like laws or court systems, but but then at the end of the day you know you have, as you say, you know, you might have the these formal institutions, but even the application of the institutions are going to depend on things that

01:59:04.000 --> 01:59:09.000
aren't formalized like notions of what's reasonable and notions of.

01:59:09.000 --> 01:59:21.000
Yeah, things like that right yeah notions of what's fair, and even things like that are written into the law. So yeah, so, so, so even, even the ways in which these things are very formalized.

01:59:21.000 --> 01:59:28.000
Nevertheless, they can never be formalized, it's a yeah exactly I can never be

01:59:28.000 --> 01:59:43.000
your quote. You make the distinction between internal and external, and then I think how sad that it's all about the presenters perspective.

01:59:43.000 --> 01:59:46.000
So, indeed.

01:59:46.000 --> 01:59:59.000
Everybody have a perspective, no better job at the legislature to scholars, and then know you want to.

01:59:59.000 --> 02:00:12.000
You have to need, you need to look at the substance and selection of the regions of the decisions. again, so, so, so, Yeah.

02:00:12.000 --> 02:00:18.000
By the way, I do learn from know being provoked from the songs.

02:00:18.000 --> 02:00:24.000
Yeah. Okay, good. Yeah, good. Excellent. Thank you. Yeah, thank you.

02:00:24.000 --> 02:00:36.000
So, I like reading circle cuz he's so clear but then you have to change it all to make it something true.

02:00:36.000 --> 02:00:39.000
But he's wonderfully clear.

02:00:39.000 --> 02:00:40.000
Okay.

02:00:40.000 --> 02:00:42.000
Yeah.

02:00:42.000 --> 02:01:02.000
division of labor because now as philosophers, you. Anyone know you go into this research from a certain perspective, focusing in on certain areas. And then other, other people pick it up, do some stuff.

02:01:02.000 --> 02:01:06.000
Yeah so

02:01:06.000 --> 02:01:17.000
yeah that's that's that's true. I mean I guess philosophies like like every other field now where you have a specializations and you know someone's working over here and someone's working over here and.

02:01:17.000 --> 02:01:21.000
Yeah.

02:01:21.000 --> 02:01:25.000
So

02:01:25.000 --> 02:01:39.000
it's great that that's never, never assumed among sellers people that you're, you're, you're just a specialist, it's not allowed that's, that's what makes it so hard to write about sellers and that's what was so hard, writing about the book is that is

02:01:39.000 --> 02:01:48.000
that you like you're not a lot you're not really allowed to be a specialist if you're writing about sellers because I mean there's a sense in which he wasn't, he was a generalist, really.

02:01:48.000 --> 02:01:51.000
Yeah.

02:01:51.000 --> 02:01:55.000
He had this picture of how it all at all hung together.

02:01:55.000 --> 02:02:14.000
That was what's nice about this conference so for me to one another thing that was great about it was people with really developed views on certain things that I hadn't, you know, explored to it, and also have this, this feeling other philosophers know

02:02:14.000 --> 02:02:28.000
they are, you are a close, families, you interrogate It's hard work. Yeah, much more rigorous way, then the lawyers, perhaps.

02:02:28.000 --> 02:02:54.000
Yeah, because this along to this and this.

02:02:54.000 --> 02:03:10.000
concepts or theory, or whatever, you know, we can be a bit tribal in philosophy though but one thing I've been a Christian appreciating about the law, I've never appreciated more than the last couple of years.

02:03:10.000 --> 02:03:28.000
Not that I know anything really about it but the way it's serving to protect certain institutions in America, particularly, you know, yeah, it's, and they, they go after the judges and they but yet when it comes down to it the the crucial structures there

02:03:28.000 --> 02:03:31.000
that are just hanging on under attack.

02:03:31.000 --> 02:03:36.000
The legal law is true.

02:03:36.000 --> 02:03:40.000
So, yeah, it's a very authoritarian.

02:03:40.000 --> 02:03:47.000
Some of the judgment from the highest court. It's so brutal.

02:03:47.000 --> 02:03:50.000
Let's do a will points.

02:03:50.000 --> 02:03:57.000
If I am that kind of decision.

02:03:57.000 --> 02:04:06.000
So yesterday someone can be temple for a certain lawyers successfully arguing for the.

02:04:06.000 --> 02:04:25.000
This activists by pointing out, though they intense and cannot be attributed to certain the no individual person could carry out your attention to disperse yeah yeah so

02:04:25.000 --> 02:04:34.000
I think how important to have a child who have a multidisciplinary.

02:04:34.000 --> 02:04:38.000
Yeah.

02:04:38.000 --> 02:04:42.000
fitness and yes.

02:04:42.000 --> 02:04:47.000
Great, so

02:04:47.000 --> 02:04:51.000
I'm gonna jump in to say, fairly well everyone.

02:04:51.000 --> 02:04:57.000
I guess this was great I really really enjoyed this one. Thank you very much.

02:04:57.000 --> 02:05:01.000
Great to meet you

02:05:01.000 --> 02:05:04.000
will be both working on congratulations on.

02:05:04.000 --> 02:05:16.000
Well I guess there's, you and I and Preston and in the to Berlin folks mighty and lots we've all got our volumes coming out.

02:05:16.000 --> 02:05:22.000
So is your volume going to be individualistic collectivist it's hard to

02:05:22.000 --> 02:05:24.000
choose your own adventure.

02:05:24.000 --> 02:05:25.000
Right.

02:05:25.000 --> 02:05:30.000
Yeah. Just by Kyle.

02:05:30.000 --> 02:05:35.000
Thank you again. See ya.

02:05:35.000 --> 02:05:45.000
Just I hope I hope Peter mom shop is not to distress when he finds out that the actual volume is, is, is, is quite a bit longer than than what was in the prospectus.

02:05:45.000 --> 02:05:47.000
Yeah.

02:05:47.000 --> 02:05:58.000
You know, it's something I've been wondering about was with the in the space of reasons. One, why they went for the shorter, some reflections on language games and didn't say that.

02:05:58.000 --> 02:06:16.000
In the preface because I went through and documented all the differences just for my own sake, it's utterly if you refer to SRLG now you got to make sure if they're saying if you've got the brand them in shock volume.

02:06:16.000 --> 02:06:43.000
This passage is isn't even in there like the difference between the section on more morale on motivation and obligation, huge difference in the in the space of reasons volume and I don't know why they did that.

 

WEBVTT

 

Note: Audio matches this exactly, video has the beginning and ending edited and 5/6 and are on the same transcript. A simple text search of the 2nd presenter's name will allow you to find the start of the second section within that same file.

 

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Hey, I'm not hearing anyone.

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Can you guys hear me.

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Okay.

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We can hear you, Bill.

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Someone say something.

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Oh, I'm finally I hear you, yeah okay good, I was Zippo.

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That's relief. Thank you.

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Good morning.

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Good morning

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or good afternoon as the case may be. Yeah.

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Yeah, so, so where are the Germans.

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I thought lunch would be would be here.

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Stephanie's representing.

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Yeah, that's all they don't have a summer break right now.

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It's August of course they do. Yeah Oh they I guess they do, yeah.

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Yeah, but then that should not keep them from attending a conference Right, right, right.

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I'm gonna have to scold them get lazy there they're all in my archive somewhere.

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We can start, let me say, remind people of two things will begin and first of all, welcome to the second day of the conference, and I just would like to remind people that they have the captions on. So if you would like sub scripts please click on the live transcript button at the bottom and then

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the relevant

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link on the drop down.

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And also, if you would like to contribute to the q amp a, you may do so by by by raised do clicking on the hand race sign or by contributing to the chat, we hope to get around to the chat but even if not we can download it and shared with the speakers.

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So with that said please Stephanie.

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Okay, welcome to the second day, I am glad to introduce our first speaker for today Preston still will from the University of Alabama and Preston is about to publish a book on him very interesting and broad ranging project and he will also talk about

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that project in his paper, which is called shared intentionality and to discuss of cognition, so please Preston, go ahead.

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regard here you can hear you.

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That's okay. How's that.

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Yeah. can you.

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Good.

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Thank you all for showing up, and thrilled to be here this is such a great meeting with people.

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So I'm really excited.

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What I'm going to do so let me share screens here I've got a presentation. I uploaded an essay, just a couple of days ago I don't expect people would have had time to read it and it's not necessary.

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So let me at least get a PowerPoint.

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Up here, and I'll work through that

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book that on, everyone can see that I hope.

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So what I'm going to do is I'm going to talk about the relationship between shared intentionality and discursive cognition, and as Stephanie mentioned, this comes out of material that I've been working on in Credit Karma for the last couple of years,

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and that we're going to book.

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Hopefully in September I said proofs of final final final version of the proofs of a couple of days ago about a week ago.

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So what I'm going to do is I'm going to start by just laying out the problem space that I'm addressing these issues.

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I'm then going to look at, non discursive intentional and the anti cognition, this came up a little bit in build breeze talk. I think it's important that we be able to tell a story about the ontogeny and the philosophy of discursive cognition, and my

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view is going to be that in both cases.

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Reality is an important part of that story.

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So I'll start by looking at non destructive potential Niantic cognition I'll do that fairly quickly. There's quite a bit here. And so I'm going to be going through some of it quicker than other bits that I've got an audience familiar with some of this

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stuff more than others.

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And then going to look at discursive intentional Pantheon to cognition and they're going to do that but we have a semantics for the mobile operators for shared intentionality and for the antic modality talk about what's obliged permitted and forbidden

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in terms of agency.

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And then we'll look at some formal properties of the semantics, and the breakout yesterday.

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I hope I'm getting bills claim here like that it was important to at least get enough logic on board, to be able to tell when presented with a wall of symbolic text, whether there was anything interesting there, or whether you were just being beat with

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text so my hope is in discussing the formal stuff in sections three and four, that I can at least address the kind of concerns that that somebody like they'll would have.

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So I'm not going to go into the details of that very much but there's enough there I hope to, for those of you that are interested in that kind of material to see what's going on and I'm definitely willing to talk about it in the kitchen.

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And then we will look at empirical support and predictions that this account makes because if I'm right we can glean something about it. Sure discursive cognition, or rationality, in terms of a semantics for these mobile operators so I'm going to argue

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some empirical support for the position of hope, and that it makes some predictions that are worth taking seriously.

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This is stuff that I think of is mostly complete, I'm happy with the material have to hear. Beginning in Part Six though I'm gonna look at some issues that I'm less confident about the next two parts.

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The first I'm going to look at the relationship between intentional, and biotic cognition, in practical reasoning, and then going to draw contrast between proof there and model theory because everything I'm going to be doing up to this point is, in terms

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terms of model theory and I think it's important to think about proof theories

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and someone's saying something to me or is this may be Christmas just that we sometimes can't hear you right maybe you could go closer to your microphone.

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Oh, sure. Absolutely, absolutely. And I'm, I met my parents place in the mountains of Montana and they have some weird kind of Genki internet connection here so it may that may be an issue too so if there are problems.

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raise your hand.

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And I'll

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address that.

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Okay, so I look at proof the remodel theory, I'm then going to look at Stephanie's meta linguistic interpretation of sellers counter shared intentionality.

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She's published this essay, recently I think it's a great reading we've a number of us have discussed it so I'm going to discuss that quickly and try to slot it in the to the view on developing, particularly with regards to the relationship between proof

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theory and model theory, and then going to look at an account of proof the have been Luke improved body and Julian Schroeder and their notion of rejection, be seen as a kind of rejection or something similar to what I'm doing and again this is this one

00:11:41.000 --> 00:11:55.000
I'm really sort of in the weeds when it comes to not sure what what to think about this stuff. And then there's time at the end I want to address it goes notion of absolute knowing is bad spelling out truth conditions for sharing mental states and thinking

00:11:55.000 --> 00:11:59.000
about what it is to be one of us is a claim about the way things are.

00:11:59.000 --> 00:12:03.000
I doubt I'll get to delete.

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We can we can address it.

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OK, so I'm going to do and philosophy across the board that views declarative explains representations of the way the world are the way the world is where the way the space of possible worlds is.

00:12:23.000 --> 00:12:38.000
So this view for grounds representational intentionality where the mind is meant that the world and normative assessment of claims then is measured in terms of whether the mind is represented correctly.

00:12:38.000 --> 00:12:47.000
Now, no Belknap declares this or a version of this kind of principle. The declarative fallacy. the thought that just because of the things ended declarative mood it's meant to represent the world.

00:12:47.000 --> 00:13:02.000
But oftentimes you say things that are clarity that don't clearly have that function. So something like the cups go in the cupboard might be a way of eating to a roommate how to organize the house for friends help clean up from an employer to an employee,

00:13:02.000 --> 00:13:04.000
it might it, man.

00:13:04.000 --> 00:13:18.000
So this this came up yesterday in his discussion, Stephanie mentioned that context is going to matter a lot for settling some of the claims that we make and trying to determine whether they have one quarter of intentionality or another.

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And I think that that's correct and we need to bear in mind that there are these two complimentary ways we can think about the mind in relation to the world as protein from the other direction.

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Some of the claims we make the declarative have the world of mind direction of fit, where normative assessment is measured not in terms of whether the mind is represented the world rather in terms of whether the world is is the mind, cleanse it to me.

00:13:41.000 --> 00:13:52.000
And so I want to give a semantics that mobile operators, they give expression to shared intentions and the judgment, where I am having this practical intentionality.

00:13:52.000 --> 00:14:06.000
So, overall, my hope is that I've provided a framework that can be used by philosophers linguists and scientists to look at the relationship between discursive and non discursive cognition and human beings.

00:14:06.000 --> 00:14:18.000
So, in the book in particular I try to address the number of issues that come up in these fields in a way that's neutral Kindle substantive commitment between them so as to give a common framework.

00:14:18.000 --> 00:14:27.000
But then also to show how we can address some of the issues because I think it provides a resource for engaging with some of this stuff.

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So originally I thought I'd give a kind of historical approach this talk, because Alan given was going to be here I'm using different stuff.

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See, able to make I think I'm going to focus more of a topical thing so I'll flag some of the issues that come up in the history, philosophy about this issue, for the most part, just going to present it as it is the idea.

00:14:50.000 --> 00:15:06.000
And I'm going to try to minimize the formalism and give a general, I see this research program. My hope is that other people will see it as well. And so, maybe this is a kind of advertisement I'm hoping I can bring people around to seeing things, my view

00:15:06.000 --> 00:15:16.000
or my point of view or at the very least, saying that my point of view is worth partnering with to show me that I'm wrong about something

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That's

00:15:20.000 --> 00:15:25.000
okay so in the book, I give, it's listed there.

00:15:25.000 --> 00:15:36.000
a little bit, I give an account of discursive cognition. Understood is beating the rules button action in terms of a semantics for intentional and do.

00:15:36.000 --> 00:15:51.000
The idea is that to obey rule is to exercise the cognition, the cognition is rationality and use their plans of action is the world of mine correlates to the world as a basis for interpreting mind to fit world represent.

00:15:51.000 --> 00:16:04.000
So, use words and plans to account for the two directions potential, and then draw inferences, and then the idea once this model is up and running to draw inferences about the nature of dispersal cognition are shared intentionality in terms of the kinds

00:16:04.000 --> 00:16:16.000
of things that have to be imposed on the model to get the semantics right, get the right kind of entitlements. And, and to see that that you get the sort of logic you want out of it.

00:16:16.000 --> 00:16:29.000
So the key thesis I'm defending is the shared intentionality to is the basis for and a foundation for the self government that comes with the anti cognition, that's the key I do this fairly quickly.

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I think that the notion of picturing is is an important part of any kind of philosophical anthropology

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is a variation of world world relation between ultimately states of the central nervous system and properties in the environment, processes or literally in the environment.

00:16:54.000 --> 00:17:09.000
So I think of it as having a primitive binder world and world of mind intentionality, so when I reached to pick a glass up right where I see what the glass is I'm not only representing the space around, but I'm engaged in it in certain ways that prepare

00:17:09.000 --> 00:17:13.000
me to act in in ways that allow me to manipulate it.

00:17:13.000 --> 00:17:23.000
So I think I'm picturing is that it's basis that kind of non discursive cognition, this is the sort of thing that these can do an animal to board.

00:17:23.000 --> 00:17:34.000
But in addition to picturing I think we need a notion of shared practical picturing and what I call the antic picture, so this will come up a little bit later but basically the idea is that your practical picturing involves motor representational neural

00:17:34.000 --> 00:17:51.000
mirroring so this is a piece in the 90s, and we've since found that it's across the animal kingdom, but I do something like move a cup up to a countertop and you watch me, there's a part of your motor representational complex, that is planning, from your

00:17:51.000 --> 00:18:06.000
perspective to do what I'm doing is if you were me, so it's not just that you're representing what I'm doing from your point of view, you're actually engaged in your practical faculties in ways that would be appropriate if you were the one who was doing

00:18:06.000 --> 00:18:07.000
it.

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So I think this is a kind of shared practical picturing and you can see how this would facilitate shared agency if you are moving a flight of a table up a flight of stairs narrow in terms, I see that you need to get the legs up on the side.

00:18:20.000 --> 00:18:30.000
I know that I need to go down, important because I can see in some sense, this is what I would do if I was you or what I would need you to do if you will meet.

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So I think if the Arctic picturing and as a kind of shared practical picturing that involves the exercise of what's draw some calls the reactive attitude so these are an effective states that involve evaluations of others things like admiration pride,

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discuss.

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Okay, so this is all in the background as

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part of the transition from non discursive to discursive cognition. I think one of the roles for last year is to individually, intermediate categories between extremes that we don't at a given time, understand how they relate.

00:19:06.000 --> 00:19:12.000
So one of the things I'm trying to do here then is to propose these intermediate categories that will come up a number of times.

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Okay, but I think of all this.

00:19:14.000 --> 00:19:29.000
Being non discursive. So the district count and it's going to be founded on this notion of single mindedness, and rejection. So here's the idea. One chooses to do something candidly just in case one rejects every choice incompatible with that choice.

00:19:29.000 --> 00:19:35.000
And so rejecting primitive effective Pakistan's modeled on the picture.

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Now there's no sufficient entertains an attitude of rejection toward everything compatible with What does now vacations on the scene that's actually kind of tricky because you can just say well I reject not doing, but in the absence of nation.

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There's no supposition that it may be caught you know maybe caught with someone who was within a mental state involved rejecting everything compatible with what piece decided to do.

00:19:58.000 --> 00:20:12.000
But nevertheless, it's useful to model the hunter cognition, as if the kinds of mental states were ones that we could adopt so hyper vigilance is the term I used to characterize the agents are involved in planning and there's a bunch of artificiality

00:20:12.000 --> 00:20:28.000
that are imposed and planning to make sense of it, but I think it's useful to think of the extremes, particularly when we're doing model construction to think of the extremes in precise ways that may involve separating them from features that are part

00:20:28.000 --> 00:20:43.000
of what they are, as a matter of the kind of thing they actually are in the world, as opposed to our model. So again, I took picturing to be a primitive joint mine world and worldwide intentionality, but in this amazing, I'm creating my world intentionality

00:20:43.000 --> 00:20:56.000
in terms of possible worlds and world mind intentionality in terms of plants so that's an artificial reality, it's going to be useful similarly for the notion of rejection so maybe only the angels, ever, ever, ever entertain rejection in this way.

00:20:56.000 --> 00:21:03.000
Nevertheless, it's useful for, for we mere mortals to think of it in these terms. So I claim.

00:21:03.000 --> 00:21:06.000
Single mindedness then is a kind of

00:21:06.000 --> 00:21:18.000
finding life of the course of action by not letting myself do anything out of the judgment that out to dress professional.

00:21:18.000 --> 00:21:28.000
That involves rejecting everything compatible with it so I reject gym clothes for instance. And so, in, in one thing I might know is I'm planning my morning, or my evening the night for us.

00:21:28.000 --> 00:21:32.000
If my clothes are clean suit is dirty, that I need to get it cleaned or I need to touch it up or whatever.

00:21:32.000 --> 00:21:39.000
or I need to touch it up or whatever. So, single mindedness that is a mile strong beyond

00:21:39.000 --> 00:21:50.000
is the kind of stuff to practice involves finding yourself of course backs and by not letting yourself do something new, contravening. So, discuss more detail later.

00:21:50.000 --> 00:21:56.000
Alright so the notion of

00:21:56.000 --> 00:22:00.000
getting audio is still be.

00:22:00.000 --> 00:22:03.000
This comes through as well as it can.

00:22:03.000 --> 00:22:20.000
Single mindedness gives you an edge of nonstick strong Niantic modality. Actually let me let me check. Real quick,

00:22:20.000 --> 00:22:38.000
this may kick me off. If I do, I'll come back, so I apologize hold on just a second. Okay.

00:22:38.000 --> 00:22:39.000
Okay.

00:22:39.000 --> 00:22:47.000
So, again.

00:22:47.000 --> 00:23:01.000
So single mindedness gives an account that astronomy on the ground, can I quickly interrupt you, or proposes that maybe it would be a good idea of your clothes the video maybe that can end up on some whatever.

00:23:01.000 --> 00:23:03.000
Okay.

00:23:03.000 --> 00:23:10.000
I hope you can still share your screen now let's. Yeah, the screen.

00:23:10.000 --> 00:23:11.000
Yes.

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You've got the screen Good, good, good.

00:23:13.000 --> 00:23:27.000
Okay, so a single mindedness gives the account of the strong, the modality of obligation for forbid. And then, the notion of differences you specify the week modality.

00:23:27.000 --> 00:23:38.000
Now, this is the historical flat so the distinct choice attitudes was independently developed for login Tell me develop, at least three times, 16 years.

00:23:38.000 --> 00:23:54.000
Give does it in thinking how to live. There was a book by people like sugar and dryer. I mean, it makes sense of obligation, neither of them note this distinction will dry or doesn't want essay and attributes that ever present something novel, so it's

00:23:54.000 --> 00:24:04.000
actually there and give it to begin with. It looks to me left are sort of comes to it on his own, but actually in a couple of essays from sellers in the 60s early 70s.

00:24:04.000 --> 00:24:14.000
In each case, they characterize the strong attitude in terms of preference but I don't think that's right. Because, an animal that's chasing of praise exhibiting preferences.

00:24:14.000 --> 00:24:26.000
But that's not what is going on in the anti cognition, so I think really the idea is this notion of single minded. Furthermore, once you've got single defined difference in terms of single.

00:24:26.000 --> 00:24:41.000
That's what I do.

00:24:41.000 --> 00:24:49.000
But it's different, just in case there's some action be incompatible with he could have chosen to be without changing any of your single minded choices.

00:24:49.000 --> 00:24:52.000
So if I think I had to dress professionally.

00:24:52.000 --> 00:25:03.000
And I between me is to reject rejecting each, so rejection in the sense iterating in a way that's like negation.

00:25:03.000 --> 00:25:12.000
So, it's very case of thinking, dress professionally, I think, to dress professionally, that I'm permitted dressed in black suit.

00:25:12.000 --> 00:25:24.000
Then I'm going to choose single mindedly dress professionally by rejecting anything possible which means I'm not going to dress my gym clothes, but I'm planning to choose in differently between the two suits in the sense that either of them.

00:25:24.000 --> 00:25:28.000
Each satisfy my single minded choice to dress professional.

00:25:28.000 --> 00:25:41.000
Okay, so then just really quick. This is just a possible world semantics with the additional, it's basically to get Boolean logic.

00:25:41.000 --> 00:25:47.000
Just the set theoretic operations that with the middle of the 19th century.

00:25:47.000 --> 00:25:57.000
So, let idiotic plan be defined as a maximally consistent plan of action for every circumstance, every agent, and every choice.

00:25:57.000 --> 00:26:11.000
The agent, either single mindedly chooses to do that thing chooses not to do it differently chooses do it or indefinitely chooses not to do it so it should exhaust all the possibilities of agents choices and actions.

00:26:11.000 --> 00:26:23.000
So, the understanding understood tensions and action. So this is a large distinguish choice to boil water in order to make tea from a choice to boil the water in order to make coffee.

00:26:23.000 --> 00:26:33.000
So the idea is that you individually choices and find a farm is a brain, if you could specify that the intent action and then we didn't put the semantic value of sentence five with these Scott brackets brackets.

00:26:33.000 --> 00:26:52.000
And we didn't put the semantic value of sentence five with these Scott brackets with these double brackets. In terms of the spec interpreted first sentence having the mind to fit world to fit the interpretation of flies going to be the set of worlds which

00:26:52.000 --> 00:26:55.000
is true.

00:26:55.000 --> 00:27:08.000
Through the Arctic expressions are then defined in terms of plans of action, and I'm treating at this point in the semantics I'm treating, just the prescriptive fragments so I'm just looking at the hyper plans here, so to say they're doing is obliged

00:27:08.000 --> 00:27:28.000
see expresses universally rejecting not fancy at it to say it's the set of plans for every agent who's single mindedly agency to say that is an expressive University rejecting doing a CD, which is to set up our plans where every agent, choose a single

00:27:28.000 --> 00:27:42.000
mindedly not agency, and then say that doing is permitted and he expresses universally rejecting rejecting doing agency, which may, which is the set of pipe pipelines for every agent, either single line only choose a day and C, or indifferently chooses

00:27:42.000 --> 00:27:46.000
whether or not.

00:27:46.000 --> 00:28:01.000
Plan is actually consists of action, just in the same way that it was, but intentional April plans don't distinguish the attitudes of single mindedness and indifference. This is because they don't have a strong in a week down to Dallas modality and the way that the deal.

00:28:01.000 --> 00:28:14.000
way that the deal. So we're Iota or i have to say i when i when i read it out where I Oda is a meta linguistic variable taking you through the first person singular, plural pronouns, as its value.

00:28:14.000 --> 00:28:27.000
I feel AC is a set of hyper plans where I choose a together on cnh were together is important if you've got the plural pronouns, we can play.

00:28:27.000 --> 00:28:47.000
So, now, in this case, what I got here is I have the semantic utterances or triples. So, before I was looking just at the single plans because I was considering the fragment of the language where you have either just purely unintentional purely

00:28:47.000 --> 00:28:57.000
sentences, but we want to be able to model relations among these sentences. So we have to take as our semantic interpreted order triples of world's data paper pens and intentional.

00:28:57.000 --> 00:29:09.000
But if you do that, you get just all of the regular classical logic defined in terms of operations sets in the way that everyone's familiar with.

00:29:09.000 --> 00:29:17.000
Okay, you can then introduce quantification, and you get the right kind of influences it's provable that an obligation is a permission.

00:29:17.000 --> 00:29:29.000
Even when quantification on the scene distinguish a raid a victim or a relative rising semantic interpretations the world's as I do here.

00:29:29.000 --> 00:29:32.000
And you can

00:29:32.000 --> 00:29:38.000
relationships between different kinds of modalities. So I'm going to just skip this.

00:29:38.000 --> 00:29:58.000
But you, you can ask me questions if you like the template will or been can be modeled these claims on necessity and possibility, then interactions between different kinds of fidelity, so you can distinguish one should a in order to be where the modality

00:29:58.000 --> 00:30:17.000
modality has wide scope. And in order to be one today, where the theological modality has come for cuz you distinguish the antic from attentional plans, there's a coherent but practically irrational mental state expressed by

00:30:17.000 --> 00:30:36.000
a shovel. Here, there are hyper states. These order triples that know that content but it's practically irrational since there's no action, take satisfies all of the blank admits that you adopt.

00:30:36.000 --> 00:30:44.000
OK, so now I'm going to look at some of its the empirical some of you, and the predictions effects.

00:30:44.000 --> 00:30:49.000
So I already mentioned neural bearing and sure what I call shared practical picture.

00:30:49.000 --> 00:31:00.000
So, this is exactly what you would expect if shared intentionality involves this to the perspectives of other people and plant plan on how you would behave.

00:31:00.000 --> 00:31:13.000
if you were someone else. So, here's Stephen butterfill, talking about neural control for understanding intentionality much coordination of joint action appears to involve not fully distinguishing others actions.

00:31:13.000 --> 00:31:29.000
Take motor simulation task or representation and motor representation of collective goals. In each case coordination of those motor or testers and patients factions tasks goals.

00:31:29.000 --> 00:31:41.000
plans as a matter of pairings and representing past it she will always also be appropriate. If it were you and not her was about form.

00:31:41.000 --> 00:31:54.000
So I mentioned that the intentional hyper plans don't distinguish single mindedness and indifference and this is because they don't have a distinction between a strong in a week, Global force.

00:31:54.000 --> 00:31:57.000
This guests shares.

00:31:57.000 --> 00:32:03.000
Kind of practical rationality practical cognition, and what's all been able to accomplish.

00:32:03.000 --> 00:32:17.000
And then some of the things that support suggestion so you choose, without choosing single mindedly, so the wolf that chases a prey. Say what is chasing an antelope burden is looking for a weekend alone, or chase the wolf is going to make choices, but

00:32:17.000 --> 00:32:24.000
but the choices are going to be single minded in the sense that it's not adopting an effective stance, effective practical sense worth finding itself to that course of action.

00:32:24.000 --> 00:32:33.000
And this can be seen because if the envelope that it chases suddenly gets a second when stumble.

00:32:33.000 --> 00:32:42.000
Trust will divert to the any consideration of anything chosen.

00:32:42.000 --> 00:33:12.000
So chooses looks like something that it's more complicated requires additional cognitive complexity and simply choose for the more with the notion of single by choice you can discriminate practical genus species religions, when I planned on choosing and

00:33:13.000 --> 00:33:29.000
And I think the case can be made then the cognition is the foundation of discursive cognition in the sense that involves this kind of self bindings, the self government, because a human being in the content context is an agent that x not only in accord

00:33:29.000 --> 00:33:40.000
with a rule but on the basis of a recognition of its propriety. So if we take this content and idea, one that makes with little cells.

00:33:40.000 --> 00:33:58.000
At least they will take as our part of our inspiration, then we can think of the Artic cognition is a mechanism for that kind of content self government because it's single mindedness that allows us to exercise that that course of action where we don't

00:33:58.000 --> 00:34:04.000
allow ourselves to do something we've committed ourselves to reject and

00:34:04.000 --> 00:34:19.000
Furthermore, positive and negative reinforcement schedules instituted by shared intentionality suffice to set up normative statuses, even if the people engaged in that shared intentionality don't know, don't know what they're doing or aren't aware of

00:34:19.000 --> 00:34:30.000
what they're doing and the, the sense of awareness that comes with discursive self government to ethnic so stick meeting and flocked anything or just negative and positive reinforcement so acting on the intention to stick be doing AMC and flocked and

00:34:30.000 --> 00:34:39.000
not doing AMC is one way of training people to conform to the norm that A is forbidden and see. Instead of all the

00:34:39.000 --> 00:34:39.000
up with some words.

00:34:39.000 --> 00:34:54.000
some work. So this suggests that consumer language is normal for things and that a vocal communication, a language might be undergoing development goals tactic complexity,

00:34:54.000 --> 00:34:55.000
social attitudes.

00:34:55.000 --> 00:35:11.000
There's I see no be any construction to the land itself without anyone being able to save money, so they were institution for

00:35:11.000 --> 00:35:18.000
the community.

00:35:18.000 --> 00:35:25.000
There's a bunch of work been developmental say

00:35:25.000 --> 00:35:34.000
it's out of shared intentionality beginning and what is just around like was

00:35:34.000 --> 00:35:37.000
almost cannot hear you.

00:35:37.000 --> 00:35:40.000
Okay,

00:35:40.000 --> 00:36:01.000
quite a bit of work in developmental technology, about the emergence of normative adults opinion, nine months of age, cubits exhibit proclivity to share mental states with their caregivers, so attention and emotion, and from nine months stage asked me

00:36:01.000 --> 00:36:10.000
for sharing meditates develops into capacity to share and enforce.

00:36:10.000 --> 00:36:25.000
So, recent review article by Schmidt and cozy, they close with a claim that further research might support a view that is remarkably consonant with the one I've developed here.

00:36:25.000 --> 00:36:32.000
They say one picture that's worth being explored more systematically and future research is that well if you will be.

00:36:32.000 --> 00:36:58.000
I'm potentially in the natural loans as breakfast and success uniquely human forms of normal psychology and equally shared intentionality developed in close to hand them in early ontogeny, the former building on and going out of the ladder.

00:36:58.000 --> 00:37:01.000
is founded on this distinction between a strong and weak force.

00:37:01.000 --> 00:37:17.000
It should intentionality is the kind of thing that but isn't practical standpoint, involving putting yourself into the position of other people, provide a foundation for what's going to be the Artic cognition the capacity to choose single minded but.

00:37:17.000 --> 00:37:33.000
But again, I'm thinking in terms of single mindedness is a kind of abstract idealization at the level of phylogenetic. I think it's better to think in terms of shared practical picturing and the authentic picturing that hominids we're developing a massive

00:37:33.000 --> 00:37:46.000
state, but to do it in a way of normative we're evaluating valence and attitudes like admiration and discuss would have been important for that process.

00:37:46.000 --> 00:37:56.000
Okay, so I'm proposing

00:37:56.000 --> 00:38:04.000
or norm psychology develops out of shared intention intention testing something similar in the species.

00:38:04.000 --> 00:38:08.000
Okay so, Thomas.

00:38:08.000 --> 00:38:25.000
Thomas Hello thinks that we can give an account of the development of human cognition, on the basis of step process of evolution from joint, the collective intention joint intentionality involves sharing mental states with small groups, respecting.

00:38:25.000 --> 00:38:40.000
People hunting small groups of people hunting in the time of their hunting or in building tools at a time that they're building tools, but no expand sense of what he calls collective intentionality which is, in principle, unrestricted space and time where

00:38:40.000 --> 00:38:54.000
the members of the community. Are you might never meet might not even be able to themselves claim is that human connection involves judgments about what is true and moral is what binding on everyone

00:38:54.000 --> 00:39:02.000
It isn't enough to account for human connection, but rather, but there's a necessity for collective intention.

00:39:02.000 --> 00:39:10.000
Because collective intentionality is allowed is allows us to conceive of truth of what's true and what's more, is what's binding on everyone.

00:39:10.000 --> 00:39:28.000
And it lays this out notes there may need to be additional stages and proposed between intentionality and the development of human cognition, and I can be Genius Bar is proposing some intermediate stage that kind of collective intentionality, and the

00:39:28.000 --> 00:39:42.000
development of human cognition, we need a notion of single minded, because this is what allows us to account for recognizing something is true, or good, in the sense of recognition that involves that merely acting in conformity with a norm from the basis

00:39:42.000 --> 00:39:49.000
of an awareness of its proprietary responding to it as something that commands or medium.

00:39:49.000 --> 00:39:57.000
Think it's plausible that we could have been able to speak a language, sharing attention to communicate, which could have blown could have been home Gov.

00:39:57.000 --> 00:40:01.000
Long before we were aware of norms the sense of awareness that bulbs.

00:40:01.000 --> 00:40:09.000
The other person cognition.

00:40:09.000 --> 00:40:15.000
allowed us to adopt those cognitive stances.

00:40:15.000 --> 00:40:24.000
Okay. So one last thing about the sport and predictions. So, brand new Dell have this debate about whether logic use is necessary for reason laundering.

00:40:24.000 --> 00:40:37.000
Things that know there could have been human beings that were engaged in the practice of giving and asking for reasons without logic yet being on the scene, and that the virtue of logic is that makes explicit what was implicit in those reasoning practices,

00:40:37.000 --> 00:40:46.000
because there's no, there's no sense in which a group of people, reasoning accepted so they're using logical operators.

00:40:46.000 --> 00:40:51.000
My suggestion is that that logic makes the difference that single minded.

00:40:51.000 --> 00:40:57.000
This is what allows you to recognize this piece

00:40:57.000 --> 00:40:59.000
to the convention.

00:40:59.000 --> 00:41:10.000
So it's entirely possible as far as I can see the community that have been using logical aging in the nation and getting an internet connection stable message.

00:41:10.000 --> 00:41:13.000
I hope people can still hear

00:41:13.000 --> 00:41:22.000
that say about that. The way trying to

00:41:22.000 --> 00:41:27.000
run the sort of

00:41:27.000 --> 00:41:30.000
throw my hat in.

00:41:30.000 --> 00:41:45.000
My father always said that you should never get the middle of between two pods that are bigger than you, and so it's not a good idea but that's, that's my claim.

00:41:45.000 --> 00:41:48.000
That's,

00:41:48.000 --> 00:41:54.000
that's Yes, yes. Okay, thank you. So now I'm going to get into the stuff that's a little.

00:41:54.000 --> 00:42:06.000
It's this this this stuff is all still in process, so maybe I've only got about 10 minutes left so maybe I'll do this a little quicker. Anyway, I'm positive will not get to absolute knowing but it's implicit in what we're doing.

00:42:06.000 --> 00:42:16.000
Okay, so consider the following. I want to get to Prague the morning, the best way to get to Prague tomorrow morning it's take the a train us

00:42:16.000 --> 00:42:32.000
maintain and the other condition involves minus worse than the body, the sandbox The conclusion is strong, the expression of intention, through the article and we're.

00:42:32.000 --> 00:42:46.000
a conditional patch. But this treaty on decoding cognition is a kind of punk tape mental act. That is something like observing facts and then proceeding to draw some information.

00:42:46.000 --> 00:43:02.000
I think clarity.

00:43:02.000 --> 00:43:11.000
So I, it seems to me that this influence is perfectly fine on its own there's there's no need to impose digital reason here involves the kind of material.

00:43:11.000 --> 00:43:21.000
It's just part of what it is to have desire and to think that stuff but his desire is to kentisbeare this

00:43:21.000 --> 00:43:24.000
fire desire.

00:43:24.000 --> 00:43:37.000
And then single mindedness to be seen. Not in some particular act, but in a commitment that spells itself out over the course of planning or realizing the plan that's expressed with that intention.

00:43:37.000 --> 00:43:52.000
So as I'm thinking about what to do in the night before I have to make decisions to make sure I'm ready and I'm awake and then my bags are packed. When I wake up in the morning, I have to make sure I'm not allowing desire to sleep to suppress my admit

00:43:52.000 --> 00:43:56.000
this is single minded This is a kind of self government.

00:43:56.000 --> 00:44:04.000
I suppress my desires, even though I'd like to sleep in because I committed myself to 10 reasons for later so of course.

00:44:04.000 --> 00:44:16.000
And so the intention then acts as a kind of guide that my single mindedness finds itself to over the course of realizing that plan.

00:44:16.000 --> 00:44:29.000
Okay, so I think that we can then spell a difference between world and instrumental practical rationality, it says the moral law applies independently of one's personal place in space and time, it's not intentional on one person or group of people's desires,

00:44:29.000 --> 00:44:31.000
but claiming.

00:44:31.000 --> 00:44:50.000
That's about the semantics for the article ality is being unrestricted when it comes to agencies, the agents and circumstances that have a duty or obligation applies to. It's not a claim in normative ethics so as far as I can see that's compatible with being at the ontology just a virtue theorists and

00:44:50.000 --> 00:44:53.000
ethics of care consequential ism what happened.

00:44:53.000 --> 00:45:10.000
Okay, so let me mention just I've got about five minutes left here so let me just get enough of the proof theory model theory stuff on the board to at least indicate how I think my view which might look to be in conflict with Stephanie's is actually compatible.

00:45:10.000 --> 00:45:21.000
So there's a tortured history to the term intentional semantics in contemporary philosophers at LX intentional semantics co obsessional of possible worlds semantics.

00:45:21.000 --> 00:45:35.000
This is owed to current EPS decision and meaning and assessing to use the potential to replace what Fred talked about in terms of senses. Now the distinction between sense and reference it didn't work for centuries, it shows up in the medieval position

00:45:35.000 --> 00:45:54.000
syncopation distinction in logic report well it's in a logical font and purse cool and just about everyone Prager sense of reference card app and meaning and it says, it says well look, since we can't get a grip on it.

00:45:54.000 --> 00:46:01.000
I'm going to use this lead Mitzi in turn, and I'm going to define intention as a function for the state description to extension.

00:46:01.000 --> 00:46:17.000
Now, that is, essentially possible world semantics state descriptions are maximally determined states of affairs where every sentence organizations including a current app doesn't have an accessibility relation, it was one of cookies brilliance discoveries

00:46:17.000 --> 00:46:28.000
was to see accessibility is what allows us to distinguish the modal teams sky Lewis button eyes in the 20s, but it's there and current and potential.

00:46:28.000 --> 00:46:36.000
OK, so the this view of intentions takes the outputs to be extensions to be referencing the world.

00:46:36.000 --> 00:46:50.000
But the old notion of intention or comprehension I prefer the term comprehension because it doesn't seem to have this this baggage that tension it's got the old term of comprehension was not about a relationship between words or concepts in the world,

00:46:50.000 --> 00:46:56.000
but about a relationship between concepts or between five minutes. Okay. Yes.

00:46:56.000 --> 00:47:09.000
So, this is to the notion of comprehension then it doesn't involve word world relations, but rather inter linguistic relations relations within language or within thought.

00:47:09.000 --> 00:47:25.000
So I think what I've developed is a model theory is the basis for word to fit world extensions involve modeling theoretical rationality and world to fit word extensions modeling, practical rational.

00:47:25.000 --> 00:47:28.000
Using possible worlds.

00:47:28.000 --> 00:47:46.000
Now, this leaves room then for taking proof theory as specifying comprehension and terms of concept containment or word word relations. And if that's right if that's a good way of reconstructing the old extension comprehension distinction, so that option

00:47:46.000 --> 00:48:01.000
is modeled with proof theory as opposed to trying to build comprehension inside model theory, then it should be useful and sorting out some debates. So what I want to do is mention to and look at at least both so this is Stephanie's account of the middle

00:48:01.000 --> 00:48:10.000
and what she calls the middle and mystic interpretation of sellers account of ethical statements. And then the other is in providing slaughters proof theoretic interpretation of the Arctic modality.

00:48:10.000 --> 00:48:18.000
Because if I'm right that model theory and proof or complementary then there should be a way to reconcile these different.

00:48:18.000 --> 00:48:28.000
These essay, she argued the sellers in his later work comes around understanding the object language claim one ought to AMC question.

00:48:28.000 --> 00:48:41.000
But as what we said in the middle is we spell a is implied by we shall promote the general welfare and the double use of the quotes there indicates that we're talking about language, and she knows that this involves an indirect connection agency, because

00:48:41.000 --> 00:48:43.000
we're going through the middle at which here.

00:48:43.000 --> 00:48:58.000
Now, in other words, I've argued that you can give an interpretation of the atomic sentences in proof theoretic semantics, in terms of the role of those sentences, as premises and

00:48:58.000 --> 00:49:14.000
meaning of Eric's matrix is the role that plays in explaining things and being explained by things that gives you an introduction in a way for Adams, that intended interpretive Missy and Fred says has this book on probiotics Mannix where he lays this

00:49:14.000 --> 00:49:25.000
out, and he uses introduction elimination rules for specifying the meaning of a sentence so the idea is that the conjunction means, what it does in virtue of the introduction wolf or conjunction and the elimination of overhead reduction.

00:49:25.000 --> 00:49:30.000
So specify McCullough.

00:49:30.000 --> 00:49:40.000
To give an introduction the nation rules for Adams, in terms of roles and explanation that gives them a meeting prophetic semantics.

00:49:40.000 --> 00:49:54.000
So this is intentional, versus hyper intentional. But the very term hyper intentionality is an artifact of the decision to use extensions, as the meanings of of what get called intentional sentences.

00:49:54.000 --> 00:50:11.000
So, it's just confused to think in those terms, but it's easy to say that it's hyper intentional because the meaning of a is going to different from the meaning of Ana, because an days will be justified by the introduction, and is going to be just.

00:50:11.000 --> 00:50:14.000
So it's easily.

00:50:14.000 --> 00:50:29.000
So now consider what duck sellers would say in response to the phone. Why not one a response would be, because we show a is implied by we shall promote the general work will deliver because we shall a is implied by we shall promote the general welfare.

00:50:29.000 --> 00:50:37.000
That's the same there's a good explanation for why why not a the, what's the implication relation between shirt intentionality and promoting the general welfare.

00:50:37.000 --> 00:50:51.000
But according to France says and my work. That's the finest is to give the proof theoretic meaning of one not eight, so we can see, Stephanie than giving her middle linguistic interpretation approved through theoretic analysis of the comprehension of

00:50:51.000 --> 00:50:57.000
claims like one day, whereas I'm giving a model theoretic analysis of their extension.

00:50:57.000 --> 00:51:01.000
And so this then I claim is compatible the two views are compatible.

00:51:01.000 --> 00:51:12.000
Okay, if I had more I'll stop here if I had more time I talked about the directness of the middle linguistic account, something similar is true of the account, given by loader.

00:51:12.000 --> 00:51:30.000
And I think that if you look at bilateral semantics, there's a way of seeing the bilateral semantics produces logically complex sentences to complexes of attitudes of assertion and denial, in a way that suggests, there's an additional into position between

00:51:30.000 --> 00:51:42.000
Thomas fellows collective intentionality and cognition. Not only do you need single mindedness, which involves what I call a agent of rejection where I'm rejecting choices.

00:51:42.000 --> 00:51:48.000
You also need linguistic

00:51:48.000 --> 00:51:52.000
intro linguistic word word relation.

00:51:52.000 --> 00:52:00.000
So that's, that's in the background, and I as I say this stuff is all tentative.

00:52:00.000 --> 00:52:14.000
I'm hoping I can spell it out, as I go forward, and I look forward to questions and comments from people so thank you for bearing with me

00:52:14.000 --> 00:52:24.000
to press them.

00:52:24.000 --> 00:52:25.000
Okay.

00:52:25.000 --> 00:52:45.000
So if you have a question, raise your hand wave with me, or give a signal in the chat.

00:52:45.000 --> 00:52:52.000
Yeah.

00:52:52.000 --> 00:53:02.000
Hey Preston Thanks a lot, wow that was massive and thanks for the PowerPoint slides they helped a lot. given that your internet connection was really shaky.

00:53:02.000 --> 00:53:15.000
So I have just a clarification question about the earlier parts of the papers over the you introduce the idea of his formal semantics, representing if I understand.

00:53:15.000 --> 00:53:31.000
Believe contents or meanings of declarative sentences in sets of positive terms of sets of possible worlds and the meaning of prescriptive sentences or sentences expressing intentions in terms of sets of the antic hyper plans, the only type of states.

00:53:31.000 --> 00:53:37.000
I get this right. So,

00:53:37.000 --> 00:53:54.000
could you could this formal semantics account for the possibility that a belief and an intention or a declarative statement and statement expressing a intention could have the same propositional content.

00:53:54.000 --> 00:54:07.000
I mean, given that one is modeled in terms of of hype of plans, versus the other is modeled in terms of possible world so it seems like very very formally speaking at least

00:54:07.000 --> 00:54:18.000
state cognitive states all the sentences expressing them with different directions of fit could not have the same propositional content is that is that right and.

00:54:18.000 --> 00:54:23.000
Well,

00:54:23.000 --> 00:54:28.000
it depends what you mean but

00:54:28.000 --> 00:54:41.000
That's not something I've given much thought to, I think, I would, I would like to be in a position to say that although I don't know that that's true I probably use it at some point.

00:54:41.000 --> 00:54:56.000
But I haven't given it much thought to the extent that I do use it I just think it. I just think of it in terms of what stipulated as the semantic turbulence for these things so, strictly speaking, managers, interpret in our sets of triples of worlds

00:54:56.000 --> 00:54:58.000
plans and intentions.

00:54:58.000 --> 00:55:10.000
And then it's going to be the case that the means of the cup is on the shelf, and I shall put the cup on the shelf is the goal, different sets of hyper states.

00:55:10.000 --> 00:55:16.000
Now, you might have a view that has

00:55:16.000 --> 00:55:29.000
been on the shelf for cup is on the show, and give some kind of an account of attitude as a force marker for soccer attitude that if something that's not part of that is a different thing.

00:55:29.000 --> 00:55:32.000
That's not my view.

00:55:32.000 --> 00:55:53.000
It's not obviously for be more clearly committed to the distinction between cases, but I'm not committed in the case so if someone wants to tweak it and do something with that.

00:55:53.000 --> 00:55:59.000
Okay. Preston we still have problems hearing you speak really slowly articulate, very carefully.

00:55:59.000 --> 00:56:11.000
Particularly, very carefully. Yeah, yeah. It's a pity. Have another my kid.

00:56:11.000 --> 00:56:13.000
All right. Thanks.

00:56:13.000 --> 00:56:29.000
Yeah, many interesting things, and I am interested in the work of people looking at the intersection or, you know, points for dialogue between settlers and Tomasello.

00:56:29.000 --> 00:56:54.000
I think it's an exciting bit of sort of cross disciplinary work but I'm kind of a bit confused I guess about why I haven't really seen critiques of time so there's particular brands of philosophizing about his own findings from solutions.

00:56:54.000 --> 00:57:14.000
I think to myself kind of pics bits of philosophy from here in there he's quite keen on sell his quite keen on Davidson, but from a psychological point of view there seem to be quite a few problems and quite a few places where to miss others and Schmitz

00:57:14.000 --> 00:57:34.000
record cheese journalism will have a problem for solution, I'm not sure what a shared mental states is, for example, when does one mental state ends and the next one starts to an agent extra mental state to know and I'm sharing mental state with someone,

00:57:34.000 --> 00:57:41.000
and that Thomas says, starting position of influence.

00:57:41.000 --> 00:57:59.000
Starting from a veil of ignorance where they have mutual trust and respect from each other, and then go through a process of inner labeling that they then share in order to become, social, and communicative.

00:57:59.000 --> 00:58:02.000
This idea of

00:58:02.000 --> 00:58:15.000
lots of fully fledged concepts that they've got up and running, and they then once they have those private concepts, make explicit.

00:58:15.000 --> 00:58:37.000
I think I, yeah, that there's lots of part of part of it, which of course a really unique and powerful bits of empirical work but I often feel like I wish solutions would push back against some of the ways in which Thomas other especially and to some

00:58:37.000 --> 00:58:38.000
extent.

00:58:38.000 --> 00:58:45.000
Schmidt and phrase it

00:58:45.000 --> 00:58:46.000
up.

00:58:46.000 --> 00:59:03.000
I would directly to chat to my eye. One of the things that Thomas Bo does is he rolls on Brad Smith Bradman's notion of shared intentionality, he just sort of has a, an offhand remark and a couple of places that that's the way he's approaching it now.

00:59:03.000 --> 00:59:17.000
Glenda that me and lots of course, both argue that there's problems with that, precisely because Robin has this really conceptually sophisticated notion of shared intentionality, I not only have to share an intention with you, but I have to know, you

00:59:17.000 --> 00:59:21.000
have to know that you that I started attention with you.

00:59:21.000 --> 00:59:34.000
In chapter two my book I take this stuff on board and I argue that some of the work that butterfill in particular has done in looking at neural mirroring and processes of what I call share practical picturing and accounting for shared intentionality can

00:59:34.000 --> 00:59:48.000
be slotted in as a substitute for tomatoes appeal to Bradman's analysis in a way that allows him to entitle himself to the non discursive resources that I claim these notions of picture.

00:59:48.000 --> 00:59:50.000
So absolutely right.

00:59:50.000 --> 01:00:03.000
You know, Thomas Ellis, it's great that he's doing all this popularizing work that the first. Not only does he really appeal to sellers in workplaces and some of his work with him do as well, first page of a natural history of human thinking refers to

01:00:03.000 --> 01:00:15.000
both Hegel and purse so he's squarely in the in the field and the kind of work that folks like I should be from a, but I absolutely agree we shouldn't be taking it on critically and we have just as much

01:00:15.000 --> 01:00:18.000
benefit off of the science.

01:00:18.000 --> 01:00:26.000
I think so, That's fair.

01:00:26.000 --> 01:00:29.000
Okay.

01:00:29.000 --> 01:00:39.000
Just have a look if there's another question if not then I would like to ask one myself or two.

01:00:39.000 --> 01:00:44.000
Yeah, the first question that I have.

01:00:44.000 --> 01:01:02.000
I wonder how sharp that distinction between choosing single mindedly and choosing in differently is in the real life situations, because I understand that when you use these notions for semantic modeling then you can just say that there's a shop boundary

01:01:02.000 --> 01:01:20.000
Yeah, but then you want to apply that to real life situations, and how chapters that distinction like sometimes we do not choose in terms of something like a real moral art we choose based on preferences, but still say the preference, this might be very

01:01:20.000 --> 01:01:33.000
strong. Yeah, and my attitude of not rejecting rejecting the alternatives that might be a week attitude, actually a week out just a week rejection, in terms of strength of the rejection.

01:01:33.000 --> 01:01:41.000
So, it would be hard to change my decision. On the other hand, it might be decisions which are generally moral decisions.

01:01:41.000 --> 01:01:55.000
But where my attitude of rejecting the alternatives might still be rather weak as a moral in a moral dilemma for example, you know, but I'm might be easily swayed in my, in my decision.

01:01:55.000 --> 01:01:57.000
I might be unsure. Yeah.

01:01:57.000 --> 01:02:07.000
So, so that would be the question is, how sharp is that distinction. That would be the first one and the second one out when you talked about

01:02:07.000 --> 01:02:14.000
introducing odd statements as

01:02:14.000 --> 01:02:21.000
as being explained by statements about the implication relations between we intentions.

01:02:21.000 --> 01:02:32.000
I just wondered what kind of explanation you have in mind because there are different kinds of explanations you know their causal ones are the ones in terms of mechanics and more this just maybe broadly reason given once.

01:02:32.000 --> 01:02:36.000
So, what just what kind of explanations that.

01:02:36.000 --> 01:02:58.000
Yeah, well, so thank you. And I'm sorry I wasn't able to get more into to your essay in the, in the chat, the bills do justice to your view, because I think it's great you

01:02:58.000 --> 01:03:02.000
first

01:03:02.000 --> 01:03:16.000
get to throw my hands up and say yeah we're some lunar being, we think we think, most of what we do is motivated by all kinds of unreflective processes lots of conscious.

01:03:16.000 --> 01:03:22.000
Know that possible for us to know what motivates.

01:03:22.000 --> 01:03:26.000
And then, I don't know what to say.

01:03:26.000 --> 01:03:47.000
I hope this is, I hope that could be used for people to do things like conflict resolution. So think about what involved, you are engaged in certain oftentimes what you do is imagine yourself in the other person's perspective, try to adopt their point

01:03:47.000 --> 01:03:48.000
of view.

01:03:48.000 --> 01:03:58.000
It seems that the trend perfect on practical actually that I'm hoping my approach can help model.

01:03:58.000 --> 01:04:07.000
And then he, but that kind of work this is gonna be on underscores what I was calling the non discursive side.

01:04:07.000 --> 01:04:28.000
In particular logic picturing. And when it comes to the antic picturing if there is anything like that. It's not going to be this sort of thing that's modeled by rejection is an attitude that's in taking everything in compatible with the action and rejecting

01:04:28.000 --> 01:04:35.000
this on one of the.

01:04:35.000 --> 01:04:46.000
But I think it's worth looking into his third, really, is a notion of mindedness that objection

01:04:46.000 --> 01:04:51.000
lies.

01:04:51.000 --> 01:04:55.000
The admission.

01:04:55.000 --> 01:05:05.000
Two years of age children who are playing in a joint game with a, with an analogy break off and do another game, if it's if the game is more enjoyable.

01:05:05.000 --> 01:05:15.000
He first game explicitly entered into something they're going to do together. By the age of three children who have extended the game to.

01:05:15.000 --> 01:05:21.000
They're all the way back. Nicely will ask for permission.

01:05:21.000 --> 01:05:39.000
So it seems like at this stage where more dimension pose itself on top of our share of activities, if I'm right the attention of the article and bolts rejected.

01:05:39.000 --> 01:05:57.000
three is receptive to that the child to it. So, that's a way of trying to address your question by emphasizing the need to look at the wear of the brain, and the physiology and psychology.

01:05:57.000 --> 01:06:07.000
When it comes to the semantics. Yeah, I'm just taking them as explicit, sort of, I'm treating them.

01:06:07.000 --> 01:06:10.000
Just.

01:06:10.000 --> 01:06:20.000
And then I what the, the actual fact of the matter in our brains is going to look like. But my hope is that there's enough here that aren't getting your second question.

01:06:20.000 --> 01:06:29.000
What kind of explanation is involved in my.

01:06:29.000 --> 01:06:32.000
So this proof of bonuses.

01:06:32.000 --> 01:06:44.000
The similarity to my ensure

01:06:44.000 --> 01:06:54.000
we can attack you anymore. Preston

01:06:54.000 --> 01:06:57.000
Preston I you're still there.

01:06:57.000 --> 01:07:02.000
Seems.

01:07:02.000 --> 01:07:04.000
so it seems.

01:07:04.000 --> 01:07:09.000
Preston has gone

01:07:09.000 --> 01:07:13.000
person we can't hear you.

01:07:13.000 --> 01:07:32.000
So maybe I suggest that we finish the this session, have a break, and maybe Preston will be back with a with a stable connection afterwards, we can chat about things afterwards.

01:07:32.000 --> 01:07:34.000
If there's from.

01:07:34.000 --> 01:07:44.000
Yeah. Maybe if I record pri is present if you can hear us disconnect, or I can disconnect you actually enforce it to reconnect and, maybe, I don't know.

01:07:44.000 --> 01:07:50.000
Shall we try that. Yeah, I think I might as well.

01:07:50.000 --> 01:07:56.000
Let's see.

01:07:56.000 --> 01:08:12.000
Reston, you might also try rebooting your Wi Fi, as well as hotspot and so I don't know if it matters. Can you guys hear me right now again.

01:08:12.000 --> 01:08:14.000
Yeah. Okay.

01:08:14.000 --> 01:08:24.000
Well, I don't know what I don't want to go over time. Let me just at least answer Stephanie's last question. It's a great question. What kind of explanation is involved, I have not given it much thought.

01:08:24.000 --> 01:08:34.000
In the essay where I lay out the semantics for atomic sentences and approved theoretic semantics, I rely on Jared Mickelson's notion of best explanation.

01:08:34.000 --> 01:08:49.000
But that's developed in the sciences, so I'm open to the possibility that there are, say moral explanations or other kinds of explanation, and I just haven't given it much thought.

01:08:49.000 --> 01:09:00.000
Okay, thank you for for these answers I just have a look. Whether there's more questions.

01:09:00.000 --> 01:09:02.000
Okay.

01:09:02.000 --> 01:09:06.000
Yeah.

01:09:06.000 --> 01:09:20.000
I don't know if there's time, but just to present thanks a clarity victory question Could you say something about the connection between single minded choice and self government by norms.

01:09:20.000 --> 01:09:39.000
So is the idea that endorsing normative statements is somehow is implicit in the practice of of every single minded chooser and, and if so, how and if not, what is the what is the connection you see between those between self single minded choice and

01:09:39.000 --> 01:09:41.000
self government.

01:09:41.000 --> 01:10:00.000
I wouldn't say that every single minded choice is a responsiveness to a thought of what what to do, but that every response to this to a thought about what not to do, is or expresses this in light of choice.

01:10:00.000 --> 01:10:17.000
And then the way I see them. So in the book, I adopt psychological psychological nominal ism at the beginning, and my claim is that responsiveness to reasons as rules prescribing behavior requires a language that represents those rules, and then psychological

01:10:17.000 --> 01:10:32.000
model ism is the mechanism for having a representation of a rule by the end of it. I'm open to the possibility that we might be responsive to rules representatives such in ways that are non linguistic what's important for my story though, is that you

01:10:32.000 --> 01:10:48.000
can get a language on the scene in terms of norms enforced by shared intentionality without anybody exercising single mindedness so that once you've got language on the scene, then the ability to exercise single mindedness gives you a capacity to be responsive

01:10:48.000 --> 01:10:58.000
to rules representatives such and languages What gives you the representation of rules. Does that answer your question, and maybe I'll have to think more about it.

01:10:58.000 --> 01:11:00.000
Thanks.

01:11:00.000 --> 01:11:03.000
Okay.

01:11:03.000 --> 01:11:10.000
I.

01:11:10.000 --> 01:11:16.000
So, there seemed to be no more questions. Yeah.

01:11:16.000 --> 01:11:26.000
At the end, now we could hear you really well. I don't know what now.

01:11:26.000 --> 01:11:28.000
Yeah.

01:11:28.000 --> 01:11:38.000
Oh, it's a, it's great. This is my first time being back in Montana and three years it's great to be home but you make certain concessions when you, when you live out.

01:11:38.000 --> 01:11:40.000
I know, I know.

01:11:40.000 --> 01:11:48.000
Okay, then. I think that we think Kristen, thanks a lot for the talk.

01:11:48.000 --> 01:12:03.000
I look forward to the rest of this to this is just great.

01:12:03.000 --> 01:12:09.000
See y'all on 13 minutes.

01:12:09.000 --> 01:12:11.000
Yes, indeed.

01:12:11.000 --> 01:12:21.000
Continue at one window, can we continue, we continue at 20 past the hour.

01:12:21.000 --> 01:12:23.000
That's right.

01:12:23.000 --> 01:12:29.000
So, 1120. Eastern Standard Time.

01:12:29.000 --> 01:12:59.000
bead.

01:13:03.000 --> 01:13:07.000
I'm gonna go get myself some coffee Ronald.

01:13:07.000 --> 01:13:37.000
Sounds good. see you shortly. Yep. Take care of me.

01:17:25.000 --> 01:17:29.000
Anyone hanging around.

01:17:29.000 --> 01:17:32.000
I just got back, got myself some coffee.

01:17:32.000 --> 01:17:38.000
Yeah, I do too, so Oh,

01:17:38.000 --> 01:17:41.000
it's warm and very humid.

01:17:41.000 --> 01:17:45.000
Yeah, yeah it's it's over 90 degrees here.

01:17:45.000 --> 01:17:51.000
I've been freezing all winter long. I'm not going to complain.

01:17:51.000 --> 01:17:59.000
Yeah, I start melting it about 80 or 85 degrees so and it gets over 90 I just look.

01:17:59.000 --> 01:18:06.000
I've become too used to the colder weather this hot stuff in the summer.

01:18:06.000 --> 01:18:08.000
It's either.

01:18:08.000 --> 01:18:10.000
Yeah, well.

01:18:10.000 --> 01:18:15.000
The song has not been far from my mind.

01:18:15.000 --> 01:18:21.000
And who knows after the next election. That may be the only the only place left.

01:18:21.000 --> 01:18:27.000
You know we have a decent refugees.

01:18:27.000 --> 01:18:43.000
Welcoming studies, especially for people lacking medications and stuff like that. So, I, I think I understood that you were retired. I am now retired I'm officially retired.

01:18:43.000 --> 01:18:47.000
Okay, it's not old just retired.

01:18:47.000 --> 01:18:54.000
I'm just retired. That's why I was questioning you

01:18:54.000 --> 01:19:04.000
yeah well you know i figured 70 was about the right time and I may be waited a year too late I teaching last year was not fun.

01:19:04.000 --> 01:19:15.000
I guess that was the worst teaching experience ever for both of us. Yeah, yeah, I really hated it.

01:19:15.000 --> 01:19:18.000
I know, me too.

01:19:18.000 --> 01:19:32.000
I, I was been moved by all the testimonies that some of your former students wrote on social media as to your teaching, and that was so great and one of them.

01:19:32.000 --> 01:19:49.000
I think that was a woman and she wrote a she wasn't a song. And to me because well, this was amazing. I wish I could have pushed kind of kid.

01:19:49.000 --> 01:20:02.000
I was terribly moved by it. And, you know, I still those some of those students are still, you know obviously in contact with me and I I treasure that

01:20:02.000 --> 01:20:06.000
I was very. Yeah, I was, I was sort of gobsmacked by it.

01:20:06.000 --> 01:20:11.000
Could you have a genuine retirement party.

01:20:11.000 --> 01:20:13.000
No.

01:20:13.000 --> 01:20:28.000
Well they say well we can't do it now but we'll do do in the fall, but here comes the fall and now we've got the Delta variants. So, I don't know, at some point, we'll have a big party and.

01:20:28.000 --> 01:20:32.000
And I'll insisted Everyone dance.

01:20:32.000 --> 01:20:35.000
Okay.

01:20:35.000 --> 01:20:37.000
I'll be there.

01:20:37.000 --> 01:20:43.000
Alright, well I'll send you an invitation.

01:20:43.000 --> 01:21:00.000
Not that far drive it's about what, five hours up to 90 oh yeah yeah yeah i know but I don't know whether the border is as reopened. Yeah, no, the Canadians have reopened for us we can get into Canada but the US is being pissy and not allowing the Canadians

01:21:00.000 --> 01:21:08.000
into the US, ya know the Canadians now are more thoroughly vaccinated than we are.

01:21:08.000 --> 01:21:17.000
was reading that something like 38 states would qualify as as like you know read countries if they were countries, from which crap travel would be banned.

01:21:17.000 --> 01:21:20.000
So, we should do that.

01:21:20.000 --> 01:21:27.000
Maybe the Oh yeah, I'm like, okay, fine in states like you know Florida.

01:21:27.000 --> 01:21:48.000
Yeah, well I keep thinking that maybe at some point will will reconsider the idea of secession and we'll just, you know, Red Sox nation will succeed from the union and become the ideologically better alternative for ages, Canada, invade the United States.

01:21:48.000 --> 01:21:51.000
Yes, what would you, you would be welcome.

01:21:51.000 --> 01:21:55.000
Oh you know you did once we tried.

01:21:55.000 --> 01:21:57.000
Yeah.

01:21:57.000 --> 01:21:59.000
Prince tried.

01:21:59.000 --> 01:22:05.000
Yeah, but we just love when we when it.

01:22:05.000 --> 01:22:09.000
Thanks to the, the American soul.

01:22:09.000 --> 01:22:21.000
Well, at some point, it may be necessary for Canada to liberate America.

01:22:21.000 --> 01:22:27.000
So, called birthday.

01:22:27.000 --> 01:22:30.000
Your birthday yesterday.

01:22:30.000 --> 01:22:34.000
Ah, that's why that's why I had to leave to.

01:22:34.000 --> 01:22:40.000
I had to, I had to get either sort of cooking and cleaning for the party.

01:22:40.000 --> 01:22:44.000
Well belated Happy birthday to you then. Thank you.

01:22:44.000 --> 01:22:49.000
So how are you fine.

01:22:49.000 --> 01:22:52.000
How are you,

01:22:52.000 --> 01:23:06.000
I'm now 47 spring chicken. Yeah, well and I was like wait like you know because but you know this is this is of course the oldest I've I've ever been.

01:23:06.000 --> 01:23:13.000
Yeah, it feels old to me,

01:23:13.000 --> 01:23:19.000
if, if, if Canada were to liberate us, we'd be back under British rule. Right.

01:23:19.000 --> 01:23:22.000
Yeah.

01:23:22.000 --> 01:23:30.000
Yeah. I mean, you know, all of our all of our wars that you get managed to the home office.

01:23:30.000 --> 01:23:36.000
Participate in the Commonwealth Games. Yeah. See, I think there are advantages here.

01:23:36.000 --> 01:23:41.000
Do we have to be Doctor Who fans then I don't know how this works. Yeah.

01:23:41.000 --> 01:23:49.000
That is a requirement. I'm way ahead of you know, And you will have to pledge to them.

01:23:49.000 --> 01:23:55.000
The Queen, and maybe should you should do that now before I pass.

01:23:55.000 --> 01:24:00.000
It will pass pledge to the key and you don't want.

01:24:00.000 --> 01:24:02.000
Yeah.

01:24:02.000 --> 01:24:07.000
Also will have to our last month to have, like, roughly some.

01:24:07.000 --> 01:24:18.000
Please know get rid of baseball just play cricket and soccer and you know just, you know, the whole sports is image names for you know it's it's going to be a, yeah.

01:24:18.000 --> 01:24:21.000
It'll be a lot.

01:24:21.000 --> 01:24:29.000
You will have to learn to be sorry for everything all the time

01:24:29.000 --> 01:24:33.000
to do

01:24:33.000 --> 01:24:39.000
as a Jewish person I think I already have, I think I already have a handle on that one.

01:24:39.000 --> 01:24:42.000
Oh no, the Jews.

01:24:42.000 --> 01:24:44.000
Sorry.

01:24:44.000 --> 01:24:56.000
Sorry folks the British. The British are the cream of apologies, they're very good at apologize not very good at fixing anything but they're very good at apologizing for the fact that it's broken.

01:24:56.000 --> 01:25:03.000
All right, very sorry to interrupt you guys.

01:25:03.000 --> 01:25:08.000
So, you're welcome back everybody.

01:25:08.000 --> 01:25:15.000
It is my great pleasure and honor to introduce our keynote speaker for this workshop.

01:25:15.000 --> 01:25:27.000
Danielle McMath Danielle is the TV sub brown professor at Haverford College, and Professor and Chair of the philosophy department they are.

01:25:27.000 --> 01:25:49.000
Danielle did a PhD in philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh. In, 1988, working under the supervision of john Haugland and prior to that she earned a Bachelor of Science in biochemistry at the University of Alberta, and a BA in Philosophy and Religion

01:25:49.000 --> 01:25:52.000
study at McGill.

01:25:52.000 --> 01:26:09.000
Danielle has sold over 50 articles and book chapters, focusing mainly on Philip on the philosophy of language, mainly pragmatist and male pragmatist approaches on reasoning and rationality and on the history of philosophy of mathematics and logic.

01:26:09.000 --> 01:26:24.000
She has also published two books, one on Craig is logic of Harvard in 2005 and in 2014 with Oxford University Press, realizing reason, a narrative of truth and knowledge.

01:26:24.000 --> 01:26:41.000
And in this later massive 500 page world she offers a detailed narrative of the development of reason and rationality in the west towards greater power and clarity focusing on mathematic mathematical reasoning and mathematical practices in the ancient

01:26:41.000 --> 01:26:43.000
world.

01:26:43.000 --> 01:26:54.000
In, in the 17th and 18th century Europe following the cart. And then fragrance and following.

01:26:54.000 --> 01:27:13.000
So given these focuses Danielle's focuses on these issues in the history of mathematics philosophy of mathematics logic reason I'm all the more grateful that she accepted our invitation to be our keynote speaker in a conference on ethics, well for itself

01:27:13.000 --> 01:27:15.000
suffix.

01:27:15.000 --> 01:27:22.000
So her keynote address is entitled morality tribalism and value.

01:27:22.000 --> 01:27:28.000
Please join me in welcoming Dr Macbeth.

01:27:28.000 --> 01:27:36.000
Thank you, Ronald, and thank you for the invitation, this is as Ron said I do not.

01:27:36.000 --> 01:27:54.000
This is not an area that I work in, but I am very pleased to be here and to me, he sort of a first foray for me into into a practical philosophy and that itself is I think is special to.

01:27:54.000 --> 01:28:07.000
So, in the closing chapter of science and metaphysics sellers takes out what he describes in the preface of that work as the keystone of the argument of the lock lectures from which the book is derived.

01:28:07.000 --> 01:28:22.000
The topic is the objectivity and inter subjectivity of ethical judgments and as is true of the lectures overall sellers here finds many of his most fundamental insights and motivations already in current.

01:28:22.000 --> 01:28:39.000
He follows current first in distinguishing between on the one hand, wants desires and feelings and on the other one ought to one, the moral art, and also in correlating that distinction, with the dichotomy of causes and reasons, the realm of nature, in

01:28:39.000 --> 01:28:42.000
the realm of freedom.

01:28:42.000 --> 01:28:56.000
With con sellers furthermore finds an analog of objective truth as what any rational being not believe in the idea of objective goodness as what any rational being ought to will.

01:28:56.000 --> 01:29:08.000
But where's caught thinks that the only good is a good will. The will to act for the sake of the moral law seller sees the need for something less formal more substantive.

01:29:08.000 --> 01:29:20.000
According to sellers, what is a good reason for action is a particular sort of we intention, namely, that it shall sub we be the case that our welfare is maximized.

01:29:20.000 --> 01:29:31.000
As will become evident, I cannot see how sellers account in avoiding formalism avoids a deeply problematic form of tribalism.

01:29:31.000 --> 01:29:43.000
What I aim for here then is a sketch emphasis on sketch of an alternative still salon ASEAN conception of what practical philosophy might be

01:29:43.000 --> 01:30:00.000
sellers names I quote to explore the fundamental principles of a metaphysics of practice with particular reference to the values in terms of which we lead not just one compartment of our lives, but our lives, so far as the task is to provide a viable

01:30:00.000 --> 01:30:15.000
alternative to a life of sellers as informed or enlightened self interest. An alternative to a life dominated by an overarching ego directed valuing expressed in our that is sellers terminology.

01:30:15.000 --> 01:30:34.000
By, would that I lead a satisfying life for all that it may appear externally indistinguishable such a life is not properly, a moral life, as shown by the fact, if it is a thought, and sellers that does hedge his bets a bit here, that he says there's

01:30:34.000 --> 01:30:53.000
no conceptual absurdity in either doing a I would be conducive to a satisfying life, but I ought not to do AI, or doing be would would not be conducive to a satisfying life but I ought to do be a satisfying life, at least as sellers understands it is

01:30:53.000 --> 01:31:11.000
grounded ultimately in what one wants or desires. But as anyone knows the question what one ought to do, but it is right or good to do what one has reason to do is essentially different from the question, what one wants to do.

01:31:11.000 --> 01:31:25.000
It may be that in some cases what one ought to do is, whatever one once, but there's a crucial conceptual difference nonetheless. And it is one two which we rational beings are especially sensitive.

01:31:25.000 --> 01:31:43.000
We know that a life governed by desires, especially sensory desires, the pleasures of the flesh is a life suitable only for pigs, and even higher desires, for instance the desire for social recognition for on for the honor and the esteem of one's fellows

01:31:43.000 --> 01:31:56.000
cannot satisfy us rational beings, we rational beings know that the crucial thing is not to be honored and esteemed, but to be worthy of honor and esteem.

01:31:56.000 --> 01:32:06.000
The life of honor, no better than the life of pigs is not the best life for a human being as Plato already argued in Republic.

01:32:06.000 --> 01:32:13.000
According to Plato, the best life is instead, the life of wisdom, the life of the lover of truth.

01:32:13.000 --> 01:32:21.000
Sellers clearly rejects the account, but not because he thinks that the focus on truth is misguided.

01:32:21.000 --> 01:32:25.000
The problem is instead with the formulation, in terms of desire.

01:32:25.000 --> 01:32:39.000
Again the worth of inaction for sellers as for content lies and it's having been done not out of any desire, not even for the love of truth, but for the sake of duty, because that is what ought to be done.

01:32:39.000 --> 01:32:48.000
The distinction between what one wants to do even all things considered, and what one ought to do is fundamental for sellers as for content.

01:32:48.000 --> 01:33:03.000
The problem is defined something that is clearly rational that can properly justify a course of action as what one ought to do. Wow. By the same token, being such as can motivate action.

01:33:03.000 --> 01:33:19.000
What sort of thing is, one's duty, that it can at once justify and motivate properly moral action, unsurprisingly sellers rejects what he calls the point of view of benevolence the point of view, according to which one x out of a desire for the welfare

01:33:19.000 --> 01:33:27.000
of people generally, and he objects to that point of view on the grounds that it is, so to speak, and external point of view.

01:33:27.000 --> 01:33:43.000
But when once, even if it is the welfare of people generally is, again, nearly accidental something one finds oneself to be motivated by, but with which one cannot as a rational being identify oneself.

01:33:43.000 --> 01:33:59.000
Of course, a person can in fact identify with such a desire to live a life that is grounded in such a desire, but because an insofar as such a life is merely something one once the one may have wanted something else instead.

01:33:59.000 --> 01:34:12.000
It cannot find the property immoral, for me to view the moral arc is essentially, unlike any particular want one might find oneself with in being so it seems unequivocal in principle.

01:34:12.000 --> 01:34:16.000
What we're trying to do is seller says uniquely determined.

01:34:16.000 --> 01:34:27.000
But if that is right, then the unqualified ought the moral lot cannot be a matter of what we want. All things considered.

01:34:27.000 --> 01:34:36.000
Sellers unequivocally rejects any appeal to desires, including a desire for the general welfare of people in his account of moral point of view.

01:34:36.000 --> 01:34:53.000
Sellers his view is nonetheless. Nonetheless deeply related to the hypothetical imperative of impartial benevolence, the imperative to do this or that, if one wants the general welfare of all people, the imperative sellers focuses on is to be at once

01:34:53.000 --> 01:35:08.000
categorical and interests objective. A we intention and objective, that is true, or at least truth apt quote in that there is, in principle, decision procedure with respect to specific ethical statements.

01:35:08.000 --> 01:35:25.000
According to sellers at the heart of the moral point of view, is the intention that each shell sub we be the case that our welfare is maximized quote to value from a moral point of view is in this way to value as a member of the relevant community.

01:35:25.000 --> 01:35:40.000
Indeed, according to sellers, it is a conceptual fact that people constitute a community, a week by virtual thinking of each other as one of us, and by willing the common good, not under the species of benevolence, but by willing it as one of us, or from

01:35:40.000 --> 01:35:42.000
from the moral point of view.

01:35:42.000 --> 01:35:47.000
People constitute a community, a Wi Fi willing the common good as one of us.

01:35:47.000 --> 01:36:08.000
And it is this constitutes the moral point of view. So sellers argues, this sounds like tribalism indeed sellers himself suggests as much, though he clearly takes his to be a benign form of tribalism sellers rights in a footnote, I, this is the this is

01:36:08.000 --> 01:36:27.000
the complete footnote, quote, does interesting points remain to be made about the tribal centricity of moral judgments in the not to remote past and on what it would be to change from speaking of a being as it to speaking of it as one of them, in a sense,

01:36:27.000 --> 01:36:43.000
which radically contrast with one of us. And from there to speaking of the being as a member of the encompassing community within which we draw relative distinctions between me and they perhaps most interesting point is that to discuss with another person

01:36:43.000 --> 01:36:54.000
what ought to be done presupposes shall I say dialectically that you and your members of one community, and

01:36:54.000 --> 01:37:11.000
seller seems to have no problem with tribalism according to which ones attitudes and behaviors are not to be grounded in one's tribe, the social group with which one identifies his concern is only with what he calls tribal centricity, which is characterized

01:37:11.000 --> 01:37:16.000
by excluding from the tribe. Those who are included.

01:37:16.000 --> 01:37:26.000
The thought is that if we can talk with them about what is to be done, what ought to be done. Whether or not we actually do engage with them in such a discussion.

01:37:26.000 --> 01:37:31.000
Then they are members of our community that is the moral community.

01:37:31.000 --> 01:37:34.000
And not to be recognized as.

01:37:34.000 --> 01:37:52.000
Thus, If there is a meaningful, they to contrast with us, that contrast can ultimately be made only from within the all encompassing community of speakers outside of which are only things that is non persons beings that do not speak.

01:37:52.000 --> 01:38:06.000
The idea that if we can talk with them, then they are one of us has a long history. The ancient Greeks, for example, the other is the Barbarian the one with whom I cannot speak, who does not speak the language I speak.

01:38:06.000 --> 01:38:11.000
Needless to say seller says something less parochial in mind.

01:38:11.000 --> 01:38:28.000
Another is one of us, if barring differences in the particular language we each speak, we can speak with them as phenom puts it in the first chapter of back black skin white masks, the chapter entitled, The Negro and language, fennel says to speak, is

01:38:28.000 --> 01:38:32.000
to exist. Absolutely. For the other.

01:38:32.000 --> 01:38:50.000
And contrary wise to fail to recognize that another speaks to take it that they are at best, merely parodying speech can seem to absolve one of any obligation to listen to them to absolve one of the requirement, the one recognized and as one of us.

01:38:50.000 --> 01:38:55.000
So to denial need not be explicit or even intentional.

01:38:55.000 --> 01:39:01.000
In such cases one simply finds that one cannot hear meaning in the utterance of the other.

01:39:01.000 --> 01:39:12.000
Despite their speaking in a language one understands this fennel suggests, is the plight of the black men.

01:39:12.000 --> 01:39:25.000
Sellers argues that the unqualified or the moral art is grounded in a way intention that to value from a moral point of view, is to value as a member of the relevant community.

01:39:25.000 --> 01:39:31.000
I've indicated that such an account cannot invoice cannot avoid tribal centricity.

01:39:31.000 --> 01:39:37.000
The problem is not that of correctly identifying the relevant community.

01:39:37.000 --> 01:39:57.000
It is that any attempt to delineate this with that community as the relevant one is itself a moral issue, insofar as it is. Sellers account in being tribal is viciously circular sellers conception of the moral point of view, requires knowing already,

01:39:57.000 --> 01:40:09.000
who ought to count is one of us, a member of the relevant community where this must be seen as a moral issue. Indeed, as a moral issue of the first order.

01:40:09.000 --> 01:40:14.000
The problem is structural.

01:40:14.000 --> 01:40:31.000
It is a well established fact empirical fact about human beings that they can flourish, only if they're able to identify with improved. Only if they can understand themselves as one of us were who we are is defined at least in part, by a shared project.

01:40:31.000 --> 01:40:34.000
And so by celebrity and me intentions.

01:40:34.000 --> 01:40:42.000
It is I've suggested nonetheless a mistake to try to understand the moral point of view, in such terms.

01:40:42.000 --> 01:40:52.000
But if so, what if anything remains to be said about quoting sellers the values in terms of which we lead our lives Sarfaraz.

01:40:52.000 --> 01:40:55.000
Is there still a meaningful question here.

01:40:55.000 --> 01:41:08.000
If there is, it can only be understood as a question for each of us individually, what are the values in terms of which I should lead my life.

01:41:08.000 --> 01:41:13.000
But what sort of question is this, in particular, is it a moral question.

01:41:13.000 --> 01:41:22.000
I think that it is indeed it may be the only truly fundamental moral question.

01:41:22.000 --> 01:41:38.000
In grounding practical reasoning in we intentions seller seeks a premise, from which to reason, having session intention gives one a reason to perform this or that action, and so far as that action provides a means to the end.

01:41:38.000 --> 01:41:41.000
That is articulated in the intention.

01:41:41.000 --> 01:41:55.000
It is just this that seems to be the source of the difficulty, insofar as we intentions must then be founded on punitive facts about who we are, the relevant tribe, but they cannot be.

01:41:55.000 --> 01:42:11.000
As we've seen, what I want to explore them, are the prospects for seeing values as providing instead principles, according to which to reason principles that can be made explicit in claims and subjected to critically reflective scrutiny.

01:42:11.000 --> 01:42:21.000
But there are nonetheless categorically different from premises from which to reason and cannot be made to follow from.

01:42:21.000 --> 01:42:33.000
Consider again, the fact that we humans as the essentially social beings we are can flourish only through our identification with some group.

01:42:33.000 --> 01:42:40.000
There are two ways we can think about the relationship between this fact about us and questions of morality and value.

01:42:40.000 --> 01:42:51.000
The first way sellers way is to try to make the in group maximally wide in the relevant premise, so wide that there is de facto know out.

01:42:51.000 --> 01:43:04.000
The second is to recognize the moral principle grounded in reason transcends such as situated thinking in requiring over and above the treatment appropriate to those in the in group and those are the out group.

01:43:04.000 --> 01:43:21.000
The one recognize that all within one interacts are to be treated with respect. That is as ends rather than as means with is not about who one is or is not about who is or is not a person, but is instead of fundamental principle of one's active relationships

01:43:21.000 --> 01:43:24.000
world, and everything in it.

01:43:24.000 --> 01:43:40.000
In this way we distinguish between a negative and purely formal demand of reason not to interfere with the projects of others any others, not to treat them as means, and a positive demand in regard to the in group to promote their welfare as one zone,

01:43:40.000 --> 01:43:45.000
that is to have an active regard for they're flourishing.

01:43:45.000 --> 01:44:03.000
We need also finally to distinguish between on the one hand, the pragmatic question of how the various members of any defacto community. For example, those living in our town here and now in our state, or even in our world, how they are to live together

01:44:03.000 --> 01:44:15.000
to get along, and as far as possible to thrive. And on the other hand, the question of principle. How I ought to live my life, some flowers.

01:44:15.000 --> 01:44:32.000
Among the relevant considerations in regard to the first pragmatic question, are for example, our actual history and resources are homogeneous it or diversity, or knowledge and power structures, perhaps even our national character, or if we are might

01:44:32.000 --> 01:44:37.000
leave our lack of any such character.

01:44:37.000 --> 01:44:47.000
It must be decided with the institution institutions and laws are to be what is to be promoted and what suppressed. Our children are to be educated, and so on.

01:44:47.000 --> 01:44:51.000
But this is again a practical issue.

01:44:51.000 --> 01:45:08.000
It concerns not how in the abstract one should live according to what values, but how here and now, given all the contingencies and messy details of our actual circumstances, some actual group might arrange its communal life.

01:45:08.000 --> 01:45:23.000
Still, the values in terms of which one leads one's life, obviously do enter into the nuts and bolts of addressing such a question. Most immediately in one's reflections on the aims, the laws and institutions are to serve.

01:45:23.000 --> 01:45:31.000
We turn them to our second question, the question of principle of the values by which to live one's life.

01:45:31.000 --> 01:45:41.000
This question. The question of the values by which to live one's life, at least as it is understood here as a characteristically Cartesian cast.

01:45:41.000 --> 01:45:54.000
Having reached a sufficiently mature age, I sit alone in my study wondering what I ought to value above all else, how I ought to live my life.

01:45:54.000 --> 01:45:57.000
I have furthermore come to realize.

01:45:57.000 --> 01:46:12.000
Come explicitly to realize that neither the desires and aversions I find myself with nor reason alone can provide the answers I seek sellers would say that there is nowhere left to turn.

01:46:12.000 --> 01:46:23.000
But that is just not so. There are also emotions as indeed sellers himself can help us to see.

01:46:23.000 --> 01:46:39.000
Although the distinction is not invariably recognized the emotional states or dispositions of a person are essentially different from the current feelings one can have emotions do often give rise to feelings and they can easily be confused with feelings

01:46:39.000 --> 01:46:43.000
But in fact, emotions and feelings are different.

01:46:43.000 --> 01:46:54.000
We of course often do find ourselves with feelings pair dogmatically of desire and aversion. And insofar as we have such feelings. We are motivated to act.

01:46:54.000 --> 01:47:07.000
Just desire something just is to pursue it, other things being equal, and to be averse to something is to shun it again, other things being equal, and some animals have only feelings.

01:47:07.000 --> 01:47:24.000
Feelings are enough to guide them through a complex world of things that can benefit them biologically and things that can harm them biologically other animals in particularly inherently social animals such as primates cannot live by desire and aversion

01:47:24.000 --> 01:47:45.000
alone, social animals need also to have emotions biting the changeable disposition of states of the animal that can give rise to feelings of current events, of which the animal is in some sense conscious, but are not themselves, feelings, emotions are

01:47:45.000 --> 01:48:01.000
not events but disposition of state states of which one may not be conscious emotions or Furthermore, responsive to things and they are evaluated have settled understandings of the significance of things, whether kinds of things such as certain sorts

01:48:01.000 --> 01:48:08.000
of activities or particular individuals. Most immediately. This or that specific.

01:48:08.000 --> 01:48:25.000
And again, social animals do need emotions, as well as feelings, if they are to live. The socially articulated lives. They do social animals need to identify with the booth and hence to be motivated to become one of us, they need to take pride in being

01:48:25.000 --> 01:48:26.000
one of us.

01:48:26.000 --> 01:48:29.000
And to be ashamed at failing to be so.

01:48:29.000 --> 01:48:46.000
And if they are to navigate successfully the complex social worlds. They need to have a biding valuations of others in the group who matters, and who does not, then in what ways such emotions can again give rise to feelings, but they are not themselves

01:48:46.000 --> 01:48:52.000
feelings, but instead disposition states of the animal.

01:48:52.000 --> 01:49:10.000
This distinction between emotions and feelings can be clarified at least initially by an analogy with the contrast between perceptible objects and our sensory experience of them perceptible objects, though they are changeable and perishable also persist

01:49:10.000 --> 01:49:20.000
over time and have various characteristic features and relations, and they can affect us perceptual it causes us to have characteristic sensory experiences.

01:49:20.000 --> 01:49:34.000
We know such objects through our sensory experiences of them, but objects and our sensory experiences of them are nonetheless, different, the object shows up and experience, but exists, independent of it.

01:49:34.000 --> 01:49:41.000
We can think of one's emotional states, as in certain respects like perceptible objects.

01:49:41.000 --> 01:49:57.000
Although changeable and perishable, they persist over time and have characteristic features and relations to one another and emotions like perceptible objects can affect us catalyzed by things in the environment emotions lead us to have characteristic

01:49:57.000 --> 01:50:01.000
desires and the versions that are inherently motivating.

01:50:01.000 --> 01:50:06.000
We can let us know our emotions through the feelings, to which they give rise.

01:50:06.000 --> 01:50:09.000
But again, the two are nonetheless, different.

01:50:09.000 --> 01:50:24.000
I can for example be in an emotional state of extreme frustration leads me to lash out angrily at another who's annoyed me in some way, my response to that person may be the first indication that I have the emotion that I not only feel anger but am frustrated.

01:50:24.000 --> 01:50:29.000
It's disposed to feel an act in certain characteristic ways.

01:50:29.000 --> 01:50:45.000
Emotions reveal things as meaningful or significant to one in a particular way, one cares positively or negatively about the activity or thing personal type of person, the thing matters to one, and it's mattering is, it's constituted by one's being in

01:50:45.000 --> 01:50:57.000
a certain emotional state in relation to it. Such states can develop over time. And they are, at least to some extent, culturally shaped over the course of one's upbringing.

01:50:57.000 --> 01:51:09.000
Much is once perceptions are shaped at least to some extent by how we perceive things to be. So once emotional life is shaped at least to some extent by how we value things.

01:51:09.000 --> 01:51:21.000
Emotions are further more deeply personal, though, perceptions are not motions or personal first and they're being different for different people, even within the same cultural group.

01:51:21.000 --> 01:51:32.000
However, culturally, like we are. it is nonetheless to the what gives you joy, what you love and esteem may be very different from what gives me joy. What gives what I love and esteem.

01:51:32.000 --> 01:51:42.000
What gives what I love and esteem. But emotions are personal also in being a source of meaning and significance.

01:51:42.000 --> 01:51:56.000
We identify with our emotions, in a way, we cannot identify with our feelings, our desires and aversions, and we do so because emotions aren't stitched ugly sources of meaning and significance for us.

01:51:56.000 --> 01:52:05.000
Emotions constitute what a person as that particular person cares about what in the world is a value to them.

01:52:05.000 --> 01:52:19.000
Emotions are in this way fundamental to who we are, not only as essentially social animals, but as persons, that is, as rational social animals.

01:52:19.000 --> 01:52:30.000
Emotions connect us whether positively or negatively to the things we encounter in our lives. And they do so not in the fleeting and motivating way of desire and aversion.

01:52:30.000 --> 01:52:47.000
But abiding Lee. And fundamentally. And personally, it is in virtue of our emotional states that we not only our perception to be aware of things, but find them to be a value to us to matter to who and what we are.

01:52:47.000 --> 01:52:52.000
But of course, this is all merely contingent at least so far.

01:52:52.000 --> 01:53:13.000
Emotions revealed to one what is for one as it happens, significant, what we need now to ask is what one ought to find significant what is truly significant what the world point of view, reveals to be of actual value as sellers more than anyone else has

01:53:13.000 --> 01:53:31.000
helped us to realize there is no absolute beginning or foundation for knowledge, but only the ongoing work of correcting mistakes, and misconceptions being rational is not a matter of having some absolute foundation for knowledge, but instead of matter

01:53:31.000 --> 01:53:46.000
But instead, a matter of reasoning in a certain way, a matter more specifically a being constitutive Lee, a critically reflective thinker, able and willing to call anything into question as reason sees fit.

01:53:46.000 --> 01:53:50.000
Though not, of course, all at once.

01:53:50.000 --> 01:54:06.000
This capacity for critical reflection was for the more radically transformed. With the advent of maturity with the realization dramatically enacted in Descartes' meditations that it is possible to withdraw the mind from the senses and stay card puts it

01:54:06.000 --> 01:54:24.000
to reconceived one's perceptual experience not this or that perceptual experience, but perceptual experience as such as near experience perceptual experience so reconceived is not regulatory of how things are or mistakenly seem to be, but is to be understood

01:54:24.000 --> 01:54:29.000
simply as experienced as how things show up for one.

01:54:29.000 --> 01:54:32.000
However, they in fact, our.

01:54:32.000 --> 01:54:48.000
With the advent of modernity, the everyday idea that reality sometimes shows itself in its true colors, and sometimes miss needs as we mere appearances would be replaced, at least for the purposes of scientific practice with the idea that things just

01:54:48.000 --> 01:54:54.000
do show up in various ways to various sorts of procedures.

01:54:54.000 --> 01:55:07.000
The connection, which previously seemed to be constituent of between months experience of things and once beliefs about them between ones experiences of things and what they actually are had been severed.

01:55:07.000 --> 01:55:19.000
Now, consider the relationship between ones emotional states on the one hand, and one's desires and feelings and the intentional actions they provoke on the other.

01:55:19.000 --> 01:55:35.000
Emotional attitudes, we have two things do give rise to feelings and desires when we are confronted with various sorts of objects in various sorts of circumstances, and at least at first, such desires are acted upon unless some other desire or feeling

01:55:35.000 --> 01:55:51.000
leads one to refrain from acting, much as at first ones experiences of things culminating beliefs, unless something leads one to doubt that things are quite as they seen part of coming to maturity in everyday life involves learning.

01:55:51.000 --> 01:56:04.000
Not only that things are not always what they seem that one can have a loser experiences of things, but also that not all desires are desirable that one can have wayward desires.

01:56:04.000 --> 01:56:11.000
On the side of knowing. There's also the coming to a distinctively modern understanding with respect to perceptual experience.

01:56:11.000 --> 01:56:25.000
What we need to see is that a relative move can be made on the side of action. Although in the course of one's upbringing when it comes to find oneself within the array of values that is reasons for acting in various ways in various circumstances in ways

01:56:25.000 --> 01:56:37.000
that are for instance benevolent courageous temperate one still at some point must explicitly and subconsciously examine those inherited values, assess them for their genuine validity.

01:56:37.000 --> 01:56:45.000
Only so is one properly or fully a free agent to be fully and properly free.

01:56:45.000 --> 01:56:59.000
One must not only have good reasons for actions, for instance, those acquired growing up in one's community, one must make those reasons one its own as the reasons they are only this does one take full responsibility for what one does.

01:56:59.000 --> 01:57:07.000
For who. One is we can understand how this is to work on analogy with the corresponding move on the side of perception.

01:57:07.000 --> 01:57:22.000
At first, with the dawning of any self consciousness at all. The task is to establish what is a good reason for action all things considered, that is on reflection given the full array array of values that are at least in part, once inheritance, as one

01:57:22.000 --> 01:57:39.000
of us a member of the community, into which one has been acculturated cetera reflection is again available from the beginning. And in essence involves nothing more than determining which apparently valuable actions are indeed to be valued and which are

01:57:39.000 --> 01:57:55.000
merely apparently valuable, a life lived according to such values may be satisfying. And indeed, it may be held by all concerned to be honorable what it is not, I think, is a properly moral life not in the full moral sense, modern sense of concern to

01:57:55.000 --> 01:58:14.000
sellers, what is needed to realize it is properly moral is something akin to the transformative Cartesian moment of withdrawing one's mind from the census namely the transformative moment of withdrawing one's mind from one's feelings and desires.

01:58:14.000 --> 01:58:22.000
The effect of such a transformation on the side of cognition, we know this December the tie between perceptual experience and belief.

01:58:22.000 --> 01:58:32.000
On the side of action. It is to sever the tie between desires and feelings on the one hand, and what one does. On the other.

01:58:32.000 --> 01:58:39.000
And given the one has no motivating force for one can no longer properly be conceived as feeling or desire at all.

01:58:39.000 --> 01:58:55.000
What remains is only the emotion to withdraw the mind from one's desires is one withdraws the mind from the senses on Day cards account leaves one with mental states of valuation of things mattering to one, but in something like the disinterested way

01:58:55.000 --> 01:59:01.000
beautiful things matter to one in the static experience as current understands it.

01:59:01.000 --> 01:59:18.000
And this I submit is true freedom, or at least the ground of true freedom, precisely because and insofar as one identifies with one's emotional states recognizes them as constitutive of who one in particular have who, in particular one is.

01:59:18.000 --> 01:59:26.000
Where's desires and feelings or brute forces that act willy nilly on ones will causing one to do whether one would or not.

01:59:26.000 --> 01:59:34.000
Emotions are constitutive of one's very being one sense of who and what one is of what matters, why it matters and read it from your. Okay.

01:59:34.000 --> 01:59:47.000
10 minutes from y'all. Okay. Whereas feelings move on to act directly to act because one wants this or that. Emotions move on to act on the indirectly by providing principles according to this to reason.

01:59:47.000 --> 01:59:53.000
It is because of this or that is a value that when it's moved,

01:59:53.000 --> 02:00:08.000
obviously much more might be said about just what such a transformative moment amounts to and I think a lot more needs to be said. But I want to focus on what can be said in favor of the rationality of this or that emotional state.

02:00:08.000 --> 02:00:13.000
Since we need to distinguish, in principle, between one values and what ought to be valued.

02:00:13.000 --> 02:00:19.000
And here I want to suggest Kant can guide us

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consider first what con describes is the common human understanding that is merely healthy not yet cultivated understanding which conference is done this con, the least that can be expected from anyone who lays claim to the name of a human being can identify

02:00:37.000 --> 02:00:53.000
three Maxim's of such understanding that in the anthropology, he said, set suggest can be made unalterable commands for the class of thinkers. That is, as I understand the class of especially reflective human beings, those who go into the sort of thing

02:00:53.000 --> 02:01:11.000
that philosophers, typically do the capacity for rationally reflective criticism is a capacity we have insofar as we're human is because we are not merely animals in particular social animals, but rational social animals that we asked whether what we

02:01:11.000 --> 02:01:27.000
ourselves believing is really true whether what we find ourselves valuing is really worth value me. Really good. We are the animals that are responsive two reasons as reasons and cons three Maxim's unpack what is involved in the rational activity if such

02:01:27.000 --> 02:01:34.000
animals, what is involved in particular I want to suggest in the moral reasoning of such animals.

02:01:34.000 --> 02:01:42.000
The first Maximus to think for oneself to make up one's own mind rather than have it made up through one by something or someone else.

02:01:42.000 --> 02:01:58.000
And in the case of moral thinking, in particular, concepts maximum common human understanding would seem to enjoy that one recognized for oneself, the value in something, one cannot take it on testimony, either that have another or that of one's own desires

02:01:58.000 --> 02:02:01.000
that the thing is indeed valuable.

02:02:01.000 --> 02:02:07.000
Can't con second maximum is to think from the standpoint of everyone else.

02:02:07.000 --> 02:02:19.000
What does that mean to think from the standpoint of everyone else in particular how is this different from thinking as one of us, which I've already rejected as unavoidably an objection to the tribal centric.

02:02:19.000 --> 02:02:29.000
The clue lies in constant lighten the NSA and what current describes as the public use a reason they use which someone makes a reason as a scholar.

02:02:29.000 --> 02:02:33.000
But, before the entire public of the breeders.

02:02:33.000 --> 02:02:43.000
Interestingly cons point here is not that we need to agree with others. It's rather that we need to attend to the reasons people give for and against the different views.

02:02:43.000 --> 02:02:55.000
What is distinctive of thinkers on this view is that they do not merely have reasons for their judgments, nor even that they worry as much, one might about what are the reasons for their reasons.

02:02:55.000 --> 02:03:09.000
What is distinctive of thinkers, and I've suggested or its distinctive of thinking from a properly moral point of view, in particular, is that they are critically reflective of the rational linkages between reasons on the one hand, and what they are puter

02:03:09.000 --> 02:03:12.000
reasons for on the other.

02:03:12.000 --> 02:03:20.000
There are critically reflective not only of their reasons, but of the principles according to which they reason.

02:03:20.000 --> 02:03:32.000
So the problem is not to know what is the reason in this or that case but what sort of thing, I had to count as a reason at all that is in accordance with what principle when take something to be a reason for something.

02:03:32.000 --> 02:03:51.000
The morally serious person needs explicitly and self consciously to consider other points of view other perspectives relative to which one's own principles of reasoning, may be revealed to be merely parochial or question Baby, I'm right sellers have,

02:03:51.000 --> 02:04:05.000
as, as if I'm right sellers have been revealed to be insofar as they uncritically acquiesce to the authority of a particular conception of reason one associated first and foremost, with the practice of the exact sciences.

02:04:05.000 --> 02:04:20.000
The third Maxim, to think consistently is it tells us in the critical judgment. The most difficult to achieve. And something that can only be achieved through the combination of first two, and after frequent observance of them has made them automatic

02:04:20.000 --> 02:04:32.000
course in the ordinary case thinking consistently is not very difficult when has contradictory beliefs perhaps and inconsistent pride of beliefs, and so must reject one rather, but sometimes it is not that simple.

02:04:32.000 --> 02:04:48.000
Even in the argument of, even in the case of beliefs, and perhaps it is never simple, in the case of one's values is not simple in the case of belief, when it is a principle rather than merely a belief that in is in question.

02:04:48.000 --> 02:05:03.000
And if the line we've been pursuing here is correct, it's not simple in the case of values, precisely because I mean so far is to embrace and value, just is to embrace a principal and recently, five values at the well being of members of my family, that

02:05:03.000 --> 02:05:06.000
does not give me a reason to act, not directly.

02:05:06.000 --> 02:05:15.000
Instead of confers value on courses of action, according to whether or not they do promote the value of the well being of those I care about.

02:05:15.000 --> 02:05:31.000
It provides me not with a premise from which to reason. But instead, a principle, according to which to reason as one might expect. The problem of resolving conflicts among the principles governing one's reasoning is essentially different from the problem

02:05:31.000 --> 02:05:44.000
with resolving conflicts among ones claims about which to reason in accordance with ones existing principles and reasoning, thinking from the standpoint of everyone else in a way that is equally a matter of thinking for oneself.

02:05:44.000 --> 02:06:02.000
Can we require a substantive discovery, a realization that fundamentally transforms the space of possibilities within which one's thought moves by articulating new principles with which to reason principles that at once reveal the one sidedness of one's

02:06:02.000 --> 02:06:18.000
original principles and show how they could be reconciled moral thinking that starts from substandard valuations is I suggest such a course of critically reflective reasoning, one that does not really overcome opposition in difference, but at the same

02:06:18.000 --> 02:06:32.000
time incorporates the insights that were harbored in that opposition in difference to them consistently at once for oneself and from the standpoint of everyone else is to think dialectically.

02:06:32.000 --> 02:06:34.000
But who is everyone else.

02:06:34.000 --> 02:06:50.000
More pointedly, how does this conception thinking from a moral point of view, avoid tribalism here what is crucial. Is that the relevant, others are not those with whom one identifies once in group.

02:06:50.000 --> 02:06:54.000
But instead, those who are exemplary for one.

02:06:54.000 --> 02:07:01.000
Those who one respects as persons, which can again be quite idiosyncratic and personal.

02:07:01.000 --> 02:07:11.000
At first, everyone else relevant others will be for instance members of one's own family ones closest friends. And if one is lucky, at least some of one's teachers.

02:07:11.000 --> 02:07:21.000
The people one respects those one looks up to and takes to be exemplary for one's own behavior and values will be the first people in one community.

02:07:21.000 --> 02:07:37.000
But as one learns to read and comes to extend one's reading beyond what we read within the community, one can discover new exemplars new voices that seemed to matter, and with them new ways of thinking about what matters at all.

02:07:37.000 --> 02:07:54.000
Over time, new writers into one circle and old ones fall away once values change and one begins to achieve a settled understanding of who one is and what one values were this involves in turn the sort of dialectical development already outlined.

02:07:54.000 --> 02:08:11.000
Clearly, there is nothing here to suggest any sort of consensus, or universality to the values one comes on reflection to endorse the constellation of values by which another lives and in terms of which they articulated as who they are, can be quite different

02:08:11.000 --> 02:08:14.000
from one's own constellation of values.

02:08:14.000 --> 02:08:20.000
The writers they esteem and read, need not be the writers, I esteem and read.

02:08:20.000 --> 02:08:38.000
There is a fundamental difference between sellers this conception of what it is to be irrational being and the conception of a rational being that is gestured out here for sellers, we are as the rational beings we are constituent ugly instances of a kind.

02:08:38.000 --> 02:08:56.000
We are instances of a kind, as any living beings are only in our case, the relevant kind is the kind of rational and the account outlined here by contrast, it is not only our powers of reason of rational effective criticism, but also our individuality

02:08:56.000 --> 02:09:11.000
and uniqueness that our constituent of us at least insofar as we are fully realized, and therefore, fully free on our account we begin our lives as we ran most as instance of a particular biological form of life.

02:09:11.000 --> 02:09:22.000
And through our acculturation into the social form of life of our community. We become fully fledged members of that community instances of that particular social of life.

02:09:22.000 --> 02:09:38.000
But if the community enables it as it should, we embark finally on a journey of self actualization one that only begins with all the contingencies of one socio cultural circumstances, and the emotional profile native to one that only begins with the values

02:09:38.000 --> 02:09:55.000
that just do seem to one to be a value, the journey ends if all goes well with values that are truly valuable and with an individual, someone not intelligible as an instance of a kind, but only as itself.

02:09:55.000 --> 02:10:07.000
Moral serious non seriousness on this view is not a matter of what any and everyone should think doing value, but a matter of what I should think doing value.

02:10:07.000 --> 02:10:26.000
And in this, I have only my own lights to go on my own understanding of what is valuable. What matters, but also who is valuable to me as a reader and thinker, aiming to discover what of all what I value, really is valuable, at least to me.

02:10:26.000 --> 02:10:42.000
I began with sellers this idea that we needed an alternative to a life of informed, or enlightened self interest and alternative to the ego directed value sellers thinks of things out as a life that is merely satisfying and an alternative is needed sellers

02:10:42.000 --> 02:10:52.000
things because living a satisfying life is neither necessary more sufficient for living a worthwhile like life one ought to live.

02:10:52.000 --> 02:11:08.000
But a worthwhile life is nonetheless, a life that one odd as a rationally will affect a person, defined satisfying. Indeed, maximally satisfying, a worthwhile life is a life one ought to want to live.

02:11:08.000 --> 02:11:19.000
And because of I, as I suggested sellers his own alternative to ego directed valuing his idea of we intentions, is not really tribal but nutritiously tribal centric.

02:11:19.000 --> 02:11:25.000
We were led again to ego directed value, but with a difference.

02:11:25.000 --> 02:11:42.000
Whereas seller seems to assume that satisfaction is invariably a matter of feeling satisfied. Would you write the whole tense no intrinsic value with yours considered satisfaction in relation to the emotions, which we saw are intrinsically evaluative

02:11:42.000 --> 02:11:59.000
because emotions, including that of satisfaction or disposition of states of a person that are as beliefs are subject to rationally reflective criticism and correction and can be so subject, independent of how in particular one feels emotions are not

02:11:59.000 --> 02:12:01.000
merely self interested.

02:12:01.000 --> 02:12:18.000
They can be and in successful cases our values of what is truly valuable. One can educate one's emotions and as a rational reflective person one has a responsibility so to educate them to be successful in this just is, as far as I can see, to live a life

02:12:18.000 --> 02:12:30.000
that is at once, satisfying to one and a life, why not to live. Thank you.

02:12:30.000 --> 02:12:33.000
Thanks a lot, Danielle.

02:12:33.000 --> 02:12:43.000
For your paper, and I see already some hand to all, please go ahead.

02:12:43.000 --> 02:12:45.000
Thank you very much.

02:12:45.000 --> 02:12:51.000
Thank you very much it, and the eligible for the top.

02:12:51.000 --> 02:13:10.000
My question is, to what extent, based on your account of massaging edits, and especially in this, you just put in the conclusion on that. The issue of the emotional education.

02:13:10.000 --> 02:13:29.000
What would you describe the kind of virtue ethics, to set us. And then, if you do, how would that be compatible with the kind of the oncologist data, seems to endorse as well.

02:13:29.000 --> 02:13:39.000
So where are we going on between somehow I restore and can't according to you.

02:13:39.000 --> 02:13:53.000
Yeah. Um, this seems to be exactly the case where because I don't work in this area.

02:13:53.000 --> 02:13:55.000
I mean to me.

02:13:55.000 --> 02:14:12.000
I It really does. As far as I can see. Seeing that sellers is very content in the way he thinks about ethics only he doesn't want to be so formalist, which is why I take it he wants to have this idea of a substantive idea we intentions that I think causes

02:14:12.000 --> 02:14:17.000
the problem right you know you can have the purely formal notion in current.

02:14:17.000 --> 02:14:25.000
That seems to me okay but but as soon as you try to take sellers this route to give some substance then I then I think there are problems.

02:14:25.000 --> 02:14:29.000
Um,

02:14:29.000 --> 02:14:32.000
I mean,

02:14:32.000 --> 02:14:48.000
if I was to look for a more virtue ethics strand in sellers I would go with the difference between odd to BS and not to do's and that's so fundamental that I think probably one could make a lot of that.

02:14:48.000 --> 02:14:56.000
So, it is it is so crucial, the way one lives these values for sellers.

02:14:56.000 --> 02:15:02.000
Um, so I think that would be a strand of of a more.

02:15:02.000 --> 02:15:21.000
A more recent healing virtue ethics just because of the way the social has a role in sellers, but but I do think that on on his explicit thinking about this i mean i i spent some time thinking about how I want to go in and what I think might be deeply

02:15:21.000 --> 02:15:23.000
going on and sellers.

02:15:23.000 --> 02:15:31.000
And it's a very interesting question in the way that he wants to, you know, be content but but bring in the social.

02:15:31.000 --> 02:15:46.000
So I mean I think that's a that's a really interesting and important question but, yeah, that's, that's sort of where I would go, if I was, if I was thinking about that, that issue.

02:15:46.000 --> 02:15:53.000
All right, I think Carol your hand up, what's up next and then Zach, Nick, and then Preston, go ahead.

02:15:53.000 --> 02:15:54.000
Thanks. Yeah.

02:15:54.000 --> 02:16:16.000
So, yeah, it was pretty interesting that you brought up a phenom but funnels on phone strategy is also sort of another option you you listed some options and then said, we've run out of options but I think fed on goes a route which is not Cartesian or

02:16:16.000 --> 02:16:36.000
canteen which is in the gate in kind of Hadean Marxist direction, and in ways which are interestingly similar to Brandon's new book as well so Infineon there is this interesting concept of live experience.

02:16:36.000 --> 02:16:49.000
And there is a dialectic within the experience but part of finance talking about doing is the source of hermeneutics good genealogy genealogical exercise.

02:16:49.000 --> 02:16:58.000
So you one way in which you kind of avoids tribalism is. And to make yourself aware of it so in a way you are.

02:16:58.000 --> 02:17:07.000
Tutoring your lived experience so you have a position, you have a little experience so I was yet.

02:17:07.000 --> 02:17:23.000
Rather than trying to kind of rehash that I was kind of, I know you use the words didactic I guess I wanted to know what specifically you held in mind there and what you thought about the kind of reconstructive reconstructed accounts which is in the feminine,

02:17:23.000 --> 02:17:39.000
and in that part of a living because interestingly now being brought out in the new Brandon was a way to avoid some of the tribalism you're talking about, well as a method for instance case appropriate self appropriation and empowerment.

02:17:39.000 --> 02:17:43.000
Okay, good. Thank you. Um.

02:17:43.000 --> 02:17:56.000
The tribalism problem comes up when one tries to understand the moral point of view, in terms of.

02:17:56.000 --> 02:18:09.000
We intentions were you it already has to be settled who we are, I, I, it seems to me it's just question begging, if, if the, you know, there's a moral issue of who you recognize.

02:18:09.000 --> 02:18:19.000
I have no problem with any of this and I mean, I think Hagen's is really interesting in this, in this context.

02:18:19.000 --> 02:18:35.000
But, but the issue was really, who am I, who am I speaking for here, and how Am I understanding the moral point of view, is the moral point of view an issue for me and how I live my life.

02:18:35.000 --> 02:18:38.000
Or does it have to be understood.

02:18:38.000 --> 02:18:42.000
First, through

02:18:42.000 --> 02:18:54.000
an understanding of who we are and that's really what I'm seeing is problematic. And that is, I mean in hey go, as I understand it, ethical life is in terms of the community.

02:18:54.000 --> 02:18:58.000
Um,

02:18:58.000 --> 02:19:09.000
and there I want to distinguish between the actual community and, and the sort of celebrity in content idea of the rational, the community rational beings.

02:19:09.000 --> 02:19:14.000
So I don't know enough about

02:19:14.000 --> 02:19:30.000
the details of funnel, but but I have, you know, avoiding tribalism as it were in one's own thinking through a dialectical reconstructive examination.

02:19:30.000 --> 02:19:38.000
It's it's the structural problem that I see particularly in sellers his way of thinking about we intentions as the ground of.

02:19:38.000 --> 02:19:41.000
Does that make sense.

02:19:41.000 --> 02:19:43.000
Thanks.

02:19:43.000 --> 02:19:46.000
Zach.

02:19:46.000 --> 02:19:50.000
All right. Thanks a lot, Daniel fascinating.

02:19:50.000 --> 02:20:18.000
Um, so I wanted to ask something about just this contrast between the sort of collective and sort of individualistic understanding of what morality is all about that you were just sort of highlighting so I understand it that your, your critique of the

02:20:18.000 --> 02:20:40.000
we are, we're not sort of from the on the slaughter ASEAN account we're not really capable of reasoning, our way into the moral point of view we don't have responsibility or control over the extent to which, who we recognize as we fully lines up with

02:20:40.000 --> 02:21:08.000
who we ought to recognize as we were in part at, you know, at the mercy of the kinds of abilities to reason and conception of reason into which were acculturated, um, I, I have, have not sort of been inclined to read sellers as as thinking of this conception

02:21:08.000 --> 02:21:28.000
of the moral point of view as necessarily one in which entirely we have the power to reason ourselves into right i'd rather thought that, from the point of view, maybe it's fine, that we're at in to some extent sort of at the mercy of a history about

02:21:28.000 --> 02:21:37.000
the extent to which were sort of fully achieved a kind of cosmopolitan conception of

02:21:37.000 --> 02:21:40.000
what is morally important.

02:21:40.000 --> 02:22:07.000
And my thought is that what you're doing here is you're making a kind of trade off. So, in, in retreating to a kind of a conception of what the sort of fundamental moral question is that we can sort of exercise control over sort of how we

02:22:07.000 --> 02:22:12.000
how we exercise control over.

02:22:12.000 --> 02:22:14.000
Finding an answer to.

02:22:14.000 --> 02:22:23.000
We are a. We're now.

02:22:23.000 --> 02:22:34.000
I think, potentially sort of limiting the scope of what morality is about, in a way that you might find objectionable so right.

02:22:34.000 --> 02:22:43.000
I take it you, you may be expressing some kind of a skepticism right about when you when you talk about these kinds of questions education and so on as parochial.

02:22:43.000 --> 02:22:46.000
Right.

02:22:46.000 --> 02:23:01.000
Why not, why not just accept that kind of pluralism here, there, there's a fun, the same maybe there's a fundamental moral question which is, right, what we should do and this sort of transcends this transcends

02:23:01.000 --> 02:23:18.000
any of those sort of parochial questions about our. What we recognize today as our community and our circumstances, there's the, the question about, you know, realizing something, some, some kind of sort of higher purpose and then then the progression

02:23:18.000 --> 02:23:33.000
of, of humankind and in that extent we can exercise a little bit of control over the fate of our species but very very limited way and okay we're at the mercy of history but that's a deeply ethical question, too. So I wanted to suggest that as an alternative

02:23:33.000 --> 02:23:47.000
sort of pluralist alternative which takes acknowledges, your, your right to think there's this ethical question that our power of reasons sort of allows us to have control over and there's another one where we're just lucky, we're just lucky to be along

02:23:47.000 --> 02:23:55.000
for the ride. But why not acknowledge that as a deep fundamental question about ethics, to.

02:23:55.000 --> 02:23:57.000
Okay, good.

02:23:57.000 --> 02:24:02.000
Yeah.

02:24:02.000 --> 02:24:03.000
Okay.

02:24:03.000 --> 02:24:21.000
The issue is not that we don't have control over who we are to recognize the issue is, I want to say this is a structural problem with sellers as approach that he can have it both ways he cannot have it, that the moral point of view, is grounded in, we

02:24:21.000 --> 02:24:37.000
intentions in the way he wants, and that we have a movement obligation to reflect on who we are. I mean I think we do have a moral obligation to reflect on who we are, but well you know i that i have to speak for myself under the circumstances.

02:24:37.000 --> 02:24:53.000
But But I don't see how sellers can have that. So this is a theoretical problem. So, and I mean, this, this whole discussion is at a very high level in theory I wanted to separate out practical questions, but I think sellers has a there's a structural

02:24:53.000 --> 02:25:01.000
problem, if you except main reason is for sure, a critically reflective capacity.

02:25:01.000 --> 02:25:07.000
Is there a kind there that can ground. The we.

02:25:07.000 --> 02:25:25.000
I am skeptical about that. Um, but But certainly, it wasn't just, it wasn't anything about limitations on our ability to reflect. It was a structural problem with the very idea of we intentions as sellers understands them so that's that's the first thing

02:25:25.000 --> 02:25:29.000
that I think is really important.

02:25:29.000 --> 02:25:52.000
The retreat, I, I, I am worried that the way we tend to think about ethics and morality in this universe lies the way that really seems to require that we have this substandard notion of reason that can give us foundations is not only sort of deeply not

02:25:52.000 --> 02:26:13.000
so early in in some, in some sense, but really problematic, that I want to see I want to suggest this is a way of going beyond sort of ways we've been thinking about morality that are way too caught up in the project of science, and I'm,

02:26:13.000 --> 02:26:18.000
you know, models of truth, that makes sense in certain contexts.

02:26:18.000 --> 02:26:38.000
So, so I mean it may sound skeptical but it's it's it is skeptical of one kind of project I think that's right. Um, it does limit the scope of what morality is, it, it, we have we have practical issues you know what should we do, yeah, we have big practical

02:26:38.000 --> 02:26:50.000
problems about what we should do. I'm not sure philosophers theorizing about some grand we is is actually very helpful there.

02:26:50.000 --> 02:26:56.000
Um, so So in that sense, it is limiting the scope.

02:26:56.000 --> 02:26:59.000
It is quite radical. I.

02:26:59.000 --> 02:27:06.000
If you're going to get me to do practical.

02:27:06.000 --> 02:27:23.000
So, so I think there's, there's the, the thought is these are deeply important questions but their questions people should be asking for themselves that they should not be trying to answer for everybody, which I take it is part of that, you know, it only

02:27:23.000 --> 02:27:31.000
is valid if it's universal, and I want to say this is my true, maybe, maybe, maybe we should think about this differently, whereas I think the content.

02:27:31.000 --> 02:27:48.000
So rz and it's it's so closely allied with the truth, that it can't have any validity. If it isn't, universalised, so you end up with desires over here, more a lot over here and simply nothing else.

02:27:48.000 --> 02:27:51.000
And I'm trying to get beyond that.

02:27:51.000 --> 02:27:56.000
Make.

02:27:56.000 --> 02:27:58.000
Thanks.

02:27:58.000 --> 02:28:09.000
I think I still don't understand the charge that sellers as objection we parochial his we includes everybody, there's nobody who's not included.

02:28:09.000 --> 02:28:21.000
Now you suggested that maybe was problematic about it is that you have to appeal to moral properties to draw to include them to figure out that everyone is included.

02:28:21.000 --> 02:28:37.000
But I don't know that that's true either. So, I'm the we is the community of all rational beings and the rational beings for sellers are just the things that can shape their behavior by appeal to reasons that are shaped by their whose behaviors can be

02:28:37.000 --> 02:28:49.000
shaped by reasons and not merely by causes, which doesn't look like an especially moral thing it's, I don't know, metaphysical or something.

02:28:49.000 --> 02:29:04.000
So yeah I don't understand how, how is parochial, or if he is or sorry, How, how is tribal or if he is why it's objectionable given that, there's no out group, and the lines around, and the and the basis for including everybody doesn't refer, as far as

02:29:04.000 --> 02:29:09.000
I can tell it anything this especially moral.

02:29:09.000 --> 02:29:31.000
Okay, Fair enough. Um, I, I don't think that's right. In fact, I mean that's that's sort of a fundamental point here that that the idea that it includes everybody already involves a substantive notion of for example What counts is the reason.

02:29:31.000 --> 02:29:37.000
These, these ideas I think our need to be contested.

02:29:37.000 --> 02:29:57.000
You know there's a there's a way we've been thinking about it, you know, in the European tradition in philosophy that I think we're starting to have very good reason to think is is really loaded in a programmatic way.

02:29:57.000 --> 02:30:11.000
And as I mentioned in in responding to Zach, I think a lot of it is it's it's model too much on the sciences, and on you know the exact science particular.

02:30:11.000 --> 02:30:30.000
So, so I'm rational beings. As you know, having their, their being able to be shaped by reasons, that's not going to cut it fine enough for me because I'm going to I'm going to say, Well, okay, but what do you tend to use a reason.

02:30:30.000 --> 02:30:34.000
So it's that it's that ability is that need.

02:30:34.000 --> 02:30:47.000
Again, it's this it's the problem that you want some substance here, but it's got to be pre moral because it's supposed to be the ground of the moral point of view, and I'm saying no, that's a moral issue.

02:30:47.000 --> 02:30:51.000
You can have that you can't have both of those.

02:30:51.000 --> 02:30:55.000
So you think, brother.

02:30:55.000 --> 02:31:13.000
I'm sorry. I'm sorry. We have four minutes, and there are two more hands up so I would like to give press and Jim, actually, like, I can take mine down, I'd like to, what I'd rather hear Nick's the immigration than my question.

02:31:13.000 --> 02:31:31.000
OK, now go ahead. Alright so you think that the being able to being able to consider the pros and cons toward have one actions.

02:31:31.000 --> 02:31:33.000
Humans are by their nature.

02:31:33.000 --> 02:31:44.000
Rule followers the sorts of things that can be shaped by reasons. So like, Who are you concerned that it might exclude since it's definitely going to include all people.

02:31:44.000 --> 02:31:49.000
Well, wait a minute, are we, how are we defining human beings biologically.

02:31:49.000 --> 02:32:07.000
I mean we're going to exclude children, we're going to exclude people with all other sorts of the sorts of things that I'm to say that you can shape your behavior by appeal to reasons isn't to say that you can do it right now immediately say that you're

02:32:07.000 --> 02:32:12.000
the sort of thing whose essence is to be reasoned directed.

02:32:12.000 --> 02:32:15.000
And again, I'm going to ask you.

02:32:15.000 --> 02:32:17.000
You know that.

02:32:17.000 --> 02:32:21.000
It can be contested what counts as a reason.

02:32:21.000 --> 02:32:29.000
Some things that some people would say look this is a reason other people instead that's not a reason you're not you're not being guided by reasons here.

02:32:29.000 --> 02:32:42.000
You being guided by, I don't know, superstition emotion, whatever.

02:32:42.000 --> 02:32:51.000
It's going to be a reason. Yeah, I just this this goes back to talk because when you were talking about the two groups and they, They both.

02:32:51.000 --> 02:32:59.000
You know that not such an increase in taxes and not such a long one or whatever it was

02:32:59.000 --> 02:33:13.000
that that is like pure pragmatics I mean, I bet the bonobos do, that's not that's not rational necessarily that's just dealing with other social beings in.

02:33:13.000 --> 02:33:27.000
I know I'm actually quite serious about the but almost, I don't know but bonobos but but that you negotiate with cons specifics in ways that allow both of you to save face and carry on.

02:33:27.000 --> 02:33:41.000
That seems to me that there's no reason to think that as much to do with being rational, that's just being smart in the way that animals are smart, breath from what we have one minute.

02:33:41.000 --> 02:33:50.000
Yeah, I'll try at least what your question please go ahead, it. I think it's circles on the same issue and and Zachary and Nicholas has questions, sir.

02:33:50.000 --> 02:34:03.000
Help me, I think, if I see what's going on here now. Daniel. It seems like you've got two criticisms of sellers here there's the one the charge of parochialism and that we intentions don't give us the right kind of universality.

02:34:03.000 --> 02:34:15.000
And then there's this criticism that look morality involves a whole bunch of stuff. It just can't be characterized in terms of sharing intentions, a lot of its individual, a lot of it turns on emotional relationships with with people close to us.

02:34:15.000 --> 02:34:28.000
I'm that second criticism, it seems to me that's a I'm totally on board with that, let me just try to say something in defensive sellers by way of the world view of criticism because it seems to me, he addresses some of this.

02:34:28.000 --> 02:34:43.000
So, this is at the end of section, 13 of imperatives intentions and the logic of art so it's the it's the closing paragraph of the penultimate section, it's particularly important to distinguish the loyalty to people generally the recognition of each

02:34:43.000 --> 02:34:58.000
man everywhere is one of us from the impartial level one fellow man which is itself a matter of principle for one confuses these two old suspect that the to defend principles in terms of impartial love is to circle the recognition of each man everywhere

02:34:58.000 --> 02:35:04.000
is one of us was the extension of trouble loyalty which exploded it into something new. That sounds straight out from Solomon.

02:35:04.000 --> 02:35:09.000
It has a precarious toehold in the world, and we're usually a far smaller group.

02:35:09.000 --> 02:35:19.000
Cons conception of each rational being everywhere as one of us is still more breathtaking point of view, which may become a live auction. So that would just be a way of trying to say.

02:35:19.000 --> 02:35:25.000
On the first criticism sellers maybe has something to say, I think you've still got a good bite on the second.

02:35:25.000 --> 02:35:31.000
Okay, let me just say something really quick about the first, I think, I think.

02:35:31.000 --> 02:35:52.000
I want to distinguish I mean I did I did claim that he had a parochial view of of rationality, but the key, the key problem is not, it's any view of rationality is going to be problematic, because that itself on sellers on that kind of account that sellers

02:35:52.000 --> 02:36:12.000
sellers has. It requires a foundation in who it is that counts as a person. And I think it's, it's going to be a moral issue for that view, but then you can't use it to ground, what is the moral point of view, so leave aside, you know, whether sounds

02:36:12.000 --> 02:36:28.000
his parochial and and just go with that structural point that the way things are set up, who we are, has to be a moral issue and it can't be a moral issue.

02:36:28.000 --> 02:36:31.000
And that's the problem.

02:36:31.000 --> 02:36:34.000
Because the ground.

02:36:34.000 --> 02:36:50.000
So we may continue to have this conversation, but officially I close the session but we can all hang around here and continue talking about officially, this is closed so please before we end do let's give another hand to Danielle paper, please.

02:36:50.000 --> 02:36:52.000
Thank you everyone.

02:36:52.000 --> 02:36:59.000
Make questions.

02:36:59.000 --> 02:37:05.000
I knew that would be a bit.

02:37:05.000 --> 02:37:14.000
It's a lot to take in. Yeah, yeah. Well, yeah, yeah. I mean, it is pretty radical, but

02:37:14.000 --> 02:37:22.000
sometimes you just have to, I have to read these comments.

02:37:22.000 --> 02:37:27.000
I mean, it seems to me that, to me it seemed like.

02:37:27.000 --> 02:37:37.000
And I'm not sure what dialectically going on here but parts of your paper seem to be quite sympathetic with

02:37:37.000 --> 02:37:47.000
ground rounding moral evaluation and the moral point of view is reasoning because you also want critical reflection on on the emotions and you mentioned can't.

02:37:47.000 --> 02:37:56.000
Interestingly, the aesthetics, actually. Well it's somehow, an appreciation I'm taking it a moral appreciation.

02:37:56.000 --> 02:38:08.000
On a unaided by concepts for her.

02:38:08.000 --> 02:38:16.000
So, so I found that really interesting I found I mean I felt like two voices friendly amendment.

02:38:16.000 --> 02:38:34.000
And then the other no tribalism so in your paper. Well you can think of it as I mean I did, I did. I said at the beginning, you know I wanted this to be sort of spoilers in it so if you start with some of the sort of key fundamental themes and sellers

02:38:34.000 --> 02:38:51.000
the most important one is, as far as I'm concerned the you know that being a rational being is being critically reflective, that, that the rationality of of inquiry have any way of being human, lies in that reflection and correction.

02:38:51.000 --> 02:39:01.000
It doesn't lie in.

02:39:01.000 --> 02:39:19.000
So that I'm taking is fundamental and that's absolutely central. That's what is going to make this different from you know the way other animals live their emotional lives is the capacity to reflect and be critically reflective about one's values.

02:39:19.000 --> 02:39:22.000
Um,

02:39:22.000 --> 02:39:35.000
I also I mean this The second part is this idea of the emotions that we are social beings I mean this is central to sellers. It's just that he didn't.

02:39:35.000 --> 02:39:54.000
He didn't take it beyond content by saying look, there's more to being a social animal than just desires and reasons. Right. Once you introduce sociality, you've got to introduce emotions, and the question is can they do some work in reflecting on our

02:39:54.000 --> 02:39:58.000
moral lives, and I want to say yes they're critical.

02:39:58.000 --> 02:40:08.000
And I just I don't see that reason, can do more than, give us that credit and critically reflective capacity.

02:40:08.000 --> 02:40:22.000
Sellers wants it to do to do substandard work and I think it's interesting that even in content doesn't the categorical imperative imperative is formal sellers is trying to get some substance by Appeal to Reason, and I am.

02:40:22.000 --> 02:40:32.000
I think this is questionable you

02:40:32.000 --> 02:40:38.000
think for me remedy interviewers was the idea of we intentions he has two concerns.

02:40:38.000 --> 02:40:53.000
One is, it's like like like almost some kind of moral foundational there's some established one key principle. Yeah. And then to a deduction and see which kinds of we intentions are morally appropriate which aren't.

02:40:53.000 --> 02:41:06.000
But there's also another concept that he has when he introduces that concept of the intention and maybe that speaks more to your concerns me the concern to enable us to do.

02:41:06.000 --> 02:41:10.000
Interpersonal rational inquiry.

02:41:10.000 --> 02:41:28.000
In, from the moral point of view, setting the question aside whether there is any sense of moral principle from which all right. Moreover, the intentions can can be decided just just to allow us to to critically reflect into personally on each other's.

02:41:28.000 --> 02:41:46.000
We intend on each other's intentions he thinks I intentions can't do it he needs me intentions. So maybe that second concern is more in line with what you would like to affect because it can contribute to explain our ability to perhaps to critically reflect

02:41:46.000 --> 02:41:49.000
on our emotions.

02:41:49.000 --> 02:42:06.000
Well that was what I was using Kant's maxims of common human human understanding for because I do think that yes, adopting other people's point of view is really important, but I I'm building that into the reflective process which is way content does

02:42:06.000 --> 02:42:19.000
it and and i mean i i mentioned this reading thing I think this is fascinating. I don't understand exactly how reading is, I mean there's something different between meeting and talking to people.

02:42:19.000 --> 02:42:34.000
And I think probably this conscious idea that we are reading public is really important, but I don't, I don't really understand it, but that's quite different from us talking together about what we should do.

02:42:34.000 --> 02:42:38.000
I'm gonna say we need to do that when we have practical problems.

02:42:38.000 --> 02:42:51.000
But when you're trying to theorize, which is what we're doing as philosophers you're trying to theorize and understand what a moral point of view is.

02:42:51.000 --> 02:43:01.000
I I'm, I'm worried that that is going to have this problematic. Question begun character.

02:43:01.000 --> 02:43:14.000
So, I'm all for, you know, thinking really hard about solving our practical problems I mean they're huge and they're really important and we need to bring them all our moral understanding to it.

02:43:14.000 --> 02:43:17.000
I worry that

02:43:17.000 --> 02:43:33.000
in the it seems to me it's important to distinguish the practical in the theoretical questions that practically you can't assume that other people are with you, you still have to solve your problems and I think often moral reasoning gets in the way of

02:43:33.000 --> 02:43:40.000
actually addressing those practical problems,

02:43:40.000 --> 02:43:44.000
different question but it's not a.

02:43:44.000 --> 02:43:54.000
It's about the, the aspect that sellers goes with purely formal aspects of counsel, ultimately, and so on.

02:43:54.000 --> 02:44:06.000
And there is this other aspect of sellers where he says in certain places you have, if you don't have a sort of psychological he might have said emotional concern for others.

02:44:06.000 --> 02:44:13.000
Nothing's going to get off, off the ground. He says this in

02:44:13.000 --> 02:44:22.000
its kind of go right at the end of this little essay science and ethics, he says, moral principles and, and so on.

02:44:22.000 --> 02:44:38.000
And something similar seems to be going on in the in the logic of art, and all the way back actually but, um, so it's not you need that kind of basic concern for others.

02:44:38.000 --> 02:44:52.000
And then he develops a notion of impartial beloved benevolence where if you you know hopefully doesn't he says in the logical by that. I don't know how you got there but if you've got there so you love your neighbor for their own sake,

02:44:52.000 --> 02:44:59.000
So you've already expanded sort of this psychological concern for others that we just need as basic.

02:44:59.000 --> 02:45:15.000
And I think that plays a role in sellers that it doesn't didn't count but it's complicated, because what he does is then turn that into impartial benevolence, which is the love of impartial love of humanity.

02:45:15.000 --> 02:45:27.000
By saying I would that everyone is happy I'm concerned for everybody. I'm expanding that everywhere, then that's not enough.

02:45:27.000 --> 02:45:40.000
Because it's still the egocentric perspective, even though it's other. It's benevolence impartial benevolence. The impartial is just it's for everybody.

02:45:40.000 --> 02:45:58.000
And so then he says, the we, and is the sort of benevolence that chimes in and the moral point of view is then brings in these weird intentions, but I find this very complicated because there's a, there's a sense in which this deep this this ultimate

02:45:58.000 --> 02:46:15.000
concern for others is behind the whole story in a way that it's not in current it's not it's not the same sort of foundational grounding in our, in, in what it is to be a reason or the way it is and current.

02:46:15.000 --> 02:46:31.000
So that's that's just, it's just a thought. It doesn't have to your rich paper on how it's nothing like them, Richard story about the emotions but it is non purely formulas, they sort of feel like and sellers, because there's more to benevolence than

02:46:31.000 --> 02:46:40.000
the we have all the week plays a crucial role in universalism well and I think I would say that already.

02:46:40.000 --> 02:46:59.000
You know impartial benevolence is already going to have the flavor of the problem that I worried about, because in claiming that it's impartial. You're, you're building in and understanding of, you know who the relevant beings are so, so as I you know

02:46:59.000 --> 02:47:14.000
you're saying it's impartial but it's still sort of egocentric so that you have to get that impartial benevolence and then you have to sort of from there adopt the moral point of view, which yeah i think i mean that that gives a nice, a nice sort of developmental

02:47:14.000 --> 02:47:15.000
story.

02:47:15.000 --> 02:47:29.000
But, it lives the, the issue that I'm concerned with, which is, you know, that understanding of the we and, again, it's, it's not a factual problem it's not, you know, how do we figure out who we are.

02:47:29.000 --> 02:47:39.000
It's in the context of sellers projects, I just don't, I, you can't deal with that question. Yeah, it doesn't matter.

02:47:39.000 --> 02:47:53.000
I mean it's what I said isn't doesn't really address that issue between you and so it's but it does show that he's not a sort of purely a foundational is Pure Reason con formula.

02:47:53.000 --> 02:47:58.000
In his intentions but it doesn't. Yeah.

02:47:58.000 --> 02:48:02.000
But I think there, you'd have to wait. Again, I don't know anything about this.

02:48:02.000 --> 02:48:18.000
So caught. As far as I can reason is concerned, we've got the categorical imperative purely formal, but then his, his theory of virtue doesn't that isn't that about human beings and therefore, there's going to be some substance there will know that's

02:48:18.000 --> 02:48:23.000
real important, I think, and then, and so sort of mentioned that.

02:48:23.000 --> 02:48:37.000
But there's a difference and it's an on the same page as Preston was talking about in this logic about thing, only the only the revised edition, but he says I'm oh no it's in science and metaphysics, to.

02:48:37.000 --> 02:48:41.000
He says can't, I'm not talking about benevolence.

02:48:41.000 --> 02:48:49.000
As a duty the way can't does in his virtue theory because sellers is very things, the virtue theory is very important to sell us because happiness is crucial.

02:48:49.000 --> 02:49:08.000
So, but it comes in in a different way that comes in, when you've already got the moral point of view, and you have a duty to develop the talents of others because you're already playing the whole game, whereas this one, his loyalty from Royce, or the

02:49:08.000 --> 02:49:10.000
love of your neighbor.

02:49:10.000 --> 02:49:26.000
That's, that's prior to the, to the complete logical story so so kinds virtue ethics is still embedded within the full we story, and that's why you got to develop other people's talents.

02:49:26.000 --> 02:49:39.000
But this and I don't claim to have it all worked out how cells tries to do it but this idea of love of neighbor or loyalty, playing a slightly different role that has to be bootstrapped up into that.

02:49:39.000 --> 02:49:43.000
logical we, the way that's connected to the community.

02:49:43.000 --> 02:49:47.000
That's, that's a slightly different thing.

02:49:47.000 --> 02:49:49.000
But a

02:49:49.000 --> 02:50:05.000
paper very I really liked it. I did wonder about, but I'm talking too much here old old head Some say, but on the last one I just wondered about that you listen to the people who you respect their opinions, you've got your emotional structure there's

02:50:05.000 --> 02:50:15.000
going to be before that you had developed the second Maxim from Canada, which was viewing people from the standpoint, doing things from the standpoint of everyone.

02:50:15.000 --> 02:50:31.000
Right. And I know that was kind but you seem to be very sympathetically exposing that, like it was something you could take on board. But then I worried that your view became the tribal because viewing from the standpoint of everyone is circumscribed

02:50:31.000 --> 02:50:35.000
by those you respect their opinions.

02:50:35.000 --> 02:50:47.000
Yeah, no, I think I mean, partly what was interesting to me about that second one particular though yes i i'm not everyone just raises the same problems again.

02:50:47.000 --> 02:51:06.000
Um, but that he focuses not on the reasons but on the principles I think that is absolutely fascinating that that when he's talking about what you need to be doing as far as that second maximum is concerned, is thinking about how their reasoning, rather

02:51:06.000 --> 02:51:09.000
than from what their reasoning.

02:51:09.000 --> 02:51:18.000
And I think that is that is absolutely to the point because, you know, the idea of values.

02:51:18.000 --> 02:51:35.000
What you have to learn by reflecting on where somebody else is coming from is thinking about how they're thinking how they're seeing things. And yes, I, you know, respect is.

02:51:35.000 --> 02:51:47.000
Well, again, you know I am content in so many ways you know this is the original viewing. I mean respect is is a very peculiar thing. You don't have to listen to everybody.

02:51:47.000 --> 02:51:58.000
And there's no point listening to people who other people say, are wonderful and you can hear it. I mean, maybe you should work to try and hear it, but that's because you respect them.

02:51:58.000 --> 02:52:01.000
Oh do you were gonna say something, sorry.

02:52:01.000 --> 02:52:22.000
Oh, I don't know what extent, very clever, but then yeah I was wondering whether you would endorse the idea of the kind of new feminist critique

02:52:22.000 --> 02:52:48.000
that aren't saying that. Well, when you say we and we intentions, and the Rule of the Rules of rationality, that are supposed to pray to the usual problem of, well, I'm thinking that he is speaking from kind of out of body universal, and the streets,

02:52:48.000 --> 02:53:00.000
a social individual, why was the trend of contemporary so far as the mythology and ethics, as well.

02:53:00.000 --> 02:53:12.000
Makes it rather hear that, uh, well, every we is located, and to some extent.

02:53:12.000 --> 02:53:17.000
Sit on, as well as can't.

02:53:17.000 --> 02:53:28.000
He's just speaking in the name of the white male, your appeal centric and so forth and so on so would you would you go there.

02:53:28.000 --> 02:53:49.000
That is certainly part of it. Not, not particularly from a feminist point of view but that's included I think the more I read, the more point of views that that open up and say, No, those values and and you know, I just wrote this book on, you know, realizing

02:53:49.000 --> 02:54:03.000
reason. I don't think any of that back, but that conception of rationality tied to mathematics and the way the natural sciences are shaped by mathematics.

02:54:03.000 --> 02:54:21.000
That's not the whole story of rationality. That's actually, I now think that having told the story of realizing reason, having this idea that the project of science has been completed, which is one of the main themes of that book.

02:54:21.000 --> 02:54:30.000
We can finally separate the philosophical project from that scientific project.

02:54:30.000 --> 02:54:32.000
They were so intertwined.

02:54:32.000 --> 02:54:45.000
The project of science the project of absolute knowledge was, I think, I now think was Miss shaping the project to philosophy.

02:54:45.000 --> 02:55:01.000
And now, now we can let philosophy flourish out from under the weight of that monolith of science. And so, yes.

02:55:01.000 --> 02:55:11.000
I. That's the way I would put it but it absolutely is, you know, consonant with what feminists have been same time, but also other people.

02:55:11.000 --> 02:55:15.000
Um, people who worry about the arts.

02:55:15.000 --> 02:55:25.000
Um, you know, other cultures, I, you know, Chinese culture, it's, it's choice, really different.

02:55:25.000 --> 02:55:29.000
And it does start to look like.

02:55:29.000 --> 02:55:35.000
We had this particular conception of rationality, that has its place.

02:55:35.000 --> 02:55:45.000
But it's not the whole story, and I and then I want to say in anytime you do try and tell the whole story, you're going to have the same problem again.

02:55:45.000 --> 02:55:53.000
So, yeah, I think that a lot of these feminist worries are are valid.

02:55:53.000 --> 02:55:57.000
But they're not the only people who have who have valid worries.

02:55:57.000 --> 02:56:01.000
Yeah, you want to stick with the enlightenment's.

02:56:01.000 --> 02:56:05.000
You know,

02:56:05.000 --> 02:56:08.000
I can't give up.

02:56:08.000 --> 02:56:28.000
Enlightenment, that for that yeah i i sure exactly the same concerns that you do, but I just have to read your book now. Yeah, yeah. No, but I think this is really important because I, I, I am such an enlightenment thinker, I am my students made me This

02:56:28.000 --> 02:56:29.000
is mug.

02:56:29.000 --> 02:56:32.000
So, there's content.

02:56:32.000 --> 02:56:53.000
And there's me, and I are in conversation, they know that content is so important to me what and sellers but but con i mean when I was when I was a graduate student, I didn't want to just, you know, think like con i wanted to be.

02:56:53.000 --> 02:57:10.000
So, you know, this is very near and dear to my heart and I don't think we don't have to choose between these we just have to not make a certain mistake that I think I'm seeing sellers making in thinking about the moral point of view.

02:57:10.000 --> 02:57:15.000
So this is not against reason and rationality at all.

02:57:15.000 --> 02:57:24.000
It's not against science. It's not against mathematics, but it's it saying that's not everything.

02:57:24.000 --> 02:57:30.000
There's a lot more to thinking about our lives.

02:57:30.000 --> 02:57:32.000
Then,

02:57:32.000 --> 02:57:39.000
View from, from science. Anyway, I'm going to go get

02:57:39.000 --> 02:57:42.000
go.

02:57:42.000 --> 02:57:44.000
Only as well. Okay.

02:57:44.000 --> 02:58:03.000
We'll see everybody here.

 

WEBVTT

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Hey, I'm not hearing anyone.

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Can you guys hear me.

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Okay.

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We can hear you, Bill.

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Someone say something.

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Oh, I'm finally I hear you, yeah okay good, I was Zippo.

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That's relief. Thank you.

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Good morning.

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Good morning

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or good afternoon as the case may be. Yeah.

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Yeah, so, so where are the Germans.

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I thought lunch would be would be here.

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Stephanie's representing.

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Yeah, that's all they don't have a summer break right now.

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It's August of course they do. Yeah Oh they I guess they do, yeah.

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Yeah, but then that should not keep them from attending a conference Right, right, right.

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I'm gonna have to scold them get lazy there they're all in my archive somewhere.

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We can start, let me say, remind people of two things will begin and first of all, welcome to the second day of the conference, and I just would like to remind people that they have the captions on. So if you would like sub scripts please click on the live transcript button at the bottom and then

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the relevant

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link on the drop down.

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And also, if you would like to contribute to the q amp a, you may do so by by by raised do clicking on the hand race sign or by contributing to the chat, we hope to get around to the chat but even if not we can download it and shared with the speakers.

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So with that said please Stephanie.

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Okay, welcome to the second day, I am glad to introduce our first speaker for today Preston still will from the University of Alabama and Preston is about to publish a book on him very interesting and broad ranging project and he will also talk about

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that project in his paper, which is called shared intentionality and to discuss of cognition, so please Preston, go ahead.

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regard here you can hear you.

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That's okay. How's that.

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Yeah. can you.

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Good.

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Thank you all for showing up, and thrilled to be here this is such a great meeting with people.

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So I'm really excited.

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What I'm going to do so let me share screens here I've got a presentation. I uploaded an essay, just a couple of days ago I don't expect people would have had time to read it and it's not necessary.

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So let me at least get a PowerPoint.

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Up here, and I'll work through that

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book that on, everyone can see that I hope.

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So what I'm going to do is I'm going to talk about the relationship between shared intentionality and discursive cognition, and as Stephanie mentioned, this comes out of material that I've been working on in Credit Karma for the last couple of years,

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and that we're going to book.

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Hopefully in September I said proofs of final final final version of the proofs of a couple of days ago about a week ago.

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So what I'm going to do is I'm going to start by just laying out the problem space that I'm addressing these issues.

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I'm then going to look at, non discursive intentional and the anti cognition, this came up a little bit in build breeze talk. I think it's important that we be able to tell a story about the ontogeny and the philosophy of discursive cognition, and my

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view is going to be that in both cases.

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Reality is an important part of that story.

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So I'll start by looking at non destructive potential Niantic cognition I'll do that fairly quickly. There's quite a bit here. And so I'm going to be going through some of it quicker than other bits that I've got an audience familiar with some of this

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stuff more than others.

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And then going to look at discursive intentional Pantheon to cognition and they're going to do that but we have a semantics for the mobile operators for shared intentionality and for the antic modality talk about what's obliged permitted and forbidden

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in terms of agency.

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And then we'll look at some formal properties of the semantics, and the breakout yesterday.

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I hope I'm getting bills claim here like that it was important to at least get enough logic on board, to be able to tell when presented with a wall of symbolic text, whether there was anything interesting there, or whether you were just being beat with

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text so my hope is in discussing the formal stuff in sections three and four, that I can at least address the kind of concerns that that somebody like they'll would have.

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So I'm not going to go into the details of that very much but there's enough there I hope to, for those of you that are interested in that kind of material to see what's going on and I'm definitely willing to talk about it in the kitchen.

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And then we will look at empirical support and predictions that this account makes because if I'm right we can glean something about it. Sure discursive cognition, or rationality, in terms of a semantics for these mobile operators so I'm going to argue

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some empirical support for the position of hope, and that it makes some predictions that are worth taking seriously.

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This is stuff that I think of is mostly complete, I'm happy with the material have to hear. Beginning in Part Six though I'm gonna look at some issues that I'm less confident about the next two parts.

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The first I'm going to look at the relationship between intentional, and biotic cognition, in practical reasoning, and then going to draw contrast between proof there and model theory because everything I'm going to be doing up to this point is, in terms

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terms of model theory and I think it's important to think about proof theories

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and someone's saying something to me or is this may be Christmas just that we sometimes can't hear you right maybe you could go closer to your microphone.

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Oh, sure. Absolutely, absolutely. And I'm, I met my parents place in the mountains of Montana and they have some weird kind of Genki internet connection here so it may that may be an issue too so if there are problems.

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raise your hand.

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And I'll

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address that.

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Okay, so I look at proof the remodel theory, I'm then going to look at Stephanie's meta linguistic interpretation of sellers counter shared intentionality.

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She's published this essay, recently I think it's a great reading we've a number of us have discussed it so I'm going to discuss that quickly and try to slot it in the to the view on developing, particularly with regards to the relationship between proof

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theory and model theory, and then going to look at an account of proof the have been Luke improved body and Julian Schroeder and their notion of rejection, be seen as a kind of rejection or something similar to what I'm doing and again this is this one

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I'm really sort of in the weeds when it comes to not sure what what to think about this stuff. And then there's time at the end I want to address it goes notion of absolute knowing is bad spelling out truth conditions for sharing mental states and thinking

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about what it is to be one of us is a claim about the way things are.

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I doubt I'll get to delete.

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We can we can address it.

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OK, so I'm going to do and philosophy across the board that views declarative explains representations of the way the world are the way the world is where the way the space of possible worlds is.

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So this view for grounds representational intentionality where the mind is meant that the world and normative assessment of claims then is measured in terms of whether the mind is represented correctly.

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Now, no Belknap declares this or a version of this kind of principle. The declarative fallacy. the thought that just because of the things ended declarative mood it's meant to represent the world.

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But oftentimes you say things that are clarity that don't clearly have that function. So something like the cups go in the cupboard might be a way of eating to a roommate how to organize the house for friends help clean up from an employer to an employee,

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it might it, man.

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So this this came up yesterday in his discussion, Stephanie mentioned that context is going to matter a lot for settling some of the claims that we make and trying to determine whether they have one quarter of intentionality or another.

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And I think that that's correct and we need to bear in mind that there are these two complimentary ways we can think about the mind in relation to the world as protein from the other direction.

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Some of the claims we make the declarative have the world of mind direction of fit, where normative assessment is measured not in terms of whether the mind is represented the world rather in terms of whether the world is is the mind, cleanse it to me.

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And so I want to give a semantics that mobile operators, they give expression to shared intentions and the judgment, where I am having this practical intentionality.

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So, overall, my hope is that I've provided a framework that can be used by philosophers linguists and scientists to look at the relationship between discursive and non discursive cognition and human beings.

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So, in the book in particular I try to address the number of issues that come up in these fields in a way that's neutral Kindle substantive commitment between them so as to give a common framework.

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But then also to show how we can address some of the issues because I think it provides a resource for engaging with some of this stuff.

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So originally I thought I'd give a kind of historical approach this talk, because Alan given was going to be here I'm using different stuff.

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See, able to make I think I'm going to focus more of a topical thing so I'll flag some of the issues that come up in the history, philosophy about this issue, for the most part, just going to present it as it is the idea.

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And I'm going to try to minimize the formalism and give a general, I see this research program. My hope is that other people will see it as well. And so, maybe this is a kind of advertisement I'm hoping I can bring people around to seeing things, my view

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or my point of view or at the very least, saying that my point of view is worth partnering with to show me that I'm wrong about something

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That's

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okay so in the book, I give, it's listed there.

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a little bit, I give an account of discursive cognition. Understood is beating the rules button action in terms of a semantics for intentional and do.

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The idea is that to obey rule is to exercise the cognition, the cognition is rationality and use their plans of action is the world of mine correlates to the world as a basis for interpreting mind to fit world represent.

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So, use words and plans to account for the two directions potential, and then draw inferences, and then the idea once this model is up and running to draw inferences about the nature of dispersal cognition are shared intentionality in terms of the kinds

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of things that have to be imposed on the model to get the semantics right, get the right kind of entitlements. And, and to see that that you get the sort of logic you want out of it.

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So the key thesis I'm defending is the shared intentionality to is the basis for and a foundation for the self government that comes with the anti cognition, that's the key I do this fairly quickly.

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I think that the notion of picturing is is an important part of any kind of philosophical anthropology

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is a variation of world world relation between ultimately states of the central nervous system and properties in the environment, processes or literally in the environment.

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So I think of it as having a primitive binder world and world of mind intentionality, so when I reached to pick a glass up right where I see what the glass is I'm not only representing the space around, but I'm engaged in it in certain ways that prepare

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me to act in in ways that allow me to manipulate it.

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So I think I'm picturing is that it's basis that kind of non discursive cognition, this is the sort of thing that these can do an animal to board.

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But in addition to picturing I think we need a notion of shared practical picturing and what I call the antic picture, so this will come up a little bit later but basically the idea is that your practical picturing involves motor representational neural

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mirroring so this is a piece in the 90s, and we've since found that it's across the animal kingdom, but I do something like move a cup up to a countertop and you watch me, there's a part of your motor representational complex, that is planning, from your

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perspective to do what I'm doing is if you were me, so it's not just that you're representing what I'm doing from your point of view, you're actually engaged in your practical faculties in ways that would be appropriate if you were the one who was doing

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it.

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So I think this is a kind of shared practical picturing and you can see how this would facilitate shared agency if you are moving a flight of a table up a flight of stairs narrow in terms, I see that you need to get the legs up on the side.

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I know that I need to go down, important because I can see in some sense, this is what I would do if I was you or what I would need you to do if you will meet.

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So I think if the Arctic picturing and as a kind of shared practical picturing that involves the exercise of what's draw some calls the reactive attitude so these are an effective states that involve evaluations of others things like admiration pride,

00:18:43.000 --> 00:18:45.000
discuss.

00:18:45.000 --> 00:18:51.000
Okay, so this is all in the background as

00:18:51.000 --> 00:19:06.000
part of the transition from non discursive to discursive cognition. I think one of the roles for last year is to individually, intermediate categories between extremes that we don't at a given time, understand how they relate.

00:19:06.000 --> 00:19:12.000
So one of the things I'm trying to do here then is to propose these intermediate categories that will come up a number of times.

00:19:12.000 --> 00:19:14.000
Okay, but I think of all this.

00:19:14.000 --> 00:19:29.000
Being non discursive. So the district count and it's going to be founded on this notion of single mindedness, and rejection. So here's the idea. One chooses to do something candidly just in case one rejects every choice incompatible with that choice.

00:19:29.000 --> 00:19:35.000
And so rejecting primitive effective Pakistan's modeled on the picture.

00:19:35.000 --> 00:19:48.000
Now there's no sufficient entertains an attitude of rejection toward everything compatible with What does now vacations on the scene that's actually kind of tricky because you can just say well I reject not doing, but in the absence of nation.

00:19:48.000 --> 00:19:58.000
There's no supposition that it may be caught you know maybe caught with someone who was within a mental state involved rejecting everything compatible with what piece decided to do.

00:19:58.000 --> 00:20:12.000
But nevertheless, it's useful to model the hunter cognition, as if the kinds of mental states were ones that we could adopt so hyper vigilance is the term I used to characterize the agents are involved in planning and there's a bunch of artificiality

00:20:12.000 --> 00:20:28.000
that are imposed and planning to make sense of it, but I think it's useful to think of the extremes, particularly when we're doing model construction to think of the extremes in precise ways that may involve separating them from features that are part

00:20:28.000 --> 00:20:43.000
of what they are, as a matter of the kind of thing they actually are in the world, as opposed to our model. So again, I took picturing to be a primitive joint mine world and worldwide intentionality, but in this amazing, I'm creating my world intentionality

00:20:43.000 --> 00:20:56.000
in terms of possible worlds and world mind intentionality in terms of plants so that's an artificial reality, it's going to be useful similarly for the notion of rejection so maybe only the angels, ever, ever, ever entertain rejection in this way.

00:20:56.000 --> 00:21:03.000
Nevertheless, it's useful for, for we mere mortals to think of it in these terms. So I claim.

00:21:03.000 --> 00:21:06.000
Single mindedness then is a kind of

00:21:06.000 --> 00:21:18.000
finding life of the course of action by not letting myself do anything out of the judgment that out to dress professional.

00:21:18.000 --> 00:21:28.000
That involves rejecting everything compatible with it so I reject gym clothes for instance. And so, in, in one thing I might know is I'm planning my morning, or my evening the night for us.

00:21:28.000 --> 00:21:32.000
If my clothes are clean suit is dirty, that I need to get it cleaned or I need to touch it up or whatever.

00:21:32.000 --> 00:21:39.000
or I need to touch it up or whatever. So, single mindedness that is a mile strong beyond

00:21:39.000 --> 00:21:50.000
is the kind of stuff to practice involves finding yourself of course backs and by not letting yourself do something new, contravening. So, discuss more detail later.

00:21:50.000 --> 00:21:56.000
Alright so the notion of

00:21:56.000 --> 00:22:00.000
getting audio is still be.

00:22:00.000 --> 00:22:03.000
This comes through as well as it can.

00:22:03.000 --> 00:22:20.000
Single mindedness gives you an edge of nonstick strong Niantic modality. Actually let me let me check. Real quick,

00:22:20.000 --> 00:22:38.000
this may kick me off. If I do, I'll come back, so I apologize hold on just a second. Okay.

00:22:38.000 --> 00:22:39.000
Okay.

00:22:39.000 --> 00:22:47.000
So, again.

00:22:47.000 --> 00:23:01.000
So single mindedness gives an account that astronomy on the ground, can I quickly interrupt you, or proposes that maybe it would be a good idea of your clothes the video maybe that can end up on some whatever.

00:23:01.000 --> 00:23:03.000
Okay.

00:23:03.000 --> 00:23:10.000
I hope you can still share your screen now let's. Yeah, the screen.

00:23:10.000 --> 00:23:11.000
Yes.

00:23:11.000 --> 00:23:13.000
You've got the screen Good, good, good.

00:23:13.000 --> 00:23:27.000
Okay, so a single mindedness gives the account of the strong, the modality of obligation for forbid. And then, the notion of differences you specify the week modality.

00:23:27.000 --> 00:23:38.000
Now, this is the historical flat so the distinct choice attitudes was independently developed for login Tell me develop, at least three times, 16 years.

00:23:38.000 --> 00:23:54.000
Give does it in thinking how to live. There was a book by people like sugar and dryer. I mean, it makes sense of obligation, neither of them note this distinction will dry or doesn't want essay and attributes that ever present something novel, so it's

00:23:54.000 --> 00:24:04.000
actually there and give it to begin with. It looks to me left are sort of comes to it on his own, but actually in a couple of essays from sellers in the 60s early 70s.

00:24:04.000 --> 00:24:14.000
In each case, they characterize the strong attitude in terms of preference but I don't think that's right. Because, an animal that's chasing of praise exhibiting preferences.

00:24:14.000 --> 00:24:26.000
But that's not what is going on in the anti cognition, so I think really the idea is this notion of single minded. Furthermore, once you've got single defined difference in terms of single.

00:24:26.000 --> 00:24:41.000
That's what I do.

00:24:41.000 --> 00:24:49.000
But it's different, just in case there's some action be incompatible with he could have chosen to be without changing any of your single minded choices.

00:24:49.000 --> 00:24:52.000
So if I think I had to dress professionally.

00:24:52.000 --> 00:25:03.000
And I between me is to reject rejecting each, so rejection in the sense iterating in a way that's like negation.

00:25:03.000 --> 00:25:12.000
So, it's very case of thinking, dress professionally, I think, to dress professionally, that I'm permitted dressed in black suit.

00:25:12.000 --> 00:25:24.000
Then I'm going to choose single mindedly dress professionally by rejecting anything possible which means I'm not going to dress my gym clothes, but I'm planning to choose in differently between the two suits in the sense that either of them.

00:25:24.000 --> 00:25:28.000
Each satisfy my single minded choice to dress professional.

00:25:28.000 --> 00:25:41.000
Okay, so then just really quick. This is just a possible world semantics with the additional, it's basically to get Boolean logic.

00:25:41.000 --> 00:25:47.000
Just the set theoretic operations that with the middle of the 19th century.

00:25:47.000 --> 00:25:57.000
So, let idiotic plan be defined as a maximally consistent plan of action for every circumstance, every agent, and every choice.

00:25:57.000 --> 00:26:11.000
The agent, either single mindedly chooses to do that thing chooses not to do it differently chooses do it or indefinitely chooses not to do it so it should exhaust all the possibilities of agents choices and actions.

00:26:11.000 --> 00:26:23.000
So, the understanding understood tensions and action. So this is a large distinguish choice to boil water in order to make tea from a choice to boil the water in order to make coffee.

00:26:23.000 --> 00:26:33.000
So the idea is that you individually choices and find a farm is a brain, if you could specify that the intent action and then we didn't put the semantic value of sentence five with these Scott brackets brackets.

00:26:33.000 --> 00:26:52.000
And we didn't put the semantic value of sentence five with these Scott brackets with these double brackets. In terms of the spec interpreted first sentence having the mind to fit world to fit the interpretation of flies going to be the set of worlds which

00:26:52.000 --> 00:26:55.000
is true.

00:26:55.000 --> 00:27:08.000
Through the Arctic expressions are then defined in terms of plans of action, and I'm treating at this point in the semantics I'm treating, just the prescriptive fragments so I'm just looking at the hyper plans here, so to say they're doing is obliged

00:27:08.000 --> 00:27:28.000
see expresses universally rejecting not fancy at it to say it's the set of plans for every agent who's single mindedly agency to say that is an expressive University rejecting doing a CD, which is to set up our plans where every agent, choose a single

00:27:28.000 --> 00:27:42.000
mindedly not agency, and then say that doing is permitted and he expresses universally rejecting rejecting doing agency, which may, which is the set of pipe pipelines for every agent, either single line only choose a day and C, or indifferently chooses

00:27:42.000 --> 00:27:46.000
whether or not.

00:27:46.000 --> 00:28:01.000
Plan is actually consists of action, just in the same way that it was, but intentional April plans don't distinguish the attitudes of single mindedness and indifference. This is because they don't have a strong in a week down to Dallas modality and the way that the deal.

00:28:01.000 --> 00:28:14.000
way that the deal. So we're Iota or i have to say i when i when i read it out where I Oda is a meta linguistic variable taking you through the first person singular, plural pronouns, as its value.

00:28:14.000 --> 00:28:27.000
I feel AC is a set of hyper plans where I choose a together on cnh were together is important if you've got the plural pronouns, we can play.

00:28:27.000 --> 00:28:47.000
So, now, in this case, what I got here is I have the semantic utterances or triples. So, before I was looking just at the single plans because I was considering the fragment of the language where you have either just purely unintentional purely

00:28:47.000 --> 00:28:57.000
sentences, but we want to be able to model relations among these sentences. So we have to take as our semantic interpreted order triples of world's data paper pens and intentional.

00:28:57.000 --> 00:29:09.000
But if you do that, you get just all of the regular classical logic defined in terms of operations sets in the way that everyone's familiar with.

00:29:09.000 --> 00:29:17.000
Okay, you can then introduce quantification, and you get the right kind of influences it's provable that an obligation is a permission.

00:29:17.000 --> 00:29:29.000
Even when quantification on the scene distinguish a raid a victim or a relative rising semantic interpretations the world's as I do here.

00:29:29.000 --> 00:29:32.000
And you can

00:29:32.000 --> 00:29:38.000
relationships between different kinds of modalities. So I'm going to just skip this.

00:29:38.000 --> 00:29:58.000
But you, you can ask me questions if you like the template will or been can be modeled these claims on necessity and possibility, then interactions between different kinds of fidelity, so you can distinguish one should a in order to be where the modality

00:29:58.000 --> 00:30:17.000
modality has wide scope. And in order to be one today, where the theological modality has come for cuz you distinguish the antic from attentional plans, there's a coherent but practically irrational mental state expressed by

00:30:17.000 --> 00:30:36.000
a shovel. Here, there are hyper states. These order triples that know that content but it's practically irrational since there's no action, take satisfies all of the blank admits that you adopt.

00:30:36.000 --> 00:30:44.000
OK, so now I'm going to look at some of its the empirical some of you, and the predictions effects.

00:30:44.000 --> 00:30:49.000
So I already mentioned neural bearing and sure what I call shared practical picture.

00:30:49.000 --> 00:31:00.000
So, this is exactly what you would expect if shared intentionality involves this to the perspectives of other people and plant plan on how you would behave.

00:31:00.000 --> 00:31:13.000
if you were someone else. So, here's Stephen butterfill, talking about neural control for understanding intentionality much coordination of joint action appears to involve not fully distinguishing others actions.

00:31:13.000 --> 00:31:29.000
Take motor simulation task or representation and motor representation of collective goals. In each case coordination of those motor or testers and patients factions tasks goals.

00:31:29.000 --> 00:31:41.000
plans as a matter of pairings and representing past it she will always also be appropriate. If it were you and not her was about form.

00:31:41.000 --> 00:31:54.000
So I mentioned that the intentional hyper plans don't distinguish single mindedness and indifference and this is because they don't have a distinction between a strong in a week, Global force.

00:31:54.000 --> 00:31:57.000
This guests shares.

00:31:57.000 --> 00:32:03.000
Kind of practical rationality practical cognition, and what's all been able to accomplish.

00:32:03.000 --> 00:32:17.000
And then some of the things that support suggestion so you choose, without choosing single mindedly, so the wolf that chases a prey. Say what is chasing an antelope burden is looking for a weekend alone, or chase the wolf is going to make choices, but

00:32:17.000 --> 00:32:24.000
but the choices are going to be single minded in the sense that it's not adopting an effective stance, effective practical sense worth finding itself to that course of action.

00:32:24.000 --> 00:32:33.000
And this can be seen because if the envelope that it chases suddenly gets a second when stumble.

00:32:33.000 --> 00:32:42.000
Trust will divert to the any consideration of anything chosen.

00:32:42.000 --> 00:33:12.000
So chooses looks like something that it's more complicated requires additional cognitive complexity and simply choose for the more with the notion of single by choice you can discriminate practical genus species religions, when I planned on choosing and

00:33:13.000 --> 00:33:29.000
And I think the case can be made then the cognition is the foundation of discursive cognition in the sense that involves this kind of self bindings, the self government, because a human being in the content context is an agent that x not only in accord

00:33:29.000 --> 00:33:40.000
with a rule but on the basis of a recognition of its propriety. So if we take this content and idea, one that makes with little cells.

00:33:40.000 --> 00:33:58.000
At least they will take as our part of our inspiration, then we can think of the Artic cognition is a mechanism for that kind of content self government because it's single mindedness that allows us to exercise that that course of action where we don't

00:33:58.000 --> 00:34:04.000
allow ourselves to do something we've committed ourselves to reject and

00:34:04.000 --> 00:34:19.000
Furthermore, positive and negative reinforcement schedules instituted by shared intentionality suffice to set up normative statuses, even if the people engaged in that shared intentionality don't know, don't know what they're doing or aren't aware of

00:34:19.000 --> 00:34:30.000
what they're doing and the, the sense of awareness that comes with discursive self government to ethnic so stick meeting and flocked anything or just negative and positive reinforcement so acting on the intention to stick be doing AMC and flocked and

00:34:30.000 --> 00:34:39.000
not doing AMC is one way of training people to conform to the norm that A is forbidden and see. Instead of all the

00:34:39.000 --> 00:34:39.000
up with some words.

00:34:39.000 --> 00:34:54.000
some work. So this suggests that consumer language is normal for things and that a vocal communication, a language might be undergoing development goals tactic complexity,

00:34:54.000 --> 00:34:55.000
social attitudes.

00:34:55.000 --> 00:35:11.000
There's I see no be any construction to the land itself without anyone being able to save money, so they were institution for

00:35:11.000 --> 00:35:18.000
the community.

00:35:18.000 --> 00:35:25.000
There's a bunch of work been developmental say

00:35:25.000 --> 00:35:34.000
it's out of shared intentionality beginning and what is just around like was

00:35:34.000 --> 00:35:37.000
almost cannot hear you.

00:35:37.000 --> 00:35:40.000
Okay,

00:35:40.000 --> 00:36:01.000
quite a bit of work in developmental technology, about the emergence of normative adults opinion, nine months of age, cubits exhibit proclivity to share mental states with their caregivers, so attention and emotion, and from nine months stage asked me

00:36:01.000 --> 00:36:10.000
for sharing meditates develops into capacity to share and enforce.

00:36:10.000 --> 00:36:25.000
So, recent review article by Schmidt and cozy, they close with a claim that further research might support a view that is remarkably consonant with the one I've developed here.

00:36:25.000 --> 00:36:32.000
They say one picture that's worth being explored more systematically and future research is that well if you will be.

00:36:32.000 --> 00:36:58.000
I'm potentially in the natural loans as breakfast and success uniquely human forms of normal psychology and equally shared intentionality developed in close to hand them in early ontogeny, the former building on and going out of the ladder.

00:36:58.000 --> 00:37:01.000
is founded on this distinction between a strong and weak force.

00:37:01.000 --> 00:37:17.000
It should intentionality is the kind of thing that but isn't practical standpoint, involving putting yourself into the position of other people, provide a foundation for what's going to be the Artic cognition the capacity to choose single minded but.

00:37:17.000 --> 00:37:33.000
But again, I'm thinking in terms of single mindedness is a kind of abstract idealization at the level of phylogenetic. I think it's better to think in terms of shared practical picturing and the authentic picturing that hominids we're developing a massive

00:37:33.000 --> 00:37:46.000
state, but to do it in a way of normative we're evaluating valence and attitudes like admiration and discuss would have been important for that process.

00:37:46.000 --> 00:37:56.000
Okay, so I'm proposing

00:37:56.000 --> 00:38:04.000
or norm psychology develops out of shared intention intention testing something similar in the species.

00:38:04.000 --> 00:38:08.000
Okay so, Thomas.

00:38:08.000 --> 00:38:25.000
Thomas Hello thinks that we can give an account of the development of human cognition, on the basis of step process of evolution from joint, the collective intention joint intentionality involves sharing mental states with small groups, respecting.

00:38:25.000 --> 00:38:40.000
People hunting small groups of people hunting in the time of their hunting or in building tools at a time that they're building tools, but no expand sense of what he calls collective intentionality which is, in principle, unrestricted space and time where

00:38:40.000 --> 00:38:54.000
the members of the community. Are you might never meet might not even be able to themselves claim is that human connection involves judgments about what is true and moral is what binding on everyone

00:38:54.000 --> 00:39:02.000
It isn't enough to account for human connection, but rather, but there's a necessity for collective intention.

00:39:02.000 --> 00:39:10.000
Because collective intentionality is allowed is allows us to conceive of truth of what's true and what's more, is what's binding on everyone.

00:39:10.000 --> 00:39:28.000
And it lays this out notes there may need to be additional stages and proposed between intentionality and the development of human cognition, and I can be Genius Bar is proposing some intermediate stage that kind of collective intentionality, and the

00:39:28.000 --> 00:39:42.000
development of human cognition, we need a notion of single minded, because this is what allows us to account for recognizing something is true, or good, in the sense of recognition that involves that merely acting in conformity with a norm from the basis

00:39:42.000 --> 00:39:49.000
of an awareness of its proprietary responding to it as something that commands or medium.

00:39:49.000 --> 00:39:57.000
Think it's plausible that we could have been able to speak a language, sharing attention to communicate, which could have blown could have been home Gov.

00:39:57.000 --> 00:40:01.000
Long before we were aware of norms the sense of awareness that bulbs.

00:40:01.000 --> 00:40:09.000
The other person cognition.

00:40:09.000 --> 00:40:15.000
allowed us to adopt those cognitive stances.

00:40:15.000 --> 00:40:24.000
Okay. So one last thing about the sport and predictions. So, brand new Dell have this debate about whether logic use is necessary for reason laundering.

00:40:24.000 --> 00:40:37.000
Things that know there could have been human beings that were engaged in the practice of giving and asking for reasons without logic yet being on the scene, and that the virtue of logic is that makes explicit what was implicit in those reasoning practices,

00:40:37.000 --> 00:40:46.000
because there's no, there's no sense in which a group of people, reasoning accepted so they're using logical operators.

00:40:46.000 --> 00:40:51.000
My suggestion is that that logic makes the difference that single minded.

00:40:51.000 --> 00:40:57.000
This is what allows you to recognize this piece

00:40:57.000 --> 00:40:59.000
to the convention.

00:40:59.000 --> 00:41:10.000
So it's entirely possible as far as I can see the community that have been using logical aging in the nation and getting an internet connection stable message.

00:41:10.000 --> 00:41:13.000
I hope people can still hear

00:41:13.000 --> 00:41:22.000
that say about that. The way trying to

00:41:22.000 --> 00:41:27.000
run the sort of

00:41:27.000 --> 00:41:30.000
throw my hat in.

00:41:30.000 --> 00:41:45.000
My father always said that you should never get the middle of between two pods that are bigger than you, and so it's not a good idea but that's, that's my claim.

00:41:45.000 --> 00:41:48.000
That's,

00:41:48.000 --> 00:41:54.000
that's Yes, yes. Okay, thank you. So now I'm going to get into the stuff that's a little.

00:41:54.000 --> 00:42:06.000
It's this this this stuff is all still in process, so maybe I've only got about 10 minutes left so maybe I'll do this a little quicker. Anyway, I'm positive will not get to absolute knowing but it's implicit in what we're doing.

00:42:06.000 --> 00:42:16.000
Okay, so consider the following. I want to get to Prague the morning, the best way to get to Prague tomorrow morning it's take the a train us

00:42:16.000 --> 00:42:32.000
maintain and the other condition involves minus worse than the body, the sandbox The conclusion is strong, the expression of intention, through the article and we're.

00:42:32.000 --> 00:42:46.000
a conditional patch. But this treaty on decoding cognition is a kind of punk tape mental act. That is something like observing facts and then proceeding to draw some information.

00:42:46.000 --> 00:43:02.000
I think clarity.

00:43:02.000 --> 00:43:11.000
So I, it seems to me that this influence is perfectly fine on its own there's there's no need to impose digital reason here involves the kind of material.

00:43:11.000 --> 00:43:21.000
It's just part of what it is to have desire and to think that stuff but his desire is to kentisbeare this

00:43:21.000 --> 00:43:24.000
fire desire.

00:43:24.000 --> 00:43:37.000
And then single mindedness to be seen. Not in some particular act, but in a commitment that spells itself out over the course of planning or realizing the plan that's expressed with that intention.

00:43:37.000 --> 00:43:52.000
So as I'm thinking about what to do in the night before I have to make decisions to make sure I'm ready and I'm awake and then my bags are packed. When I wake up in the morning, I have to make sure I'm not allowing desire to sleep to suppress my admit

00:43:52.000 --> 00:43:56.000
this is single minded This is a kind of self government.

00:43:56.000 --> 00:44:04.000
I suppress my desires, even though I'd like to sleep in because I committed myself to 10 reasons for later so of course.

00:44:04.000 --> 00:44:16.000
And so the intention then acts as a kind of guide that my single mindedness finds itself to over the course of realizing that plan.

00:44:16.000 --> 00:44:29.000
Okay, so I think that we can then spell a difference between world and instrumental practical rationality, it says the moral law applies independently of one's personal place in space and time, it's not intentional on one person or group of people's desires,

00:44:29.000 --> 00:44:31.000
but claiming.

00:44:31.000 --> 00:44:50.000
That's about the semantics for the article ality is being unrestricted when it comes to agencies, the agents and circumstances that have a duty or obligation applies to. It's not a claim in normative ethics so as far as I can see that's compatible with being at the ontology just a virtue theorists and

00:44:50.000 --> 00:44:53.000
ethics of care consequential ism what happened.

00:44:53.000 --> 00:45:10.000
Okay, so let me mention just I've got about five minutes left here so let me just get enough of the proof theory model theory stuff on the board to at least indicate how I think my view which might look to be in conflict with Stephanie's is actually compatible.

00:45:10.000 --> 00:45:21.000
So there's a tortured history to the term intentional semantics in contemporary philosophers at LX intentional semantics co obsessional of possible worlds semantics.

00:45:21.000 --> 00:45:35.000
This is owed to current EPS decision and meaning and assessing to use the potential to replace what Fred talked about in terms of senses. Now the distinction between sense and reference it didn't work for centuries, it shows up in the medieval position

00:45:35.000 --> 00:45:54.000
syncopation distinction in logic report well it's in a logical font and purse cool and just about everyone Prager sense of reference card app and meaning and it says, it says well look, since we can't get a grip on it.

00:45:54.000 --> 00:46:01.000
I'm going to use this lead Mitzi in turn, and I'm going to define intention as a function for the state description to extension.

00:46:01.000 --> 00:46:17.000
Now, that is, essentially possible world semantics state descriptions are maximally determined states of affairs where every sentence organizations including a current app doesn't have an accessibility relation, it was one of cookies brilliance discoveries

00:46:17.000 --> 00:46:28.000
was to see accessibility is what allows us to distinguish the modal teams sky Lewis button eyes in the 20s, but it's there and current and potential.

00:46:28.000 --> 00:46:36.000
OK, so the this view of intentions takes the outputs to be extensions to be referencing the world.

00:46:36.000 --> 00:46:50.000
But the old notion of intention or comprehension I prefer the term comprehension because it doesn't seem to have this this baggage that tension it's got the old term of comprehension was not about a relationship between words or concepts in the world,

00:46:50.000 --> 00:46:56.000
but about a relationship between concepts or between five minutes. Okay. Yes.

00:46:56.000 --> 00:47:09.000
So, this is to the notion of comprehension then it doesn't involve word world relations, but rather inter linguistic relations relations within language or within thought.

00:47:09.000 --> 00:47:25.000
So I think what I've developed is a model theory is the basis for word to fit world extensions involve modeling theoretical rationality and world to fit word extensions modeling, practical rational.

00:47:25.000 --> 00:47:28.000
Using possible worlds.

00:47:28.000 --> 00:47:46.000
Now, this leaves room then for taking proof theory as specifying comprehension and terms of concept containment or word word relations. And if that's right if that's a good way of reconstructing the old extension comprehension distinction, so that option

00:47:46.000 --> 00:48:01.000
is modeled with proof theory as opposed to trying to build comprehension inside model theory, then it should be useful and sorting out some debates. So what I want to do is mention to and look at at least both so this is Stephanie's account of the middle

00:48:01.000 --> 00:48:10.000
and what she calls the middle and mystic interpretation of sellers account of ethical statements. And then the other is in providing slaughters proof theoretic interpretation of the Arctic modality.

00:48:10.000 --> 00:48:18.000
Because if I'm right that model theory and proof or complementary then there should be a way to reconcile these different.

00:48:18.000 --> 00:48:28.000
These essay, she argued the sellers in his later work comes around understanding the object language claim one ought to AMC question.

00:48:28.000 --> 00:48:41.000
But as what we said in the middle is we spell a is implied by we shall promote the general welfare and the double use of the quotes there indicates that we're talking about language, and she knows that this involves an indirect connection agency, because

00:48:41.000 --> 00:48:43.000
we're going through the middle at which here.

00:48:43.000 --> 00:48:58.000
Now, in other words, I've argued that you can give an interpretation of the atomic sentences in proof theoretic semantics, in terms of the role of those sentences, as premises and

00:48:58.000 --> 00:49:14.000
meaning of Eric's matrix is the role that plays in explaining things and being explained by things that gives you an introduction in a way for Adams, that intended interpretive Missy and Fred says has this book on probiotics Mannix where he lays this

00:49:14.000 --> 00:49:25.000
out, and he uses introduction elimination rules for specifying the meaning of a sentence so the idea is that the conjunction means, what it does in virtue of the introduction wolf or conjunction and the elimination of overhead reduction.

00:49:25.000 --> 00:49:30.000
So specify McCullough.

00:49:30.000 --> 00:49:40.000
To give an introduction the nation rules for Adams, in terms of roles and explanation that gives them a meeting prophetic semantics.

00:49:40.000 --> 00:49:54.000
So this is intentional, versus hyper intentional. But the very term hyper intentionality is an artifact of the decision to use extensions, as the meanings of of what get called intentional sentences.

00:49:54.000 --> 00:50:11.000
So, it's just confused to think in those terms, but it's easy to say that it's hyper intentional because the meaning of a is going to different from the meaning of Ana, because an days will be justified by the introduction, and is going to be just.

00:50:11.000 --> 00:50:14.000
So it's easily.

00:50:14.000 --> 00:50:29.000
So now consider what duck sellers would say in response to the phone. Why not one a response would be, because we show a is implied by we shall promote the general work will deliver because we shall a is implied by we shall promote the general welfare.

00:50:29.000 --> 00:50:37.000
That's the same there's a good explanation for why why not a the, what's the implication relation between shirt intentionality and promoting the general welfare.

00:50:37.000 --> 00:50:51.000
But according to France says and my work. That's the finest is to give the proof theoretic meaning of one not eight, so we can see, Stephanie than giving her middle linguistic interpretation approved through theoretic analysis of the comprehension of

00:50:51.000 --> 00:50:57.000
claims like one day, whereas I'm giving a model theoretic analysis of their extension.

00:50:57.000 --> 00:51:01.000
And so this then I claim is compatible the two views are compatible.

00:51:01.000 --> 00:51:12.000
Okay, if I had more I'll stop here if I had more time I talked about the directness of the middle linguistic account, something similar is true of the account, given by loader.

00:51:12.000 --> 00:51:30.000
And I think that if you look at bilateral semantics, there's a way of seeing the bilateral semantics produces logically complex sentences to complexes of attitudes of assertion and denial, in a way that suggests, there's an additional into position between

00:51:30.000 --> 00:51:42.000
Thomas fellows collective intentionality and cognition. Not only do you need single mindedness, which involves what I call a agent of rejection where I'm rejecting choices.

00:51:42.000 --> 00:51:48.000
You also need linguistic

00:51:48.000 --> 00:51:52.000
intro linguistic word word relation.

00:51:52.000 --> 00:52:00.000
So that's, that's in the background, and I as I say this stuff is all tentative.

00:52:00.000 --> 00:52:14.000
I'm hoping I can spell it out, as I go forward, and I look forward to questions and comments from people so thank you for bearing with me

00:52:14.000 --> 00:52:24.000
to press them.

00:52:24.000 --> 00:52:25.000
Okay.

00:52:25.000 --> 00:52:45.000
So if you have a question, raise your hand wave with me, or give a signal in the chat.

00:52:45.000 --> 00:52:52.000
Yeah.

00:52:52.000 --> 00:53:02.000
Hey Preston Thanks a lot, wow that was massive and thanks for the PowerPoint slides they helped a lot. given that your internet connection was really shaky.

00:53:02.000 --> 00:53:15.000
So I have just a clarification question about the earlier parts of the papers over the you introduce the idea of his formal semantics, representing if I understand.

00:53:15.000 --> 00:53:31.000
Believe contents or meanings of declarative sentences in sets of positive terms of sets of possible worlds and the meaning of prescriptive sentences or sentences expressing intentions in terms of sets of the antic hyper plans, the only type of states.

00:53:31.000 --> 00:53:37.000
I get this right. So,

00:53:37.000 --> 00:53:54.000
could you could this formal semantics account for the possibility that a belief and an intention or a declarative statement and statement expressing a intention could have the same propositional content.

00:53:54.000 --> 00:54:07.000
I mean, given that one is modeled in terms of of hype of plans, versus the other is modeled in terms of possible world so it seems like very very formally speaking at least

00:54:07.000 --> 00:54:18.000
state cognitive states all the sentences expressing them with different directions of fit could not have the same propositional content is that is that right and.

00:54:18.000 --> 00:54:23.000
Well,

00:54:23.000 --> 00:54:28.000
it depends what you mean but

00:54:28.000 --> 00:54:41.000
That's not something I've given much thought to, I think, I would, I would like to be in a position to say that although I don't know that that's true I probably use it at some point.

00:54:41.000 --> 00:54:56.000
But I haven't given it much thought to the extent that I do use it I just think it. I just think of it in terms of what stipulated as the semantic turbulence for these things so, strictly speaking, managers, interpret in our sets of triples of worlds

00:54:56.000 --> 00:54:58.000
plans and intentions.

00:54:58.000 --> 00:55:10.000
And then it's going to be the case that the means of the cup is on the shelf, and I shall put the cup on the shelf is the goal, different sets of hyper states.

00:55:10.000 --> 00:55:16.000
Now, you might have a view that has

00:55:16.000 --> 00:55:29.000
been on the shelf for cup is on the show, and give some kind of an account of attitude as a force marker for soccer attitude that if something that's not part of that is a different thing.

00:55:29.000 --> 00:55:32.000
That's not my view.

00:55:32.000 --> 00:55:53.000
It's not obviously for be more clearly committed to the distinction between cases, but I'm not committed in the case so if someone wants to tweak it and do something with that.

00:55:53.000 --> 00:55:59.000
Okay. Preston we still have problems hearing you speak really slowly articulate, very carefully.

00:55:59.000 --> 00:56:11.000
Particularly, very carefully. Yeah, yeah. It's a pity. Have another my kid.

00:56:11.000 --> 00:56:13.000
All right. Thanks.

00:56:13.000 --> 00:56:29.000
Yeah, many interesting things, and I am interested in the work of people looking at the intersection or, you know, points for dialogue between settlers and Tomasello.

00:56:29.000 --> 00:56:54.000
I think it's an exciting bit of sort of cross disciplinary work but I'm kind of a bit confused I guess about why I haven't really seen critiques of time so there's particular brands of philosophizing about his own findings from solutions.

00:56:54.000 --> 00:57:14.000
I think to myself kind of pics bits of philosophy from here in there he's quite keen on sell his quite keen on Davidson, but from a psychological point of view there seem to be quite a few problems and quite a few places where to miss others and Schmitz

00:57:14.000 --> 00:57:34.000
record cheese journalism will have a problem for solution, I'm not sure what a shared mental states is, for example, when does one mental state ends and the next one starts to an agent extra mental state to know and I'm sharing mental state with someone,

00:57:34.000 --> 00:57:41.000
and that Thomas says, starting position of influence.

00:57:41.000 --> 00:57:59.000
Starting from a veil of ignorance where they have mutual trust and respect from each other, and then go through a process of inner labeling that they then share in order to become, social, and communicative.

00:57:59.000 --> 00:58:02.000
This idea of

00:58:02.000 --> 00:58:15.000
lots of fully fledged concepts that they've got up and running, and they then once they have those private concepts, make explicit.

00:58:15.000 --> 00:58:37.000
I think I, yeah, that there's lots of part of part of it, which of course a really unique and powerful bits of empirical work but I often feel like I wish solutions would push back against some of the ways in which Thomas other especially and to some

00:58:37.000 --> 00:58:38.000
extent.

00:58:38.000 --> 00:58:45.000
Schmidt and phrase it

00:58:45.000 --> 00:58:46.000
up.

00:58:46.000 --> 00:59:03.000
I would directly to chat to my eye. One of the things that Thomas Bo does is he rolls on Brad Smith Bradman's notion of shared intentionality, he just sort of has a, an offhand remark and a couple of places that that's the way he's approaching it now.

00:59:03.000 --> 00:59:17.000
Glenda that me and lots of course, both argue that there's problems with that, precisely because Robin has this really conceptually sophisticated notion of shared intentionality, I not only have to share an intention with you, but I have to know, you

00:59:17.000 --> 00:59:21.000
have to know that you that I started attention with you.

00:59:21.000 --> 00:59:34.000
In chapter two my book I take this stuff on board and I argue that some of the work that butterfill in particular has done in looking at neural mirroring and processes of what I call share practical picturing and accounting for shared intentionality can

00:59:34.000 --> 00:59:48.000
be slotted in as a substitute for tomatoes appeal to Bradman's analysis in a way that allows him to entitle himself to the non discursive resources that I claim these notions of picture.

00:59:48.000 --> 00:59:50.000
So absolutely right.

00:59:50.000 --> 01:00:03.000
You know, Thomas Ellis, it's great that he's doing all this popularizing work that the first. Not only does he really appeal to sellers in workplaces and some of his work with him do as well, first page of a natural history of human thinking refers to

01:00:03.000 --> 01:00:15.000
both Hegel and purse so he's squarely in the in the field and the kind of work that folks like I should be from a, but I absolutely agree we shouldn't be taking it on critically and we have just as much

01:00:15.000 --> 01:00:18.000
benefit off of the science.

01:00:18.000 --> 01:00:26.000
I think so, That's fair.

01:00:26.000 --> 01:00:29.000
Okay.

01:00:29.000 --> 01:00:39.000
Just have a look if there's another question if not then I would like to ask one myself or two.

01:00:39.000 --> 01:00:44.000
Yeah, the first question that I have.

01:00:44.000 --> 01:01:02.000
I wonder how sharp that distinction between choosing single mindedly and choosing in differently is in the real life situations, because I understand that when you use these notions for semantic modeling then you can just say that there's a shop boundary

01:01:02.000 --> 01:01:20.000
Yeah, but then you want to apply that to real life situations, and how chapters that distinction like sometimes we do not choose in terms of something like a real moral art we choose based on preferences, but still say the preference, this might be very

01:01:20.000 --> 01:01:33.000
strong. Yeah, and my attitude of not rejecting rejecting the alternatives that might be a week attitude, actually a week out just a week rejection, in terms of strength of the rejection.

01:01:33.000 --> 01:01:41.000
So, it would be hard to change my decision. On the other hand, it might be decisions which are generally moral decisions.

01:01:41.000 --> 01:01:55.000
But where my attitude of rejecting the alternatives might still be rather weak as a moral in a moral dilemma for example, you know, but I'm might be easily swayed in my, in my decision.

01:01:55.000 --> 01:01:57.000
I might be unsure. Yeah.

01:01:57.000 --> 01:02:07.000
So, so that would be the question is, how sharp is that distinction. That would be the first one and the second one out when you talked about

01:02:07.000 --> 01:02:14.000
introducing odd statements as

01:02:14.000 --> 01:02:21.000
as being explained by statements about the implication relations between we intentions.

01:02:21.000 --> 01:02:32.000
I just wondered what kind of explanation you have in mind because there are different kinds of explanations you know their causal ones are the ones in terms of mechanics and more this just maybe broadly reason given once.

01:02:32.000 --> 01:02:36.000
So, what just what kind of explanations that.

01:02:36.000 --> 01:02:58.000
Yeah, well, so thank you. And I'm sorry I wasn't able to get more into to your essay in the, in the chat, the bills do justice to your view, because I think it's great you

01:02:58.000 --> 01:03:02.000
first

01:03:02.000 --> 01:03:16.000
get to throw my hands up and say yeah we're some lunar being, we think we think, most of what we do is motivated by all kinds of unreflective processes lots of conscious.

01:03:16.000 --> 01:03:22.000
Know that possible for us to know what motivates.

01:03:22.000 --> 01:03:26.000
And then, I don't know what to say.

01:03:26.000 --> 01:03:47.000
I hope this is, I hope that could be used for people to do things like conflict resolution. So think about what involved, you are engaged in certain oftentimes what you do is imagine yourself in the other person's perspective, try to adopt their point

01:03:47.000 --> 01:03:48.000
of view.

01:03:48.000 --> 01:03:58.000
It seems that the trend perfect on practical actually that I'm hoping my approach can help model.

01:03:58.000 --> 01:04:07.000
And then he, but that kind of work this is gonna be on underscores what I was calling the non discursive side.

01:04:07.000 --> 01:04:28.000
In particular logic picturing. And when it comes to the antic picturing if there is anything like that. It's not going to be this sort of thing that's modeled by rejection is an attitude that's in taking everything in compatible with the action and rejecting

01:04:28.000 --> 01:04:35.000
this on one of the.

01:04:35.000 --> 01:04:46.000
But I think it's worth looking into his third, really, is a notion of mindedness that objection

01:04:46.000 --> 01:04:51.000
lies.

01:04:51.000 --> 01:04:55.000
The admission.

01:04:55.000 --> 01:05:05.000
Two years of age children who are playing in a joint game with a, with an analogy break off and do another game, if it's if the game is more enjoyable.

01:05:05.000 --> 01:05:15.000
He first game explicitly entered into something they're going to do together. By the age of three children who have extended the game to.

01:05:15.000 --> 01:05:21.000
They're all the way back. Nicely will ask for permission.

01:05:21.000 --> 01:05:39.000
So it seems like at this stage where more dimension pose itself on top of our share of activities, if I'm right the attention of the article and bolts rejected.

01:05:39.000 --> 01:05:57.000
three is receptive to that the child to it. So, that's a way of trying to address your question by emphasizing the need to look at the wear of the brain, and the physiology and psychology.

01:05:57.000 --> 01:06:07.000
When it comes to the semantics. Yeah, I'm just taking them as explicit, sort of, I'm treating them.

01:06:07.000 --> 01:06:10.000
Just.

01:06:10.000 --> 01:06:20.000
And then I what the, the actual fact of the matter in our brains is going to look like. But my hope is that there's enough here that aren't getting your second question.

01:06:20.000 --> 01:06:29.000
What kind of explanation is involved in my.

01:06:29.000 --> 01:06:32.000
So this proof of bonuses.

01:06:32.000 --> 01:06:44.000
The similarity to my ensure

01:06:44.000 --> 01:06:54.000
we can attack you anymore. Preston

01:06:54.000 --> 01:06:57.000
Preston I you're still there.

01:06:57.000 --> 01:07:02.000
Seems.

01:07:02.000 --> 01:07:04.000
so it seems.

01:07:04.000 --> 01:07:09.000
Preston has gone

01:07:09.000 --> 01:07:13.000
person we can't hear you.

01:07:13.000 --> 01:07:32.000
So maybe I suggest that we finish the this session, have a break, and maybe Preston will be back with a with a stable connection afterwards, we can chat about things afterwards.

01:07:32.000 --> 01:07:34.000
If there's from.

01:07:34.000 --> 01:07:44.000
Yeah. Maybe if I record pri is present if you can hear us disconnect, or I can disconnect you actually enforce it to reconnect and, maybe, I don't know.

01:07:44.000 --> 01:07:50.000
Shall we try that. Yeah, I think I might as well.

01:07:50.000 --> 01:07:56.000
Let's see.

01:07:56.000 --> 01:08:12.000
Reston, you might also try rebooting your Wi Fi, as well as hotspot and so I don't know if it matters. Can you guys hear me right now again.

01:08:12.000 --> 01:08:14.000
Yeah. Okay.

01:08:14.000 --> 01:08:24.000
Well, I don't know what I don't want to go over time. Let me just at least answer Stephanie's last question. It's a great question. What kind of explanation is involved, I have not given it much thought.

01:08:24.000 --> 01:08:34.000
In the essay where I lay out the semantics for atomic sentences and approved theoretic semantics, I rely on Jared Mickelson's notion of best explanation.

01:08:34.000 --> 01:08:49.000
But that's developed in the sciences, so I'm open to the possibility that there are, say moral explanations or other kinds of explanation, and I just haven't given it much thought.

01:08:49.000 --> 01:09:00.000
Okay, thank you for for these answers I just have a look. Whether there's more questions.

01:09:00.000 --> 01:09:02.000
Okay.

01:09:02.000 --> 01:09:06.000
Yeah.

01:09:06.000 --> 01:09:20.000
I don't know if there's time, but just to present thanks a clarity victory question Could you say something about the connection between single minded choice and self government by norms.

01:09:20.000 --> 01:09:39.000
So is the idea that endorsing normative statements is somehow is implicit in the practice of of every single minded chooser and, and if so, how and if not, what is the what is the connection you see between those between self single minded choice and

01:09:39.000 --> 01:09:41.000
self government.

01:09:41.000 --> 01:10:00.000
I wouldn't say that every single minded choice is a responsiveness to a thought of what what to do, but that every response to this to a thought about what not to do, is or expresses this in light of choice.

01:10:00.000 --> 01:10:17.000
And then the way I see them. So in the book, I adopt psychological psychological nominal ism at the beginning, and my claim is that responsiveness to reasons as rules prescribing behavior requires a language that represents those rules, and then psychological

01:10:17.000 --> 01:10:32.000
model ism is the mechanism for having a representation of a rule by the end of it. I'm open to the possibility that we might be responsive to rules representatives such in ways that are non linguistic what's important for my story though, is that you

01:10:32.000 --> 01:10:48.000
can get a language on the scene in terms of norms enforced by shared intentionality without anybody exercising single mindedness so that once you've got language on the scene, then the ability to exercise single mindedness gives you a capacity to be responsive

01:10:48.000 --> 01:10:58.000
to rules representatives such and languages What gives you the representation of rules. Does that answer your question, and maybe I'll have to think more about it.

01:10:58.000 --> 01:11:00.000
Thanks.

01:11:00.000 --> 01:11:03.000
Okay.

01:11:03.000 --> 01:11:10.000
I.

01:11:10.000 --> 01:11:16.000
So, there seemed to be no more questions. Yeah.

01:11:16.000 --> 01:11:26.000
At the end, now we could hear you really well. I don't know what now.

01:11:26.000 --> 01:11:28.000
Yeah.

01:11:28.000 --> 01:11:38.000
Oh, it's a, it's great. This is my first time being back in Montana and three years it's great to be home but you make certain concessions when you, when you live out.

01:11:38.000 --> 01:11:40.000
I know, I know.

01:11:40.000 --> 01:11:48.000
Okay, then. I think that we think Kristen, thanks a lot for the talk.

01:11:48.000 --> 01:12:03.000
I look forward to the rest of this to this is just great.

01:12:03.000 --> 01:12:09.000
See y'all on 13 minutes.

01:12:09.000 --> 01:12:11.000
Yes, indeed.

01:12:11.000 --> 01:12:21.000
Continue at one window, can we continue, we continue at 20 past the hour.

01:12:21.000 --> 01:12:23.000
That's right.

01:12:23.000 --> 01:12:29.000
So, 1120. Eastern Standard Time.

01:12:29.000 --> 01:12:59.000
bead.

01:13:03.000 --> 01:13:07.000
I'm gonna go get myself some coffee Ronald.

01:13:07.000 --> 01:13:37.000
Sounds good. see you shortly. Yep. Take care of me.

01:17:25.000 --> 01:17:29.000
Anyone hanging around.

01:17:29.000 --> 01:17:32.000
I just got back, got myself some coffee.

01:17:32.000 --> 01:17:38.000
Yeah, I do too, so Oh,

01:17:38.000 --> 01:17:41.000
it's warm and very humid.

01:17:41.000 --> 01:17:45.000
Yeah, yeah it's it's over 90 degrees here.

01:17:45.000 --> 01:17:51.000
I've been freezing all winter long. I'm not going to complain.

01:17:51.000 --> 01:17:59.000
Yeah, I start melting it about 80 or 85 degrees so and it gets over 90 I just look.

01:17:59.000 --> 01:18:06.000
I've become too used to the colder weather this hot stuff in the summer.

01:18:06.000 --> 01:18:08.000
It's either.

01:18:08.000 --> 01:18:10.000
Yeah, well.

01:18:10.000 --> 01:18:15.000
The song has not been far from my mind.

01:18:15.000 --> 01:18:21.000
And who knows after the next election. That may be the only the only place left.

01:18:21.000 --> 01:18:27.000
You know we have a decent refugees.

01:18:27.000 --> 01:18:43.000
Welcoming studies, especially for people lacking medications and stuff like that. So, I, I think I understood that you were retired. I am now retired I'm officially retired.

01:18:43.000 --> 01:18:47.000
Okay, it's not old just retired.

01:18:47.000 --> 01:18:54.000
I'm just retired. That's why I was questioning you

01:18:54.000 --> 01:19:04.000
yeah well you know i figured 70 was about the right time and I may be waited a year too late I teaching last year was not fun.

01:19:04.000 --> 01:19:15.000
I guess that was the worst teaching experience ever for both of us. Yeah, yeah, I really hated it.

01:19:15.000 --> 01:19:18.000
I know, me too.

01:19:18.000 --> 01:19:32.000
I, I was been moved by all the testimonies that some of your former students wrote on social media as to your teaching, and that was so great and one of them.

01:19:32.000 --> 01:19:49.000
I think that was a woman and she wrote a she wasn't a song. And to me because well, this was amazing. I wish I could have pushed kind of kid.

01:19:49.000 --> 01:20:02.000
I was terribly moved by it. And, you know, I still those some of those students are still, you know obviously in contact with me and I I treasure that

01:20:02.000 --> 01:20:06.000
I was very. Yeah, I was, I was sort of gobsmacked by it.

01:20:06.000 --> 01:20:11.000
Could you have a genuine retirement party.

01:20:11.000 --> 01:20:13.000
No.

01:20:13.000 --> 01:20:28.000
Well they say well we can't do it now but we'll do do in the fall, but here comes the fall and now we've got the Delta variants. So, I don't know, at some point, we'll have a big party and.

01:20:28.000 --> 01:20:32.000
And I'll insisted Everyone dance.

01:20:32.000 --> 01:20:35.000
Okay.

01:20:35.000 --> 01:20:37.000
I'll be there.

01:20:37.000 --> 01:20:43.000
Alright, well I'll send you an invitation.

01:20:43.000 --> 01:21:00.000
Not that far drive it's about what, five hours up to 90 oh yeah yeah yeah i know but I don't know whether the border is as reopened. Yeah, no, the Canadians have reopened for us we can get into Canada but the US is being pissy and not allowing the Canadians

01:21:00.000 --> 01:21:08.000
into the US, ya know the Canadians now are more thoroughly vaccinated than we are.

01:21:08.000 --> 01:21:17.000
was reading that something like 38 states would qualify as as like you know read countries if they were countries, from which crap travel would be banned.

01:21:17.000 --> 01:21:20.000
So, we should do that.

01:21:20.000 --> 01:21:27.000
Maybe the Oh yeah, I'm like, okay, fine in states like you know Florida.

01:21:27.000 --> 01:21:48.000
Yeah, well I keep thinking that maybe at some point will will reconsider the idea of secession and we'll just, you know, Red Sox nation will succeed from the union and become the ideologically better alternative for ages, Canada, invade the United States.

01:21:48.000 --> 01:21:51.000
Yes, what would you, you would be welcome.

01:21:51.000 --> 01:21:55.000
Oh you know you did once we tried.

01:21:55.000 --> 01:21:57.000
Yeah.

01:21:57.000 --> 01:21:59.000
Prince tried.

01:21:59.000 --> 01:22:05.000
Yeah, but we just love when we when it.

01:22:05.000 --> 01:22:09.000
Thanks to the, the American soul.

01:22:09.000 --> 01:22:21.000
Well, at some point, it may be necessary for Canada to liberate America.

01:22:21.000 --> 01:22:27.000
So, called birthday.

01:22:27.000 --> 01:22:30.000
Your birthday yesterday.

01:22:30.000 --> 01:22:34.000
Ah, that's why that's why I had to leave to.

01:22:34.000 --> 01:22:40.000
I had to, I had to get either sort of cooking and cleaning for the party.

01:22:40.000 --> 01:22:44.000
Well belated Happy birthday to you then. Thank you.

01:22:44.000 --> 01:22:49.000
So how are you fine.

01:22:49.000 --> 01:22:52.000
How are you,

01:22:52.000 --> 01:23:06.000
I'm now 47 spring chicken. Yeah, well and I was like wait like you know because but you know this is this is of course the oldest I've I've ever been.

01:23:06.000 --> 01:23:13.000
Yeah, it feels old to me,

01:23:13.000 --> 01:23:19.000
if, if, if Canada were to liberate us, we'd be back under British rule. Right.

01:23:19.000 --> 01:23:22.000
Yeah.

01:23:22.000 --> 01:23:30.000
Yeah. I mean, you know, all of our all of our wars that you get managed to the home office.

01:23:30.000 --> 01:23:36.000
Participate in the Commonwealth Games. Yeah. See, I think there are advantages here.

01:23:36.000 --> 01:23:41.000
Do we have to be Doctor Who fans then I don't know how this works. Yeah.

01:23:41.000 --> 01:23:49.000
That is a requirement. I'm way ahead of you know, And you will have to pledge to them.

01:23:49.000 --> 01:23:55.000
The Queen, and maybe should you should do that now before I pass.

01:23:55.000 --> 01:24:00.000
It will pass pledge to the key and you don't want.

01:24:00.000 --> 01:24:02.000
Yeah.

01:24:02.000 --> 01:24:07.000
Also will have to our last month to have, like, roughly some.

01:24:07.000 --> 01:24:18.000
Please know get rid of baseball just play cricket and soccer and you know just, you know, the whole sports is image names for you know it's it's going to be a, yeah.

01:24:18.000 --> 01:24:21.000
It'll be a lot.

01:24:21.000 --> 01:24:29.000
You will have to learn to be sorry for everything all the time

01:24:29.000 --> 01:24:33.000
to do

01:24:33.000 --> 01:24:39.000
as a Jewish person I think I already have, I think I already have a handle on that one.

01:24:39.000 --> 01:24:42.000
Oh no, the Jews.

01:24:42.000 --> 01:24:44.000
Sorry.

01:24:44.000 --> 01:24:56.000
Sorry folks the British. The British are the cream of apologies, they're very good at apologize not very good at fixing anything but they're very good at apologizing for the fact that it's broken.

01:24:56.000 --> 01:25:03.000
All right, very sorry to interrupt you guys.

01:25:03.000 --> 01:25:08.000
So, you're welcome back everybody.

01:25:08.000 --> 01:25:15.000
It is my great pleasure and honor to introduce our keynote speaker for this workshop.

01:25:15.000 --> 01:25:27.000
Danielle McMath Danielle is the TV sub brown professor at Haverford College, and Professor and Chair of the philosophy department they are.

01:25:27.000 --> 01:25:49.000
Danielle did a PhD in philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh. In, 1988, working under the supervision of john Haugland and prior to that she earned a Bachelor of Science in biochemistry at the University of Alberta, and a BA in Philosophy and Religion

01:25:49.000 --> 01:25:52.000
study at McGill.

01:25:52.000 --> 01:26:09.000
Danielle has sold over 50 articles and book chapters, focusing mainly on Philip on the philosophy of language, mainly pragmatist and male pragmatist approaches on reasoning and rationality and on the history of philosophy of mathematics and logic.

01:26:09.000 --> 01:26:24.000
She has also published two books, one on Craig is logic of Harvard in 2005 and in 2014 with Oxford University Press, realizing reason, a narrative of truth and knowledge.

01:26:24.000 --> 01:26:41.000
And in this later massive 500 page world she offers a detailed narrative of the development of reason and rationality in the west towards greater power and clarity focusing on mathematic mathematical reasoning and mathematical practices in the ancient

01:26:41.000 --> 01:26:43.000
world.

01:26:43.000 --> 01:26:54.000
In, in the 17th and 18th century Europe following the cart. And then fragrance and following.

01:26:54.000 --> 01:27:13.000
So given these focuses Danielle's focuses on these issues in the history of mathematics philosophy of mathematics logic reason I'm all the more grateful that she accepted our invitation to be our keynote speaker in a conference on ethics, well for itself

01:27:13.000 --> 01:27:15.000
suffix.

01:27:15.000 --> 01:27:22.000
So her keynote address is entitled morality tribalism and value.

01:27:22.000 --> 01:27:28.000
Please join me in welcoming Dr Macbeth.

01:27:28.000 --> 01:27:36.000
Thank you, Ronald, and thank you for the invitation, this is as Ron said I do not.

01:27:36.000 --> 01:27:54.000
This is not an area that I work in, but I am very pleased to be here and to me, he sort of a first foray for me into into a practical philosophy and that itself is I think is special to.

01:27:54.000 --> 01:28:07.000
So, in the closing chapter of science and metaphysics sellers takes out what he describes in the preface of that work as the keystone of the argument of the lock lectures from which the book is derived.

01:28:07.000 --> 01:28:22.000
The topic is the objectivity and inter subjectivity of ethical judgments and as is true of the lectures overall sellers here finds many of his most fundamental insights and motivations already in current.

01:28:22.000 --> 01:28:39.000
He follows current first in distinguishing between on the one hand, wants desires and feelings and on the other one ought to one, the moral art, and also in correlating that distinction, with the dichotomy of causes and reasons, the realm of nature, in

01:28:39.000 --> 01:28:42.000
the realm of freedom.

01:28:42.000 --> 01:28:56.000
With con sellers furthermore finds an analog of objective truth as what any rational being not believe in the idea of objective goodness as what any rational being ought to will.

01:28:56.000 --> 01:29:08.000
But where's caught thinks that the only good is a good will. The will to act for the sake of the moral law seller sees the need for something less formal more substantive.

01:29:08.000 --> 01:29:20.000
According to sellers, what is a good reason for action is a particular sort of we intention, namely, that it shall sub we be the case that our welfare is maximized.

01:29:20.000 --> 01:29:31.000
As will become evident, I cannot see how sellers account in avoiding formalism avoids a deeply problematic form of tribalism.

01:29:31.000 --> 01:29:43.000
What I aim for here then is a sketch emphasis on sketch of an alternative still salon ASEAN conception of what practical philosophy might be

01:29:43.000 --> 01:30:00.000
sellers names I quote to explore the fundamental principles of a metaphysics of practice with particular reference to the values in terms of which we lead not just one compartment of our lives, but our lives, so far as the task is to provide a viable

01:30:00.000 --> 01:30:15.000
alternative to a life of sellers as informed or enlightened self interest. An alternative to a life dominated by an overarching ego directed valuing expressed in our that is sellers terminology.

01:30:15.000 --> 01:30:34.000
By, would that I lead a satisfying life for all that it may appear externally indistinguishable such a life is not properly, a moral life, as shown by the fact, if it is a thought, and sellers that does hedge his bets a bit here, that he says there's

01:30:34.000 --> 01:30:53.000
no conceptual absurdity in either doing a I would be conducive to a satisfying life, but I ought not to do AI, or doing be would would not be conducive to a satisfying life but I ought to do be a satisfying life, at least as sellers understands it is

01:30:53.000 --> 01:31:11.000
grounded ultimately in what one wants or desires. But as anyone knows the question what one ought to do, but it is right or good to do what one has reason to do is essentially different from the question, what one wants to do.

01:31:11.000 --> 01:31:25.000
It may be that in some cases what one ought to do is, whatever one once, but there's a crucial conceptual difference nonetheless. And it is one two which we rational beings are especially sensitive.

01:31:25.000 --> 01:31:43.000
We know that a life governed by desires, especially sensory desires, the pleasures of the flesh is a life suitable only for pigs, and even higher desires, for instance the desire for social recognition for on for the honor and the esteem of one's fellows

01:31:43.000 --> 01:31:56.000
cannot satisfy us rational beings, we rational beings know that the crucial thing is not to be honored and esteemed, but to be worthy of honor and esteem.

01:31:56.000 --> 01:32:06.000
The life of honor, no better than the life of pigs is not the best life for a human being as Plato already argued in Republic.

01:32:06.000 --> 01:32:13.000
According to Plato, the best life is instead, the life of wisdom, the life of the lover of truth.

01:32:13.000 --> 01:32:21.000
Sellers clearly rejects the account, but not because he thinks that the focus on truth is misguided.

01:32:21.000 --> 01:32:25.000
The problem is instead with the formulation, in terms of desire.

01:32:25.000 --> 01:32:39.000
Again the worth of inaction for sellers as for content lies and it's having been done not out of any desire, not even for the love of truth, but for the sake of duty, because that is what ought to be done.

01:32:39.000 --> 01:32:48.000
The distinction between what one wants to do even all things considered, and what one ought to do is fundamental for sellers as for content.

01:32:48.000 --> 01:33:03.000
The problem is defined something that is clearly rational that can properly justify a course of action as what one ought to do. Wow. By the same token, being such as can motivate action.

01:33:03.000 --> 01:33:19.000
What sort of thing is, one's duty, that it can at once justify and motivate properly moral action, unsurprisingly sellers rejects what he calls the point of view of benevolence the point of view, according to which one x out of a desire for the welfare

01:33:19.000 --> 01:33:27.000
of people generally, and he objects to that point of view on the grounds that it is, so to speak, and external point of view.

01:33:27.000 --> 01:33:43.000
But when once, even if it is the welfare of people generally is, again, nearly accidental something one finds oneself to be motivated by, but with which one cannot as a rational being identify oneself.

01:33:43.000 --> 01:33:59.000
Of course, a person can in fact identify with such a desire to live a life that is grounded in such a desire, but because an insofar as such a life is merely something one once the one may have wanted something else instead.

01:33:59.000 --> 01:34:12.000
It cannot find the property immoral, for me to view the moral arc is essentially, unlike any particular want one might find oneself with in being so it seems unequivocal in principle.

01:34:12.000 --> 01:34:16.000
What we're trying to do is seller says uniquely determined.

01:34:16.000 --> 01:34:27.000
But if that is right, then the unqualified ought the moral lot cannot be a matter of what we want. All things considered.

01:34:27.000 --> 01:34:36.000
Sellers unequivocally rejects any appeal to desires, including a desire for the general welfare of people in his account of moral point of view.

01:34:36.000 --> 01:34:53.000
Sellers his view is nonetheless. Nonetheless deeply related to the hypothetical imperative of impartial benevolence, the imperative to do this or that, if one wants the general welfare of all people, the imperative sellers focuses on is to be at once

01:34:53.000 --> 01:35:08.000
categorical and interests objective. A we intention and objective, that is true, or at least truth apt quote in that there is, in principle, decision procedure with respect to specific ethical statements.

01:35:08.000 --> 01:35:25.000
According to sellers at the heart of the moral point of view, is the intention that each shell sub we be the case that our welfare is maximized quote to value from a moral point of view is in this way to value as a member of the relevant community.

01:35:25.000 --> 01:35:40.000
Indeed, according to sellers, it is a conceptual fact that people constitute a community, a week by virtual thinking of each other as one of us, and by willing the common good, not under the species of benevolence, but by willing it as one of us, or from

01:35:40.000 --> 01:35:42.000
from the moral point of view.

01:35:42.000 --> 01:35:47.000
People constitute a community, a Wi Fi willing the common good as one of us.

01:35:47.000 --> 01:36:08.000
And it is this constitutes the moral point of view. So sellers argues, this sounds like tribalism indeed sellers himself suggests as much, though he clearly takes his to be a benign form of tribalism sellers rights in a footnote, I, this is the this is

01:36:08.000 --> 01:36:27.000
the complete footnote, quote, does interesting points remain to be made about the tribal centricity of moral judgments in the not to remote past and on what it would be to change from speaking of a being as it to speaking of it as one of them, in a sense,

01:36:27.000 --> 01:36:43.000
which radically contrast with one of us. And from there to speaking of the being as a member of the encompassing community within which we draw relative distinctions between me and they perhaps most interesting point is that to discuss with another person

01:36:43.000 --> 01:36:54.000
what ought to be done presupposes shall I say dialectically that you and your members of one community, and

01:36:54.000 --> 01:37:11.000
seller seems to have no problem with tribalism according to which ones attitudes and behaviors are not to be grounded in one's tribe, the social group with which one identifies his concern is only with what he calls tribal centricity, which is characterized

01:37:11.000 --> 01:37:16.000
by excluding from the tribe. Those who are included.

01:37:16.000 --> 01:37:26.000
The thought is that if we can talk with them about what is to be done, what ought to be done. Whether or not we actually do engage with them in such a discussion.

01:37:26.000 --> 01:37:31.000
Then they are members of our community that is the moral community.

01:37:31.000 --> 01:37:34.000
And not to be recognized as.

01:37:34.000 --> 01:37:52.000
Thus, If there is a meaningful, they to contrast with us, that contrast can ultimately be made only from within the all encompassing community of speakers outside of which are only things that is non persons beings that do not speak.

01:37:52.000 --> 01:38:06.000
The idea that if we can talk with them, then they are one of us has a long history. The ancient Greeks, for example, the other is the Barbarian the one with whom I cannot speak, who does not speak the language I speak.

01:38:06.000 --> 01:38:11.000
Needless to say seller says something less parochial in mind.

01:38:11.000 --> 01:38:28.000
Another is one of us, if barring differences in the particular language we each speak, we can speak with them as phenom puts it in the first chapter of back black skin white masks, the chapter entitled, The Negro and language, fennel says to speak, is

01:38:28.000 --> 01:38:32.000
to exist. Absolutely. For the other.

01:38:32.000 --> 01:38:50.000
And contrary wise to fail to recognize that another speaks to take it that they are at best, merely parodying speech can seem to absolve one of any obligation to listen to them to absolve one of the requirement, the one recognized and as one of us.

01:38:50.000 --> 01:38:55.000
So to denial need not be explicit or even intentional.

01:38:55.000 --> 01:39:01.000
In such cases one simply finds that one cannot hear meaning in the utterance of the other.

01:39:01.000 --> 01:39:12.000
Despite their speaking in a language one understands this fennel suggests, is the plight of the black men.

01:39:12.000 --> 01:39:25.000
Sellers argues that the unqualified or the moral art is grounded in a way intention that to value from a moral point of view, is to value as a member of the relevant community.

01:39:25.000 --> 01:39:31.000
I've indicated that such an account cannot invoice cannot avoid tribal centricity.

01:39:31.000 --> 01:39:37.000
The problem is not that of correctly identifying the relevant community.

01:39:37.000 --> 01:39:57.000
It is that any attempt to delineate this with that community as the relevant one is itself a moral issue, insofar as it is. Sellers account in being tribal is viciously circular sellers conception of the moral point of view, requires knowing already,

01:39:57.000 --> 01:40:09.000
who ought to count is one of us, a member of the relevant community where this must be seen as a moral issue. Indeed, as a moral issue of the first order.

01:40:09.000 --> 01:40:14.000
The problem is structural.

01:40:14.000 --> 01:40:31.000
It is a well established fact empirical fact about human beings that they can flourish, only if they're able to identify with improved. Only if they can understand themselves as one of us were who we are is defined at least in part, by a shared project.

01:40:31.000 --> 01:40:34.000
And so by celebrity and me intentions.

01:40:34.000 --> 01:40:42.000
It is I've suggested nonetheless a mistake to try to understand the moral point of view, in such terms.

01:40:42.000 --> 01:40:52.000
But if so, what if anything remains to be said about quoting sellers the values in terms of which we lead our lives Sarfaraz.

01:40:52.000 --> 01:40:55.000
Is there still a meaningful question here.

01:40:55.000 --> 01:41:08.000
If there is, it can only be understood as a question for each of us individually, what are the values in terms of which I should lead my life.

01:41:08.000 --> 01:41:13.000
But what sort of question is this, in particular, is it a moral question.

01:41:13.000 --> 01:41:22.000
I think that it is indeed it may be the only truly fundamental moral question.

01:41:22.000 --> 01:41:38.000
In grounding practical reasoning in we intentions seller seeks a premise, from which to reason, having session intention gives one a reason to perform this or that action, and so far as that action provides a means to the end.

01:41:38.000 --> 01:41:41.000
That is articulated in the intention.

01:41:41.000 --> 01:41:55.000
It is just this that seems to be the source of the difficulty, insofar as we intentions must then be founded on punitive facts about who we are, the relevant tribe, but they cannot be.

01:41:55.000 --> 01:42:11.000
As we've seen, what I want to explore them, are the prospects for seeing values as providing instead principles, according to which to reason principles that can be made explicit in claims and subjected to critically reflective scrutiny.

01:42:11.000 --> 01:42:21.000
But there are nonetheless categorically different from premises from which to reason and cannot be made to follow from.

01:42:21.000 --> 01:42:33.000
Consider again, the fact that we humans as the essentially social beings we are can flourish only through our identification with some group.

01:42:33.000 --> 01:42:40.000
There are two ways we can think about the relationship between this fact about us and questions of morality and value.

01:42:40.000 --> 01:42:51.000
The first way sellers way is to try to make the in group maximally wide in the relevant premise, so wide that there is de facto know out.

01:42:51.000 --> 01:43:04.000
The second is to recognize the moral principle grounded in reason transcends such as situated thinking in requiring over and above the treatment appropriate to those in the in group and those are the out group.

01:43:04.000 --> 01:43:21.000
The one recognize that all within one interacts are to be treated with respect. That is as ends rather than as means with is not about who one is or is not about who is or is not a person, but is instead of fundamental principle of one's active relationships

01:43:21.000 --> 01:43:24.000
world, and everything in it.

01:43:24.000 --> 01:43:40.000
In this way we distinguish between a negative and purely formal demand of reason not to interfere with the projects of others any others, not to treat them as means, and a positive demand in regard to the in group to promote their welfare as one zone,

01:43:40.000 --> 01:43:45.000
that is to have an active regard for they're flourishing.

01:43:45.000 --> 01:44:03.000
We need also finally to distinguish between on the one hand, the pragmatic question of how the various members of any defacto community. For example, those living in our town here and now in our state, or even in our world, how they are to live together

01:44:03.000 --> 01:44:15.000
to get along, and as far as possible to thrive. And on the other hand, the question of principle. How I ought to live my life, some flowers.

01:44:15.000 --> 01:44:32.000
Among the relevant considerations in regard to the first pragmatic question, are for example, our actual history and resources are homogeneous it or diversity, or knowledge and power structures, perhaps even our national character, or if we are might

01:44:32.000 --> 01:44:37.000
leave our lack of any such character.

01:44:37.000 --> 01:44:47.000
It must be decided with the institution institutions and laws are to be what is to be promoted and what suppressed. Our children are to be educated, and so on.

01:44:47.000 --> 01:44:51.000
But this is again a practical issue.

01:44:51.000 --> 01:45:08.000
It concerns not how in the abstract one should live according to what values, but how here and now, given all the contingencies and messy details of our actual circumstances, some actual group might arrange its communal life.

01:45:08.000 --> 01:45:23.000
Still, the values in terms of which one leads one's life, obviously do enter into the nuts and bolts of addressing such a question. Most immediately in one's reflections on the aims, the laws and institutions are to serve.

01:45:23.000 --> 01:45:31.000
We turn them to our second question, the question of principle of the values by which to live one's life.

01:45:31.000 --> 01:45:41.000
This question. The question of the values by which to live one's life, at least as it is understood here as a characteristically Cartesian cast.

01:45:41.000 --> 01:45:54.000
Having reached a sufficiently mature age, I sit alone in my study wondering what I ought to value above all else, how I ought to live my life.

01:45:54.000 --> 01:45:57.000
I have furthermore come to realize.

01:45:57.000 --> 01:46:12.000
Come explicitly to realize that neither the desires and aversions I find myself with nor reason alone can provide the answers I seek sellers would say that there is nowhere left to turn.

01:46:12.000 --> 01:46:23.000
But that is just not so. There are also emotions as indeed sellers himself can help us to see.

01:46:23.000 --> 01:46:39.000
Although the distinction is not invariably recognized the emotional states or dispositions of a person are essentially different from the current feelings one can have emotions do often give rise to feelings and they can easily be confused with feelings

01:46:39.000 --> 01:46:43.000
But in fact, emotions and feelings are different.

01:46:43.000 --> 01:46:54.000
We of course often do find ourselves with feelings pair dogmatically of desire and aversion. And insofar as we have such feelings. We are motivated to act.

01:46:54.000 --> 01:47:07.000
Just desire something just is to pursue it, other things being equal, and to be averse to something is to shun it again, other things being equal, and some animals have only feelings.

01:47:07.000 --> 01:47:24.000
Feelings are enough to guide them through a complex world of things that can benefit them biologically and things that can harm them biologically other animals in particularly inherently social animals such as primates cannot live by desire and aversion

01:47:24.000 --> 01:47:45.000
alone, social animals need also to have emotions biting the changeable disposition of states of the animal that can give rise to feelings of current events, of which the animal is in some sense conscious, but are not themselves, feelings, emotions are

01:47:45.000 --> 01:48:01.000
not events but disposition of state states of which one may not be conscious emotions or Furthermore, responsive to things and they are evaluated have settled understandings of the significance of things, whether kinds of things such as certain sorts

01:48:01.000 --> 01:48:08.000
of activities or particular individuals. Most immediately. This or that specific.

01:48:08.000 --> 01:48:25.000
And again, social animals do need emotions, as well as feelings, if they are to live. The socially articulated lives. They do social animals need to identify with the booth and hence to be motivated to become one of us, they need to take pride in being

01:48:25.000 --> 01:48:26.000
one of us.

01:48:26.000 --> 01:48:29.000
And to be ashamed at failing to be so.

01:48:29.000 --> 01:48:46.000
And if they are to navigate successfully the complex social worlds. They need to have a biding valuations of others in the group who matters, and who does not, then in what ways such emotions can again give rise to feelings, but they are not themselves

01:48:46.000 --> 01:48:52.000
feelings, but instead disposition states of the animal.

01:48:52.000 --> 01:49:10.000
This distinction between emotions and feelings can be clarified at least initially by an analogy with the contrast between perceptible objects and our sensory experience of them perceptible objects, though they are changeable and perishable also persist

01:49:10.000 --> 01:49:20.000
over time and have various characteristic features and relations, and they can affect us perceptual it causes us to have characteristic sensory experiences.

01:49:20.000 --> 01:49:34.000
We know such objects through our sensory experiences of them, but objects and our sensory experiences of them are nonetheless, different, the object shows up and experience, but exists, independent of it.

01:49:34.000 --> 01:49:41.000
We can think of one's emotional states, as in certain respects like perceptible objects.

01:49:41.000 --> 01:49:57.000
Although changeable and perishable, they persist over time and have characteristic features and relations to one another and emotions like perceptible objects can affect us catalyzed by things in the environment emotions lead us to have characteristic

01:49:57.000 --> 01:50:01.000
desires and the versions that are inherently motivating.

01:50:01.000 --> 01:50:06.000
We can let us know our emotions through the feelings, to which they give rise.

01:50:06.000 --> 01:50:09.000
But again, the two are nonetheless, different.

01:50:09.000 --> 01:50:24.000
I can for example be in an emotional state of extreme frustration leads me to lash out angrily at another who's annoyed me in some way, my response to that person may be the first indication that I have the emotion that I not only feel anger but am frustrated.

01:50:24.000 --> 01:50:29.000
It's disposed to feel an act in certain characteristic ways.

01:50:29.000 --> 01:50:45.000
Emotions reveal things as meaningful or significant to one in a particular way, one cares positively or negatively about the activity or thing personal type of person, the thing matters to one, and it's mattering is, it's constituted by one's being in

01:50:45.000 --> 01:50:57.000
a certain emotional state in relation to it. Such states can develop over time. And they are, at least to some extent, culturally shaped over the course of one's upbringing.

01:50:57.000 --> 01:51:09.000
Much is once perceptions are shaped at least to some extent by how we perceive things to be. So once emotional life is shaped at least to some extent by how we value things.

01:51:09.000 --> 01:51:21.000
Emotions are further more deeply personal, though, perceptions are not motions or personal first and they're being different for different people, even within the same cultural group.

01:51:21.000 --> 01:51:32.000
However, culturally, like we are. it is nonetheless to the what gives you joy, what you love and esteem may be very different from what gives me joy. What gives what I love and esteem.

01:51:32.000 --> 01:51:42.000
What gives what I love and esteem. But emotions are personal also in being a source of meaning and significance.

01:51:42.000 --> 01:51:56.000
We identify with our emotions, in a way, we cannot identify with our feelings, our desires and aversions, and we do so because emotions aren't stitched ugly sources of meaning and significance for us.

01:51:56.000 --> 01:52:05.000
Emotions constitute what a person as that particular person cares about what in the world is a value to them.

01:52:05.000 --> 01:52:19.000
Emotions are in this way fundamental to who we are, not only as essentially social animals, but as persons, that is, as rational social animals.

01:52:19.000 --> 01:52:30.000
Emotions connect us whether positively or negatively to the things we encounter in our lives. And they do so not in the fleeting and motivating way of desire and aversion.

01:52:30.000 --> 01:52:47.000
But abiding Lee. And fundamentally. And personally, it is in virtue of our emotional states that we not only our perception to be aware of things, but find them to be a value to us to matter to who and what we are.

01:52:47.000 --> 01:52:52.000
But of course, this is all merely contingent at least so far.

01:52:52.000 --> 01:53:13.000
Emotions revealed to one what is for one as it happens, significant, what we need now to ask is what one ought to find significant what is truly significant what the world point of view, reveals to be of actual value as sellers more than anyone else has

01:53:13.000 --> 01:53:31.000
helped us to realize there is no absolute beginning or foundation for knowledge, but only the ongoing work of correcting mistakes, and misconceptions being rational is not a matter of having some absolute foundation for knowledge, but instead of matter

01:53:31.000 --> 01:53:46.000
But instead, a matter of reasoning in a certain way, a matter more specifically a being constitutive Lee, a critically reflective thinker, able and willing to call anything into question as reason sees fit.

01:53:46.000 --> 01:53:50.000
Though not, of course, all at once.

01:53:50.000 --> 01:54:06.000
This capacity for critical reflection was for the more radically transformed. With the advent of maturity with the realization dramatically enacted in Descartes' meditations that it is possible to withdraw the mind from the senses and stay card puts it

01:54:06.000 --> 01:54:24.000
to reconceived one's perceptual experience not this or that perceptual experience, but perceptual experience as such as near experience perceptual experience so reconceived is not regulatory of how things are or mistakenly seem to be, but is to be understood

01:54:24.000 --> 01:54:29.000
simply as experienced as how things show up for one.

01:54:29.000 --> 01:54:32.000
However, they in fact, our.

01:54:32.000 --> 01:54:48.000
With the advent of modernity, the everyday idea that reality sometimes shows itself in its true colors, and sometimes miss needs as we mere appearances would be replaced, at least for the purposes of scientific practice with the idea that things just

01:54:48.000 --> 01:54:54.000
do show up in various ways to various sorts of procedures.

01:54:54.000 --> 01:55:07.000
The connection, which previously seemed to be constituent of between months experience of things and once beliefs about them between ones experiences of things and what they actually are had been severed.

01:55:07.000 --> 01:55:19.000
Now, consider the relationship between ones emotional states on the one hand, and one's desires and feelings and the intentional actions they provoke on the other.

01:55:19.000 --> 01:55:35.000
Emotional attitudes, we have two things do give rise to feelings and desires when we are confronted with various sorts of objects in various sorts of circumstances, and at least at first, such desires are acted upon unless some other desire or feeling

01:55:35.000 --> 01:55:51.000
leads one to refrain from acting, much as at first ones experiences of things culminating beliefs, unless something leads one to doubt that things are quite as they seen part of coming to maturity in everyday life involves learning.

01:55:51.000 --> 01:56:04.000
Not only that things are not always what they seem that one can have a loser experiences of things, but also that not all desires are desirable that one can have wayward desires.

01:56:04.000 --> 01:56:11.000
On the side of knowing. There's also the coming to a distinctively modern understanding with respect to perceptual experience.

01:56:11.000 --> 01:56:25.000
What we need to see is that a relative move can be made on the side of action. Although in the course of one's upbringing when it comes to find oneself within the array of values that is reasons for acting in various ways in various circumstances in ways

01:56:25.000 --> 01:56:37.000
that are for instance benevolent courageous temperate one still at some point must explicitly and subconsciously examine those inherited values, assess them for their genuine validity.

01:56:37.000 --> 01:56:45.000
Only so is one properly or fully a free agent to be fully and properly free.

01:56:45.000 --> 01:56:59.000
One must not only have good reasons for actions, for instance, those acquired growing up in one's community, one must make those reasons one its own as the reasons they are only this does one take full responsibility for what one does.

01:56:59.000 --> 01:57:07.000
For who. One is we can understand how this is to work on analogy with the corresponding move on the side of perception.

01:57:07.000 --> 01:57:22.000
At first, with the dawning of any self consciousness at all. The task is to establish what is a good reason for action all things considered, that is on reflection given the full array array of values that are at least in part, once inheritance, as one

01:57:22.000 --> 01:57:39.000
of us a member of the community, into which one has been acculturated cetera reflection is again available from the beginning. And in essence involves nothing more than determining which apparently valuable actions are indeed to be valued and which are

01:57:39.000 --> 01:57:55.000
merely apparently valuable, a life lived according to such values may be satisfying. And indeed, it may be held by all concerned to be honorable what it is not, I think, is a properly moral life not in the full moral sense, modern sense of concern to

01:57:55.000 --> 01:58:14.000
sellers, what is needed to realize it is properly moral is something akin to the transformative Cartesian moment of withdrawing one's mind from the census namely the transformative moment of withdrawing one's mind from one's feelings and desires.

01:58:14.000 --> 01:58:22.000
The effect of such a transformation on the side of cognition, we know this December the tie between perceptual experience and belief.

01:58:22.000 --> 01:58:32.000
On the side of action. It is to sever the tie between desires and feelings on the one hand, and what one does. On the other.

01:58:32.000 --> 01:58:39.000
And given the one has no motivating force for one can no longer properly be conceived as feeling or desire at all.

01:58:39.000 --> 01:58:55.000
What remains is only the emotion to withdraw the mind from one's desires is one withdraws the mind from the senses on Day cards account leaves one with mental states of valuation of things mattering to one, but in something like the disinterested way

01:58:55.000 --> 01:59:01.000
beautiful things matter to one in the static experience as current understands it.

01:59:01.000 --> 01:59:18.000
And this I submit is true freedom, or at least the ground of true freedom, precisely because and insofar as one identifies with one's emotional states recognizes them as constitutive of who one in particular have who, in particular one is.

01:59:18.000 --> 01:59:26.000
Where's desires and feelings or brute forces that act willy nilly on ones will causing one to do whether one would or not.

01:59:26.000 --> 01:59:34.000
Emotions are constitutive of one's very being one sense of who and what one is of what matters, why it matters and read it from your. Okay.

01:59:34.000 --> 01:59:47.000
10 minutes from y'all. Okay. Whereas feelings move on to act directly to act because one wants this or that. Emotions move on to act on the indirectly by providing principles according to this to reason.

01:59:47.000 --> 01:59:53.000
It is because of this or that is a value that when it's moved,

01:59:53.000 --> 02:00:08.000
obviously much more might be said about just what such a transformative moment amounts to and I think a lot more needs to be said. But I want to focus on what can be said in favor of the rationality of this or that emotional state.

02:00:08.000 --> 02:00:13.000
Since we need to distinguish, in principle, between one values and what ought to be valued.

02:00:13.000 --> 02:00:19.000
And here I want to suggest Kant can guide us

02:00:19.000 --> 02:00:37.000
consider first what con describes is the common human understanding that is merely healthy not yet cultivated understanding which conference is done this con, the least that can be expected from anyone who lays claim to the name of a human being can identify

02:00:37.000 --> 02:00:53.000
three Maxim's of such understanding that in the anthropology, he said, set suggest can be made unalterable commands for the class of thinkers. That is, as I understand the class of especially reflective human beings, those who go into the sort of thing

02:00:53.000 --> 02:01:11.000
that philosophers, typically do the capacity for rationally reflective criticism is a capacity we have insofar as we're human is because we are not merely animals in particular social animals, but rational social animals that we asked whether what we

02:01:11.000 --> 02:01:27.000
ourselves believing is really true whether what we find ourselves valuing is really worth value me. Really good. We are the animals that are responsive two reasons as reasons and cons three Maxim's unpack what is involved in the rational activity if such

02:01:27.000 --> 02:01:34.000
animals, what is involved in particular I want to suggest in the moral reasoning of such animals.

02:01:34.000 --> 02:01:42.000
The first Maximus to think for oneself to make up one's own mind rather than have it made up through one by something or someone else.

02:01:42.000 --> 02:01:58.000
And in the case of moral thinking, in particular, concepts maximum common human understanding would seem to enjoy that one recognized for oneself, the value in something, one cannot take it on testimony, either that have another or that of one's own desires

02:01:58.000 --> 02:02:01.000
that the thing is indeed valuable.

02:02:01.000 --> 02:02:07.000
Can't con second maximum is to think from the standpoint of everyone else.

02:02:07.000 --> 02:02:19.000
What does that mean to think from the standpoint of everyone else in particular how is this different from thinking as one of us, which I've already rejected as unavoidably an objection to the tribal centric.

02:02:19.000 --> 02:02:29.000
The clue lies in constant lighten the NSA and what current describes as the public use a reason they use which someone makes a reason as a scholar.

02:02:29.000 --> 02:02:33.000
But, before the entire public of the breeders.

02:02:33.000 --> 02:02:43.000
Interestingly cons point here is not that we need to agree with others. It's rather that we need to attend to the reasons people give for and against the different views.

02:02:43.000 --> 02:02:55.000
What is distinctive of thinkers on this view is that they do not merely have reasons for their judgments, nor even that they worry as much, one might about what are the reasons for their reasons.

02:02:55.000 --> 02:03:09.000
What is distinctive of thinkers, and I've suggested or its distinctive of thinking from a properly moral point of view, in particular, is that they are critically reflective of the rational linkages between reasons on the one hand, and what they are puter

02:03:09.000 --> 02:03:12.000
reasons for on the other.

02:03:12.000 --> 02:03:20.000
There are critically reflective not only of their reasons, but of the principles according to which they reason.

02:03:20.000 --> 02:03:32.000
So the problem is not to know what is the reason in this or that case but what sort of thing, I had to count as a reason at all that is in accordance with what principle when take something to be a reason for something.

02:03:32.000 --> 02:03:51.000
The morally serious person needs explicitly and self consciously to consider other points of view other perspectives relative to which one's own principles of reasoning, may be revealed to be merely parochial or question Baby, I'm right sellers have,

02:03:51.000 --> 02:04:05.000
as, as if I'm right sellers have been revealed to be insofar as they uncritically acquiesce to the authority of a particular conception of reason one associated first and foremost, with the practice of the exact sciences.

02:04:05.000 --> 02:04:20.000
The third Maxim, to think consistently is it tells us in the critical judgment. The most difficult to achieve. And something that can only be achieved through the combination of first two, and after frequent observance of them has made them automatic

02:04:20.000 --> 02:04:32.000
course in the ordinary case thinking consistently is not very difficult when has contradictory beliefs perhaps and inconsistent pride of beliefs, and so must reject one rather, but sometimes it is not that simple.

02:04:32.000 --> 02:04:48.000
Even in the argument of, even in the case of beliefs, and perhaps it is never simple, in the case of one's values is not simple in the case of belief, when it is a principle rather than merely a belief that in is in question.

02:04:48.000 --> 02:05:03.000
And if the line we've been pursuing here is correct, it's not simple in the case of values, precisely because I mean so far is to embrace and value, just is to embrace a principal and recently, five values at the well being of members of my family, that

02:05:03.000 --> 02:05:06.000
does not give me a reason to act, not directly.

02:05:06.000 --> 02:05:15.000
Instead of confers value on courses of action, according to whether or not they do promote the value of the well being of those I care about.

02:05:15.000 --> 02:05:31.000
It provides me not with a premise from which to reason. But instead, a principle, according to which to reason as one might expect. The problem of resolving conflicts among the principles governing one's reasoning is essentially different from the problem

02:05:31.000 --> 02:05:44.000
with resolving conflicts among ones claims about which to reason in accordance with ones existing principles and reasoning, thinking from the standpoint of everyone else in a way that is equally a matter of thinking for oneself.

02:05:44.000 --> 02:06:02.000
Can we require a substantive discovery, a realization that fundamentally transforms the space of possibilities within which one's thought moves by articulating new principles with which to reason principles that at once reveal the one sidedness of one's

02:06:02.000 --> 02:06:18.000
original principles and show how they could be reconciled moral thinking that starts from substandard valuations is I suggest such a course of critically reflective reasoning, one that does not really overcome opposition in difference, but at the same

02:06:18.000 --> 02:06:32.000
time incorporates the insights that were harbored in that opposition in difference to them consistently at once for oneself and from the standpoint of everyone else is to think dialectically.

02:06:32.000 --> 02:06:34.000
But who is everyone else.

02:06:34.000 --> 02:06:50.000
More pointedly, how does this conception thinking from a moral point of view, avoid tribalism here what is crucial. Is that the relevant, others are not those with whom one identifies once in group.

02:06:50.000 --> 02:06:54.000
But instead, those who are exemplary for one.

02:06:54.000 --> 02:07:01.000
Those who one respects as persons, which can again be quite idiosyncratic and personal.

02:07:01.000 --> 02:07:11.000
At first, everyone else relevant others will be for instance members of one's own family ones closest friends. And if one is lucky, at least some of one's teachers.

02:07:11.000 --> 02:07:21.000
The people one respects those one looks up to and takes to be exemplary for one's own behavior and values will be the first people in one community.

02:07:21.000 --> 02:07:37.000
But as one learns to read and comes to extend one's reading beyond what we read within the community, one can discover new exemplars new voices that seemed to matter, and with them new ways of thinking about what matters at all.

02:07:37.000 --> 02:07:54.000
Over time, new writers into one circle and old ones fall away once values change and one begins to achieve a settled understanding of who one is and what one values were this involves in turn the sort of dialectical development already outlined.

02:07:54.000 --> 02:08:11.000
Clearly, there is nothing here to suggest any sort of consensus, or universality to the values one comes on reflection to endorse the constellation of values by which another lives and in terms of which they articulated as who they are, can be quite different

02:08:11.000 --> 02:08:14.000
from one's own constellation of values.

02:08:14.000 --> 02:08:20.000
The writers they esteem and read, need not be the writers, I esteem and read.

02:08:20.000 --> 02:08:38.000
There is a fundamental difference between sellers this conception of what it is to be irrational being and the conception of a rational being that is gestured out here for sellers, we are as the rational beings we are constituent ugly instances of a kind.

02:08:38.000 --> 02:08:56.000
We are instances of a kind, as any living beings are only in our case, the relevant kind is the kind of rational and the account outlined here by contrast, it is not only our powers of reason of rational effective criticism, but also our individuality

02:08:56.000 --> 02:09:11.000
and uniqueness that our constituent of us at least insofar as we are fully realized, and therefore, fully free on our account we begin our lives as we ran most as instance of a particular biological form of life.

02:09:11.000 --> 02:09:22.000
And through our acculturation into the social form of life of our community. We become fully fledged members of that community instances of that particular social of life.

02:09:22.000 --> 02:09:38.000
But if the community enables it as it should, we embark finally on a journey of self actualization one that only begins with all the contingencies of one socio cultural circumstances, and the emotional profile native to one that only begins with the values

02:09:38.000 --> 02:09:55.000
that just do seem to one to be a value, the journey ends if all goes well with values that are truly valuable and with an individual, someone not intelligible as an instance of a kind, but only as itself.

02:09:55.000 --> 02:10:07.000
Moral serious non seriousness on this view is not a matter of what any and everyone should think doing value, but a matter of what I should think doing value.

02:10:07.000 --> 02:10:26.000
And in this, I have only my own lights to go on my own understanding of what is valuable. What matters, but also who is valuable to me as a reader and thinker, aiming to discover what of all what I value, really is valuable, at least to me.

02:10:26.000 --> 02:10:42.000
I began with sellers this idea that we needed an alternative to a life of informed, or enlightened self interest and alternative to the ego directed value sellers thinks of things out as a life that is merely satisfying and an alternative is needed sellers

02:10:42.000 --> 02:10:52.000
things because living a satisfying life is neither necessary more sufficient for living a worthwhile like life one ought to live.

02:10:52.000 --> 02:11:08.000
But a worthwhile life is nonetheless, a life that one odd as a rationally will affect a person, defined satisfying. Indeed, maximally satisfying, a worthwhile life is a life one ought to want to live.

02:11:08.000 --> 02:11:19.000
And because of I, as I suggested sellers his own alternative to ego directed valuing his idea of we intentions, is not really tribal but nutritiously tribal centric.

02:11:19.000 --> 02:11:25.000
We were led again to ego directed value, but with a difference.

02:11:25.000 --> 02:11:42.000
Whereas seller seems to assume that satisfaction is invariably a matter of feeling satisfied. Would you write the whole tense no intrinsic value with yours considered satisfaction in relation to the emotions, which we saw are intrinsically evaluative

02:11:42.000 --> 02:11:59.000
because emotions, including that of satisfaction or disposition of states of a person that are as beliefs are subject to rationally reflective criticism and correction and can be so subject, independent of how in particular one feels emotions are not

02:11:59.000 --> 02:12:01.000
merely self interested.

02:12:01.000 --> 02:12:18.000
They can be and in successful cases our values of what is truly valuable. One can educate one's emotions and as a rational reflective person one has a responsibility so to educate them to be successful in this just is, as far as I can see, to live a life

02:12:18.000 --> 02:12:30.000
that is at once, satisfying to one and a life, why not to live. Thank you.

02:12:30.000 --> 02:12:33.000
Thanks a lot, Danielle.

02:12:33.000 --> 02:12:43.000
For your paper, and I see already some hand to all, please go ahead.

02:12:43.000 --> 02:12:45.000
Thank you very much.

02:12:45.000 --> 02:12:51.000
Thank you very much it, and the eligible for the top.

02:12:51.000 --> 02:13:10.000
My question is, to what extent, based on your account of massaging edits, and especially in this, you just put in the conclusion on that. The issue of the emotional education.

02:13:10.000 --> 02:13:29.000
What would you describe the kind of virtue ethics, to set us. And then, if you do, how would that be compatible with the kind of the oncologist data, seems to endorse as well.

02:13:29.000 --> 02:13:39.000
So where are we going on between somehow I restore and can't according to you.

02:13:39.000 --> 02:13:53.000
Yeah. Um, this seems to be exactly the case where because I don't work in this area.

02:13:53.000 --> 02:13:55.000
I mean to me.

02:13:55.000 --> 02:14:12.000
I It really does. As far as I can see. Seeing that sellers is very content in the way he thinks about ethics only he doesn't want to be so formalist, which is why I take it he wants to have this idea of a substantive idea we intentions that I think causes

02:14:12.000 --> 02:14:17.000
the problem right you know you can have the purely formal notion in current.

02:14:17.000 --> 02:14:25.000
That seems to me okay but but as soon as you try to take sellers this route to give some substance then I then I think there are problems.

02:14:25.000 --> 02:14:29.000
Um,

02:14:29.000 --> 02:14:32.000
I mean,

02:14:32.000 --> 02:14:48.000
if I was to look for a more virtue ethics strand in sellers I would go with the difference between odd to BS and not to do's and that's so fundamental that I think probably one could make a lot of that.

02:14:48.000 --> 02:14:56.000
So, it is it is so crucial, the way one lives these values for sellers.

02:14:56.000 --> 02:15:02.000
Um, so I think that would be a strand of of a more.

02:15:02.000 --> 02:15:21.000
A more recent healing virtue ethics just because of the way the social has a role in sellers, but but I do think that on on his explicit thinking about this i mean i i spent some time thinking about how I want to go in and what I think might be deeply

02:15:21.000 --> 02:15:23.000
going on and sellers.

02:15:23.000 --> 02:15:31.000
And it's a very interesting question in the way that he wants to, you know, be content but but bring in the social.

02:15:31.000 --> 02:15:46.000
So I mean I think that's a that's a really interesting and important question but, yeah, that's, that's sort of where I would go, if I was, if I was thinking about that, that issue.

02:15:46.000 --> 02:15:53.000
All right, I think Carol your hand up, what's up next and then Zach, Nick, and then Preston, go ahead.

02:15:53.000 --> 02:15:54.000
Thanks. Yeah.

02:15:54.000 --> 02:16:16.000
So, yeah, it was pretty interesting that you brought up a phenom but funnels on phone strategy is also sort of another option you you listed some options and then said, we've run out of options but I think fed on goes a route which is not Cartesian or

02:16:16.000 --> 02:16:36.000
canteen which is in the gate in kind of Hadean Marxist direction, and in ways which are interestingly similar to Brandon's new book as well so Infineon there is this interesting concept of live experience.

02:16:36.000 --> 02:16:49.000
And there is a dialectic within the experience but part of finance talking about doing is the source of hermeneutics good genealogy genealogical exercise.

02:16:49.000 --> 02:16:58.000
So you one way in which you kind of avoids tribalism is. And to make yourself aware of it so in a way you are.

02:16:58.000 --> 02:17:07.000
Tutoring your lived experience so you have a position, you have a little experience so I was yet.

02:17:07.000 --> 02:17:23.000
Rather than trying to kind of rehash that I was kind of, I know you use the words didactic I guess I wanted to know what specifically you held in mind there and what you thought about the kind of reconstructive reconstructed accounts which is in the feminine,

02:17:23.000 --> 02:17:39.000
and in that part of a living because interestingly now being brought out in the new Brandon was a way to avoid some of the tribalism you're talking about, well as a method for instance case appropriate self appropriation and empowerment.

02:17:39.000 --> 02:17:43.000
Okay, good. Thank you. Um.

02:17:43.000 --> 02:17:56.000
The tribalism problem comes up when one tries to understand the moral point of view, in terms of.

02:17:56.000 --> 02:18:09.000
We intentions were you it already has to be settled who we are, I, I, it seems to me it's just question begging, if, if the, you know, there's a moral issue of who you recognize.

02:18:09.000 --> 02:18:19.000
I have no problem with any of this and I mean, I think Hagen's is really interesting in this, in this context.

02:18:19.000 --> 02:18:35.000
But, but the issue was really, who am I, who am I speaking for here, and how Am I understanding the moral point of view, is the moral point of view an issue for me and how I live my life.

02:18:35.000 --> 02:18:38.000
Or does it have to be understood.

02:18:38.000 --> 02:18:42.000
First, through

02:18:42.000 --> 02:18:54.000
an understanding of who we are and that's really what I'm seeing is problematic. And that is, I mean in hey go, as I understand it, ethical life is in terms of the community.

02:18:54.000 --> 02:18:58.000
Um,

02:18:58.000 --> 02:19:09.000
and there I want to distinguish between the actual community and, and the sort of celebrity in content idea of the rational, the community rational beings.

02:19:09.000 --> 02:19:14.000
So I don't know enough about

02:19:14.000 --> 02:19:30.000
the details of funnel, but but I have, you know, avoiding tribalism as it were in one's own thinking through a dialectical reconstructive examination.

02:19:30.000 --> 02:19:38.000
It's it's the structural problem that I see particularly in sellers his way of thinking about we intentions as the ground of.

02:19:38.000 --> 02:19:41.000
Does that make sense.

02:19:41.000 --> 02:19:43.000
Thanks.

02:19:43.000 --> 02:19:46.000
Zach.

02:19:46.000 --> 02:19:50.000
All right. Thanks a lot, Daniel fascinating.

02:19:50.000 --> 02:20:18.000
Um, so I wanted to ask something about just this contrast between the sort of collective and sort of individualistic understanding of what morality is all about that you were just sort of highlighting so I understand it that your, your critique of the

02:20:18.000 --> 02:20:40.000
we are, we're not sort of from the on the slaughter ASEAN account we're not really capable of reasoning, our way into the moral point of view we don't have responsibility or control over the extent to which, who we recognize as we fully lines up with

02:20:40.000 --> 02:21:08.000
who we ought to recognize as we were in part at, you know, at the mercy of the kinds of abilities to reason and conception of reason into which were acculturated, um, I, I have, have not sort of been inclined to read sellers as as thinking of this conception

02:21:08.000 --> 02:21:28.000
of the moral point of view as necessarily one in which entirely we have the power to reason ourselves into right i'd rather thought that, from the point of view, maybe it's fine, that we're at in to some extent sort of at the mercy of a history about

02:21:28.000 --> 02:21:37.000
the extent to which were sort of fully achieved a kind of cosmopolitan conception of

02:21:37.000 --> 02:21:40.000
what is morally important.

02:21:40.000 --> 02:22:07.000
And my thought is that what you're doing here is you're making a kind of trade off. So, in, in retreating to a kind of a conception of what the sort of fundamental moral question is that we can sort of exercise control over sort of how we

02:22:07.000 --> 02:22:12.000
how we exercise control over.

02:22:12.000 --> 02:22:14.000
Finding an answer to.

02:22:14.000 --> 02:22:23.000
We are a. We're now.

02:22:23.000 --> 02:22:34.000
I think, potentially sort of limiting the scope of what morality is about, in a way that you might find objectionable so right.

02:22:34.000 --> 02:22:43.000
I take it you, you may be expressing some kind of a skepticism right about when you when you talk about these kinds of questions education and so on as parochial.

02:22:43.000 --> 02:22:46.000
Right.

02:22:46.000 --> 02:23:01.000
Why not, why not just accept that kind of pluralism here, there, there's a fun, the same maybe there's a fundamental moral question which is, right, what we should do and this sort of transcends this transcends

02:23:01.000 --> 02:23:18.000
any of those sort of parochial questions about our. What we recognize today as our community and our circumstances, there's the, the question about, you know, realizing something, some, some kind of sort of higher purpose and then then the progression

02:23:18.000 --> 02:23:33.000
of, of humankind and in that extent we can exercise a little bit of control over the fate of our species but very very limited way and okay we're at the mercy of history but that's a deeply ethical question, too. So I wanted to suggest that as an alternative

02:23:33.000 --> 02:23:47.000
sort of pluralist alternative which takes acknowledges, your, your right to think there's this ethical question that our power of reasons sort of allows us to have control over and there's another one where we're just lucky, we're just lucky to be along

02:23:47.000 --> 02:23:55.000
for the ride. But why not acknowledge that as a deep fundamental question about ethics, to.

02:23:55.000 --> 02:23:57.000
Okay, good.

02:23:57.000 --> 02:24:02.000
Yeah.

02:24:02.000 --> 02:24:03.000
Okay.

02:24:03.000 --> 02:24:21.000
The issue is not that we don't have control over who we are to recognize the issue is, I want to say this is a structural problem with sellers as approach that he can have it both ways he cannot have it, that the moral point of view, is grounded in, we

02:24:21.000 --> 02:24:37.000
intentions in the way he wants, and that we have a movement obligation to reflect on who we are. I mean I think we do have a moral obligation to reflect on who we are, but well you know i that i have to speak for myself under the circumstances.

02:24:37.000 --> 02:24:53.000
But But I don't see how sellers can have that. So this is a theoretical problem. So, and I mean, this, this whole discussion is at a very high level in theory I wanted to separate out practical questions, but I think sellers has a there's a structural

02:24:53.000 --> 02:25:01.000
problem, if you except main reason is for sure, a critically reflective capacity.

02:25:01.000 --> 02:25:07.000
Is there a kind there that can ground. The we.

02:25:07.000 --> 02:25:25.000
I am skeptical about that. Um, but But certainly, it wasn't just, it wasn't anything about limitations on our ability to reflect. It was a structural problem with the very idea of we intentions as sellers understands them so that's that's the first thing

02:25:25.000 --> 02:25:29.000
that I think is really important.

02:25:29.000 --> 02:25:52.000
The retreat, I, I, I am worried that the way we tend to think about ethics and morality in this universe lies the way that really seems to require that we have this substandard notion of reason that can give us foundations is not only sort of deeply not

02:25:52.000 --> 02:26:13.000
so early in in some, in some sense, but really problematic, that I want to see I want to suggest this is a way of going beyond sort of ways we've been thinking about morality that are way too caught up in the project of science, and I'm,

02:26:13.000 --> 02:26:18.000
you know, models of truth, that makes sense in certain contexts.

02:26:18.000 --> 02:26:38.000
So, so I mean it may sound skeptical but it's it's it is skeptical of one kind of project I think that's right. Um, it does limit the scope of what morality is, it, it, we have we have practical issues you know what should we do, yeah, we have big practical

02:26:38.000 --> 02:26:50.000
problems about what we should do. I'm not sure philosophers theorizing about some grand we is is actually very helpful there.

02:26:50.000 --> 02:26:56.000
Um, so So in that sense, it is limiting the scope.

02:26:56.000 --> 02:26:59.000
It is quite radical. I.

02:26:59.000 --> 02:27:06.000
If you're going to get me to do practical.

02:27:06.000 --> 02:27:23.000
So, so I think there's, there's the, the thought is these are deeply important questions but their questions people should be asking for themselves that they should not be trying to answer for everybody, which I take it is part of that, you know, it only

02:27:23.000 --> 02:27:31.000
is valid if it's universal, and I want to say this is my true, maybe, maybe, maybe we should think about this differently, whereas I think the content.

02:27:31.000 --> 02:27:48.000
So rz and it's it's so closely allied with the truth, that it can't have any validity. If it isn't, universalised, so you end up with desires over here, more a lot over here and simply nothing else.

02:27:48.000 --> 02:27:51.000
And I'm trying to get beyond that.

02:27:51.000 --> 02:27:56.000
Make.

02:27:56.000 --> 02:27:58.000
Thanks.

02:27:58.000 --> 02:28:09.000
I think I still don't understand the charge that sellers as objection we parochial his we includes everybody, there's nobody who's not included.

02:28:09.000 --> 02:28:21.000
Now you suggested that maybe was problematic about it is that you have to appeal to moral properties to draw to include them to figure out that everyone is included.

02:28:21.000 --> 02:28:37.000
But I don't know that that's true either. So, I'm the we is the community of all rational beings and the rational beings for sellers are just the things that can shape their behavior by appeal to reasons that are shaped by their whose behaviors can be

02:28:37.000 --> 02:28:49.000
shaped by reasons and not merely by causes, which doesn't look like an especially moral thing it's, I don't know, metaphysical or something.

02:28:49.000 --> 02:29:04.000
So yeah I don't understand how, how is parochial, or if he is or sorry, How, how is tribal or if he is why it's objectionable given that, there's no out group, and the lines around, and the and the basis for including everybody doesn't refer, as far as

02:29:04.000 --> 02:29:09.000
I can tell it anything this especially moral.

02:29:09.000 --> 02:29:31.000
Okay, Fair enough. Um, I, I don't think that's right. In fact, I mean that's that's sort of a fundamental point here that that the idea that it includes everybody already involves a substantive notion of for example What counts is the reason.

02:29:31.000 --> 02:29:37.000
These, these ideas I think our need to be contested.

02:29:37.000 --> 02:29:57.000
You know there's a there's a way we've been thinking about it, you know, in the European tradition in philosophy that I think we're starting to have very good reason to think is is really loaded in a programmatic way.

02:29:57.000 --> 02:30:11.000
And as I mentioned in in responding to Zach, I think a lot of it is it's it's model too much on the sciences, and on you know the exact science particular.

02:30:11.000 --> 02:30:30.000
So, so I'm rational beings. As you know, having their, their being able to be shaped by reasons, that's not going to cut it fine enough for me because I'm going to I'm going to say, Well, okay, but what do you tend to use a reason.

02:30:30.000 --> 02:30:34.000
So it's that it's that ability is that need.

02:30:34.000 --> 02:30:47.000
Again, it's this it's the problem that you want some substance here, but it's got to be pre moral because it's supposed to be the ground of the moral point of view, and I'm saying no, that's a moral issue.

02:30:47.000 --> 02:30:51.000
You can have that you can't have both of those.

02:30:51.000 --> 02:30:55.000
So you think, brother.

02:30:55.000 --> 02:31:13.000
I'm sorry. I'm sorry. We have four minutes, and there are two more hands up so I would like to give press and Jim, actually, like, I can take mine down, I'd like to, what I'd rather hear Nick's the immigration than my question.

02:31:13.000 --> 02:31:31.000
OK, now go ahead. Alright so you think that the being able to being able to consider the pros and cons toward have one actions.

02:31:31.000 --> 02:31:33.000
Humans are by their nature.

02:31:33.000 --> 02:31:44.000
Rule followers the sorts of things that can be shaped by reasons. So like, Who are you concerned that it might exclude since it's definitely going to include all people.

02:31:44.000 --> 02:31:49.000
Well, wait a minute, are we, how are we defining human beings biologically.

02:31:49.000 --> 02:32:07.000
I mean we're going to exclude children, we're going to exclude people with all other sorts of the sorts of things that I'm to say that you can shape your behavior by appeal to reasons isn't to say that you can do it right now immediately say that you're

02:32:07.000 --> 02:32:12.000
the sort of thing whose essence is to be reasoned directed.

02:32:12.000 --> 02:32:15.000
And again, I'm going to ask you.

02:32:15.000 --> 02:32:17.000
You know that.

02:32:17.000 --> 02:32:21.000
It can be contested what counts as a reason.

02:32:21.000 --> 02:32:29.000
Some things that some people would say look this is a reason other people instead that's not a reason you're not you're not being guided by reasons here.

02:32:29.000 --> 02:32:42.000
You being guided by, I don't know, superstition emotion, whatever.

02:32:42.000 --> 02:32:51.000
It's going to be a reason. Yeah, I just this this goes back to talk because when you were talking about the two groups and they, They both.

02:32:51.000 --> 02:32:59.000
You know that not such an increase in taxes and not such a long one or whatever it was

02:32:59.000 --> 02:33:13.000
that that is like pure pragmatics I mean, I bet the bonobos do, that's not that's not rational necessarily that's just dealing with other social beings in.

02:33:13.000 --> 02:33:27.000
I know I'm actually quite serious about the but almost, I don't know but bonobos but but that you negotiate with cons specifics in ways that allow both of you to save face and carry on.

02:33:27.000 --> 02:33:41.000
That seems to me that there's no reason to think that as much to do with being rational, that's just being smart in the way that animals are smart, breath from what we have one minute.

02:33:41.000 --> 02:33:50.000
Yeah, I'll try at least what your question please go ahead, it. I think it's circles on the same issue and and Zachary and Nicholas has questions, sir.

02:33:50.000 --> 02:34:03.000
Help me, I think, if I see what's going on here now. Daniel. It seems like you've got two criticisms of sellers here there's the one the charge of parochialism and that we intentions don't give us the right kind of universality.

02:34:03.000 --> 02:34:15.000
And then there's this criticism that look morality involves a whole bunch of stuff. It just can't be characterized in terms of sharing intentions, a lot of its individual, a lot of it turns on emotional relationships with with people close to us.

02:34:15.000 --> 02:34:28.000
I'm that second criticism, it seems to me that's a I'm totally on board with that, let me just try to say something in defensive sellers by way of the world view of criticism because it seems to me, he addresses some of this.

02:34:28.000 --> 02:34:43.000
So, this is at the end of section, 13 of imperatives intentions and the logic of art so it's the it's the closing paragraph of the penultimate section, it's particularly important to distinguish the loyalty to people generally the recognition of each

02:34:43.000 --> 02:34:58.000
man everywhere is one of us from the impartial level one fellow man which is itself a matter of principle for one confuses these two old suspect that the to defend principles in terms of impartial love is to circle the recognition of each man everywhere

02:34:58.000 --> 02:35:04.000
is one of us was the extension of trouble loyalty which exploded it into something new. That sounds straight out from Solomon.

02:35:04.000 --> 02:35:09.000
It has a precarious toehold in the world, and we're usually a far smaller group.

02:35:09.000 --> 02:35:19.000
Cons conception of each rational being everywhere as one of us is still more breathtaking point of view, which may become a live auction. So that would just be a way of trying to say.

02:35:19.000 --> 02:35:25.000
On the first criticism sellers maybe has something to say, I think you've still got a good bite on the second.

02:35:25.000 --> 02:35:31.000
Okay, let me just say something really quick about the first, I think, I think.

02:35:31.000 --> 02:35:52.000
I want to distinguish I mean I did I did claim that he had a parochial view of of rationality, but the key, the key problem is not, it's any view of rationality is going to be problematic, because that itself on sellers on that kind of account that sellers

02:35:52.000 --> 02:36:12.000
sellers has. It requires a foundation in who it is that counts as a person. And I think it's, it's going to be a moral issue for that view, but then you can't use it to ground, what is the moral point of view, so leave aside, you know, whether sounds

02:36:12.000 --> 02:36:28.000
his parochial and and just go with that structural point that the way things are set up, who we are, has to be a moral issue and it can't be a moral issue.

02:36:28.000 --> 02:36:31.000
And that's the problem.

02:36:31.000 --> 02:36:34.000
Because the ground.

02:36:34.000 --> 02:36:50.000
So we may continue to have this conversation, but officially I close the session but we can all hang around here and continue talking about officially, this is closed so please before we end do let's give another hand to Danielle paper, please.

02:36:50.000 --> 02:36:52.000
Thank you everyone.

02:36:52.000 --> 02:36:59.000
Make questions.

02:36:59.000 --> 02:37:05.000
I knew that would be a bit.

02:37:05.000 --> 02:37:14.000
It's a lot to take in. Yeah, yeah. Well, yeah, yeah. I mean, it is pretty radical, but

02:37:14.000 --> 02:37:22.000
sometimes you just have to, I have to read these comments.

02:37:22.000 --> 02:37:27.000
I mean, it seems to me that, to me it seemed like.

02:37:27.000 --> 02:37:37.000
And I'm not sure what dialectically going on here but parts of your paper seem to be quite sympathetic with

02:37:37.000 --> 02:37:47.000
ground rounding moral evaluation and the moral point of view is reasoning because you also want critical reflection on on the emotions and you mentioned can't.

02:37:47.000 --> 02:37:56.000
Interestingly, the aesthetics, actually. Well it's somehow, an appreciation I'm taking it a moral appreciation.

02:37:56.000 --> 02:38:08.000
On a unaided by concepts for her.

02:38:08.000 --> 02:38:16.000
So, so I found that really interesting I found I mean I felt like two voices friendly amendment.

02:38:16.000 --> 02:38:34.000
And then the other no tribalism so in your paper. Well you can think of it as I mean I did, I did. I said at the beginning, you know I wanted this to be sort of spoilers in it so if you start with some of the sort of key fundamental themes and sellers

02:38:34.000 --> 02:38:51.000
the most important one is, as far as I'm concerned the you know that being a rational being is being critically reflective, that, that the rationality of of inquiry have any way of being human, lies in that reflection and correction.

02:38:51.000 --> 02:39:01.000
It doesn't lie in.

02:39:01.000 --> 02:39:19.000
So that I'm taking is fundamental and that's absolutely central. That's what is going to make this different from you know the way other animals live their emotional lives is the capacity to reflect and be critically reflective about one's values.

02:39:19.000 --> 02:39:22.000
Um,

02:39:22.000 --> 02:39:35.000
I also I mean this The second part is this idea of the emotions that we are social beings I mean this is central to sellers. It's just that he didn't.

02:39:35.000 --> 02:39:54.000
He didn't take it beyond content by saying look, there's more to being a social animal than just desires and reasons. Right. Once you introduce sociality, you've got to introduce emotions, and the question is can they do some work in reflecting on our

02:39:54.000 --> 02:39:58.000
moral lives, and I want to say yes they're critical.

02:39:58.000 --> 02:40:08.000
And I just I don't see that reason, can do more than, give us that credit and critically reflective capacity.

02:40:08.000 --> 02:40:22.000
Sellers wants it to do to do substandard work and I think it's interesting that even in content doesn't the categorical imperative imperative is formal sellers is trying to get some substance by Appeal to Reason, and I am.

02:40:22.000 --> 02:40:32.000
I think this is questionable you

02:40:32.000 --> 02:40:38.000
think for me remedy interviewers was the idea of we intentions he has two concerns.

02:40:38.000 --> 02:40:53.000
One is, it's like like like almost some kind of moral foundational there's some established one key principle. Yeah. And then to a deduction and see which kinds of we intentions are morally appropriate which aren't.

02:40:53.000 --> 02:41:06.000
But there's also another concept that he has when he introduces that concept of the intention and maybe that speaks more to your concerns me the concern to enable us to do.

02:41:06.000 --> 02:41:10.000
Interpersonal rational inquiry.

02:41:10.000 --> 02:41:28.000
In, from the moral point of view, setting the question aside whether there is any sense of moral principle from which all right. Moreover, the intentions can can be decided just just to allow us to to critically reflect into personally on each other's.

02:41:28.000 --> 02:41:46.000
We intend on each other's intentions he thinks I intentions can't do it he needs me intentions. So maybe that second concern is more in line with what you would like to affect because it can contribute to explain our ability to perhaps to critically reflect

02:41:46.000 --> 02:41:49.000
on our emotions.

02:41:49.000 --> 02:42:06.000
Well that was what I was using Kant's maxims of common human human understanding for because I do think that yes, adopting other people's point of view is really important, but I I'm building that into the reflective process which is way content does

02:42:06.000 --> 02:42:19.000
it and and i mean i i mentioned this reading thing I think this is fascinating. I don't understand exactly how reading is, I mean there's something different between meeting and talking to people.

02:42:19.000 --> 02:42:34.000
And I think probably this conscious idea that we are reading public is really important, but I don't, I don't really understand it, but that's quite different from us talking together about what we should do.

02:42:34.000 --> 02:42:38.000
I'm gonna say we need to do that when we have practical problems.

02:42:38.000 --> 02:42:51.000
But when you're trying to theorize, which is what we're doing as philosophers you're trying to theorize and understand what a moral point of view is.

02:42:51.000 --> 02:43:01.000
I I'm, I'm worried that that is going to have this problematic. Question begun character.

02:43:01.000 --> 02:43:14.000
So, I'm all for, you know, thinking really hard about solving our practical problems I mean they're huge and they're really important and we need to bring them all our moral understanding to it.

02:43:14.000 --> 02:43:17.000
I worry that

02:43:17.000 --> 02:43:33.000
in the it seems to me it's important to distinguish the practical in the theoretical questions that practically you can't assume that other people are with you, you still have to solve your problems and I think often moral reasoning gets in the way of

02:43:33.000 --> 02:43:40.000
actually addressing those practical problems,

02:43:40.000 --> 02:43:44.000
different question but it's not a.

02:43:44.000 --> 02:43:54.000
It's about the, the aspect that sellers goes with purely formal aspects of counsel, ultimately, and so on.

02:43:54.000 --> 02:44:06.000
And there is this other aspect of sellers where he says in certain places you have, if you don't have a sort of psychological he might have said emotional concern for others.

02:44:06.000 --> 02:44:13.000
Nothing's going to get off, off the ground. He says this in

02:44:13.000 --> 02:44:22.000
its kind of go right at the end of this little essay science and ethics, he says, moral principles and, and so on.

02:44:22.000 --> 02:44:38.000
And something similar seems to be going on in the in the logic of art, and all the way back actually but, um, so it's not you need that kind of basic concern for others.

02:44:38.000 --> 02:44:52.000
And then he develops a notion of impartial beloved benevolence where if you you know hopefully doesn't he says in the logical by that. I don't know how you got there but if you've got there so you love your neighbor for their own sake,

02:44:52.000 --> 02:44:59.000
So you've already expanded sort of this psychological concern for others that we just need as basic.

02:44:59.000 --> 02:45:15.000
And I think that plays a role in sellers that it doesn't didn't count but it's complicated, because what he does is then turn that into impartial benevolence, which is the love of impartial love of humanity.

02:45:15.000 --> 02:45:27.000
By saying I would that everyone is happy I'm concerned for everybody. I'm expanding that everywhere, then that's not enough.

02:45:27.000 --> 02:45:40.000
Because it's still the egocentric perspective, even though it's other. It's benevolence impartial benevolence. The impartial is just it's for everybody.

02:45:40.000 --> 02:45:58.000
And so then he says, the we, and is the sort of benevolence that chimes in and the moral point of view is then brings in these weird intentions, but I find this very complicated because there's a, there's a sense in which this deep this this ultimate

02:45:58.000 --> 02:46:15.000
concern for others is behind the whole story in a way that it's not in current it's not it's not the same sort of foundational grounding in our, in, in what it is to be a reason or the way it is and current.

02:46:15.000 --> 02:46:31.000
So that's that's just, it's just a thought. It doesn't have to your rich paper on how it's nothing like them, Richard story about the emotions but it is non purely formulas, they sort of feel like and sellers, because there's more to benevolence than

02:46:31.000 --> 02:46:40.000
the we have all the week plays a crucial role in universalism well and I think I would say that already.

02:46:40.000 --> 02:46:59.000
You know impartial benevolence is already going to have the flavor of the problem that I worried about, because in claiming that it's impartial. You're, you're building in and understanding of, you know who the relevant beings are so, so as I you know

02:46:59.000 --> 02:47:14.000
you're saying it's impartial but it's still sort of egocentric so that you have to get that impartial benevolence and then you have to sort of from there adopt the moral point of view, which yeah i think i mean that that gives a nice, a nice sort of developmental

02:47:14.000 --> 02:47:15.000
story.

02:47:15.000 --> 02:47:29.000
But, it lives the, the issue that I'm concerned with, which is, you know, that understanding of the we and, again, it's, it's not a factual problem it's not, you know, how do we figure out who we are.

02:47:29.000 --> 02:47:39.000
It's in the context of sellers projects, I just don't, I, you can't deal with that question. Yeah, it doesn't matter.

02:47:39.000 --> 02:47:53.000
I mean it's what I said isn't doesn't really address that issue between you and so it's but it does show that he's not a sort of purely a foundational is Pure Reason con formula.

02:47:53.000 --> 02:47:58.000
In his intentions but it doesn't. Yeah.

02:47:58.000 --> 02:48:02.000
But I think there, you'd have to wait. Again, I don't know anything about this.

02:48:02.000 --> 02:48:18.000
So caught. As far as I can reason is concerned, we've got the categorical imperative purely formal, but then his, his theory of virtue doesn't that isn't that about human beings and therefore, there's going to be some substance there will know that's

02:48:18.000 --> 02:48:23.000
real important, I think, and then, and so sort of mentioned that.

02:48:23.000 --> 02:48:37.000
But there's a difference and it's an on the same page as Preston was talking about in this logic about thing, only the only the revised edition, but he says I'm oh no it's in science and metaphysics, to.

02:48:37.000 --> 02:48:41.000
He says can't, I'm not talking about benevolence.

02:48:41.000 --> 02:48:49.000
As a duty the way can't does in his virtue theory because sellers is very things, the virtue theory is very important to sell us because happiness is crucial.

02:48:49.000 --> 02:49:08.000
So, but it comes in in a different way that comes in, when you've already got the moral point of view, and you have a duty to develop the talents of others because you're already playing the whole game, whereas this one, his loyalty from Royce, or the

02:49:08.000 --> 02:49:10.000
love of your neighbor.

02:49:10.000 --> 02:49:26.000
That's, that's prior to the, to the complete logical story so so kinds virtue ethics is still embedded within the full we story, and that's why you got to develop other people's talents.

02:49:26.000 --> 02:49:39.000
But this and I don't claim to have it all worked out how cells tries to do it but this idea of love of neighbor or loyalty, playing a slightly different role that has to be bootstrapped up into that.

02:49:39.000 --> 02:49:43.000
logical we, the way that's connected to the community.

02:49:43.000 --> 02:49:47.000
That's, that's a slightly different thing.

02:49:47.000 --> 02:49:49.000
But a

02:49:49.000 --> 02:50:05.000
paper very I really liked it. I did wonder about, but I'm talking too much here old old head Some say, but on the last one I just wondered about that you listen to the people who you respect their opinions, you've got your emotional structure there's

02:50:05.000 --> 02:50:15.000
going to be before that you had developed the second Maxim from Canada, which was viewing people from the standpoint, doing things from the standpoint of everyone.

02:50:15.000 --> 02:50:31.000
Right. And I know that was kind but you seem to be very sympathetically exposing that, like it was something you could take on board. But then I worried that your view became the tribal because viewing from the standpoint of everyone is circumscribed

02:50:31.000 --> 02:50:35.000
by those you respect their opinions.

02:50:35.000 --> 02:50:47.000
Yeah, no, I think I mean, partly what was interesting to me about that second one particular though yes i i'm not everyone just raises the same problems again.

02:50:47.000 --> 02:51:06.000
Um, but that he focuses not on the reasons but on the principles I think that is absolutely fascinating that that when he's talking about what you need to be doing as far as that second maximum is concerned, is thinking about how their reasoning, rather

02:51:06.000 --> 02:51:09.000
than from what their reasoning.

02:51:09.000 --> 02:51:18.000
And I think that is that is absolutely to the point because, you know, the idea of values.

02:51:18.000 --> 02:51:35.000
What you have to learn by reflecting on where somebody else is coming from is thinking about how they're thinking how they're seeing things. And yes, I, you know, respect is.

02:51:35.000 --> 02:51:47.000
Well, again, you know I am content in so many ways you know this is the original viewing. I mean respect is is a very peculiar thing. You don't have to listen to everybody.

02:51:47.000 --> 02:51:58.000
And there's no point listening to people who other people say, are wonderful and you can hear it. I mean, maybe you should work to try and hear it, but that's because you respect them.

02:51:58.000 --> 02:52:01.000
Oh do you were gonna say something, sorry.

02:52:01.000 --> 02:52:22.000
Oh, I don't know what extent, very clever, but then yeah I was wondering whether you would endorse the idea of the kind of new feminist critique

02:52:22.000 --> 02:52:48.000
that aren't saying that. Well, when you say we and we intentions, and the Rule of the Rules of rationality, that are supposed to pray to the usual problem of, well, I'm thinking that he is speaking from kind of out of body universal, and the streets,

02:52:48.000 --> 02:53:00.000
a social individual, why was the trend of contemporary so far as the mythology and ethics, as well.

02:53:00.000 --> 02:53:12.000
Makes it rather hear that, uh, well, every we is located, and to some extent.

02:53:12.000 --> 02:53:17.000
Sit on, as well as can't.

02:53:17.000 --> 02:53:28.000
He's just speaking in the name of the white male, your appeal centric and so forth and so on so would you would you go there.

02:53:28.000 --> 02:53:49.000
That is certainly part of it. Not, not particularly from a feminist point of view but that's included I think the more I read, the more point of views that that open up and say, No, those values and and you know, I just wrote this book on, you know, realizing

02:53:49.000 --> 02:54:03.000
reason. I don't think any of that back, but that conception of rationality tied to mathematics and the way the natural sciences are shaped by mathematics.

02:54:03.000 --> 02:54:21.000
That's not the whole story of rationality. That's actually, I now think that having told the story of realizing reason, having this idea that the project of science has been completed, which is one of the main themes of that book.

02:54:21.000 --> 02:54:30.000
We can finally separate the philosophical project from that scientific project.

02:54:30.000 --> 02:54:32.000
They were so intertwined.

02:54:32.000 --> 02:54:45.000
The project of science the project of absolute knowledge was, I think, I now think was Miss shaping the project to philosophy.

02:54:45.000 --> 02:55:01.000
And now, now we can let philosophy flourish out from under the weight of that monolith of science. And so, yes.

02:55:01.000 --> 02:55:11.000
I. That's the way I would put it but it absolutely is, you know, consonant with what feminists have been same time, but also other people.

02:55:11.000 --> 02:55:15.000
Um, people who worry about the arts.

02:55:15.000 --> 02:55:25.000
Um, you know, other cultures, I, you know, Chinese culture, it's, it's choice, really different.

02:55:25.000 --> 02:55:29.000
And it does start to look like.

02:55:29.000 --> 02:55:35.000
We had this particular conception of rationality, that has its place.

02:55:35.000 --> 02:55:45.000
But it's not the whole story, and I and then I want to say in anytime you do try and tell the whole story, you're going to have the same problem again.

02:55:45.000 --> 02:55:53.000
So, yeah, I think that a lot of these feminist worries are are valid.

02:55:53.000 --> 02:55:57.000
But they're not the only people who have who have valid worries.

02:55:57.000 --> 02:56:01.000
Yeah, you want to stick with the enlightenment's.

02:56:01.000 --> 02:56:05.000
You know,

02:56:05.000 --> 02:56:08.000
I can't give up.

02:56:08.000 --> 02:56:28.000
Enlightenment, that for that yeah i i sure exactly the same concerns that you do, but I just have to read your book now. Yeah, yeah. No, but I think this is really important because I, I, I am such an enlightenment thinker, I am my students made me This

02:56:28.000 --> 02:56:29.000
is mug.

02:56:29.000 --> 02:56:32.000
So, there's content.

02:56:32.000 --> 02:56:53.000
And there's me, and I are in conversation, they know that content is so important to me what and sellers but but con i mean when I was when I was a graduate student, I didn't want to just, you know, think like con i wanted to be.

02:56:53.000 --> 02:57:10.000
So, you know, this is very near and dear to my heart and I don't think we don't have to choose between these we just have to not make a certain mistake that I think I'm seeing sellers making in thinking about the moral point of view.

02:57:10.000 --> 02:57:15.000
So this is not against reason and rationality at all.

02:57:15.000 --> 02:57:24.000
It's not against science. It's not against mathematics, but it's it saying that's not everything.

02:57:24.000 --> 02:57:30.000
There's a lot more to thinking about our lives.

02:57:30.000 --> 02:57:32.000
Then,

02:57:32.000 --> 02:57:39.000
View from, from science. Anyway, I'm going to go get

02:57:39.000 --> 02:57:42.000
go.

02:57:42.000 --> 02:57:44.000
Only as well. Okay.

02:57:44.000 --> 02:58:03.000
We'll see everybody here.

 

WEBVTT

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Well, Perhaps we should begin.

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So our next speaker is Zachary Gabor who is a graduate student at Harvard University, and he will be speaking, his paper will be titled normal nature and narrative, two strategies in pursuit of a synaptic vision and sellers and Macbeth.

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So take it away. Zachary.

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Alright. Thanks so much, um, Yeah, I just want to start out by expressing how fortunate I feel to be here so this is my first conference dedicated to sellers that I've been to.

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And it's a wonderful experience to be in a group of people who are also share my fascination with this endlessly fascinating philosopher, and then also I just I feel especially fortunate to be able to share some reflections on the philosophy of Daniel

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Macbeth. So, as some of you know, Daniel was my undergraduate advisor and probably given the circumstances and the topic of my presentation. It goes without saying.

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She was tremendous influence on me and still is.

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In my development as a philosopher, so I just feel really really fortunate to be able to share some reflections on her working on salaries as work. Oh and I wanted to say, I still have the page the spiral bound copy of the page proofs of realizing reason

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from the seminar course on philosophy of math that I took with Danielle. On the eve of realizing reasons publication. So I just wanted to bring that out as a little problem.

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Okay, um, Let me share my screen and begin.

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Okay so, as you'll see, I just, just at the last moment decided to change the title.

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Norm nature narrative and sellers and Danielle Macbeth, just because the old one was clunky and also I realized, as I was finishing things up what I was cared about was not as much synopsis and more stereoscopy.

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So, let's get started.

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Alright so, um, when I initially wrote this paper I had this turn of phrase to describe what I thought. Sellers was doing and characterizing the philosophical quest, which I was sort of proud of, but then when I returned.

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I thought, well, I still think this is kind of a catchy turn of phrase, but it's a severely under explained, so let me explain a little bit more what I think.

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Sellers is consuming as the philosophical question at the beginning of philosophy and scientific image man that phrase is making sense of the fact that there's just one world it's reproduced above as the title of the slide.

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So as I'm sure you all know sellers draws this distinction between the manifest image and the scientific image to sort of bodies of putative knowledge that we find ourselves within the sort of present state of things.

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The scientific images and image of a world that's populated by corks and leptons and the like. And, in which things happen for the kinds of reasons that physics physicists use for things happening and then the manifest image is well it's populated by

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all sorts of things the concepts of which we sort of used to navigate the world knowledgeably.

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But, principally and crucially for my purposes.

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But, principally and crucially for my purposes as populated by persons and they're incompetent so it's so persons, essentially, are loci of rights and responsibilities they can know and be ignorant.

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They can make sense or not make sense. And they also enjoy sensory experiences. So I'm going to focus on the sort of normative aspects rather than the sort of sensory aspects of the metaphor manifest image, just for the topic of this paper so when I'm

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thinking about the sort of SolarCity and strategy for achieving a sort of join between the manifest and scientific images I'm, I'm thinking about the aspect of the strategy that addresses the sort of essentially normatively laid it aspects of the scientific

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image. So here's what seller says he about the philosophical question. He says, there's a crucial duality, which confronts the contemporary philosopher at the very beginning of his enterprise.

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Here, the most appropriate analogy is stereoscopic vision, were two different perspectives on a landscape are fused into one coherent experience. So I just want to reflect a little bit on that analogy to come to a characterization of what I think sellers

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is putting forth as his characterization of the philosophical question. So, to a significant features of the stereoscopic vision analogy.

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So one is realism or, at least, quasi realism so the image. The analogy suggests right, we need the need to reconcile not one depiction of the world and one illusion or what's would be worse to illusions.

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The analogy requires us to reconcile the idea that the sort of normative claims which are central in the in the in the manifest image are our truths, or at least there are sufficiently revived versions of both bodies of doctrine which are comprised of

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truths. Now, sellers is probably correctly described as a quasi realist about normal activity but but nonetheless. Nonetheless, he thinks, then the moral claims and that are part of the manifest image are true.

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Um, and then the second point, a feature that the analogy suggest is what I'm calling you to, which is really, it's a pair of features in an explanatory relation so think about, say examining a landscape with a pair of binoculars, wherever you look Sure

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enough, there's a pervasive and systematic correlation between what you see through the left lens and what you see through the right lens.

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And it's not just that this is a route factors and explanation for this fact, and the explanation is that these are two images of one of the same landscape being taken in slightly different ways.

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Right.

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So, what this analogy suggests is that well. There are systematic and pervasive correspondences between the sort of fact patterns of the manifest and scientific images and I think one way to see this is to think about how thoroughly in a sort of are developed

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sort of understanding of the world we rely on inter leaving patterns of explanation which deploy the kinds of ways of explaining things characteristic of science and then also the kinds of ways of explaining things characteristic of refine common sense

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and sellers, I think the analogies. See, suggests sees as a challenge on to explain how it is that these images or images of one in the same world of one and the same.

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in some deep sense underlying subject matter.

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Okay.

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So, with those features of the analogy in mind I what I call the stereoscopic challenge is to render this claim unity that the pervasive correlations between the images is explained by there being images of in some sense, the same subject matter intelligible

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without giving up either realism or some kind of quasi realistic commitment by vindicating, in some sense, the two images.

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and circumscribed the kind of approach that I'm going to be focusing on today, something that the approaches of sellers and Macbeth share. I just want to point out that they are, in a sense, naturalistic in both cases.

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So in a sense, both approaches aim to meet the stereoscopic challenge by explaining that the facts of the scientific image jointly constitute or amount to the normative significances which are inherent in the manifest image.

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Now, I, of course, don't mean to suggest in any way that this kind of naturalism would come in us to any kind of reductive is.

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So sellers famously as all discuss is in one sense reductive about the relation and in another sense not reductive about the relation, and also just that Macbeth is more thoroughgoing Lee, non reductive about the relation between the natural and the normative.

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But nonetheless, I think.

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Both.

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Both philosophers adopt a strategy that broadly construed in the sense is is naturalistic that if we begin with the world that science tells us that it is and we seek to understand how anything in that world could amount to the kind of order which is

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intelligible as normatively significant ok ok ok I'm done.

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All right. So just a couple of examples of the kind of dilemma that we face.

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That sort of sellers is responding to in posing for us his characterization of the philosophical question.

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So here's one, it's I've raised it as just a historical example to try and impress, sort of, that this is really as at least as old as modern philosophy.

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And then the other thing is, I think it's a sort of cautionary tale about what happens if we don't adopt something like a naturalistic approach or at least what we risk run the risk of having happened.

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So, Elizabeth famously asked a cart, how material Substances Act on or get acted on by non material mental substances Descartes responds.

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He feels the force of this word he says, you know he famously already acknowledges in the meditations that there's got to be some kind of unity of mind and body that's stronger than say the unity of a sailor driving the ship.

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But what he says is that the idea of this unity is primitive, it's one of the primitive ideas on what to all of our other knowledge is packed in it so it's primitively intelligible for Descartes it's intelligible but not explicable on his view.

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So, notice that on. In this sense, Descartes is taking what I would call a flying leap on the stereoscopic challenge, he's hoping that it makes sense how our world, sort of cleaved between two fundamental kinds of substances together form and integrated

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whole explanatory connected integrated whole. It's just, he hopes immediately clear.

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If it's not, and I in fact worry that it's not I don't think it is to me.

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Then we have something like an image of two parallel, that are related but not intelligibly related. Um, and what we get is a kind of unity but the unity of the Jason see not the unity of overlap.

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So, what you get is the kind of view that you get when you have say some 3d or Oculus Rift sort of binocular stereoscopic vision images imposed side by side like this, this is not the kind of unity, we want, we want one dog, rather than two, and then

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just a second example, um, which us closer to sort of the setup of the problem that I'm

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addressing is from Matt.

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This is part of Mackey's famous argument from weirdness, so I'm makki importantly, sort of thinks of the essential sort of cleavage between these two ways of thinking about the world as between the normative and the non normative that's sort of the aspect

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that I'm focusing on. That's more like the setup. The other thing is that makki is committed to taking what I call a naturalistic strategy. So what he says we have to do.

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Right, well, is to explain. What is the connection between the fact that an action is a piece of deliberate cruelty he means us to read this non normatively which is maybe absurd but that's another issue, and the moral fact that it is wrong.

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It cannot be entailed mental logical OR semantic necessity, yet it is not merely that the two features occur together. The wrongness must somehow be consequential or super lenient is wrong because it is a piece of deliberate cruelty, but just what in

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It is wrong because it is a piece of deliberate cruelty, but just what in the world is signified by this because, and how do we know that the relation that it signifies obtain so this is from ethics.

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And so, makki thinks that we do have to adopt a naturalistic strategy, and he just despairs of finding.

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Okay, so what's the plan for the rest of the talk. So first I'm going to discuss an approach to the stereoscopic challenge that I find in sellers. I call this approach the integrated language approach.

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Second, I'm going to argue that there's a mathematical reason to doubt that this approach will succeed, purely transferring that competent Oryx mixed with a little philosophy of science.

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Next, describe.

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I'm going to describe an alternative approach a narrative approach from Danielle Macbeth, which I claim is resistant to these kinds of mathematical worries so on this approach, the normative and the non normative exhibit a kind of unity and integration

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that is a irreducibly narratively explicable, and I'm going to try and argue that it resists the kind of worry that I raise for sellers.

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And then finally I'm going to suggest that something like this narrative approach or something like an appreciation of its explanatory power is implicit already in some sellers is writing, and then recognizing this can help us read him in particular I

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think it can help us make more sense of rhetorical tendencies of his that are otherwise I think quite puzzling in particular what I, in the written version of this paper sum up as his propensity to philosophize in Legends.

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I think that's an implicit recognition of the power of this kind of approach.

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Okay.

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32 minutes. Okay. So, as I say I call sellers a strategy, the integrated language approach to making intelligible the relation of the normative to the natural scientific and I call it that because I think in a slogan, what he's doing or what he suggests

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is that we can fashion or images of the world into one image of an integrated whole by fashioning our language into an integrated whole.

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And the way that I think he thinks we can do this is by exploiting what he calls the causal reduce ability of the normal to the non normative.

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So, the normative is not logically reducible to the natural scientific according to sellers. So thank his remark and empiricism and Flossie mind that to think the epidemic is reducible to the non epidemic with however he lavishes sprinkling of some junk

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lives in hypotheticals is a radical mistake of a piece with the naturalistic fallacy and ethics.

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There is no normative plane which means the same as a non normative claim, and it would be doing something like the naturalistic fallacy to think that in the normative domain of ethics, or the normative domains of, say, philosophical psychology or semantics,

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which are also a normative because a crucial aspect of the way in which our, our lives are normatively inflicted on the epidemic ways.

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But it is seller says causally reasonable.

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And what he means by that is, he thinks that their equivalence is between normative claims and what we can think of as something like their footprints in the causal order so for example and equivalents like bees utterance you meant it is raining, if and

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if k of being you or see you Zach day was reckless and unwarranted if and only if jF CNA or the left hand side is normatively charged so as I say, sellers thinks that even even semantic claims are normatively charged and the right hand side is in a language

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that sort of suitable for doing natural science and so in symmetrical solution to the mind body problem, he's thinking mostly about behavior risks but I argument a footnote of the paper that really, he's committed to the claim that we could do this in

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fundamental physics just as well as we could do it and behavior respects just wouldn't work.

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And as I mentioned in the slide.

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In some magical solutions of the mind body problem, he breaks us into three steps, he doesn't actually argue for this he says I'm not going to argue for these claims but he's makes it pretty clear that he believes them to be true that the ethical facts

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are sort of reducible on in terms of their causal footprint to psychological facts and then the psychological to semantic facts facts about behavior semantically characterized and then those in turn to facts about behavior, characterized without the use

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of semantic videos.

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Okay, so these kinds of equivalents.

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I claim, are the kind of sutures that sellers things we can use to sort of splice, the two images together at bottom.

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Let me say a little bit more about, in light of my claim about their importance, right. So, they're not a cool lenses meeting, I just actually just reproduced the thing that I said in the last slide.

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Sellers says they're supposed to be extension equivalencies in the semantic solution paper, but he clearly means they're not supposed to just be any kind of truth functional equivalencies so.

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For one thing, the whole point of the paper is that these equivalencies are supposed to exhibit a kind of, reduce ability of the normative to the natural, which you don't get just by claiming that two things just happen to fight, claiming that we can

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furnish to form sets of formula that have the same truth is.

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The other thing is that they're the kind of things that scientists can discover, he says, and he also says that the left hand side is supposed to convey the information that the right hand side, the sort of scientific side states, so they're supposed

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to be stronger than just any kind of equivalent says which have the same truth value I'm going to argue later that to do the work that he needs them to do they need to be necessary.

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Okay, so how does having such a battery of equivalent says render the relation of the normative and the natural intelligible as well.

00:19:03.000 --> 00:19:23.000
Um, well, such equivalence is, I think, provide us the tools with which to make the kinds of characterizations that are relevant for what he says, when he talks about joining the image images at the end of flaws in scientific image of man.

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So this famous quotation. He says we joined the images when by considering the actions we do and the circumstances in which we do intend to do them in scientific terms, we directly relate the world as conceived by scientific theories our purposes, and

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make it our world, and no longer an alien appendage to the world in which we do are living. Right, so the kinds of circumstances in which we're performing our action that are sort of relevant to rationalizing our actions the kinds of ones that are relevant

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in our practical cognition, are the ones that are normatively significant, the kind that are give reasons to action. And so to be able to characterize those circumstances in scientific terms.

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What we need is the kind of equivalence that witnesses the reduce ability of this situation which I have a reason for action to some set of physical circumstances.

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And I think the idea is that once we have this sort of body of doctrine that makes explicit and witnesses. The reduce ability in terms of causal footprint of the kind of order that is exhibited in our normatively laden activity to the kind of order.

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That is exhibited in the causal order of physics, then a sort of mystery about the connection fades away, so I like to compare here, the kind of thing that Patricia church one says about the explanatory gap in the philosophy of mind, where what she says

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is that it's a confusion to think that um no

00:20:59.000 --> 00:21:12.000
neuroscientific facts could explain anything about psycho like psychological conscious experience, and this confusion is one of the fact that we just don't know enough about neuroscience.

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Yeah.

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And if we if we had a really strong and thoroughgoing conception of the kind of order.

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That is manifest in the experiential goings on that are underwritten by our brain the explanatory gap would disappear. And so here I think the thought could be something like the same.

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There's still of course a semantic gap, they're not the same, you're not saying the same thing, when you characterize the circumstances that that more interaction in naturalistic terms.

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But there isn't an explanatory gap anymore because you have such a crystal in picture of the kind of order that fits these two pictures together. I think that's not an implausible hope.

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It's only that I think we can't get these equivalencies to witness the reduce ability.

00:22:02.000 --> 00:22:19.000
And here's why I think, I think there's a cardinality problem for the integrated language approach. And I'm taking this basically from an argument that's shows up in the Cornell realists work on moral naturalism, it shows up in a sturgeon paper, a paper

00:22:19.000 --> 00:22:30.000
by Nicola Sturgeon and he cites it to Boyd, but he cites I think the size of paper in which I don't actually see the argument showing up but Boyd makes it very similar argument, so related purposes in a different paper.

00:22:30.000 --> 00:22:44.000
So the basic worry is that there are too many ways in which some properties might be constructively connected right too many ways in which the natural order might have to map on to

00:22:44.000 --> 00:22:54.000
the normative order, and not enough formula level causal reducing equivalence is for this approach to be likely complete double, even in principle. So there are two steps.

00:22:54.000 --> 00:23:02.000
First step is to meet argue that to meet the stereoscopic a challenge, the causal reducing equivalencies have to be necessary says.

00:23:02.000 --> 00:23:17.000
And then the second part is to argue that in a usable language of physics, we can only stay comfortably many possible causal reducing equivalent says, but there are uncountable many candidates for how the normative and the, the natural scientific can

00:23:17.000 --> 00:23:20.000
hang together to choose from. And so there's.

00:23:20.000 --> 00:23:30.000
It is not reasonable to expect that one of the candidate equivalents is that we can state, actually matches the kind of order, that these two realms.

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Collectively, exhibit.

00:23:33.000 --> 00:23:53.000
So sellers is not a think that the normative is logically reducible to the natural, but his notion of causal reduce ability does invite a kind of linguistic imply a kind of linguistic or disability which I claim for common tutorial reasons is untenable.

00:23:53.000 --> 00:24:11.000
Okay, so here's why I think that the with the equivalence is that witness causal or disability need to be necessary. So, suppose to the contrary that your formula was something like this x other by y means it is raining if and only if, k of x and y, or

00:24:11.000 --> 00:24:28.000
if you like substitute as is more appropriate for the present circumstances, the equivalence between a moral claim, and a natural scientific claim. Suppose that holds for all, a language actual languages but not all possible languages that is either there's

00:24:28.000 --> 00:24:39.000
a possible language for which the physical property holes in the semantic property doesn't or vice versa. There's a possible language for what's the semantic property holds, but the physical property doesn't.

00:24:39.000 --> 00:24:54.000
Well, then, think about how this kind of equivalents figures and the explanation of how the world manages to fix the meaning of some other bits. It figures incomplete, because you need something else going on.

00:24:54.000 --> 00:25:01.000
A to have cooperated with the physics satisfying the formula k of xy.

00:25:01.000 --> 00:25:13.000
In order to be not to be thrown into one of the possible worlds where that is either not necessary or not sufficient for the semantic proper obtaining.

00:25:13.000 --> 00:25:28.000
But if your knowledge of the relation is limited to causal reducing equivalents. If that's your cognitive contact with the way in which the normative in the non normative world's hang together than by hypothesis, you don't have the complete explanation.

00:25:28.000 --> 00:25:44.000
You're left with something mysterious. So that's why I think if you are going to go in for a causal reducing equivalence as a witness to the intelligibility of the normative and natural hang together you need them to be necessary.

00:25:44.000 --> 00:26:00.000
Okay, now a competent oral argument about why we can't have this, there are too many properties so the first premises there at least as many physical properties and bodies and utterances, so I'm running this argument again, so my apologies, with us semantic

00:26:00.000 --> 00:26:15.000
case. Just because it just feels more closely to sort of the source material but I claim that you could run this argument you run this argument at a higher level with the case of something like a moral obligation, as well as there's many physical properties

00:26:15.000 --> 00:26:22.000
of bodies and utterances as there are functions which take possible worlds as inputs and give subsets of body odor in pairs and those worlds is outputs.

00:26:22.000 --> 00:26:36.000
So, the thinking behind this is that each such function gives you a set of extensions in all possible works, a body utterance pairs. And so for each different set of extensions and all possible worlds you have what theoretically, you don't can be considered

00:26:36.000 --> 00:26:55.000
a different property. Now, if they're infinitely many possible worlds in which their body organs pairs that it falls by cancer serum that there are uncountable many physical properties of bodies and utterances.

00:26:55.000 --> 00:27:08.000
Next, any usable language of fundamental physics or physics and chemistry or physics and chemistry and behavior respects or whatever you like will include finally many primitive terms and admit a formula only have a finite length.

00:27:08.000 --> 00:27:17.000
Now, it follows from three that any such language school only contain comfortably many formula.

00:27:17.000 --> 00:27:32.000
Now, from this we say that for any usable language of fundamental physics there are the uncountable many properties which are not designated by any formula of that language, and only counted Lee many, which are designated by some formula.

00:27:32.000 --> 00:27:48.000
Okay so, following that I have a kind of principle of indifference so now we have the argument that right there, there, there, and uncomfortably many different physical properties that could correspond to a semantic property but only counted how many

00:27:48.000 --> 00:27:51.000
physical formula with which to name them.

00:27:51.000 --> 00:28:03.000
So now here's an indifference principle, if x is an F and comfortably many apps are G's, whereas uncomfortably many apps are not G's, and we have no strong positive reason to expect that acts as a G, which would not expect to be a G.

00:28:03.000 --> 00:28:18.000
We should not expect x to be a G. And I think there's, there's a way of with measure theory making this precise had just how sparse any uncountable set is going to be an accountant or any accountable set is going to be in an uncountable set, which I think makes this principle of indifference

00:28:18.000 --> 00:28:20.000
eminently plausible.

00:28:20.000 --> 00:28:40.000
Now putting these together. Well also with the premise that we don't have a strong positive reason to expect that an arbitrary magical psychological or moral predicate is necessarily essentially equivalent to a predicate of a given usable language of

00:28:40.000 --> 00:28:54.000
Putting four and five together. We ice claimed that we should not expect there to exist causal reducing equivalence is to witness the causal or disability for every moral psychological or semantic claim in an ideal language of fundamental physics or of

00:28:54.000 --> 00:29:03.000
an ideal language of whatever science, you like. That's the cardinality argument that I have. Okay, so where does this leave us, what's the alternative.

00:29:03.000 --> 00:29:07.000
Well, I suggest there's a narrative alternate.

00:29:07.000 --> 00:29:19.000
How do we account for the relationship of the normative and the natural scientific orders, without being able to enumerate those facts that are necessary and sufficient to constitute normative significances.

00:29:19.000 --> 00:29:31.000
Well, I think that Danielle Macbeth book, realizing reason provides us a kind of exemplar of the kind of approach that can be workable for doing this.

00:29:31.000 --> 00:29:46.000
So, this book is a sustained effort to try and make it intelligible that in the natural world, there could grow up, beings capable of knowing how things are in themselves the same for all rational beings.

00:29:46.000 --> 00:29:59.000
For my purposes, I'm just going to take a very small initial part of what's going on in the book, of which is already illustrative of the approach. So this is from chapter one, entitled where we begin.

00:29:59.000 --> 00:30:06.000
And so, in that chapter we have a schematic narrative not of how it comes to pass that,

00:30:06.000 --> 00:30:20.000
there came to be rational beings capable of knowing how things are in themselves the same for all rational things but at least how that came to be sacred beings capable of knowing, knowing things, and knowing how things are in spite of appearances.

00:30:20.000 --> 00:30:41.000
So there's a schematic narrative about how it came to pass that things became significant in the relevant way so things became epidemic Lee significant how there became no wars and so how things became how things became intelligible as rational or irrational,

00:30:41.000 --> 00:30:54.000
and I think though it's not the focus of this chapter. By the same token, you can apply this approach to thinking about how things became significant as a wicked or

00:30:54.000 --> 00:30:59.000
kind or impermissible wrong or right.

00:30:59.000 --> 00:31:06.000
The idea is how they're understand how there might come to be any animals we're rational animals at all.

00:31:06.000 --> 00:31:10.000
In this chapter and, like, in SSM be.

00:31:10.000 --> 00:31:24.000
This is broken up into three steps. So there's a kind of schematic approach to explaining how out of an inanimate world, there could become a living world, and the attendance significance is of living world with things that are significant is healthy

00:31:24.000 --> 00:31:28.000
or unhealthy, you know, nourishing and so on and so forth.

00:31:28.000 --> 00:31:43.000
From there, how we could go from a world in which they're living things but there are no cultural practices to a world in which there are cultural practices, and the attendant significance, involving cultural practices so that is cultural propriety things

00:31:43.000 --> 00:31:47.000
that we do or things that we don't do for some week.

00:31:47.000 --> 00:32:06.000
And then there's a kind of schematic narrative account of how we could go from a world in which their cultural practitioners, but they're not beings, capable of knowledge of how things are in the world in spite of appearances, to a world in which there

00:32:06.000 --> 00:32:11.000
are judges, and the normative significance is which attend.

00:32:11.000 --> 00:32:15.000
such beatings.

00:32:15.000 --> 00:32:22.000
So why would taking a narrative approach, health, in the face of the problem.

00:32:22.000 --> 00:32:25.000
Well, I think it helps.

00:32:25.000 --> 00:32:40.000
Taking Macbeth example of biological evolution to think about an account of say the emergence of his characteristics, significance significance is characteristic of the animal kingdom.

00:32:40.000 --> 00:32:57.000
So, with biological evolution, Macbeth says we have an account of the emergence of the significance is that is neither reductive nor mechanistic, which makes reference and eliminate Lee to the kind of border that we see being realized, but it's not defeatist

00:32:57.000 --> 00:33:12.000
or obscurantist like that claims. Okay, why is it not defeat us, or experience as well. I claim that an account that is defeatist for obscurantist is so because it leaves us with exponential without an explanation things to be explained but no explanation

00:33:12.000 --> 00:33:20.000
for them. And it denies or forecloses the possibility of providing further explanations for them.

00:33:20.000 --> 00:33:31.000
emergence narratives, like the narratives we get an evolution about say the origin of the animal kingdom, or evolution augmented by a theory of a bio Genesis about the origin of life as such.

00:33:31.000 --> 00:33:36.000
Right. These are indefinitely definable in a sense that will specify.

00:33:36.000 --> 00:33:46.000
So what that means is, well, you take a snapshot of say crude protein. right somewhere in the somewhere in the phylogenetic tree.

00:33:46.000 --> 00:34:04.000
We have something that's evolved, that it may be difficult or impossible for us to say whether they're animals or not. Well, no matter. It's still, we can still make perfectly clear how it is that, starting with a world with no animals, there came to

00:34:04.000 --> 00:34:08.000
be the kind of border characteristic of a world with animals.

00:34:08.000 --> 00:34:23.000
By figure, saying how they figure in an emergence narrative that is by saying how such true proto animals might have, or if we get the relevant data in fact did develop from yet cruder yet less animal like beings.

00:34:23.000 --> 00:34:41.000
And by saying how they might have, or if we get the right data, how they in fact did develop into things that get further resemble the kind of order that animal lives exhibit and we can do this even if we can't productively account for what that kind

00:34:41.000 --> 00:34:56.000
of border is that is we even if all that we can do is we can describe it in terms but eliminate really make use of a sort of reference to that that kind of work.

00:34:56.000 --> 00:35:07.000
And the same is true for the other kinds of order that I say are constitutive of normatively significant world.

00:35:07.000 --> 00:35:26.000
So about about 10 minutes. Okay, perfect. Okay, so take a snapshot of the world in which there is a crude pro animals as I mentioned, proto organisms or proto cultural practitioners, proto judgers on, you may not be able to say, without puzzle reducing

00:35:26.000 --> 00:35:36.000
equivalence is there are situations of what your I claimed you just won't there just won't be an answer, even vagueness aside.

00:35:36.000 --> 00:35:55.000
Given a physical characterization on whether these things are organisms or proto practitioner or practitioners or sapiens, but we can achieve further explanatory refinement achieve an understanding of how it is that the world populated by quirks and leptons

00:35:55.000 --> 00:36:09.000
was always already invested with potential significance is it always harbored the potential to be ordered in the ways characteristic of life or in the ways characteristic of rational lives by filling in missing links in the narrative, and I have this

00:36:09.000 --> 00:36:21.000
I'm filling in missing links in the narrative, and I have this little picture here. This is a picture of a little marble elevator to try it an analogy, this isn't in the printed version of the paper because there isn't room.

00:36:21.000 --> 00:36:29.000
I want to try out this analogy it's maybe slightly complicated, but I hope, I hope that at all. I hope that'll help I'm curious to know whether you think it helps.

00:36:29.000 --> 00:36:49.000
So, imagine that you have, representing any, the state of the state of the Earth at any given point in time a little magnetic ball bearing rolling around a room so painted blue with some little green continents to make it more suggestive.

00:36:49.000 --> 00:37:02.000
So wherever it is in the room right it's coordinates parameter eyes how things are in the world right it's of course absurd to think that we could prioritize how things are in the world and informative way with three parameters, but let's subtract from

00:37:02.000 --> 00:37:17.000
that absurdity. So imagine the ball is rolling around and as it rolls around that represents things changing in the world. And imagine that the room is magnetized in such a way that as things are changing in the world.

00:37:17.000 --> 00:37:32.000
Right, as things are changing in the world. Um, it's it's it's difficult or intractable like the sort of, you know, free body problem and gravitational dynamics is intractable to give us sort of explicit formula for how things are going to keep unfolding

00:37:32.000 --> 00:37:53.000
but nonetheless it unfolds, according to what a set of laws sense about how it will unfold. Now, imagine in this model that in this room, our machines like this marble elevators, which, if the ball bearing gets stuck in and do some kind of border in the

00:37:53.000 --> 00:38:08.000
way in which the world is evolved, the way in which the state of the world of all these are the kinds of orders. These are supposed to represent in a very sort of rough schematic way, the kinds of order that I claim is sort of constitutive of things unfolding

00:38:08.000 --> 00:38:17.000
in a normative ordered way, in some sense, whether it be the emergence of life or the emergence of thinking beings, etc.

00:38:17.000 --> 00:38:20.000
So, up.

00:38:20.000 --> 00:38:26.000
What you have is, if you suppose that at some point.

00:38:26.000 --> 00:38:37.000
This Marvel elevator catches the ball, it sort of is bouncing around and eventually settles in an exhibit to kind of order, you have a kind of order that's now being exhibited in the world.

00:38:37.000 --> 00:38:52.000
You might think, if the say the elevators also moving around and it's still describing a very complicated path. You can't say in sort of explicit in an explicit closed formula, what path, the ball is now following now that it's on the Marvel elevate,

00:38:52.000 --> 00:39:02.000
and it may there may be many other kinds of elevators that the ball could have ended up on which are exhibit different kinds of orders and, you know, it's hard to specify now.

00:39:02.000 --> 00:39:18.000
But we can nonetheless say at any given point when the ball is sort of bouncing around and settling in there is in principle historical account of what forces were acting on it and how to get the the marble to settle into this kind of order to get it

00:39:18.000 --> 00:39:28.000
to get closer to just settling down and rolling around and of what it is, once it really is settled down into the kind of border into spite this thing.

00:39:28.000 --> 00:39:43.000
Now I'm not claiming that the kind of order of life is like a ontological pre exists life actually emerging the role in the model of this ball elevator though it's sort of misleading, because it's it's a physical object in the model.

00:39:43.000 --> 00:39:56.000
It really you should think of it as somehow a force field which manages to act like a ball elevator it's not ontological it's just the forces are aligned in such a way that if things go in a certain way, a certain kind of order merges, and you can tell

00:39:56.000 --> 00:40:11.000
the story of how things settled into that order, without being able to give a closed formula that describes what that order is, and you can indefinitely refine that sort of story step by step of how that order emerges.

00:40:11.000 --> 00:40:24.000
And in this context I think it's really useful to think about that view from one perspective terrestrial life on earth is a particular, it's one big tree like spatial temporal extended event.

00:40:24.000 --> 00:40:38.000
And it may be that the many warring definitions of life come from as a result of the fact that, well, there are many interesting ways in which this particular exhibits a kind of orders that we don't see in the non living parts of the universe.

00:40:38.000 --> 00:40:48.000
And no one is necessarily privileged and there may not be a good productive way to sum up what this kind of order is but we can point to it. We have cognitive contact with it because we're living it right.

00:40:48.000 --> 00:40:56.000
We can point to it and say, this kind of order has emerged, about five minutes. Yes, thank you very much. All right, so that's that's not what the analogy.

00:40:56.000 --> 00:41:13.000
So then my last five minutes, I want to discuss a little bit about why I think it's relevant to bring to keep in mind this kind of a narrative approach and its usefulness in reading sellers.

00:41:13.000 --> 00:41:24.000
So, sellers notoriously realize in a bunch of different places on sort of parables are legends or it's something that looks kind of like historical speculation.

00:41:24.000 --> 00:41:48.000
So, for example, in empiricism and philosophy of mind you have the myth of Jones, you have the legend of the original image in which the fundamental objects were only person's been pruned into what we now recognized today as the manifest image, we have

00:41:48.000 --> 00:42:01.000
in the level of Archimedes where he's illustrating a point about the acquisitions color concepts or I'm in languages thought and communication.

00:42:01.000 --> 00:42:15.000
This can be puzzling. Um, I think, in, in particular, I think the you know the legend of the the original image was kind of dumbfounded when I first read philosophy in the scientific image of man because it's like, you know what the nerve of this guy

00:42:15.000 --> 00:42:23.000
to say this without any kind of anthropological evidence but you know it's clear he's doing he's doing something here right.

00:42:23.000 --> 00:42:36.000
The Myth of Jones is the one that I'm going to take as sort of my central focus. So, what I think is interesting about the myth of Jones is that one thing to see sellers as doing here is a rational reconstruction.

00:42:36.000 --> 00:42:37.000
Right.

00:42:37.000 --> 00:42:48.000
The idea is that if there is a way in which things could have unfolded in which the theory of thoughts right could have been positive as a theory.

00:42:48.000 --> 00:42:57.000
And so positing it puts it in good order then, in some sense, we are in. We are in good standing to use it now.

00:42:57.000 --> 00:43:10.000
Something that's something analogous to what people might do in political theory and telling us sort of mythical origin narrative of our political order in terms of something that we could rationally agree to.

00:43:10.000 --> 00:43:21.000
And I think it's definitely right that this is one of the things that sellers is trying to do with them at the John's but if that's all that he's doing then I think it's really hard to make sense of what he says at the end of empiricism philosophy of

00:43:21.000 --> 00:43:35.000
mine, which is, but as my myth, Amir myth, or does the reader recognize in it. So, the man in his journey from the grunts and groans of the cave to the poly dimensional discourse of the salon or whatever exactly the wording is.

00:43:35.000 --> 00:43:45.000
These are clearly rhetorical questions, is my method method or does. Do you recognize human beings, and the answers are supposed to be a no and yes, respectively.

00:43:45.000 --> 00:43:48.000
Um, so why I think that is.

00:43:48.000 --> 00:44:02.000
And this is just this is not any kind of a reading of the myth of Jones or of these other sorts of parables from sellers but just a sort of program for what we might look for and help them to understand what they're doing for sellers.

00:44:02.000 --> 00:44:23.000
It's a program for reading these legendary fix of sellers, is to think that what he's onto some of the details that make up this myth are speculative hypotheses about emergence emergence narratives right so this is something like, even though of course,

00:44:23.000 --> 00:44:38.000
some of the details need to be abstracted away from right there wasn't a guy called Jones, or any other guy who were women or non binary person who was who said, oh, here I have this theory to explain why people are conduct themselves rational even when

00:44:38.000 --> 00:44:41.000
they're not explaining what they're doing.

00:44:41.000 --> 00:44:54.000
But nonetheless, there's something about the inflection the order in which things are realized the the the structure that's induced by asking over and over again, and then what happened.

00:44:54.000 --> 00:45:09.000
Something about that structure, I think, is supposed to in an abstract way be reflected in these narratives, and I think an implicit appreciation of the narrative approach is might be an explanation of why it is that that sellers is philosophizing in

00:45:09.000 --> 00:45:16.000
this way. Okay. So with that I'll thank you very much for listening and I look forward to your questions.

00:45:16.000 --> 00:45:28.000
Okay.

00:45:28.000 --> 00:45:45.000
Thank you very much, Zach, and so we will now open it up to questions and I think it is appropriate that Danielle should get the first question.

00:45:45.000 --> 00:45:47.000
You don't need. Yep.

00:45:47.000 --> 00:45:56.000
Okay, well thanks doc that was, that was really interesting, and I have I have I have lots of thoughts mostly.

00:45:56.000 --> 00:46:02.000
You know, mostly just sort of responses but yeah this is.

00:46:02.000 --> 00:46:12.000
Anyway, so I will just, I will give you some methods. First I actually do have a suggestion about about the technical, the technical argument.

00:46:12.000 --> 00:46:22.000
You might want to look at a piece by Dan barn evac, who by the way is a Haverford graduate not yet.

00:46:22.000 --> 00:46:22.000
And he is defending

00:46:22.000 --> 00:46:41.000
He is defending substitution interpretation of the qualifiers, and you have the structural the similar problem that we there's only. There's only, I mean he's even allowing most poser infinitely many names, we quantify over non renewable domains in mathematics,

00:46:41.000 --> 00:46:52.000
how are we going to have a substitution approach we're going to run out of names. And so he gives a technical result of that, I think, I think might find interesting.

00:46:52.000 --> 00:46:58.000
Great, I talked a little bit about it in Section six one of

00:46:58.000 --> 00:47:18.000
second I really want to just sort of underlying, and so here I'm sort of going, I guess, some of the concerns that you raised about sellers, even if that technical thing can be dealt with that the importance of the idea that there's no sharp boundary

00:47:18.000 --> 00:47:33.000
which which, as you emphasize sellers seems to be committed to by his equivalencies. And I think, I think that's really important I think that's coming on addicted shine already that that you know in like the reading machine passages.

00:47:33.000 --> 00:47:50.000
It just isn't that kind of thing where there are short boundaries that suggests the more narrative approach on. And also, and of course, realizing reason is is incredibly he Galen, and I really think we need to say well you know hey go have this, the

00:47:50.000 --> 00:47:52.000
narrative.

00:47:52.000 --> 00:48:11.000
And all the, the, the notion of life for Hegel the notion of life is absolutely fundamental and and similarly for me that that that's where you've got to start and and again we sellers, and I think it's so interesting because it's almost as if this is

00:48:11.000 --> 00:48:29.000
you know sellers is inheriting this dichotomy of the merely physical and the as it were hyper rational, and then it's like, wow, how do we get those two things together and it, it looks impossible, but it's because you're not looking at anything in between.

00:48:29.000 --> 00:48:35.000
So I think, you know, I think that was, that was really, really helpful.

00:48:35.000 --> 00:48:41.000
On your your your last point about about this.

00:48:41.000 --> 00:48:47.000
The the narrative strands and sellers, I think, I think that's really, That's really insightful.

00:48:47.000 --> 00:49:00.000
And it's an example of what you're talking about, because, you know, I'm, I'm a student of sellers and I'm pulling out of sellers something that you're saying is look it's potentially there in sellers.

00:49:00.000 --> 00:49:06.000
Right. Yes, right. What Tell me, works. Yeah, sellers.

00:49:06.000 --> 00:49:19.000
Right, yeah. He has these, yes, these new ideas, but he's being pulled back by some of the ideas he inherits from his staff. So very, very interesting.

00:49:19.000 --> 00:49:20.000
Thank you.

00:49:20.000 --> 00:49:24.000
Thanks. Thanks so much.

00:49:24.000 --> 00:49:28.000
Oh,

00:49:28.000 --> 00:49:41.000
by Rich. Thank you very much, Daiquiri and welcome to the tribes. You made what fighting the French Revolution.

00:49:41.000 --> 00:49:48.000
I would like to come back to the very point you ended the wheels.

00:49:48.000 --> 00:50:09.000
About. Should we read the me as near me, and okay i i agree that there is obviously much more than the kind of rhetorical.

00:50:09.000 --> 00:50:12.000
You're here.

00:50:12.000 --> 00:50:35.000
And something that I have been meaning to do for a while and, obviously, I won't do it so maybe you could consider it for your PhD is to compare the US that sellers that have all those artifacts, like the beef of Jones, especially the Mr.

00:50:35.000 --> 00:50:51.000
Jones, but also the distinction between the manifest and the scientific image and so forth. And he compared the youth that he makes of those narrative, with the way.

00:50:51.000 --> 00:51:03.000
Modern philosophers, like, to so I know that we, we, French, and have a good way to save your soul.

00:51:03.000 --> 00:51:08.000
And the idea of the social contract.

00:51:08.000 --> 00:51:12.000
And he is young. Yeah, who never existed.

00:51:12.000 --> 00:51:18.000
Probably won't ever exist, and had never existed blah blah blah.

00:51:18.000 --> 00:51:39.000
And, and is that just a fiction, and what's the use of fiction and, obviously, it's more than just the correction, or it has more than a pedagogical intent and, for instance, and that goes in your way.

00:51:39.000 --> 00:51:48.000
For instance, this idea that, for, for instance, language is primer.

00:51:48.000 --> 00:52:12.000
Compared to soap, of course, logically, or chronologically. It's not true. We think equal talk, but psychology of development since seems to back, Sarah speculation that is young children, they learn to refer to themselves as.

00:52:12.000 --> 00:52:25.000
It's a, and for Mike before they're able to say, I, because they have to master the separate brands and the, the concept.

00:52:25.000 --> 00:52:35.000
So maybe you could maybe that's a very traditional technique that is boring.

00:52:35.000 --> 00:52:46.000
Modern philosophers, and the issues of addiction as the social contract, what would you what you do, what would you say about that.

00:52:46.000 --> 00:52:48.000
Yeah, you have in mind.

00:52:48.000 --> 00:53:03.000
Um, it's not something I really thought about explicitly much But yeah, as you suggested I think you're definitely right there's so there's is of course this sense in which the, sort of, you know, social contracts are being built out of state of nature

00:53:03.000 --> 00:53:07.000
is is a kind of fiction, but then at the same time, right.

00:53:07.000 --> 00:53:26.000
It is a historical fact I think at least, that, you know, I'm out of a mill you in which there were animals who are socially organized in in families in small tribes there emerged, the, the, kind of order, that's characteristic of political and that's

00:53:26.000 --> 00:53:44.000
a kind of order that was potentially sort of seated in the world and under the right conditions it became realized, and it has a, it has, you know, if not the sort of explicit order all thought out proceeding the thing bits of, I'm sure you know conceptual

00:53:44.000 --> 00:53:58.000
thought and planning and stuff in faltering and holding ways, directing it in one way or another, a little bit though of course you know the total development is in a way, you know, out of any one person's or even any one group of peoples control.

00:53:58.000 --> 00:54:10.000
Um, so yeah I'm, I'm, I'm totally on on board with that comparison, I just I I don't know how much I can do with it just because I know so little about political philosophy.

00:54:10.000 --> 00:54:15.000
But I think that's a great point.

00:54:15.000 --> 00:54:20.000
Nicholas.

00:54:20.000 --> 00:54:23.000
Thanks, back.

00:54:23.000 --> 00:54:31.000
I've got a question about the cardinality argument, and maybe I just misunderstood it but anyways here's, here's the here's the thing.

00:54:31.000 --> 00:54:44.000
So you've got, we got like metaphysical categories. In this case, scientific stuff of science the physical stuff and the stuff of the manifest damage which is all the other stuff.

00:54:44.000 --> 00:54:51.000
And you got theories about them your scientific theories and then with your in you describe it, yeah just image.

00:54:51.000 --> 00:55:02.000
Now when people are interested in reductive programs, it seems to me that usually what they're interested in is saying that the metaphysical stuff is actually identical.

00:55:02.000 --> 00:55:07.000
And the way you pull off the program is by showing how to translate.

00:55:07.000 --> 00:55:09.000
One of the theories into the other one.

00:55:09.000 --> 00:55:17.000
Now translate one theory into another one you can't get a cardinality problem because they're both going to be accountable, and most accountable for it.

00:55:17.000 --> 00:55:18.000
Yeah.

00:55:18.000 --> 00:55:30.000
Yeah. so the problem you get is when you're trying to take the objects of a theory and match them onto the metaphysical categories which can be uncomfortable.

00:55:30.000 --> 00:55:39.000
Yeah, I think that's the problem here. Okay. Yeah. Um, but it seems to me what that shows is that you can't.

00:55:39.000 --> 00:55:48.000
You can't pull off the reduction, you can't show that. Yeah, the things that you're talking about in one category are the things you talked about in the other.

00:55:48.000 --> 00:56:01.000
Um, it doesn't show that they aren't right because it's not a metaphysical claims to claim about how the theory and the things mismatch. like it was the numbers of the things mismatch.

00:56:01.000 --> 00:56:07.000
So what is your argument actually shows is that you can't do the reduction.

00:56:07.000 --> 00:56:22.000
But I don't know how problematic, that is, I mean well okay so here's why. Here's why I think that might not be terribly problematic, because when philosophers make reductive claims they almost never actually tried to do the reductions, or not believe

00:56:22.000 --> 00:56:36.000
yeah and it didn't work. Yeah. But besides that, like, they say, Hey, we should think about one class of things in the way we think about another class of things, but they never try to pull it off, you know, smart and placed in its job didn't show you

00:56:36.000 --> 00:56:52.000
which brain states are identical the pain and they just said hey, like here, here's the way that we should think about phenomenal states for mental states in general there, the metaphysical category is identical to the brain state category.

00:56:52.000 --> 00:57:04.000
They didn't try to pull off the reduction, what your demonstration shows is that the reduction sellers wants can't be pulled off. Yeah, it doesn't show that the.

00:57:04.000 --> 00:57:17.000
But if sellers is looking at reductions in the same way that philosophers almost always do. He's not going to try to do it anyways like it's still interesting that it can't be done, but phosphorus I'm interested in doing the reductions themselves.

00:57:17.000 --> 00:57:22.000
Anyhow, yeah. Uh, yeah.

00:57:22.000 --> 00:57:28.000
I mean, I with your bait with with your general observation I completely agree.

00:57:28.000 --> 00:57:47.000
I think the wrinkle here is that I'm arguing that for sellers, this reproducibility in principle that the idea that this reduction quoting principle be done is supposed to witness the possibility of getting something to make sense to us, right, the possibility

00:57:47.000 --> 00:58:06.000
of the normative world order and the world order that physics describes as hanging together in an intelligible way. So, if the end of the program is intelligibility, then it actually I think really does matter whether the thing can be carried off or not.

00:58:06.000 --> 00:58:24.000
And so the objection is not to some kind of sort of ontological some kind of sort of ontological constitution claim that's like in some in some deep sense right everything is made up of quirks and leptons and what have you, but.

00:58:24.000 --> 00:58:46.000
of how these things are made up of course, and leptons can be a fully delivered in the form of the kind of reduction that I'm claiming can't be done. So we need something else to get it to make sense is the thing.

00:58:46.000 --> 00:58:52.000
Jim.

00:58:52.000 --> 00:59:11.000
Hey, I thought that was really excellent, um, thank you. So a couple of different kinds of questions but one is on the narrative thing I mean so there's so many things that make make one want to just have Adams in the void, and persons.

00:59:11.000 --> 00:59:22.000
And he has this narrative and I'm going to do this tomorrow bit but he has this narrative in. I'm not going to do it too much so.

00:59:22.000 --> 00:59:27.000
In the fourth part of philosophy and the scientific image.

00:59:27.000 --> 00:59:40.000
And that narrative can also look over simple it can look like, oh sure there's higher level laws but look let's just go straight to identify everything with the objects of physics.

00:59:40.000 --> 00:59:52.000
Yeah, and I think if you look at it more closely he tells a narrative about how any given lower level, what it would really take for it to reduce the next upper level.

00:59:52.000 --> 01:00:08.000
Yeah, so it has to have in. So, especially he says in the context of evolutionary theory, then we're talking about goal directed behavior, he says, Yeah, he says that could be described just in terms of correlations or patterns.

01:00:08.000 --> 01:00:28.000
Yeah. But what he what he says is the crucial thing is that there are normal conditions quasi normative normal conditions for any functional level. And then there are breakdowns, and what the next lower level is especially good at explaining the breakdowns

01:00:28.000 --> 01:00:34.000
it's like done it's designed, it's in relation to the intentional Stan.

01:00:34.000 --> 01:00:48.000
And, like, Jeremy Coons and working with Mark Lang McDowell and argument you know you sellers this, it's clear that here you have to have the upper level kinds in view.

01:00:48.000 --> 01:01:02.000
So he's not just changing the subject to the lower level and saying the upper level was useful. He's saying the lower the next lower level targets the upper level normality conditions and its breakdowns.

01:01:02.000 --> 01:01:20.000
Yeah. Can off, it's a sketch. Yeah, we can offer explanations of both why it worked and why it didn't. So, I mean my just yeah bro is that it's a kind of sin chronic levels analog of the way he does diet chronic theory change.

01:01:20.000 --> 01:01:40.000
So Einstein doesn't just change the subject. He has to model Newton's kind yeah failures. And so, the one suggestion is that that's a narrative about how we get down to the bottom, and how you build back up to the top.

01:01:40.000 --> 01:01:54.000
But another observation is unfortunately in not unfortunately but it's highly significant that he begins psi am seven the final section by saying, Can we extend this all the way up.

01:01:54.000 --> 01:01:57.000
And he says, No.

01:01:57.000 --> 01:02:08.000
So he says that sort of model won't work for a logical reasoning concerning the reduce ability of the art to the years. But anyway, I'll be talking about that tomorrow.

01:02:08.000 --> 01:02:14.000
But the second. So first question is just there is a narrative that could really suit what you're doing. Yeah.

01:02:14.000 --> 01:02:27.000
And the second. I'm sorry I just missed really quickly. So, so, which what was the principal work that you're, you're citing is this as appearing in OPSIMPSIOIK right you know disability.

01:02:27.000 --> 01:02:42.000
Okay, I need to go back and read yeah that's for Seminary in mind. Yeah, the fascinating to me. Yeah, four sections called the scientific m&a deals, we've level yes night things get away from this thing sellers in colleges, And you have to read it a certain

01:02:42.000 --> 01:02:48.000
Yes. Yeah, it's just persons and and atoms in the boy. Yeah.

01:02:48.000 --> 01:02:57.000
But, and then, unfortunately, you know, Part Seven says you can't do that same thing all the way up. But yeah, but that's enough.

01:02:57.000 --> 01:03:06.000
Yeah, that relates to just the second question I had was just the footprint. Yeah, so those, those equivalents is in the semantic solution paper.

01:03:06.000 --> 01:03:12.000
I mean, ultimately says he rejects extension realism.

01:03:12.000 --> 01:03:15.000
He rejects that you're going to.

01:03:15.000 --> 01:03:30.000
I mean you can say this is because the sayings of x means yr conceptually reducible or logically irreducible. That's why you don't get the extension ality thesis because he denies you get the extension ality thesis in the end.

01:03:30.000 --> 01:03:45.000
But the equivalent says are a bit odd because it's, it's the normative language or the means language or the about language conveys all this extension information about medical habits.

01:03:45.000 --> 01:03:55.000
But they're always going to be incomplete I mean they're, they're going to be, you know, the extension.

01:03:55.000 --> 01:04:00.000
The rule that says stop if if there's a yellow light.

01:04:00.000 --> 01:04:10.000
That's going to be in perfectly reflected in the, the spousal of principles is only reflected in uniform and ease of performance, you're not going to get a footprint.

01:04:10.000 --> 01:04:14.000
That's essentially equivalent to the norm.

01:04:14.000 --> 01:04:23.000
So, it's another problem. That's another problem for the causal reproducibility way of doing things. Yeah.

01:04:23.000 --> 01:04:40.000
The idea. The idea being that, well, I'm the principal espouse that whatever principle espouse is instituted by some kind of uniformity of behavior but that uniformity is is only approximate that is it's going to be instituted by a normative terminology,

01:04:40.000 --> 01:04:48.000
like means, or. Yeah, or, or ot Yeah, and the uniformity.

01:04:48.000 --> 01:05:03.000
So I agree with you, there's a causal footprint and he thinks that's absolutely crucial. But I think there's an additional problem, which is and Jeremy's in his book he, he raises some of these problems for causal reduce liability.

01:05:03.000 --> 01:05:10.000
You're not going to get a, an extension.

01:05:10.000 --> 01:05:22.000
Between upstarts of endorsing normative things, and and and the the endorsement of endorsing of the, of the principles is only in perfectly reflected on.

01:05:22.000 --> 01:05:40.000
Okay, yeah, yeah, yeah, my thought is that there's there's stuff that I sort of agree that that I don't think sellers comes out and says it clearly that I found but there's I think there's something to be said on his behalf here, which is something like

01:05:40.000 --> 01:05:57.000
there are necessary and sufficient conditions for the, if, if, well, you know, in theory, if there were this kind of causal on this kind of approach you might expect there to be necessary and sufficient conditions for imperfect uniformity to count as

01:05:57.000 --> 01:06:09.000
and and also zooming out you know not just in perfect uniform and ease but also the kinds of the kinds of sanctioning behaviors that regulate these uniformity is that, you know, Brandon for instance makes so much of.

01:06:09.000 --> 01:06:09.000
You might think that that's where the equivalence lies. And so, I think.

01:06:09.000 --> 01:06:26.000
You might think that that's where the equivalence lies. And so, I think, right, I started yeah so i think that uh maybe there's something on behalf of sellers to be said in response to this but even if that kind of worries Super Bowl I still have this

01:06:26.000 --> 01:06:32.000
cardinality worry, just by the way that would fit the brakes explaining the normality. Oh yeah.

01:06:32.000 --> 01:06:34.000
All right. Yeah, yeah.

01:06:34.000 --> 01:06:35.000
Thanks.

01:06:35.000 --> 01:06:41.000
So we have one more hand, Kyle Ferguson.

01:06:41.000 --> 01:06:46.000
Hi Zack, great job that was super interesting. Thanks.

01:06:46.000 --> 01:07:03.000
So Dan Dan it talks about intuition pumps, and he says that you know Plato's cave Descartes' evil genius the state of nature, these are all the greatest hits of philosophy and all they are little stories that are designed to pump certain intuitions.

01:07:03.000 --> 01:07:12.000
I always thought of the myth of Jones as another track on the greatest hits. And I'm wondering whether this last slide here.

01:07:12.000 --> 01:07:27.000
When you're wondering whether it's a rational reconstruction or when you're suggesting. It's an emergence narrative, whether that's that saying that it's more or something distinct from an intuition pump.

01:07:27.000 --> 01:07:45.000
And if that's if it's different from an intuition pump what what do we get out of looking at Yeah. What if you can say a little bit more about what it is that, like, what you're thinking of the intuition pump as being designed to do on this on this, on

01:07:45.000 --> 01:07:51.000
the intuition pump reading of the myth.

01:07:51.000 --> 01:08:07.000
Well, no, no. Okay, fair enough. so are you. Are you saying it isn't intuition pump and this is the intuition it's pumping. Well, I think that.

01:08:07.000 --> 01:08:14.000
Well that's I think that's a really interesting suggestion, I'm not sure that I'm saying that but I might be a.

01:08:14.000 --> 01:08:35.000
Yeah, that, uh, that what ultimately I think is, as I say is being committed to is that, or, or what is implicitly being committed to, you know, why it helps why the myth of Jones helps is ultimately not just that it's irrational reconstruction that show

01:08:35.000 --> 01:08:56.000
something about self conscious talk as being in good standing but but also that it shows something, I don't know exactly what but something about the order in which self consciousness, developed that or kind of orders that sort of exhibited by asking

01:08:56.000 --> 01:09:13.000
what happened next. And, of course, what it's being shown about the order is not exactly what the genius Jones narrative says it's not what the myth of john says, so yeah that's it it's kind of an intuition puppets like you know intuitively.

01:09:13.000 --> 01:09:28.000
A intuitively This is a kind of representation of the way in which the order emerged that adequate so in one way or another, and, and, hence.

01:09:28.000 --> 01:09:31.000
um,

01:09:31.000 --> 01:09:35.000
Well, actually, here's a dis analogy with intuition pumps, I think.

01:09:35.000 --> 01:09:47.000
Intuition pumps, generally I think are trying to force you into one thing, whereas this is supposed to be a suggestion, right, or I think the myth of Johnson's in some sense, it's a, it's a, it's a suggestion.

01:09:47.000 --> 01:09:52.000
It's a,

01:09:52.000 --> 01:10:04.000
it's it's it's it's supposed to outline, it's supposed to outline yeah I kind of suggestion about how the, the sort of order constitutive of self conscious beings in the world, emerged.

01:10:04.000 --> 01:10:11.000
I'm not sure this is all yeah all very crude I don't, I don't know what to think. But that's a really interesting suggestions. Thanks.

01:10:11.000 --> 01:10:16.000
So, we're officially out of time so let's thank our speaker.

01:10:16.000 --> 01:10:23.000
There, we may be able to stick around for some informal discussion afterwards if if.

01:10:23.000 --> 01:10:24.000
Okay.

01:10:24.000 --> 01:10:31.000
Thanks so much everyone.

01:10:31.000 --> 01:10:47.000
Thank you. Yeah, officially we don't have any socializing plan for today but we can stick around, I'll leave it open here, and then also let us know. Jeremy on all myself by email how that was our socializing session yesterday went for you, because we

01:10:47.000 --> 01:11:03.000
thinking about something, doing something similar tomorrow again, or if you thought it was a bad, please let us know. Yeah, I mean our session went when quite well and so I you know if other people have had a similar experience than me from my perspective

01:11:03.000 --> 01:11:18.000
when Well, I'd like to ask you one more question of Zack, um you know sellers hasn't has an article written with Tom Neil on the concept of emergence Have you ever looked at Yeah, whether you're talking about an emergence narrative is very interesting.

01:11:18.000 --> 01:11:27.000
Yeah, and it does you know resonate well with with evolutionary

01:11:27.000 --> 01:11:32.000
explanations. Um, I've never really looked at.

01:11:32.000 --> 01:11:46.000
I always thought it was a little cooler in sellers that he didn't say more about the nature of biology and how, because that seems to me as the important link.

01:11:46.000 --> 01:11:52.000
bubble and, and the persons that are not describing really Justin.

01:11:52.000 --> 01:11:56.000
At some point they are, but biology sort of in the middle there and he never says much about it.

01:11:56.000 --> 01:12:14.000
But the notion of them have an emergence narrative is an interesting one, and it's not clear to me exactly how well that maps on to his own conception of emergence of, but I haven't yeah I just started thinking about it, but I thought that'd be something

01:12:14.000 --> 01:12:23.000
that you might want to take a look at and see if you can accommodate

01:12:23.000 --> 01:12:31.000
his version of emergence in the notion that that that'd be adapting think writing. Yeah.

01:12:31.000 --> 01:12:48.000
Yeah, I wonder I sort of tend to agree with your skepticism be skeptical that the kind of emergence that he's talking about in that paper with meal is, is, is sort of the kind that exhibits.

01:12:48.000 --> 01:13:06.000
You know takes a narrative to exhibit its, its, its form because I think. Does he say in that paper that it's supposed to be the kinds of the kinds of special laws that, that, that, that govern physics, only in in inside human cortex is there in principle

01:13:06.000 --> 01:13:27.000
like to do civil from the fundamental design right yeah I guess I understand that he says, you know to for something to be emergent is for there to be a specific sort of realm, in which there are essentially different laws that is laws that themselves

01:13:27.000 --> 01:13:44.000
operate only within a certain set of parameters, but within those parameters yes breaking the law like fashion. And of course, that could be, yeah I'm destroy that yeah that's going on in biology and love my biology you're setting up, you know, biologists

01:13:44.000 --> 01:14:03.000
are investigating the law like interactions in things like the cell and the cell is a context in which things happen yeah, that just don't happen. Otherwise, and and maybe brands are also a context in which things happen that just don't happen other Yes.

01:14:03.000 --> 01:14:24.000
Yeah. Yeah. And, yeah, but there yeah so that's just a suggestion and some someplace that might be interesting. Yeah exploration, yeah, oh yeah, yeah, yeah i agree i think probably, if I need to go back and look but I think he still has a kind of problematic,

01:14:24.000 --> 01:14:35.000
commitment, about how this, the lower level in the realm in which the special sciences occur are sort of deductive Lee connected.

01:14:35.000 --> 01:14:39.000
Can I say something about the myth of Jones. Yeah.

01:14:39.000 --> 01:15:01.000
Because it seems to me, it's it, it already is a kind of emergence narrative, because the whole dialectic of empiricism in the plus your mind is looking for an intrinsic characterization of the common descriptive content of qualitative existential looks

01:15:01.000 --> 01:15:21.000
and ceilings. That's, that's what's driving it. And, and that's what you get at the end you have us, you have. He's any I mean all the way along he's saying how do we combine privacy with inter subjectivity, how do we how do we talk about what is private.

01:15:21.000 --> 01:15:34.000
How do you have an intrinsic characterization of that common descriptive content. And I take it again we have a kind of, of how you can get from here to there.

01:15:34.000 --> 01:15:48.000
Yeah, so I think that is you know that's not just rush and reconstruction, I think it's intended to be a kind of narrative of emergence that look sort of the way I do and realize the reason.

01:15:48.000 --> 01:16:03.000
Think about it this way, which is a very Nick and Justinian. You know, this story tells you how you can combine what initially looked uncomfortable.

01:16:03.000 --> 01:16:10.000
So, yeah, I think, I think God is. I mean if you keep in mind, yeah.

01:16:10.000 --> 01:16:22.000
The question is both the answer. And that's why those two stages you mean thoughts, and then send Yeah, right, right. Yeah, that's why it ends were actually, it's interesting because what one thing has to do with how you could have introspective self

01:16:22.000 --> 01:16:31.000
Actually, it's interesting because what one thing has to do with how you could have introspective self knowledge that that kind of privacy of your states.

01:16:31.000 --> 01:16:35.000
If language is public and all that.

01:16:35.000 --> 01:16:54.000
He does that for thoughts, then he does it for inner perceiving things and so on. But then the final final problem is you never get to the intrinsic character until you tell this story about micro neurophysiology Yeah, but that that's good.

01:16:54.000 --> 01:16:58.000
I agree with what you said yeah, yeah, yeah.

01:16:58.000 --> 01:17:02.000
This is social hour for socializing.

01:17:02.000 --> 01:17:05.000
Yeah.

01:17:05.000 --> 01:17:09.000
Thanks, but it's but it's likely like on Friday night.

01:17:09.000 --> 01:17:13.000
We don't have, we don't have our martinis.

01:17:13.000 --> 01:17:19.000
So get real busy and social hour.

01:17:19.000 --> 01:17:25.000
How many people did you get it the last social hour in the bigger group that you broke down into groups.

01:17:25.000 --> 01:17:39.000
16 I think wasn't it Ronald. Yeah, we got four groups of four. And I think that was actually the right size we were initially thinking, wow. Yeah, well we were initially thinking maybe having bigger groups but I think that wouldn't that wouldn't work

01:17:39.000 --> 01:17:42.000
I think the smaller groups, turned out to be a little bit better.

01:17:42.000 --> 01:17:48.000
Oh would have liked to have seen a few more said there were just two others besides me.

01:17:48.000 --> 01:17:57.000
That's good. Yeah, yeah. Three Three is that three is little small. Yeah, I mean this is kind of working okay.

01:17:57.000 --> 01:18:00.000
Yeah, that's true.

01:18:00.000 --> 01:18:10.000
Only because I like, I liked our group before and it went. It was nice, but then we could have a bigger one too. Yeah,

01:18:10.000 --> 01:18:25.000
little different.

01:18:25.000 --> 01:18:31.000
new meet some new people that really worked well, it did in the smaller group that's true.

01:18:31.000 --> 01:18:32.000
Yeah.

01:18:32.000 --> 01:18:42.000
Yeah, we really did. It was tough to figure out how to do the social, because all we had was was examples of how not to do it basic.

01:18:42.000 --> 01:18:58.000
Maybe it's maybe tomorrow we can do groups of five or six, and then, I mean, since we are basically family here Right. I mean, secret so on Friday we just leave it open here whoever wants to stick around on

01:18:58.000 --> 01:19:17.000
Saturday we can just leave it open, not official but then go on pick them up TVs, yeah. Yeah, exactly. I encourage people to turn their cameras on Michael wall Yeah, the top

01:19:17.000 --> 01:19:19.000
here.

01:19:19.000 --> 01:19:23.000
I had a bit of an it melt down.

01:19:23.000 --> 01:19:38.000
This week, and so yeah so my students say all the time to all my camera doesn't work.

01:19:38.000 --> 01:19:42.000
is strange strangers Oh.

01:19:42.000 --> 01:20:02.000
I was gonna say you don't normally bother to try so you know, I appreciate you making an effort for us, Michael. Yeah, you know. Besides, we're.

01:20:02.000 --> 01:20:12.000
know i'm i'm here and I should have a working arrangement, relatively soon, so

01:20:12.000 --> 01:20:16.000
who is m Stevenson and who is Zoo Jon Bon.

01:20:16.000 --> 01:20:23.000
Introduce yourself, please.

01:20:23.000 --> 01:20:29.000
We're not shy retiring shy retiring types apparently I guess

01:20:29.000 --> 01:20:39.000
what it didn't know well put anybody on the race What do you like to introduce yourself.

01:20:39.000 --> 01:20:46.000
I guess I'm not I'm not as part of the celebrity and family until yesterday.

01:20:46.000 --> 01:20:54.000
Really appreciate all the presentations and I've been learning a lot, thank you so much for having me.

01:20:54.000 --> 01:21:03.000
Absolutely you, you want to run on colleagues right yes yeah i i mean philosophy of science and history of science so I can make some bridges.

01:21:03.000 --> 01:21:19.000
And I was wondering if you're familiar with Russia's work because he talks a lot about these levels at each science what's the metaphysical level. And so when you're talking about emergence, I think that he's, he's work might be interesting for that.

01:21:19.000 --> 01:21:22.000
Just sort of a suggestion.

01:21:22.000 --> 01:21:24.000
Nicholas thresher.

01:21:24.000 --> 01:21:36.000
Um, yeah. Why don't you he was a colleague of cells. Oh, why is he okay for 100 years. How many, how long

01:21:36.000 --> 01:21:43.000
he's still teaching books and divide by five. Yeah, exactly.

01:21:43.000 --> 01:21:47.000
That's the problem with restaurants, I wouldn't know where to start, he published a book, a year or so.

01:21:47.000 --> 01:22:06.000
Well he's thinking, sort of, he publishes a lot but he really wrote one book, he kind of says more or less the same thing.

01:22:06.000 --> 01:22:17.000
I appreciate all your, your knowledge of I really enjoyed the Neo Macbeth's of you and willing to free and Zach. Thank you so much.

01:22:17.000 --> 01:22:19.000
I guess I'll see you tomorrow.

01:22:19.000 --> 01:22:22.000
Yeah, more where that came from.

01:22:22.000 --> 01:22:27.000
Well, I'm going to say goodbye.

01:22:27.000 --> 01:22:32.000
Thanks, thanks again everyone, this is really, really a treat for me.

01:22:32.000 --> 01:22:34.000
I'll see you all tomorrow.

01:22:34.000 --> 01:22:35.000
Absolutely, yeah.

01:22:35.000 --> 01:22:41.000
Jim's gonna come back to a blank computer.

01:22:41.000 --> 01:22:44.000
Yeah, I gotta go to the bank.

01:22:44.000 --> 01:22:46.000
All right.

01:22:46.000 --> 01:22:51.000
Well, Take care everybody. We will, we will do it again tomorrow.

01:22:51.000 --> 01:22:52.000
Tomorrow.

01:22:52.000 --> 01:22:53.000
Yep.

01:22:53.000 --> 01:22:57.000
CJ, we're all just gonna take it all.

01:22:57.000 --> 01:23:02.000
You have to and we're like, well there's no point anymore so

01:23:02.000 --> 01:23:04.000
tomorrow.

01:23:04.000 --> 01:23:22.000
I didn't post a paper I've been working like hell on this paper I had, I spent about two months on that on that thing about reducing the scientists to one another, and had lots of pages ended up reducing that to like a page, because I got interested in

01:23:22.000 --> 01:23:24.000
more interested in all the other stuff.

01:23:24.000 --> 01:23:39.000
And then I've had to change it over the last three days in various ways. But anyway, I noticed as I went on there today everybody else's papers up there but my mind is emerging in good form through a chaotic process and.

01:23:39.000 --> 01:23:41.000
All right.

01:23:41.000 --> 01:23:52.000
If you feel comfortable Jim it's not too late to just posted tonight, even though, right now, at least if I can finish the sort of detailed PowerPoint I might post that first.

01:23:52.000 --> 01:24:15.000
Okay. In case, I'll also show it but in case, that'll cover a lot of it.

 

WEBVTT

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Morning.

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Hey, hey, Stephanie want to see what is the exact title of your paper, is it sell us on the subjectivity of the intentions yes it centers on the inter subjectivity of intentions but in the end, I think that doesn't matter.

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Okay we are nice.

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And you aren't sure, are you are, are you Austrian, german. Yeah, yeah wasn't sure.

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just judging by the accent, people here think I'm Austrian but they, they, the only person who mouth is like me it's Donald Trump tonight what they have, I have heard of so they think, I must be Austrian.

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I'm from Flipkart originally.

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Yeah.

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Hey Bill. Hey Jeff you, where are you from originally I i.

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Originally I'm from the eastern part.

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So, I was born in the German Democratic Republic still.

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But then we moved around the year, 2000 we moved to the western part so my family lives near Frankfurt now.

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Yeah, naturally, they are coming with to visit. Just like I think right now about arriving.

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Great, yeah. The one year.

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One year of seeing each other. Yeah.

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Yeah. Well, that's pretty common nowadays.

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Yeah, I'm looking forward to seeing them tomorrow, because today that will be quite late.

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Good morning. Hi, Robin.

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Hi Theresa.

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How was your day yesterday, he's

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uh, well it was you know bittersweet I dropped my son off at college for the first time so

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you know he's growing up, leaving the nest.

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It was a big day. was it a big day, where's he going.

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He's at Chapel Hill,

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North Carolina, too. Right. Yes, so it's not too far away but it's about two and a half hours away it's not that far.

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Hey Jeremy. Hey how's it going, Hey Jeremy.

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Hey, looking forward to the day.

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Here I have my UC t shirt on.

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Now, there you go. Right exactly going to be the cheerleading squad over there. Hmm.

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Rah rah sis boom bah and all that.

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Yeah, my left my left my palm palm comes in my other shoot.

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We do the best weekend. Yeah.

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Hey, Rebecca did we meet by any chance in 2019 in Vienna. Yes, we did it's lovely to

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see you again. As it says from there. Yeah.

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That was a great workshop.

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Hopefully in the fullness of time we'll go back to doing that again.

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Indeed.

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Well, so it's 10 o'clock I think we should just start.

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In the interest of time so Good morning or good afternoon or good evening.

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Welcome to the third day of this conference.

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And our first presentation today is by Stephanie.

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Stephanie is professor at the University to rest Bohemia, in Pilsen Czech Republic, and we'll talk is entitled sell us on the inter subjectivity of the intentions.

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Welcome.

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Thank you. I will share my screen with you.

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Okay, can you see that.

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Yeah. Wonderful. Okay.

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Start Okay, my talk is titled status on the into subjectivity of we intentions. Now, and the, the topic of when tensions have cropped up quite a number of times already during the last two days.

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And we've mentioned that they are somehow important and may be fruitful and maybe not so fruitful.

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But like the software there's never been like their main focus now on that question of the intentions that will change now I will talk about the intentions and then Kyle today we'll talk about the intentions and run up we'll talk about me, we intentions

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tomorrow. So we hear a lot about that.

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And I'm be saying the most important features of we intentions for Saturday to stare into subjectivity.

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However, it remains often rather unclear in his writings. What do you actually means by that what makes we intentions into subjective and why the old to care.

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Yeah, my talk will have to aims, the first aim is to get a bit more light into that question of what makes me intentions interests objective.

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And the second aim will be to show that services, answer to that question, what makes we intentions into subjective, that these answers change throughout his career, right until the very end of that career.

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And that these changes are not unreasonable.

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I will proceed. Like this.

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First I will introduce some of the main features of Services account of intentions and we intentions.

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Just the things that we need in order to understand the rest of the talk, then I would like to turn to that question of what makes we intentions into subjective motivations that are passed for seeking into subjective intentions, what obstacles you face

00:11:03.000 --> 00:11:06.000
as how we can address them.

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I want to be a bit more reconstructed fear in that second section.

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So I would talk about what sellers might have wanted to say pattern being a bit clearer.

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Now, and then in the third section I want to turn my back to a more exegetical viewpoint.

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I want to show you that the answers which self give to that question.

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What makes me intentions interest objective that this changes.

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And that in light of what I've done then section to in light of this reconstruction. These changes make some sense they're not completely unreasonable.

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Okay. But first, for some of the features of Genesis account of intentions that we would need to know and he's already talked about some of them so I try to be quick and intention for sellers is first and foremost the mental state.

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Cognitive mental state which triggers my action.

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And of course this mental state can also be expressed in language, and you can see to such representations of intention expressions here, I shall go to the cinema tonight, or in a more regimented form Shall I go to the cinema tonight.

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You can see that for setting an intention consists of an indicative content, I go to the cinema tonight, and an intention forming operator, the shell of the rate.

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And as he has also emphasized for sellers intentions are not descriptive states that is when I say, I shall go to the cinema tonight. I do not describe myself as having an intention, but I express a state of readiness for actual commitment towards certain

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way of acting.

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So intentions and intention expressions are not descriptive, and they do not have a truth value therefore intentions cannot be true or false for sense.

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What we can see on top there I shall go to the cinema tonight that would be a paradigmatic example of an eye intention for service. But of course there's the second group of intentions we intentions, which I want to focus on these terms, I intention and

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we intention there, a bit a bit over simplifying and sentence doesn't really use them himself but for the sake of the talk of we'll just use them as everyone else.

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So, what are we intentions, you can see three examples of what such we intentions can look like and services writings on the screen, shell in brackets each of us pay that Texas, or we shall pay our taxes or, it shall sub we be the case that taxes are

00:13:55.000 --> 00:13:57.000
paid.

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These are just for illustration.

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What precisely distinguishes I intentions and we intentions. I hope that this will get clearer.

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Throughout the talk.

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But first for some other important things.

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As I said intentions cannot have truth knowledge they cannot be true or false. Nevertheless, we can reason with intentions for service we can reason about what to do, using intentions.

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And you can see such a piece of practical reasoning with intentions here. I shall go to the cinema tonight. Therefore, I shall buy tickets in the afternoon.

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And let's just assume that this is valid. Know what is preserved in such valid practical inferences is not true because intentions cannot be true or false, but it is a broader evaluative notion, which sellers course reasonableness.

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So if the premise intention is reasonable and the inference valid than the conclusion intention must also be a reasonable intention.

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And I will say a bit more about this reasonableness just in a minute.

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But before. How do we know which of these inferential steps from valid because you can see that the inference that I have here that would be a material inference for sellers, it is not valid and logical grounds.

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It's not formally valid. So how do I know whether the inference is valid. And he has talked about that so just quickly, a seller says this principle here or SM as he calls it in 1980.

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And the idea behind the principle is that the inferential steps which are valid in practical reasoning, are those influential steps, which are valid in theoretical reasoning.

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And these in turn me inferential steps which are valid in theoretical reasoning, they are determined by scientific inquiry.

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So we've heard that there is a number of problems, connected to these ideas, but I'm just accept centers SES on these matters now.

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The point is that for sellers. These influential principles or something objective, at least in principle, at least at the ideal and scientific inquiry, any rational being or to accept the same influential principles.

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Again field rational, and we assume that throughout.

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Again feel rational, and we assume that if we are rational, of course, our intentions are to be organized coherently. So for example, I should not intend to incompatible things that would be a case of irrationality and send us thinks that there are at

00:16:47.000 --> 00:16:58.000
least two such system, not one but at least two such system of coherently organized intentions for any of us.

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Each of these two systems is of course structured by the subject differential principles. And each of these is anchored in its own overarching goal, its own overarching intention, which determines the character of the system.

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The first system is what we could call the system of our personal intentions or send us something says enlightened self interest.

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And this first system is anchored in I surely a satisfying life All things considered.

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That would be the overarching goal. And now I can derive, my influential principles I can derive further intentions from that intention, which would then represent means to the end of leading that satisfying life.

00:17:42.000 --> 00:17:51.000
And the intentions, I can derive in this way from this overarching goal. That would be the reasonable intentions in that system.

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So reasonableness, maybe a bit simplifying port, can be characterized as driveability from the overall can go.

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Then we have a second influential system of intentions at least one, which is anchored in a way intention can see that. And we've heard about that from Danielle, a lot in Russia Foster, our common welfare.

00:18:15.000 --> 00:18:18.000
Again, now we can you read further intention from that overarching one of course.

00:18:18.000 --> 00:18:34.000
that overarching one of course. And if the we has the scope of all rational beings then we could call that second inferential system, the system of moral intentions and of course the we might also have a more restricted scope say the member of the local

00:18:34.000 --> 00:18:37.000
football team or something like that.

00:18:37.000 --> 00:18:41.000
Then would have a further influential system anchored in.

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We members of the local football team sharp Foster, our Commonwealth. Yeah. But the point is the important point is that we have at least these two systems.

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Okay.

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With these things in place Let's turn to that question of interest subjectivity.

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Why do we need interest subjective intentions, according to sellers, what obstacles we face on the way and what tools do we have.

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Oh, what was the fellas provide us with an order to address the problems.

00:19:08.000 --> 00:19:25.000
What was the fellas provide us with in order to address the problems. And now as I said I would like to take up a more reconstructive perspective fear on sellers I do not want to follow him too closely for a number of reasons.

00:19:25.000 --> 00:19:37.000
I think, however, that the initial setting of the problem is rather uncontroversial when we ask why the center's need interest subjective intentions and of course the broad answer is.

00:19:37.000 --> 00:19:49.000
He wants to give an account of moral statements or statements more broadly, and he wants to do so in terms of intention expressions. Some.

00:19:49.000 --> 00:20:07.000
And according to sell us we have an initial problem here and a symmetry, because more statements are into subjective. According to him, but intention expressions at least intention expressions of our standard I intentions like I should go to the cinema

00:20:07.000 --> 00:20:14.000
tonight. They are not interest subjective in that way. Instead of things we need to address now.

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What does this mean when he says that moral statements are into subjective he means, for example, that they have an objective truth value.

00:20:22.000 --> 00:20:35.000
He means that they can be shared. So when I say we ought to be friendly to our neighbors and you say we ought to be friendly to our neighbors we express the same moral belief.

00:20:35.000 --> 00:20:58.000
Moral statements can genuinely conflict, logically rationally. So, for example, when I say, we ought to be friendly to our neighbors and you say, No, it's not the case that we ought to be friendly to our neighbors, then that will be a case of genuine

00:20:58.000 --> 00:21:07.000
send us, diagnosis, all of these things, you know, and thinks that this has to be somehow addressed.

00:21:07.000 --> 00:21:23.000
I do not think that all of these diagnosis are helpful, some of them, I think are more misleading especially that topic of external negation. And therefore, I would like to pick out just one perspective, which says also users, and try to reconstruct,

00:21:23.000 --> 00:21:43.000
this idea of inter subjective intentions. From there, and the perspective I would like to pick out is that practical reasoning with intentions. It's an perspective, which says also takes up so that's not something foreign which I would import into his

00:21:43.000 --> 00:21:57.000
system but there's that always tends to be a stage in his discussions of we intentions were he tries to grapple with the issue through looking at practical reasoning with intention.

00:21:57.000 --> 00:22:15.000
So my suggestion is that we can characterize the moral domain or sell us as more point of view. And by a certain practice of practical reasoning with intentions, and that is concerned and practical reasoning with intentions.

00:22:15.000 --> 00:22:31.000
So, the idea would be that morality is a domain where all of us rational beings, of course, all of us can in order to reason from the same premise intentions to the same conclusion intentions.

00:22:31.000 --> 00:22:35.000
And we will see why that's a problem for I intentions.

00:22:35.000 --> 00:22:45.000
So put it differently, the moral domain would be eight and when will we all ought to act in the same way in the same situations that is on the same conclusion intentions.

00:22:45.000 --> 00:22:52.000
And we ought to act in that way for the same reasons that is for the same premise intentions.

00:22:52.000 --> 00:22:57.000
So, this is my suggestion and

00:22:57.000 --> 00:23:06.000
an interest objective intention would be a type of intention that we need to get this practice of console and practical reasoning off the ground.

00:23:06.000 --> 00:23:14.000
I will argue that there are two problems when we start with standard I intentions like I shall go to the cinema tonight.

00:23:14.000 --> 00:23:17.000
The first problem is there in Mexico City.

00:23:17.000 --> 00:23:27.000
And the second problem is that they are invaluable for reasonableness millionaire relative way million relative to the contenders system of personal intentions.

00:23:27.000 --> 00:23:31.000
And I just emphasize that. I think they are these two problems.

00:23:31.000 --> 00:23:45.000
Because even though sadness points to both of them indirectly from a number of angles. Sometimes tends to ride, as if addressing one of these problems already was to address the other.

00:23:45.000 --> 00:23:52.000
Yeah, but I think that if we keep them apart we can gain more clarity.

00:23:52.000 --> 00:23:56.000
And I will of course look at them right now.

00:23:56.000 --> 00:24:03.000
Okay, we start with a piece of practical reasoning with I intentions.

00:24:03.000 --> 00:24:12.000
And it's the one that we already had there and just imagine that I am voicing this piece of practical reasoning here since you're new, in front of you.

00:24:12.000 --> 00:24:19.000
So I shall go to the cinema tonight, therefore I should buy tickets in the afternoon,

00:24:19.000 --> 00:24:22.000
you as my listeners.

00:24:22.000 --> 00:24:31.000
Even though this is obviously a piece of reasoning with I intentions with my personal intentions, you as my listeners can assess a number of things about that piece of reasons.

00:24:31.000 --> 00:24:41.000
For example, you can assess whether that piece of reasoning is about given you have enough background information. Now that's clear.

00:24:41.000 --> 00:24:51.000
So you are any rational being might be able to formulate inference principles like I shall go to the cinema tonight implies, I should buy tickets in the afternoon.

00:24:51.000 --> 00:24:59.000
Now, because in the MPs are objective for centers, these are backed by science.

00:24:59.000 --> 00:25:13.000
What you might also be able to do given enough background information is that you might be able to assess the reasonableness of my premise, with respect to my other personal intentions.

00:25:13.000 --> 00:25:27.000
So for example, you might know that I'm a cinema lover and that my favorite actor is on tonight. And in the light of that information, you might be able to say okay, of course that intentional for us to go to the cinema tonight that's a perfectly reasonable

00:25:27.000 --> 00:25:38.000
intention for her to have, say, reasonable means for her to further this end of leading a satisfying life.

00:25:38.000 --> 00:25:52.000
However, even if you can't, assess these things about my piece of freezing this one thing that you cannot do according to sellers. And that is, you cannot reason consultancy with me in this case, he says you cannot draw also need not draw but you cannot

00:25:52.000 --> 00:26:07.000
draw that very inference yourself. And we will get to why that is the case in a minute but first I want to show you that sellers really says things on these lines.

00:26:07.000 --> 00:26:27.000
So here's a passage from science and metaphysics and Sanders is talking about Smith here again about Smith's personal intentions, as more radical situation here then rock lifting case and send us there's only one person that is Smith control and influence

00:26:27.000 --> 00:26:39.000
in accordance with this implication or influence principle to make the spec explicit let us reformulate the implication asked. Shall I poisoned my own implies for Smith.

00:26:39.000 --> 00:26:42.000
Shall I administer pressing

00:26:42.000 --> 00:26:51.000
the Smith, but no one else is authorized by this implication to reason. Shall I poisoned me, and therefore shall I administer crossing Yes.

00:26:51.000 --> 00:27:10.000
I'm not passage and the whole section is terribly complex, and there are many themes present. You know, I think, but one of the themes of what what I, I've just said, there's all of us rational beings can formulate these inference principles about which

00:27:10.000 --> 00:27:24.000
intention implies which other intention. But that doesn't mean that there's concern and practical reasoning, in this case, yeah. In this case, sort of says we cannot reason consistently with Smith, and in the cinema case you cannot reason consistently

00:27:24.000 --> 00:27:25.000
with me.

00:27:25.000 --> 00:27:32.000
And of course now the question is why is that yeah what's the problem.

00:27:32.000 --> 00:27:49.000
And I think that's quite a straightforward answer here. Yeah. And it seems a bit strange to emphasize the answer in that way because, because it is so straightforward, but sellers himself, although again he points to that in a number of different ways

00:27:49.000 --> 00:27:52.000
he never really explicitly stated in these terms.

00:27:52.000 --> 00:28:09.000
So I think that the problem here is simply that we have an intention in the first person singular, and we have an index circle in the intention therefore we have the index equal, I and I shall go to the cinema tonight is always referring to the speaker.

00:28:09.000 --> 00:28:24.000
And that is of course consequences, because now when I say I shall go to the cinema tonight. This was my premise, and you ought to the same words you say I shall go to the cinema tonight, then obviously we are not expressing the same intention.

00:28:24.000 --> 00:28:36.000
I am expressing my intention to go to the cinema tonight. And you express the intention for you to go to the cinema tonight yeah and obviously something very, very different.

00:28:36.000 --> 00:28:48.000
So, the consequence is that when we have intentions in the first person singular we cannot share intentions that's a simple grammatical problem we cannot share intentions.

00:28:48.000 --> 00:28:56.000
Therefore we cannot share or premises and conclusions and there is no concern and practical reason.

00:28:56.000 --> 00:29:12.000
Okay, and what can we do to address that problem. And I think it's quite clear we all know what Tell us. Tell us about that. We shift from the first person singular to the first person Pro.

00:29:12.000 --> 00:29:30.000
That is a way of overcoming this in lexicon. Now, we widen the scope of that in Mexico. Yeah, we, of course, still in Mexico, you know, but what I always refers to one person the speaker, we have a wider scope refers, at least to two people, and that

00:29:30.000 --> 00:29:46.000
is what we need. For now, you mentioned. Me and you, reasoning, practically, I reason, we should go to the cinema tonight before we should buy tickets in the afternoon, and you reason we shall go to the cinema tonight.

00:29:46.000 --> 00:29:55.000
Therefore, we should buy tickets in the afternoon, and we presuppose that it's clear that this we includes me and you, in this case.

00:29:55.000 --> 00:30:05.000
So I think here is quite uncontroversial to say that this is a piece of concern and practical reasoning, we've reason from the same premise intentions to the same conclusion intentions here.

00:30:05.000 --> 00:30:15.000
If this is not a piece of concern and practical reasoning it's not clear what would be probably couldn't bury the idea, right from the start.

00:30:15.000 --> 00:30:22.000
So what this shift to the first person plural gives us in the end it's shareable intentions.

00:30:22.000 --> 00:30:26.000
We can all share conclusions we can share premises.

00:30:26.000 --> 00:30:32.000
And therefore, there's the possibility of concealment practical reason, in that case now let's shift to the we enable that.

00:30:32.000 --> 00:30:48.000
Now, let's shift to the we enable that. However, so far this is a mere possibility. Now, it is a matter of choice for you in this situation if you want to reason conservatively with me or not.

00:30:48.000 --> 00:31:02.000
And that is of course not enough if we speak about morality, whether an action is moral and for what reason it is moral if it is. That's not a matter of choice.

00:31:02.000 --> 00:31:07.000
But it is a matter of obligation, it kind of rational but again.

00:31:07.000 --> 00:31:23.000
So just to show you that there is no pressure on you to raise and consultancy with me here in that case just imagine again that piece of reasoning. I've reason that why addressing you, including you in the week, obviously, and the reason we shall go to

00:31:23.000 --> 00:31:27.000
the cinema tonight. Therefore we should buy tickets in the afternoon.

00:31:27.000 --> 00:31:36.000
And you can reason console currently with me in that case, but you need not, there is no pressure on you to do so.

00:31:36.000 --> 00:31:48.000
And why is that if we look at the premise that I have, we shall go to the cinema tonight, then obviously that is a premise, in the first person parole.

00:31:48.000 --> 00:32:05.000
But that does not mean that there's pressure on you to accept that pranks, not to adopt that intention, because I might intend this to go to the cinema tonight together with you I might intend this merely for my own sake.

00:32:05.000 --> 00:32:15.000
Now on the, on the basis of my own personal intentions as a means of me leading a satisfying life.

00:32:15.000 --> 00:32:28.000
For example, maybe I'm cinema lover again yeah but I'm afraid to go along to the cinema for whatever reasons, and I do not mind your company, and therefore I intend we shall go to the cinema tonight.

00:32:28.000 --> 00:32:31.000
but it would be intended for my own sake.

00:32:31.000 --> 00:32:45.000
So, the problem is that even though this premise is in first person plural. It might be still merely relatively reasonable merely reasonable relative to my intention to lead a satisfying life.

00:32:45.000 --> 00:32:58.000
And you might even recognize that you know you might know, she's a cinema but she's afraid of going alone. And you might see okay yeah that intention is a reasonable intention for her to have.

00:32:58.000 --> 00:33:04.000
But that doesn't mean that there's pressure on you to adaptive, because it's merely relatively reasonable.

00:33:04.000 --> 00:33:11.000
You might even reject my premise, you might know me shall not go to the cinema tonight.

00:33:11.000 --> 00:33:26.000
And that intention might be perfectly reasonable for you to have, because maybe you hate cinema, or something like that. Yeah, so it might be perfectly reasonable relative to your intention to lead a satisfying.

00:33:26.000 --> 00:33:27.000
Yeah.

00:33:27.000 --> 00:33:39.000
So the problem here is that even though these intentions are the first person Pearl, they might be really relatively reasonable. So there's no pressure on anybody of us to adopt each other's intentions.

00:33:39.000 --> 00:33:50.000
So what we would need is a notion, not of mere relative reasonableness bad of a kind of objective reasonableness or sentences categorical a reasonable.

00:33:50.000 --> 00:34:06.000
That is a notion of reasonableness, where, when I see that an intention of somebody else is reasonable in this objective way that generates pressure on me to adopt that intention myself.

00:34:06.000 --> 00:34:12.000
This is a bit like the concept of objective truth also works for beliefs.

00:34:12.000 --> 00:34:18.000
So now how do we get this notion of objective reasonableness and again I think that these are.

00:34:18.000 --> 00:34:21.000
Tell us tools, Yeah.

00:34:21.000 --> 00:34:24.000
Obviously,

00:34:24.000 --> 00:34:40.000
we get to that notion of objective reasonableness by now setting up a second system, a second inferential system of intentions because so far we've operated in that inferential network of personal intentions now with the overarching intention for me for

00:34:40.000 --> 00:34:52.000
example to lead a satisfying life. And now we set up that second system of intentions, which is anchored in we shall Foster, our common welfare. Now that is a shareable intention.

00:34:52.000 --> 00:35:05.000
But it is special and we've heard about that quite a lot. It is special in that set of things that people must share that intentions, as long as they belong to the same.

00:35:05.000 --> 00:35:11.000
And in the limiting case the group is all rational beaks.

00:35:11.000 --> 00:35:18.000
So for sellers to be a group member it's simply to have that intention now that amounts to the same.

00:35:18.000 --> 00:35:24.000
And if people do not share that intention, we simply have no proof.

00:35:24.000 --> 00:35:35.000
So if we are prepared to say that there are group of groups that people form groups, we ought to accept that people share intentions of that form.

00:35:35.000 --> 00:35:48.000
And as I said that is the overarching intention in that system so what that gives us.

00:35:48.000 --> 00:36:00.000
So we have a shared premise. And then of course we have our influential principles which are objective, which again any rational being must accept know at least in principle, and This now gives us.

00:36:00.000 --> 00:36:15.000
Precisely, our practice of concern and practical reasoning where this pressure on us to reason. In the same way with these intentions. We have one shared premise which everybody must accept in the group, and we have objective influential principles, therefore

00:36:15.000 --> 00:36:30.000
we all must have bought a reason to the same conclusions is also gives us, of course, a decision procedure when there's conflict. For example, when I suggest a candidate.

00:36:30.000 --> 00:36:49.000
Premise intention and use such as another candidate from his intention and they are incompatible. We now have a way of rationally resolving that conflict, by tracing these candidates back to our shared overall shared goal of fostering our common welfare,

00:36:49.000 --> 00:36:55.000
and we can decide which of the intentions belong into that system,

00:36:55.000 --> 00:36:58.000
and which not.

00:36:58.000 --> 00:37:02.000
So this is precisely what we wanted to have.

00:37:02.000 --> 00:37:16.000
Okay, to sum that up a bit on what we, the suggestion was that we can characterize the moral domain by this idea of console and practical reasoning with intentions and interest objective intentions, all the intentions, we need in order to get this off

00:37:16.000 --> 00:37:18.000
the ground.

00:37:18.000 --> 00:37:34.000
When we start out with our standard I intentions, like I shall go to the cinema tonight, there were two problems we needed to address. The first was the our index equality, we address that by shifting, What is intended intended to the first person plural.

00:37:34.000 --> 00:37:37.000
In order to be shareable intentions.

00:37:37.000 --> 00:37:54.000
And the second problem was that these. I intentions or personal intentions were invaluable merely relatively for that reasonableness, and we address that by setting up the second inferential system, anchored in that necessarily shared intention and structured

00:37:54.000 --> 00:38:00.000
by objective differential principal sound again this notion of objective reasonable.

00:38:00.000 --> 00:38:18.000
And I'll be idea is that to be an interest objective intention is to have these two features, now that would be a reconstruction of this tellers your notion of interest subjective intention, it's, it needs to have these two features.

00:38:18.000 --> 00:38:19.000
Okay.

00:38:19.000 --> 00:38:21.000
So, when we have that.

00:38:21.000 --> 00:38:26.000
Let's have a look at my son is actually sense. Yeah.

00:38:26.000 --> 00:38:42.000
And especially let's have a look at how his views on what makes certain intentions into subjective, how these views developed throughout his career and I will try to show you first that there is such a development, right until the end of his career, and

00:38:42.000 --> 00:38:49.000
the development makes some, some sense it's a development towards more clarity, I think.

00:38:49.000 --> 00:39:08.000
I will have a look at the syllabus three main texts in that area in chronological order of course. So we started out in 1963 with an essay called imperatives intentions and the logical order or more precisely the second published version of that of that

00:39:08.000 --> 00:39:09.000
essay.

00:39:09.000 --> 00:39:19.000
And I will ask, how did settlers conceived into subjective intentions in that essay, how did you answer the question what makes we intentions into subject.

00:39:19.000 --> 00:39:30.000
Then there's a straightforward answer in that text I think as straightforward as we can get in and send us a text, that doesn't mean that it's clear when it's straightforward.

00:39:30.000 --> 00:39:46.000
Sort of says that what makes these we intentions interests objective, is that they are intended in a certain special mode, or in a certain special form in a remote, we formed, we could say.

00:39:46.000 --> 00:40:04.000
So this is not about who intends these intentions not about the beer of the intention. And it is not about what is intended it's not about the content of the intention, but it's about how that barrel of the intention, intense, the content in what special

00:40:04.000 --> 00:40:12.000
way he said it says For example, when the concept of a group is internalized is the concept.

00:40:12.000 --> 00:40:17.000
It becomes a form of consciousness and in particular the form of intending.

00:40:17.000 --> 00:40:25.000
The group has shared intentions by virtue of the fact that its members intent in the mode, shell. So, w.

00:40:25.000 --> 00:40:40.000
And this very label remote which is still used today and today's discussions about collective intentionality, that's probably the this essays probably also the cradle of that often very lead.

00:40:40.000 --> 00:40:56.000
So, it seems, therefore that we can quite ambiguously say that Sanders is an a proponent of such a remote account as it would be called today. Yeah, at least in 1963.

00:40:56.000 --> 00:41:07.000
My aim is to show you that. At the end of his career, that might not be an appropriate categorization any more of your skills.

00:41:07.000 --> 00:41:23.000
Also, already in 1963, it is not all about this women. It's not the only salient aspect. So for example here in that second quarter. This gives us a list of what he calls universal.

00:41:23.000 --> 00:41:30.000
they mentioned have this universal intentions.

00:41:30.000 --> 00:41:36.000
And you can see that there are two items on that list.

00:41:36.000 --> 00:41:48.000
There's a special mode of intending is what we can find under to the universality of the intending itself service calls it, but under one, there's something else.

00:41:48.000 --> 00:42:00.000
No one is what set us calls the former universality or universality of application, which can be represented by the formula, all of us to do A, B, and C.

00:42:00.000 --> 00:42:12.000
And it does not completely transparent what he has in mind here with this one but I think that a sensible understanding of that is that this concerns

00:42:12.000 --> 00:42:24.000
content of the content of the intention. Yeah, so an entire subject of intention would be an intention that all of us do action a and circumstances.

00:42:24.000 --> 00:42:27.000
Okay, this is 1963.

00:42:27.000 --> 00:42:43.000
And let's move forward. For years, to 1967, to science and metaphysics, and especially of course to the last chapter of that book where centers struggles with this notion of morality and where he puts forward.

00:42:43.000 --> 00:42:48.000
What is probably his most extensive account with intentions.

00:42:48.000 --> 00:43:02.000
Yeah, so kind of give us another list. Yeah, that makes a good comparison he gives us a another list of things off universal dimensions of.

00:43:02.000 --> 00:43:17.000
He, it is about valuing so you can see at the beginning of that quote, but says treats valuing and intending as parallel, so we can simply read that as a list of universal, they mentioned of our into subjective intentions.

00:43:17.000 --> 00:43:20.000
And you can see that there are three items on that list here.

00:43:20.000 --> 00:43:23.000
So obviously something has been asked.

00:43:23.000 --> 00:43:38.000
So let's have a look at that and a, we can find again the content of the intention, yes went into subjective intention again would be an intention that if any of us is in circumstances CE do

00:43:38.000 --> 00:43:53.000
under be with confined with telescopes, be subjective form of the intention is sometimes this entire subject to form in the chapter and that would have probably been the better Terminal Terminal logical choice here.

00:43:53.000 --> 00:44:06.000
And it's not completely transparent with this interest subjective form is but the most sensible understanding of sentence here is that this is what the mode was in 1963.

00:44:06.000 --> 00:44:21.000
So for example sentence using the subscript we are Wu to indicate the scoring much as he indicated the mode in 1963. Yeah, so I think that is a sensible understanding of him, so that we have the content under a and we have the mode under be and that makes

00:44:21.000 --> 00:44:24.000
makes see the new item on the list.

00:44:24.000 --> 00:44:33.000
And it is what service calls the objectivity of our inner subjective intentions.

00:44:33.000 --> 00:44:40.000
And it causes a decision procedure as to which of these intentions to adopt.

00:44:40.000 --> 00:44:57.000
And we already know how this decision procedure works we've talked about it. That is precisely having the second influential network having this one, shared overall intention this one shared premise and objective inferential principles and that gives

00:44:57.000 --> 00:45:06.000
us a way of deciding which intentions belong to that network of shared intentions and which do not.

00:45:06.000 --> 00:45:21.000
Okay, this is the science of metaphysics with these three items and now let's jump forward to 1982 unreasoning about values one of sentences very last published essays, during his lifetime.

00:45:21.000 --> 00:45:32.000
And I want to argue that there are quite some interesting innovations in that essay, compared to 1967, to science and metaphysics.

00:45:32.000 --> 00:45:44.000
What is striking in this essay in 1980, is that seller seems to drop any talk about a special mode or a special form of intending.

00:45:44.000 --> 00:45:50.000
Yeah, he sees us to use this mode or form talk.

00:45:50.000 --> 00:46:04.000
In contrast, when he introduces his inner subjective intentions in that essay. He gives the following examples so these are his examples. She'll be each of us run a hard race, and she'll each of us resist temptation.

00:46:04.000 --> 00:46:23.000
So that would be examples for status of inter subjective intentions. And when we know, ask what makes these intention interest subjective. What feature, this is, then all that we really have here is the content of the intention which is in the first person

00:46:23.000 --> 00:46:26.000
produce something like

00:46:26.000 --> 00:46:42.000
a. In contrast, there's no indication on sellers this part, that this has something to do with a special moment. Yeah. For example, He does not give any indication that this shell, and the Shelby these operators that they come in a special we flavor here

00:46:42.000 --> 00:46:59.000
in the special be mode. They seem to be the very same shells and the very same Shelby's that he also used for his iron tensions in the essence. So it seems as if there was just one generic shell operator which does not have a special I'm old and a special

00:46:59.000 --> 00:47:16.000
women anymore. In the Essex so just briefly put it seems as if Celis drops the mode and moves, everything concerning into subjectivity into the content of his inner subjective intentions.

00:47:16.000 --> 00:47:17.000
Okay.

00:47:17.000 --> 00:47:35.000
However, if this was all, then there would probably be a problem for setups Yeah, because now we could, we could object okay he drops that mall in 1980, but if he doesn't have this distinction between an eye mode and a remote anymore.

00:47:35.000 --> 00:47:48.000
How does he distinguish between personal intentions and community intentions between intending from the personal point of view, and intended from the point of view of being a community member.

00:47:48.000 --> 00:47:54.000
And that's the crucial distinction. He needs for his account of morality, of course.

00:47:54.000 --> 00:48:05.000
The problem is that we cannot see whether an intention, easy personal or a community intention, just by looking at intentions, which have plural contents.

00:48:05.000 --> 00:48:13.000
And this is something which says himself remarks on in 1976, in the letter he wrote to David Solomon.

00:48:13.000 --> 00:48:24.000
There he says and again this is his example which I've adapted a bit. He says okay you might think we might have intentions like Shelby each have a scratch my back.

00:48:24.000 --> 00:48:35.000
But even though this intention is in the first person prob we cannot see whether it's a personal intention or a communal attention might be any way, if these two.

00:48:35.000 --> 00:48:51.000
Yeah, probably scenario is that this is a personal intention but it might also be a community intention. Yeah, if I'm the member of the Society of friendly Becks crushers, then this might be something which I intend for the community.

00:48:51.000 --> 00:48:52.000
So, the point is that we cannot see that simply by looking at an intention with portal content.

00:48:52.000 --> 00:49:09.000
The point is that we cannot see that simply by looking at an intention with portal content. So, how the cell is now go about this issue if he doesn't have a remote and I think he has a solution here, which doesn't need that remote you right here in this

00:49:09.000 --> 00:49:25.000
this quote, which of the implication structures, I pick up in my deliberations about paying my dues, or stretching my back, determines whether the point of view, from which I'm raising is private or that of a member of the group.

00:49:25.000 --> 00:49:37.000
So it seems as if this distinction between a personal point of view, and a community point of view in intending has to do with which of the inferential networks I place my intention into.

00:49:37.000 --> 00:49:47.000
Yeah. So if I indicate that my intention has been derived from I surely they satisfying life. All things considered, it would be a personal intention.

00:49:47.000 --> 00:49:51.000
It could be evaluated for reasonableness million relatively.

00:49:51.000 --> 00:50:07.000
But if I indicate that it has been derived from for example shell each of us members of the Society of friendly back scratchers Foster, our common welfare, then it would be a community intention, it would be intended from the point of view of my being

00:50:07.000 --> 00:50:15.000
a member of that society, and it could be evaluated as objectively reasonable, at least for members of that society. Yeah.

00:50:15.000 --> 00:50:23.000
So, just to make this a bit more graphic what seems to happen in 1980 compared to 1967.

00:50:23.000 --> 00:50:31.000
When we look at this list from science and metaphysics, is that the monk disappears. And what the mode was meant to do.

00:50:31.000 --> 00:50:45.000
Providing for shareable intentions for providing for logical conflict giving us the notion of objective reasonableness and so forth. That is moved into what the content does and what this decision procedure and received us.

00:50:45.000 --> 00:50:51.000
So, uh, I also want to argue that this makes sense and with this I will finish.

00:50:51.000 --> 00:51:07.000
I think that these changes make sense in the light of what we free constructed in the second section, because they will be saying that Sarah says interests objective intention intentions on that reconstruction need to have two features.

00:51:07.000 --> 00:51:25.000
They need to have plural contents, in order to address that problem index ecology and to give us shareable intentions, and they need to be invaluable for protective reasonableness, and we guarantee that by placing them into that second influential network

00:51:25.000 --> 00:51:30.000
anchored in the one necessarily shared intention instructed by the subject of influential principles.

00:51:30.000 --> 00:51:41.000
So we said that interest objective intentions need to have these two features, and this is precisely the two features which says emphasizes in 1980 in on reasoning about values.

00:51:41.000 --> 00:51:54.000
The point is that when we have these two features, and we accept this reconstruction of course, then there's no more special job for a remote, over and above these to do, and there's nothing left to do for a remote.

00:51:54.000 --> 00:52:01.000
And therefore, it seems only consistent for status that he gives up the idea that he drops that.

00:52:01.000 --> 00:52:13.000
And of course, also because maybe that's just my feeling that we moved was quite mysterious right from the beginning. So, with this idea I want to finish.

00:52:13.000 --> 00:52:23.000
I want to thank you for listening. With this with a last quotation from sellers where he expresses that feeling that has practical philosophies developing and that we cannot ignore this.

00:52:23.000 --> 00:52:26.000
So, Thank you very much.

00:52:26.000 --> 00:52:35.000
and I'm looking forward to the discussion.

00:52:35.000 --> 00:52:38.000
Thank you so much. Stephanie.

00:52:38.000 --> 00:52:47.000
Beautiful presentation so I'm already seeing one hand here let's dive right in Cairo, go ahead, and then Danielle.

00:52:47.000 --> 00:52:51.000
I Stephanie thank you so much those those wonderful.

00:52:51.000 --> 00:53:02.000
Um, I feel a little heartbroken though at the end, that there's the idea that there's no role for the remote.

00:53:02.000 --> 00:53:18.000
And so I want to, I want to bring it back, I want to suggest that it is there in a wrap on, and the reason it appears that it isn't, is that we were only looking at the regimented intentions.

00:53:18.000 --> 00:53:39.000
So yeah, remember it was, it was shall then bracket. Each of us like I would want to know what does that intention, look like when it's expressed, and the each of us is doing double duty there it's, it's giving the universe reliable content and and the

00:53:39.000 --> 00:53:42.000
form.

00:53:42.000 --> 00:53:44.000
That's just just just a suggestion.

00:53:44.000 --> 00:53:48.000
Yeah, I hope, I hope, I hope is right.

00:53:48.000 --> 00:53:52.000
If Thanks for the question.

00:53:52.000 --> 00:53:53.000
I've.

00:53:53.000 --> 00:54:09.000
And today I've just read your paper and I have seen that we agree on on with everything, but just that, we moved question yeah that's probably something that we disagree, but your papers really cool and looking forward to your presentation today.

00:54:09.000 --> 00:54:27.000
Okay, as far as your question was concerned. First thing I would like to say is that I think that this it's a bit optional whether we want to say that status drops, this idea of a mode, or whether he simply spells out the idea that there is a mode in

00:54:27.000 --> 00:54:41.000
more specific truth in unreasoning about Valley So, so we might just say, Okay, this idea of a special mode or a special form of intending, that is simply the idea of placing an intention in that influential network of shared intention.

00:54:41.000 --> 00:54:42.000
Yeah.

00:54:42.000 --> 00:54:53.000
I think this is a bit optional. Yes, so when you want to cling to the remote you might just say okay it's there but it's just this placing an intention in that second differential network.

00:54:53.000 --> 00:54:55.000
Yeah, why not.

00:54:55.000 --> 00:54:58.000
I think it's just important that there's no mode, over and above.

00:54:58.000 --> 00:55:03.000
These two features that that I had there.

00:55:03.000 --> 00:55:09.000
So this is just if people are sentiment.

00:55:09.000 --> 00:55:16.000
But, and then this question of regimentation, how, how that would look like.

00:55:16.000 --> 00:55:26.000
It would, if I give it a natural language expression. Yeah. What is interesting is that in unreasoning about values instead of speaks about is we intentions.

00:55:26.000 --> 00:55:32.000
He never gives a natural language, rendering of these.

00:55:32.000 --> 00:55:50.000
And we can speculate why I think that one reason might be that these natural language expressions like we shall do a that this is also became, see I can say we should do a, but it remains completely unclear where I would locate that interest subjective

00:55:50.000 --> 00:56:01.000
now it might be plural bearer it might be a special mode of intending. What sort of says sometimes, it also might be a congressman it might be that the content is simply in the plural. Now when I express that intention that way.

00:56:01.000 --> 00:56:19.000
Now when I express that intention that way. So, therefore, I think, maybe the, the simple fact that service doesn't use these natural language expressions anymore Just conveys the idea that it's not so important for him now there might be any number of ways in which we would

00:56:19.000 --> 00:56:28.000
ways in which we would that express in between express these intention in normal life, using normal, natural language.

00:56:28.000 --> 00:56:31.000
But that just doesn't matter.

00:56:31.000 --> 00:56:42.000
We can choose this straightforward expression like we show to a yeah but that wouldn't tell us anything in terms of philosophical theory about these intentions.

00:56:42.000 --> 00:56:45.000
Yeah.

00:56:45.000 --> 00:56:51.000
I'm not sure whether that satisfies you but

00:56:51.000 --> 00:56:54.000
I do.

00:56:54.000 --> 00:56:59.000
Yes, Thank you, that was, that was really very interesting and very clear.

00:56:59.000 --> 00:57:13.000
You ended by saying that we made this mysterious so I want to give you an analogy, and and well see if it's an analogy. I'm thinking of content is distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience.

00:57:13.000 --> 00:57:36.000
So judgments of perception are just, you know, the Wormwood case bitter. The room feels warm judgments of experience, our judgments that purport to be objective that the predicate in the subject, are combined in the object in the world, and that carries

00:57:36.000 --> 00:57:40.000
objectivity meaning anyone on to so judge.

00:57:40.000 --> 00:57:51.000
So there you've got two modes I can judge, as it were, in the perception mode or I can judge in the experience mode and and one of them has just subjective validity and the other has object of validity.

00:57:51.000 --> 00:58:13.000
And of course, you know, the problem of the first critique is, how do I justify By what right do I make those judgments of objectivity. By what right do I judge anybody ought to judge the way on judging, which of course is connected to the problem that

00:58:13.000 --> 00:58:16.000
I was seeing that.

00:58:16.000 --> 00:58:29.000
By what right do I have these have these be intentions. So, if you think of, and of course in realizing reason. Again I'm concerned with the objectivity of those judgments so there's a real question.

00:58:29.000 --> 00:58:38.000
By what right one makes objective judgments, which simply doesn't arise for judgments of perception.

00:58:38.000 --> 00:58:54.000
So you can think of these two modes, the, you know, when I'm worrying about my own satisfying life and when I'm worrying about the moral odd, a new problem arises on the side of the moral law, if you're gonna if you're going to understand it in terms

00:58:54.000 --> 00:59:00.000
of a mode of judging you're going to have to give some story about By what right you make those judgments.

00:59:00.000 --> 00:59:19.000
So, it seems to me, possible that that that's driving sellers in the way that you were suggesting assuming, assuming that you're reading is correct, that that really and this was sort of I think the way I was thinking that we've got to find that primitive

00:59:19.000 --> 00:59:39.000
founding intention that. And this is very odd I think when you think about his, his ideas about rationality in empiricism and the philosophy of mind, where the rationality lives in self correction, but here he's looking for a foundation and unquestionable

00:59:39.000 --> 00:59:42.000
Foundation.

00:59:42.000 --> 00:59:51.000
Maybe that's where he thinks he stand up, but but that brings its own problems by his own lights.

00:59:51.000 --> 01:00:09.000
So anyway, so. Is that an acceptable way of thinking about the we mode is a mode of judgment on the model of judgments of perception and judgments of experience.

01:00:09.000 --> 01:00:31.000
And the problem of justifying that form of judgment as leaving him to, again, I think programmatically. Look for a, an, unquestionable indomitable given ground.

01:00:31.000 --> 01:00:33.000
Yes, thank you. Thank you.

01:00:33.000 --> 01:00:52.000
Yeah, I think if you want to spell out this distinction between an iPod and in a remote in these terms, why not Yeah, when I put forward every intention in a context where we talk morality then of course, I put forward something which which comes with

01:00:52.000 --> 01:01:12.000
the claim of being objectively reasonable. Yeah, it comes with a commit myself to having that intention scrutinized as to whether it really, really is objectively reasonable yeah yeah why not, as I said to college, I think we can still use the term we

01:01:12.000 --> 01:01:28.000
mode if we want to yeah it's just that this is not something. If further third element over and above the two that I had there. And then I completely agree with you that, that it is seems strange or sellers.

01:01:28.000 --> 01:01:40.000
Try so it seems to try to look for foundations and practical philosophy when he rejects them and theoretical philosophy, but then sometimes.

01:01:40.000 --> 01:01:52.000
Sometimes he's not so sure whether that intention, we should foster or Commonwealth or whether it's something that we, which we can say argue for.

01:01:52.000 --> 01:02:00.000
Yeah, something where we can say this reasons rational reasons to adopt that.

01:02:00.000 --> 01:02:04.000
But sometimes he says, that's a metal character.

01:02:04.000 --> 01:02:07.000
My character with a room.

01:02:07.000 --> 01:02:12.000
In the end, Someone who complies with morality or not.

01:02:12.000 --> 01:02:22.000
And also, sometimes he has an even in his theoretical philosophy or an epistemology he has these.

01:02:22.000 --> 01:02:38.000
These principles, like, I'm not sure about the precise formulation, but has principles like that when a belief is a perceptual believe or when it is a belief about memory and so forth than.

01:02:38.000 --> 01:02:51.000
This means that this is a true believer, and he says that we need these principles in order to be able to function like epistemic beings in the world that all without these.

01:02:51.000 --> 01:03:09.000
We couldn't function in that way. and these have a special status to for theoretical reasoning, and in his episode Mr. Customer lot of wisdom ology. And the question is whether we would want to say that they are foundations of his epistemology or not.

01:03:09.000 --> 01:03:20.000
And maybe this idea of a we intention, which will foster our common welfare might have a similar status.

01:03:20.000 --> 01:03:36.000
It is also, it's as a foundation, it is quite a thin foundation and, as you said, it's not clear who's the way it is very unclear what it means to say that there is a common word for what that come and look for comprises yeah this is all things which

01:03:36.000 --> 01:03:55.000
would need to argue, or discuss maybe, discover scientifically. Yeah. So, even if it is a foundation and it would be rather's, it wouldn't have a firm foundation I think.

01:03:55.000 --> 01:03:57.000
Jerry.

01:03:57.000 --> 01:04:10.000
Actually I see there's some hands up and I've already sent Stephanie my question, and actually have the identical question for Kyle, so you can circle back to me at the end and if we don't get to me then I'll just ask my question during the third session.

01:04:10.000 --> 01:04:15.000
And I think Zachary what's next.

01:04:15.000 --> 01:04:20.000
Okay. Thanks a lot, Stephanie. That was great. I'm really in line.

01:04:20.000 --> 01:04:24.000
So, what I have

01:04:24.000 --> 01:04:29.000
a suggestion

01:04:29.000 --> 01:04:39.000
that I'm interested in your opinion about, it's not really super fully formed but the thought is that, um, perhaps, given

01:04:39.000 --> 01:05:07.000
the character of sellers it's semantics, in particular that it's an influential role semantics. The mode content distinction is less deep, or more fungible on this point of view, then it would be for other sorts of semantic whole like other sorts of kinds

01:05:07.000 --> 01:05:22.000
of semantics. So, the idea would be like something like, consider, like the difference in motor force between an expression of a supposition and an expression of a judgment.

01:05:22.000 --> 01:05:40.000
If you think that the difference is something like that supposition is has the job of figuring in just the same inferences as the judgment does, except with the exception that you're not allowed to detach,

01:05:40.000 --> 01:05:58.000
then you might think that, in some sense, the kind of difference between a supposition that's known as white and the judgment that's known as white is, it's just one kind of difference and influential role is just a very sort of generic kind of difference

01:05:58.000 --> 01:06:00.000
and so for every judgment.

01:06:00.000 --> 01:06:07.000
For every sort of influential role for a judgment there's like a corresponding influential role for a supposition.

01:06:07.000 --> 01:06:21.000
So you might think, like, distinctions between when you have an influential role semantics distinctions between force, or mode and distinctions between contents are in some generic sense of the same kind.

01:06:21.000 --> 01:06:39.000
So the thought might be that corresponding to this, you might you might think that you might make out the distinction between having the job of being able to be justified or unable to be justified by enlightened self interest or correspondingly having

01:06:39.000 --> 01:06:55.000
a similar job, but being able to be justified or unable to be justified based on an interest in intention for the general welfare. These are like these are like schematic differences in inferential role.

01:06:55.000 --> 01:07:12.000
But, there, there, there are differences which are in a way analogous I think to the kind of difference between the influential role of a supposition and the influential role of a corresponding judge judgment, so you might think it's like

01:07:12.000 --> 01:07:27.000
you. It's just a suggestion that maybe there's a way of working this out so such that the, the force content distinction becomes less than deep, given the influential role semantics for for sellers.

01:07:27.000 --> 01:07:29.000
Yeah. Yeah.

01:07:29.000 --> 01:07:43.000
Thanks for that suggestion hadn't thought about this and it's it's really interesting and I would have to think about it but just initially I think that's it sounds, sounds good.

01:07:43.000 --> 01:07:51.000
It seems as if, when the content is given in the end by the influential role and mode.

01:07:51.000 --> 01:08:07.000
In an acceptable form at the end of his career would also be a measure of the justification or a net, which I place an intention, and that would seem like these two things like merge, maybe.

01:08:07.000 --> 01:08:20.000
However, I think that at the beginning of his career he, like when he talks about the remote in 1963, in a row.

01:08:20.000 --> 01:08:36.000
Then he seems to have something more heavy weight in mind it talks about special forms of consciousness, a special form of life. Yeah, so there, I think, of course, These were the beginning sets.

01:08:36.000 --> 01:08:41.000
You can expect other things will be unclear in the beginning.

01:08:41.000 --> 01:08:56.000
Yeah but but at the beginning that seems that the mode was meant to be something we're heavyweight but but that you are such as terribly interesting and we'll have to think about. Thank you.

01:08:56.000 --> 01:09:00.000
Thank you Stephanie for that paper is really good, really interesting.

01:09:00.000 --> 01:09:10.000
Let me also say I'm always extremely impressed when people do this stuff in when it's not their first language.

01:09:10.000 --> 01:09:13.000
I mean it's hard enough when English is your first language.

01:09:13.000 --> 01:09:22.000
Um. So here's an example that I thought of.

01:09:22.000 --> 01:09:37.000
Let's assume just for the sake of the example that I'm a single parent, but I have a couple of kids and I decide that this Christmas we are going to serve food to the homeless.

01:09:37.000 --> 01:09:46.000
And the kids hate this idea they just want to sit around the tree and open their presence. But I say no, that's what we're going to do.

01:09:46.000 --> 01:10:03.000
Now I think in that example, the only way is in the content. We, you know it this this activity applies to the group of us, our family, however, nobody else has this intention.

01:10:03.000 --> 01:10:18.000
And I don't think there's any sort of shared consciousness or, you know, you know the kids are totally not on board with this they're just being dragged along

01:10:18.000 --> 01:10:21.000
now.

01:10:21.000 --> 01:10:25.000
Is that a situ is that a case.

01:10:25.000 --> 01:10:39.000
But you know let's say I'm making this decision, because I think it would be good for the kids I think it'd be good for the family, you know it'd be good for us to do it, it's not an egoistic decision.

01:10:39.000 --> 01:10:48.000
I have the welfare of the group in mind, the common good. Kids are not seeing this common good, but we just disagree about that

01:10:48.000 --> 01:10:54.000
now is that is that the kind of intention.

01:10:54.000 --> 01:11:06.000
That would give sellers everything he wants out of the way intention.

01:11:06.000 --> 01:11:23.000
You just could you indicate what what on your opinion, what would be lacking. Well, I'm not sure anything is lacking I'm, I'm pretty friendly to this view but what I'm trying to do is isolate a case where we have the 1980 version.

01:11:23.000 --> 01:11:27.000
The we is in the content and nowhere else.

01:11:27.000 --> 01:11:31.000
And does that.

01:11:31.000 --> 01:11:36.000
Does that give So, you know, this is kind of a test sort of with that.

01:11:36.000 --> 01:11:45.000
Is that an example that that does everything that we intention is supposed to do, or might we be missing something.

01:11:45.000 --> 01:11:46.000
I think probably.

01:11:46.000 --> 01:12:02.000
It depends when we are looking at this family as our community. Yes. Is that right yeah then just, of course, except centers and then we can just presuppose that there is a shared intention.

01:12:02.000 --> 01:12:13.000
Some bit strange and families but that we share Foster, our overcome and welfare, that there is some kind of understanding of what that common with her is for the family.

01:12:13.000 --> 01:12:29.000
And now I can argue about whether this giving food to the homeless on Christmas whether this as a means towards fostering that common welfare of our family.

01:12:29.000 --> 01:12:47.000
So, on this view is the intention would have everything that that we need it has a content in the paranormal, and you can evaluate it for reasonable in the light of our aim of leading of fostering our common welfare of the family.

01:12:47.000 --> 01:12:57.000
Yeah. And then of course it depends on how that evaluation will turn up yeah maybe up to scrutinizing it you see okay and man, That does not follow from the overarching goal.

01:12:57.000 --> 01:13:11.000
That's not a means to that end of fostering families welfare, or we may see that yes, it follows. And of course you are arguing with your kids.

01:13:11.000 --> 01:13:17.000
Maybe arguing with your with your partner that would be easier. Yeah.

01:13:17.000 --> 01:13:25.000
Then, everyone's rational and we see that this is actually a means towards that end of fostering our families welfare.

01:13:25.000 --> 01:13:38.000
Then, of course, provided me all law rational we, all of us are to adopt that that intention. Yeah, I think that would be enough.

01:13:38.000 --> 01:13:42.000
Okay. All right, that's fine, Thank you.

01:13:42.000 --> 01:13:59.000
If there are no hands then I'd like to ask question myself. And so, first is just a clarity Ettore questions definitely just to make sure that I understand what you think the crucial movies in on reasoning about value, and then assuming that I understand

01:13:59.000 --> 01:14:09.000
your reconstruction, follow up question. So it seems to be that in your reconstruction the idea and on reasoning about value is that

01:14:09.000 --> 01:14:24.000
the interpersonal point of view or when the reason practically and the interpersonal for from the interpersonal point of view the inferential structure in which my, my practical reasoning is embedded my intentions are embedded is different from when I

01:14:24.000 --> 01:14:43.000
reason from the personal mode right. So for example, let me let me give this example and just run it by you and see whether that captures your reconstruction so the whooping crane society right so I intend to clean up this biotech job today, or help cleaning

01:14:43.000 --> 01:14:47.000
up this biotech, which is a habitat for whooping cranes.

01:14:47.000 --> 01:15:00.000
And if I do that in the personal mode, then I do it, maybe be based on a background intention and really personal von that the whooping whooping cranes are to flourish, or something like that.

01:15:00.000 --> 01:15:05.000
And on the other hand, if I intend to clean up this bio talk today.

01:15:05.000 --> 01:15:14.000
In the interpersonal mode one way I do that as well I find myself to be a member of the whooping crane society or. I am a member.

01:15:14.000 --> 01:15:30.000
And so, the intention in which my cleaning up my intention to clean up the bio top is grounded will be. we any of us in that society.

01:15:30.000 --> 01:15:43.000
They'll bring it about as much as we can, that the whooping cranes flourish. Okay, and so we have two different international structures in which my intention to clean up the bio talk today would be grounded, is that the idea.

01:15:43.000 --> 01:15:49.000
Okay, so then the follow up question is, Doesn't that lose the moral point of view.

01:15:49.000 --> 01:16:03.000
I mean, does that not get sell us into the kind of tribalism that Danielle accused him of yesterday I mean so basically the inferential structure in which interpersonal intentions are embedded.

01:16:03.000 --> 01:16:23.000
I'll simply intentions that we happen to share in as a group. But there is no claim on the funder of the fundamental intentions that those intentions that everybody ought to share, or to have that the latter ones are the are the ones that are crucial

01:16:23.000 --> 01:16:26.000
for morality this claim to objectivity.

01:16:26.000 --> 01:16:37.000
Instead I mean in their own reasoning about value. So okay, we have more clarity, but what we have is groups, which happened to share something fundamental intentions.

01:16:37.000 --> 01:16:53.000
Okay, but still we of course when we talk about morality and not only about, say, my intentions as a group member of the whooping crane society, then we would consider or rational beings and just by the way I agree with, Danielle on the tribalism issue.

01:16:53.000 --> 01:17:00.000
I think that that's really, there's a point there. Yeah.

01:17:00.000 --> 01:17:10.000
So, so of course we we have to take into into account that simply, for example, intending as the member of the whooping crane society is not yet. Having a moral intention.

01:17:10.000 --> 01:17:25.000
Yeah. That is just having a community intention, where the community is that whooping crane society. Yeah, that's clear. Yeah.

01:17:25.000 --> 01:17:27.000
Otherwise it's interesting that.

01:17:27.000 --> 01:17:37.000
As far as the foundation for these say overarching goals are concerned, like, each of us members of the whooping crane society should foster or common welfare.

01:17:37.000 --> 01:17:42.000
Make sure make it happen that will be trying to survive and so forth.

01:17:42.000 --> 01:17:59.000
Such things that even for for restricted groups at least he talks in that way and then reason but knows that, even for restricted groups, these are intrinsically reasonable yeah so there's no further justification to be given for them.

01:17:59.000 --> 01:18:10.000
It's just, if you are a member of the society, you have to have that intention, otherwise you will be only nominally, a member of that society yeah but not like, really.

01:18:10.000 --> 01:18:15.000
I'm not sure whether that addresses your, your question.

01:18:15.000 --> 01:18:22.000
Well I think one could run the same argument with respect to other community other to human kind. Right.

01:18:22.000 --> 01:18:30.000
The at the end of the session so I'm enjoying my follow up question, I mean, hopefully they'll come up in.

01:18:30.000 --> 01:18:40.000
In the coming sessions we are going to talk more about the intention center hopefully it comes up then. So, thank you very much definitely for your beautiful paper.

01:18:40.000 --> 01:19:10.000
And let's give ourselves a hand and then I was able to 10 minute break so we reconvene in 10 minutes. 1120 is some time to follow Jim presentation. All right.

 

WEBVTT

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Yes, we all

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got it.

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Okay,

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what Jim if you want me just to give you a brief introduction. I'm promise I'll keep it, I promise I'll keep it short and let me know when I successfully share the screen.

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Oh it's shared now. Okay. Your goodness. Yeah. So, our gym O'Shea is our next invited speaker and I'm sure he's familiar to many of you. Jim O'Shea is Professor of Philosophy at University College Dublin.

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He's written extensively on the philosophy of Wilfred sellers, including this influential volume.

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Oh, you can't see it because he's sharing his screen, whatever anyhow Wilfred sellers naturalism with the normative turn, which many of you have probably read.

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He is also edited volumes tellers and his legacy for Oxford University Press. In addition to his work on sellers, Jim has also done a lot of work on caught, having published consequently computer reason and introduction and interpretation and 2012, and

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more recently he added to the volume cons Critique of Pure Reason a critical guide for Cambridge University Press. And so, we're all very pleased to welcome Jim as a speaker today.

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He's going to be presenting on so Lars is content naturalist metaphysics of morals. Take it away, Jim, thanks so much. Jeremy run, and everybody and it's tough to follow that talk by Stephanie it's about as clear as one can get so there's no way I'm going

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to be that clear and right. But I do have an historical twists like 70 does, and it's mostly in historical paper.

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It doesn't have a lot of the nice extensions and criticisms of sellers that's wonderful that we've been seeing for everybody, but we'll see. We'll see if there are any ideas in this that are useful.

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Is it coming up on the screen. Okay.

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Yep. Okay. Yeah, it looks great.

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So pf stress and in his, and let me know if the sun so KNPF stress and in his 1985 books skepticism and naturalism some varieties coined the idea of a liberal naturalism to describe the sorts of non reductive anti skeptical and empty super naturalist

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outlooks that he finds in Hume in his return to the Bulger in a slightly relaxed version of can't because straw son went a little softer on what trends mental debug arguments could show but there was still good he thought, and the later, Vic and Stein

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so straw since liberal naturalism is a kind of anti reductionism anti skepticism anti supernatural list view of this guy.

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I use the phrase candy and naturalism to borrow to narrow the discussion to philosophers such a strong person who have argued in different ways that cat is particularly useful for developing certain formal or normally the best insights that can be repurposed

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for use on both sides of the non reductive and the naturalist sides of a liberal naturalist sellers himself notoriously pushed both the canteen insights and the scientific version of naturalism about is hard or possibly harder than they can jointly be

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pushed.

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I regard the question is difficult, both in itself.

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And in relation to the interpretation of sellers views, but I'll have at it again today this time and historical spirit in relation to sellers developing views on the nature of the normative art itself.

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Okay so section one.

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Now, on there we go.

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Um, section one is revisiting sellers conception of conceptually reduce ability with causal reduce ability. the case of item is.

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So this was discussed BY ZACH wonderfully yesterday.

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In his early writings most prominently in his 1953 or semantic solution to the mind body problem.

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Sellers as we know frame these issues in terms of a distinction between the logical OR conceptual reduce ability of a given concept he uses the phrase conceptual irreducibly ability later and it's clear biologically means in his thicker sense distinction

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between the conceptually reduce ability of a given concept as combined double in his view with the causal reproducibility of that same concept in relation to the causal reduce ability or naturalization of his main strategy

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here as in his earlier 1949 paper language rules and behavior lrB is to sketch the barest outlines of a possible scientific psychology of rule governed behavior.

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More specifically envision visions and empirical but mental logistics psychology. That would explain our behavior as being what it is because of the agents consumption or thought of rules as what causes or motivate their behavior as went literally moves

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them or would move them to act in the ways they can see that is in the language exit or world to mind, direction of fit.

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The naturalising idea in this context seems to be that the term or concept art or obligation itself would occur quote in a properly constructed causal explanation only as a subordinate element in a descriptive mental mystic context as entails occurs and

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Jones believes today entails be obvious objections will spring to mind but some of these sellers addresses so we.

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Let's give the viewer a chance to grow.

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He continues in this way.

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And after this by the way he'll.

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I'll say this in a moment he deals with mental illness and means he treats. Subsequently, so he analyzes art in terms of a mental mystic context but then he deals with mental, the mental, the mind body problem next.

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So he continues. That's a non naturalist who holds as sellers himself does it becomes clear that the only way in which moral obligation can enter the causal explanation of human history is via facts of the form.

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Jones thinks or feels that he ought to pay his debt that sort of non naturalist would be holding that art is in the above sense causally reducible as well, to is in traditional terminology would be claiming that obligation and enters the causal order,

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only as an element in the intention law object of a mental act in the rest of SSM be the semantic solution paper seller strategy is then to argue for a parallel account.

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in terms of how thoughts themselves have intentional content or me.

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The proposal as he puts it there.

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Is that the pragmatic features of the use of statements about meaning or intentionality where such use is the manifestation of habits that are genetically identical across languages.

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Do not assert but do convey the information about our resulting habits and patterns of linguistic response and inference, and Zach laid out some of this nicely

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idea that is conveyed.

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The idea is that the conveyed information about patterns of linguistic behavior could then in principle be asserted that is described naturalistically in an ideal scientific account of such symmetrical habits and uniformity.

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Nonetheless song that conceptually or pragmatically irreducible side of the story it's clear that sellers in SS MB is not asserting a simple equivalence between the relevant pragmatic features of use among speakers on the one hand, and the resulting describe

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the habits of use that correspond among the other, but rather a mutual dependence between the two.

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That is the patterns wouldn't be what they are the uniform are these without the practices, but also vice versa.

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The practices presuppose that the relevant uniformity are in place.

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Thus, so on the one hand statements that x means or is about such and such will presuppose the relevant corresponding causal patterns and habits of Verbal Behavior does cause a lot of stated in terms of a boldness and hence cause a loss formulated in

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mystic terms, he says, presuppose causal laws which are not stated in terms of a bonus, unquote, but on the other hand the stresses that quote.

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It's only because I'm one back there but it's only because people correctly use some ethical statements

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to convey what is in principle mentioned by non symmetrical statements, unquote, that it's correct to make the causal statements that relate intentional descriptions to the causal patterns or behavioral patterns.

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They both generate and presuppose. So it's our, it's our rule governed spousal of principles that what not to do or use terms in a certain way, that generally generates universe uniformity of linguistic behavior.

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And those uniformity. These are what they are because of the norm governed a spousal of principles, but the norm governor Governor's files and principles to depends on or presupposes that responses to the objects are in certain patterns and influential

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habits or certain patterns. And so, so sellers then ties this back. So to make correct use of medical statements, is to think about a bonus, and he and this ties it back to his parallel account art.

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He says there is a sense in which about enters the causal order only by virtue of the fact that people think about a bonus. That is only by a factor of the form.

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Jones thinks that x is about why.

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And in this case, resembles art.

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What this last remark makes clear is that sellers way of addressing the natural causal reduce ability, yet conceptual irreducible of intentional states.

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That's the mind body problem involves the same sort of move that he gestured at in relation to the normative art in general when he appealed to quote facts of the form Jones thinks he feels that he ought to pay his debt as sellers concludes at the end

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of SMB, quote, it will be noticed that if one combines our assertion of the causal book reduce ability of art to is with our account of mental mystic discourse, the ethical naturalism gets everything he can reasonably hope for.

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Yet, the fact remains that what is said by Jones off to page that could not be said, even in an ideal pmes, that is human the ideal extension realist logic of Principia Mathematica.

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But what's really involved in sellers move to Jones thinking about, like, Jones is thinking about obligation or about a boldness conceived as making possible the causal reduce ability or naturalize inside of his overall picture.

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It's one thing for sellers to claim to have avoided the sorts of metaphysical conceptions of causal a reduced ability, represented by his explicit targets in SSM be, such as card Cartesian dualism and or Pritchard and Ross's non natural lyst intuition

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is. But it must strike us as quite another so you can avoid those metaphysical relational conceptions, but it's must strikers is quite another thing to claim to thereby naturalistically causally reduced the normative or the intentional in general, even

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given that this is supposed to be held can jointly with recognizing the dimension of normative pragmatic, reduce ability, for example, Robert Brandon holds that normative properties.

00:13:41.000 --> 00:13:58.000
I'm sure he'd be happy, happy to say that normative properties, quote, enter the causal order in sellers phrase, only in virtue of our attitudes of taking to be committed are entitled The quote we have met the norms and they are ours.

00:13:58.000 --> 00:14:06.000
But he stresses that its norms all the way down as far as the explanation of human thought and action are concerned.

00:14:06.000 --> 00:14:19.000
In SSM be sellers doesn't really say much about how he envisions a causal reduction of the concept of obligation, by an explanatory appeal to our thoughts about obligation.

00:14:19.000 --> 00:14:36.000
He does however refer to as the reader back to his account that he had published in his 1952 revised article on obligation and motivation,

00:14:36.000 --> 00:14:54.000
that's there. So I want to take a look at sellers 1952 account of obligation and motivation, which is where he sketches, the account of the causal reduce ability and conceptual irreducible of the art that he very lightly sketches.

00:14:54.000 --> 00:14:57.000
In the semantic solution.

00:14:57.000 --> 00:15:00.000
So, one thing that's clear.

00:15:00.000 --> 00:15:17.000
In this paper is again that sellers wants to avoid the metaphysical placement problems and he prices sense, that would revert resolved from analyzing Jones's thought, I want to do X or I ought to do X, as quote asserting an ultimate and and analyze it

00:15:17.000 --> 00:15:26.000
will relation of want, or of obligation between myself and the doing events by me.

00:15:26.000 --> 00:15:46.000
Sellers analysis of both want to do and not to do reveals the surface relational grammar to be misleading. In that way wants to do X isn't like why eat an apple, as he says, A or B, but more like, quote, why finds the thought of doing x attractive, combined

00:15:46.000 --> 00:15:52.000
with wise thought of doing x tends to evoke the doing events, unquote.

00:15:52.000 --> 00:15:57.000
Similarly in his analysis of why up to do. A and C.

00:15:57.000 --> 00:16:01.000
I'll leave out the in circumstances, just for brevity.

00:16:01.000 --> 00:16:12.000
In both cases sellers sellers explains the total mental tokens of the relevant thoughts tend to motivate or move on to the doing eBay.

00:16:12.000 --> 00:16:30.000
However, the difference is that in wanting to do X, it is the thought of oneself doing x which tends to evoke the doing events, whereas quote. When I truly say I ought to do x it is this is the thought of myself doing x as an instance of everybody doing

00:16:30.000 --> 00:16:35.000
x, which tends to evoke the doing events.

00:16:35.000 --> 00:16:44.000
And in those quotes, I've left up in circumstances, see a seller's himself doesn't matter a little bit.

00:16:44.000 --> 00:17:03.000
So, but in the revised second half of that article he published in 1951 and then 1952.

00:17:03.000 --> 00:17:18.000
And there are sellers clarifies that the thought that motivates us in our ordinary moral consciousness is indeed the talk that everyone ought to do a, not just the thought that everyone does it.

00:17:18.000 --> 00:17:22.000
But he stresses that while in this way,

00:17:22.000 --> 00:17:42.000
quote, the language of norms, is a mode of discourse, which presupposes, but as irreducible to the language of fact normative statements would be empty husks will be with a unique or so he generously says logical grammar.

00:17:42.000 --> 00:17:50.000
We're not that we are also acquiring tendencies to be moved to act by the thought tokens in which the term on appears.

00:17:50.000 --> 00:18:02.000
And it is this ladder motivational role that explains quote, how the language name game of norms gains application in the world.

00:18:02.000 --> 00:18:18.000
So I asked to do a statements or thoughts or less quote, normally the expression says of a motivational tendency, but also in another sense which is revealed only in the deep structure functional analysis as it were.

00:18:18.000 --> 00:18:30.000
I ought to do X quote is also a mention of the opposite. As motivating. In this way, or as he puts it as feeling obligated.

00:18:30.000 --> 00:18:37.000
It's complicated because in that article sellers distinguishes three centers of analysis.

00:18:37.000 --> 00:18:48.000
And the third sense introduces new, new terms, and basically introduces.

00:18:48.000 --> 00:19:06.000
Kind of like redefinition it introduces introduces elements that are not just analyzing the, the materials of use that are already there he compares it to analyzing objects, ordinary objects in terms of micro entities so he's calling it all analysis,

00:19:06.000 --> 00:19:13.000
but it's partly explanation in his sense.

00:19:13.000 --> 00:19:26.000
So he concludes our is capable of analysis and descriptive terms, and is an analyst, analyze the whole concept of empirical psychology.

00:19:26.000 --> 00:19:32.000
Again, it's not that we ordinarily think of our obligations in this spot mentioning way.

00:19:32.000 --> 00:19:50.000
The idea is that this is what's really going on that that's the explanation of how it works. This bear some similarities similarities to Hugh prices to level the analysis, not the game representation stuff that's like picturing

00:19:50.000 --> 00:20:03.000
price has two levels where he has the, the normative inferential lyst use of a given concept. And he has the underlying pragmatic function of that concept in our lives.

00:20:03.000 --> 00:20:14.000
And in his subject naturalism that distinction isn't important. And I think there's something like like that arguably going on here and so.

00:20:14.000 --> 00:20:19.000
So let us concludes that quote.

00:20:19.000 --> 00:20:35.000
I ought to do X is capable of analysis and descriptive terms along the lines we have suggested. And as I said is an analyzer concept of empirical psychology and price uses anthropology in this in an arguably similar way.

00:20:35.000 --> 00:20:38.000
in his subject naturals.

00:20:38.000 --> 00:20:42.000
So sellers puts his overall conclusion this way.

00:20:42.000 --> 00:20:52.000
If the main content of this paper is sound we can run with the naturalists that psychology of feeling obligated can be developed in purely descriptive terms.

00:20:52.000 --> 00:21:04.000
Well hunting with the intuition is in a perfectly legitimate sense the concept of our obligation is ultimate and do reducible.

00:21:04.000 --> 00:21:08.000
Yeah.

00:21:08.000 --> 00:21:27.000
So, we can perhaps see why in the semantic solution paper sellers refers back to this obligation and motivation paper as attempting to sketch in a bit more detail, the conceptual reduce ability yet causal reproducibility apart is, which was his side for

00:21:27.000 --> 00:21:53.000
for middle way between a motive ism and intuition ism subsequently in his 1956 article on imperatives intentions on the logic of art, and it's it's the substantial revision in 1963.

00:21:53.000 --> 00:22:12.000
as the 1960s progressed, perhaps, in part because Canton finally began to clean up his act in the eyes of sellers analytic colleagues, he would now refrain his succour middle way in terms of a combination of teleological and de ontological things.

00:22:12.000 --> 00:22:23.000
He explains this in terms of a we intention, motivate a we intention motivated concern for the well being of every one of us as a community.

00:22:23.000 --> 00:22:38.000
This is conceptualized in terms of categorical principles of duty that are in one sense directly intended for their own sake, acting on principle, from a sense of duty.

00:22:38.000 --> 00:22:54.000
end of human welfare. In general, it's I guess it's one big, I don't know what people think about this but one important difference from cancer that says they kind of tie is good incorporates human happiness as an end.

00:22:54.000 --> 00:23:03.000
Only as proper proportion to a prior pure categorical conception of one's moral worthiness to be happy.

00:23:03.000 --> 00:23:09.000
So I'm not sure that tellers way of embedding duty for its own sake.

00:23:09.000 --> 00:23:21.000
Within and aiming at a conceptually prior concern for the community's welfare really does result in quote a thoroughly county in metaphysics of morals.

00:23:21.000 --> 00:23:31.000
Even probably just say that counts more pure attempt to ground Categorical Imperative isn't as a non runner.

00:23:31.000 --> 00:23:33.000
But anyway, that's just a question.

00:23:33.000 --> 00:23:41.000
I want to turn now to some of these familiar challenges to sellers causal reduce ability consumption.

00:23:41.000 --> 00:23:51.000
But first, what notion of the causal reduce ability or naturalistic explanation of the concept of what is supposed to emerge from these early articles.

00:23:51.000 --> 00:24:08.000
Something seems clear something seemed clear, it's not directly explicated in terms of the idea that in principle we could use particle physics to predict the redistribution of particles that are occurring in roughly the same region of space where Smith,

00:24:08.000 --> 00:24:17.000
as token the thought that she ought to pay or student loans, but I mean this isn't to say that tax analysis.

00:24:17.000 --> 00:24:36.000
isn't isn't to the point because ultimately you get down to that so I want to say a few things about that. But the proximate cause will reduce ability of art is in terms of this empirical psychology of motivation in terms of thoughts about art.

00:24:36.000 --> 00:24:53.000
Rather, the causal reduction has to do approximately with a possible Imperial psychological account of the conceptualized thoughts and feelings about art that motivate or tend to evoke, and then several sensors are expressed in corresponding patterns

00:24:53.000 --> 00:25:10.000
of behavior, also clear is that the analysis is intended to be semantically deflationary, in a way, designed to avoid reference to any non natural metaphysical relations or properties of obligation, perhaps also as sellers suggest the account would not

00:25:10.000 --> 00:25:23.000
require the asserting or using, as opposed to the explanatory mentioning of any ethical claims of concepts in the explanation of their causal motivational roles.

00:25:23.000 --> 00:25:41.000
Furthermore, the account offers a picture of morality on which it has to do primarily with willed action with universalised exit coalitions and us with transforming or having transformed the world, rather than describing or explaining in seller sense.

00:25:41.000 --> 00:25:50.000
However, the conceptually reduce ability side of the story entails that the prescribed or intended patterns of behavior.

00:25:50.000 --> 00:26:05.000
For example that no one of us misleads people in circumstances see are generally not going to be essentially equivalent to the actual patterns or uniformity is a behavior that emerge.

00:26:05.000 --> 00:26:18.000
This is why sellers concludes SMB by saying quote, we have rejected the extension of this thesis with respect to both art, and about where again as sellers puts the point elsewhere.

00:26:18.000 --> 00:26:38.000
The presuppose core generally generalizations of prescribed rules, whether moral intentional or semantic or in the nature of the case violated in this way, as he says in lrB language rules behavior quote or rule is an embodied generalization that tends

00:26:38.000 --> 00:26:54.000
to make itself, true or better he continues it tends to exhibit the occurrence of such events as would falsify it. If it weren't already false. That is for the generalizations which lie at the core of rules are rarely, if ever, true.

00:26:54.000 --> 00:26:59.000
And unless they could be false, they could scarcely functions rules.

00:26:59.000 --> 00:27:01.000
Unquote.

00:27:01.000 --> 00:27:21.000
It's one thing to rely as sellers does in this truth and correspondence article TC that 1961 or 62 on the norm nature, it's one thing to rely on the norm nature meta principle, this is what I emphasized the quote or spousal of principles is reflected

00:27:21.000 --> 00:27:38.000
in naturalistically indescribable uniformity is a performance. It's one thing to rely on that principle in a way that might be sufficient to support sellers naturalistic theory of a picture in correspondence to the world.

00:27:38.000 --> 00:27:54.000
As far as the resulting natural linguistic patterns are concerned. That's the UC mix of it in truth and correspondence, but to claim there by to have naturalistically reduce the normal activity of the art principles themselves, or to have causally reduced

00:27:54.000 --> 00:28:04.000
what is involved in the spousal have such principles. I think is a different matter.

00:28:04.000 --> 00:28:24.000
Perhaps the reductive naturalist could reply on sellers behalf, that the ideal empirical psychology he envisions would in principle be able to explain each of the divergences of the actual behavioral up shots from the prescribed norms.

00:28:24.000 --> 00:28:34.000
But the ways in which we know how to look for explanations of this kind, explaining why things break down

00:28:34.000 --> 00:28:48.000
the ways in which we look for those kinds of explanations are always reliant, or indirectly parasitic on the same wider web of normative conceptions as the normative principle in question to borrow Zach.

00:28:48.000 --> 00:29:04.000
Zach divorce nice term, the quote causal footprints unquote left at the lower levels. Don't productively explain the adaptive intentional or prescribed prescribed walking causes at the higher levels.

00:29:04.000 --> 00:29:16.000
In terms of their own higher level salient kinds of laws, from those perspectives the multiply realizing lower level patterns are many and Jerry man.

00:29:16.000 --> 00:29:28.000
These are familiar issues raised variously across the spectrum from folder. To the left wing Solaris Ian's and Jeremy raises them very well in his book on sellers ethics.

00:29:28.000 --> 00:29:36.000
And they raised print non trivial problems with the idea of a causal reduction or naturalization of non activity.

00:29:36.000 --> 00:29:53.000
Other more indirect causal reductionist responses are available to address this sort of challenge. I mean very directly available right now with Zach and Preston, and others, but for my immediate purposes I just want to invoke the general worry.

00:29:53.000 --> 00:30:00.000
And I'll return to it in. In the next section.

00:30:00.000 --> 00:30:21.000
So perhaps what most current readers takeaway from sellers early and middle analyses of motivation is the important point that perennial perennially attempt at attempting non naturalist realist conceptions of the moral law with intuition being just one

00:30:21.000 --> 00:30:36.000
example are confronted with a groundbreaking alternative groundbreaking in the sense that a lot of these notion sells some as it's developing more developed in the way he's developing

00:30:36.000 --> 00:30:53.000
an alternative and sellers normatively pragmatic expressiveness and metaphysical a deflationary account of our interests subjective conceptions or thoughts about obligation, and about what's about what motivated us cause our behavior.

00:30:53.000 --> 00:31:15.000
But the idea that what has thereby been sketched is a non trivial causal reduction of the normative bar to the scientific empirical seems and Miss way of putting the actual upshot of those analyses.

00:31:15.000 --> 00:31:32.000
And as sellers career developed from the late 1950s through the 60s, he retained and further develop the core of the above account of moral motivation, in terms of a motivated concern for others welfare expressed by means of conceptually universalised

00:31:32.000 --> 00:31:43.000
interest subjective thoughts, but this outlook gradually becomes situated within an increased focus on freedom motivation and decision, decision making.

00:31:43.000 --> 00:31:50.000
From a canteen point of view, significantly reframing the issues we've been looking at.

00:31:50.000 --> 00:32:10.000
I'll broach this issue in Section poor with some remarks on sellers very different way of framing the issues in his 1962 philosophy, and the scientific image of man the human being, psi Am I turned to some remarks on scientific image naturalism and manifest

00:32:10.000 --> 00:32:13.000
image persons.

00:32:13.000 --> 00:32:23.000
But first, on the natural icing side of things, I want to look at Part Four of psi and entitled The scientific image.

00:32:23.000 --> 00:32:28.000
Put in terms of the familiar metaphor have higher and lower levels of nature.

00:32:28.000 --> 00:32:36.000
This section considered scientific reduce liability issues across all the levels of nature.

00:32:36.000 --> 00:32:49.000
In the wider context of evolutionary theory, stepping down from what he calls human behavior aesthetics, to earthworm or animal behaviorist sticks, through medicine neurophysiology biochemistry.

00:32:49.000 --> 00:32:53.000
physical chemistry and subatomic physics.

00:32:53.000 --> 00:33:09.000
Sellers bluntly stated conclusion in that section is that quote the scientific image of man the human being, turns out to be that have a complex physical system, unquote.

00:33:09.000 --> 00:33:27.000
I noted earlier that naturalism has been given stronger and weaker readings by liberal naturalists in psi and for, it can appear to be, you know, that can appear to be a trivial token identity or merely compositional anti supernatural ism where so it

00:33:27.000 --> 00:33:32.000
says we can identify chemical objects with physical objects and so on.

00:33:32.000 --> 00:33:38.000
With methodological helpful but strictly falsified laws at the higher levels.

00:33:38.000 --> 00:33:40.000
Plus norms.

00:33:40.000 --> 00:34:03.000
Adams and the void plus Geist as Tom breed recently memorably put it in psi i am i think sellers attempts to sketch a middle way naturalism that envisions productively redefining and identifying chemical objects with systems systems of subatomic particles,

00:34:03.000 --> 00:34:20.000
for example, but while also emphasizing that the principles laws and methods of the higher sciences. And so those scientists themselves remain predictably efficacious at their own conceptualized levels.

00:34:20.000 --> 00:34:34.000
But that view of sellers, in turn, and that's what I just read there that view in turn is capable of weaker and stronger interpretations.

00:34:34.000 --> 00:34:47.000
I suspect that in psi in for this one I spent a long time thinking about this preparing for this paper months ago. And I'm only end up using using a little bit of it but it's interesting to me.

00:34:47.000 --> 00:35:04.000
I think what sellers does is set some very substantive requirements, against the background of evolutionary theory on what it would take for a lower level science actually system to succeed in productively explaining the functionally conceived phenomena

00:35:04.000 --> 00:35:11.000
of the next levels up as conceived in their own causing normative or proper functional terms.

00:35:11.000 --> 00:35:17.000
I had about 10 minutes. Okay, thanks for.

00:35:17.000 --> 00:35:21.000
I have in mind.

00:35:21.000 --> 00:35:24.000
So just remarks.

00:35:24.000 --> 00:35:27.000
Let's see if I get here next.

00:35:27.000 --> 00:35:43.000
Yeah. I haven't mind sellers remarks such as quote the scientific explanation of human behavior, and also animal behaviorist x earthworm behaviorist must take into account those cases where the correlations character is this characteristic of the organism

00:35:43.000 --> 00:36:02.000
in normal circumstances, break down on quote, and the role of the next lower level science and targeting and explaining, and the saving, both the normality and the breakdown phenomena in their own terms, but read conceiving those terms.

00:36:02.000 --> 00:36:21.000
The idea would be that what sellers has in mind is a sin chronic levels of nature analog of his sophisticated save the predecessor phenomena account of diet cryonics scientific scientific theory replacement, and conceptual change, possibly this might

00:36:21.000 --> 00:36:33.000
help sellers to respond to certain robust anti reductionist salient sorry, humans against causes reduce ability that I that I mentioned.

00:36:33.000 --> 00:36:46.000
So, so the idea is, I don't want to digress too much on it but in Einstein targets Newton's conceptions of mass acceleration and the like.

00:36:46.000 --> 00:37:07.000
Newton, Einstein ring models them in Einstein's on relativistic terms, but is is redefining the Newtonian conceptions in a specific way that targets them as the phenomena they are, and is able to explain the normal, the successes and the breakdowns of

00:37:07.000 --> 00:37:19.000
the Newtonian framework. So the idea is that tellers is looking for substantive linkages of the levels and down the levels like that in synchronous as well.

00:37:19.000 --> 00:37:35.000
And whether that works or not, certainly I think sellers own blunt statements that science pictures humans as just bundles of micro processes can be seriously misleading ways of summing up his own requirements on phenomena stating scientific explanation.

00:37:35.000 --> 00:37:43.000
But however sympathetically one might read sellers levels naturalism like returning to his father, as it were.

00:37:43.000 --> 00:38:03.000
In the final part seven and psi and sellers explicitly considers and rejects the idea that quote the categories of the person might in an analogous way to how biochemistry relates to physics and so on, be reconstructed without loss in terms.

00:38:03.000 --> 00:38:09.000
in terms of the fundamental concepts of the scientific image.

00:38:09.000 --> 00:38:24.000
Now, there's an interesting first non step in the way the TELUS does it so I think I'm going to click ahead, like this and then just read down to make sure I don't bother always looking for when I should click here, there's this interesting first non

00:38:24.000 --> 00:38:40.000
step in the way that sellers rejects that idea. And it's easily overlooked for what he first says is that he doesn't have in mind the freewill objection to such a proposed scientific reconstruction persons on this he refers the reader back to the broadly

00:38:40.000 --> 00:38:46.000
compatible this conceptual distinction. He had made earlier in psi n.

00:38:46.000 --> 00:39:03.000
During his account of the manifest image where he had distinguished between the concept of a person's responsible character in relation to our manifest conceptions of real circumstances of choice, and its ordinary manifest prevention, or disabled.

00:39:03.000 --> 00:39:09.000
And there's a nice interventionists consumption of causality that he has, you already had it in.

00:39:09.000 --> 00:39:17.000
In the 60s of what causality means in the relevant sense in the manifest image.

00:39:17.000 --> 00:39:39.000
This he opposes to the misapplied ideal scientific deterministic conception of entire cross sections of the universe is past mistakenly conceived as the pseudo circumstance in which all our behaviors behaviors find their scientifically lawful explanation

00:39:39.000 --> 00:39:43.000
pop this up to.

00:39:43.000 --> 00:40:00.000
Okay. Interestingly, he suggests that the could have done otherwise concepts that are essential to the categories of personhood could in this respect be reconstructed quote as extraordinarily complex to find concepts, unquote.

00:40:00.000 --> 00:40:18.000
He says that what's really decisive against such a complex scientific reconstruction isn't free will. But as the logical point that quote, The reduce ability of the personal is the irreducible of the art to the years about five minutes.

00:40:18.000 --> 00:40:35.000
Okay. And he goes on to sketches conception of quote. The language of community and individual intentions, pointing out that quote to think thoughts of this kind, is not to classify or to explain, but to rehearse an intention.

00:40:35.000 --> 00:40:52.000
So in the end, while he suggests that the objects of our intentional actions could be ideally conceived and fiber bendy in scientific terms, though with available recourse to explanations and higher level patterns to, as I explained quote the irreducible

00:40:52.000 --> 00:41:10.000
of the we unquote end of our action oriented thoughts in terms of art. Remain conceptually and reduced in all their crucial norm instituting artifact creating and personhood sustaining roles.

00:41:10.000 --> 00:41:27.000
So in building on this logical point during the 1960 however, I think selling sellers deep in this conception of freedom in two ways that perhaps strengthen the anti reductionist or liberal side of as liberal scientific naturalism.

00:41:27.000 --> 00:41:44.000
Okay, so I get sex with five here, and I'll just read through the, the overhead here, pointing out some key points, but it is 1966 cradling realism and determinism have filled out that compatible is now my idea I don't know, I'm not an expert on crisis

00:41:44.000 --> 00:41:48.000
and freedom and resentment by any means I just I only read read it.

00:41:48.000 --> 00:42:08.000
Very recently. But the key move and sellers view of compatible as freedom strikes me as similar in its key move to stress and very different subtlety, and subtle position on our interests objective participant reactive attitudes in freedom and resent

00:42:08.000 --> 00:42:10.000
because the similar upshot of both of those.

00:42:10.000 --> 00:42:29.000
Is that a principle of scientific determinism assuming that's fine, could not be coherently engaged in explaining human behavior, while also maintaining as we practically must stress and our views are manifest image interest subjective normative character

00:42:29.000 --> 00:42:37.000
categories and participant reactive attitudes of moral responsibility and excuse ability.

00:42:37.000 --> 00:42:57.000
So, the universal scientific determinism, it's fine. But it doesn't engage with the set of circumstances concerning real, real circumstances of accountability blame disability.

00:42:57.000 --> 00:43:15.000
And I think a similar distinction has to apply to someone as easy solution to how thoughts integrate into the scientific order the just through multiple realize ability which was a revolutionary idea when he's doing it. But this is similarly his is a normative function so the decisive issue

00:43:15.000 --> 00:43:19.000
is going to be the normal activity of those functional roles.

00:43:19.000 --> 00:43:41.000
So finally, I think, inner motivational conflicts became a greater focus of sellers. During the 1960s and in his canteen period, and he does it in a wonderful way and knowing the better and doing the worse in 1969 70, which brings back the reasons internal

00:43:41.000 --> 00:43:44.000
ism which he had from the beginning.

00:43:44.000 --> 00:44:00.000
And I just want to, you know, you can just see the picture of this he does it very clearly, although it can mislead in certain ways. He cites. He's looking at Socrates that virtue his knowledge, and he cites David Falk who sellers new.

00:44:00.000 --> 00:44:10.000
Well, apparently, when fark was head of he died when I was a graduate student at Chapel Hill and I was, I was deeply into his stuff.

00:44:10.000 --> 00:44:19.000
But anyway, apparently sellers when he was head of department at Chapel Hill called ups sellers and said, Who should I hire this was the old boy network in those days.

00:44:19.000 --> 00:44:36.000
And so I said that's this guy Rosenberg, you should you should hire him. So he knew fark well, but he refers all the way back now in 1972 is on motivation and self defense and internal list view of reasons, if a person knows that he ought to do a.

00:44:36.000 --> 00:44:53.000
Then he yep so fact facto has a reason to do it. That's the weaker version that he starts with sellers.

00:44:53.000 --> 00:45:10.000
I'm not an expert on meta ethics of these sorts of things. But seller says the reasons all are intrinsically internally motivating, but there are good reasons or motives conclusively good reasons or motives and conclusively powerful or prevailing reasons

00:45:10.000 --> 00:45:12.000
or modes.

00:45:12.000 --> 00:45:24.000
So played at Plato's insight was to try to link, what one ought to do with one what what one would be moved to do all things to consider. And to link that to the welfare of the city.

00:45:24.000 --> 00:45:53.000
But Plato's mistake was to conclude in saying that knowledge is virtue in the way that he does is to say that a conclusively good reason is necessarily a conclusively prevailing reason or motive.

00:45:53.000 --> 00:46:08.000
But such that, even after all things have been considered and I'm coming to the end here, as they really are. Even after that there would be two coherent motors quote the welfare of our community viewed as related to the actions of each of us into personal

00:46:08.000 --> 00:46:16.000
benevolence and one's own happiness or well being viewed from a personal point of view as one's own happiness or well being.

00:46:16.000 --> 00:46:20.000
As one's own happens self love or rational self interest.

00:46:20.000 --> 00:46:36.000
He says these overarching motives for us this relates to Stephanie's paper, in a way, are incremental, and not only capable of conflict but typically conflicting but not always and start training dramatic degrees.

00:46:36.000 --> 00:46:51.000
And they're often nicely overlapping and the way Bishop Butler suggests, and seller suggests on how really intelligent love self love can support but it put it ultimately depends on concern for others.

00:46:51.000 --> 00:47:08.000
Um, but the tick typically conflicting good reason. Well reason the motivations of self love versus those of morality remain at the heart of the human condition for sellers, right down to the bottom, not a foundational bottom but as, as the human condition.

00:47:08.000 --> 00:47:26.000
So, he does his bit where he adds the conceptual truth to think of oneself as a member of community with a shared motivation that entails promoting the community well for fair entails that the moral reason or motive is a conclusively good reason He grants

00:47:26.000 --> 00:47:26.000
there.

00:47:26.000 --> 00:47:34.000
But such a reason isn't conclusively prevailing over the perfectly good reasons of rational self love.

00:47:34.000 --> 00:47:38.000
And so he ends his article with this.

00:47:38.000 --> 00:47:40.000
At the moment of decision.

00:47:40.000 --> 00:47:45.000
One or the other of these candidates for an orientation of the cell phone action.

00:47:45.000 --> 00:47:57.000
Each in its own way overarching predominates. The choices and an important sense between incumbents wearables, which choice one makes is a revelation of what one.

00:47:57.000 --> 00:48:05.000
At that moment, is it's often surprising, sometimes exhilarating or disconcerting. Even devastating.

00:48:05.000 --> 00:48:22.000
But always a revolution of Revelation, and in there. And so we can know the better and do the worse for sellers not just by acting out of impulse or through weakness of wills, but through all things having being considered for what they are.

00:48:22.000 --> 00:48:27.000
These two motives of morality and of rational self love.

00:48:27.000 --> 00:48:39.000
It comes down to what's called Volker rather than Villa which gives you the moral will between the reason motive of morality and the reason motors from a personal point of view.

00:48:39.000 --> 00:48:51.000
And I think that's rock bottom not foundational to rock bottom but it's it's where it's what sellers leaves us with, and which way you go, is it is a measure of what you are.

00:48:51.000 --> 00:48:59.000
At that moment, are returning to liberal naturalism and causal reduction.

00:48:59.000 --> 00:49:08.000
I think this it's you know we can say in a naturalistic spirit like everyone wants to that how thoughts motivate our behavior.

00:49:08.000 --> 00:49:22.000
There's nothing naturalistic we mysterious about it. And so how competing motives compete and how one does prevail. We can say that there's nothing naturalistically mysterious about it.

00:49:22.000 --> 00:49:43.000
But although this inner conflict is built out of stress only and manifest image materials I think so that it adds a very ability and inscrutable practical in a practical inscrutability and variability, about how are motivated a spousal of normative principles

00:49:43.000 --> 00:49:52.000
are in perfectly reflected in the crooked timbre of our resulting naturalistically described trouble uniformity of behavior.

00:49:52.000 --> 00:50:04.000
Thanks.

00:50:04.000 --> 00:50:11.000
Thank you

00:50:11.000 --> 00:50:29.000
couldn't share myself.

00:50:29.000 --> 00:50:37.000
Hi there we go.

00:50:37.000 --> 00:50:44.000
Thank you Jim for a great talk, and the floor is now open for questions for the next 20 minutes or so.

00:50:44.000 --> 00:50:58.000
So.

00:50:58.000 --> 00:51:03.000
I'm going to exercise the chairs prerogative and ask the first question.

00:51:03.000 --> 00:51:06.000
So, as.

00:51:06.000 --> 00:51:14.000
Oh, and then the Preston, sorry Preston you were just a little bit late there, I'm still gonna exercise chairs prerogative.

00:51:14.000 --> 00:51:28.000
So, you're talking about talking about sellers naturalism and talking about, you know, the, you know what, what would it take to be in what I guess you take to be the failure of the calls will reduce ability thesis.

00:51:28.000 --> 00:51:33.000
I mean, this is, this is maybe too big of a question, but.

00:51:33.000 --> 00:51:38.000
So, so what okay stupid.

00:51:38.000 --> 00:51:52.000
I guess I guess the the worry that that that that that uh that a slot machine is going to be left with after the failure of the calls and we'll do silly thesis is is you know what kind of shape does this largely and naturalism take after that because

00:51:52.000 --> 00:52:06.000
of course you know i i guess i take it if you're if you're sort of unorthodox Lars and that's sort of a linchpin of his naturalism that seems to be a pretty central piece of of fitting persons within, within the scientific worldview.

00:52:06.000 --> 00:52:13.000
But you know I'm, I'm, I, as you know, I find it to be a totally implausible piece of the puzzle.

00:52:13.000 --> 00:52:15.000
But the once you get rid of that.

00:52:15.000 --> 00:52:21.000
How does the pieces of the puzzle fit together now exactly into the stereoscopic vision.

00:52:21.000 --> 00:52:24.000
You know, so I'm not sure.

00:52:24.000 --> 00:52:25.000
I mean I think the point.

00:52:25.000 --> 00:52:39.000
One of the points that comes out is a lot of naturalistic things come out of the early analyses that maybe aren't best put in terms of reduce ability.

00:52:39.000 --> 00:52:53.000
So it's all the the anti anti metaphysical deflationary points the point about naturalistic sources of motivation, the denial of placement problems through the deflating certain things.

00:52:53.000 --> 00:53:00.000
And in the way he wants to put that isn't in terms of causal reduce ability.

00:53:00.000 --> 00:53:07.000
But I think by philosophy in the scientific image of man he's he's come to see that.

00:53:07.000 --> 00:53:25.000
He shouldn't stay stated in the way that is going to be perfectly taken to be perfectly analogous to the way he deals with reduce ability in the other dimensions, so he explains the sort of model and i think i think it's a rich notion of you could call

00:53:25.000 --> 00:53:30.000
it calls over disability, all the way up the levels of nature.

00:53:30.000 --> 00:53:38.000
But I think he's come to see that those expressive his points that he was making earlier.

00:53:38.000 --> 00:53:55.000
Don't need to be put in terms of having been causally reduced. When we say that they're in the in the business of trends prescribing and transforming the world, and require no metaphysics of how they do so in order to do what they they do.

00:53:55.000 --> 00:54:17.000
So I think he's, he's, he's enriched his picture he's kept many of the same materials but the idea that a causal reduction of the same point that he sketching among the levels of nature in general, is the way to is the way to put the sort of liberal naturalism

00:54:17.000 --> 00:54:24.000
that integrates with science, it's misleading to put it that way.

00:54:24.000 --> 00:54:25.000
Thank you.

00:54:25.000 --> 00:54:28.000
That's actually helpful. Thank you. Preston.

00:54:28.000 --> 00:54:31.000
Yeah. Thanks, Jeremy.

00:54:31.000 --> 00:54:48.000
So Jim, I want to ask you about how you see Brandon's project in this context, because one way of understanding what Brandon was doing in making it explicit with the distinction between normative statuses and normative attitudes, is to try to give a kind

00:54:48.000 --> 00:55:07.000
of causal reduction of the sort that you're outlining sellers here. And I guess I'm just I'm curious, from your standpoint since you've got a pretty developed view on what you take to be the merits and flaws of sellers own approach.

00:55:07.000 --> 00:55:15.000
Do you feel that Brandon's effort in that regard is any better that rounding normative statuses.

00:55:15.000 --> 00:55:22.000
Or at least our finances to know the statuses. in our attitudes is.

00:55:22.000 --> 00:55:34.000
So, possible or or, I mean he doesn't go to the detail that sellers does but you feel like it's got some life to it. Yeah, I think that's fair. I think it's very similar.

00:55:34.000 --> 00:55:38.000
And so, it's not that that.

00:55:38.000 --> 00:55:55.000
I thought you were going to push the naturalist pictures story a little bit more by. Once you get to, I think, brand sellers is looking at how we Institute and express norms in terms of our attitudes.

00:55:55.000 --> 00:56:13.000
And then how these this business about asserting and conveying or pre supposing naturalistic uniformity is Brent. That's very much in brand them done in a more systematic way then sellers.

00:56:13.000 --> 00:56:24.000
With the pragmatic metal languages I mean you're really good on this and how they are related to the pragmatic metal languages and how they relate to first order discourse.

00:56:24.000 --> 00:56:31.000
So I see sellers and brand them as very tightly linked in that way.

00:56:31.000 --> 00:56:54.000
The thing is that then brand them with the norms, all the way down, as it were, he cites Milliken, and he price in in very nice ways and says there's this other project of trying to give a naturalistic account of how we get into this game.

00:56:54.000 --> 00:57:07.000
And this isn't to mention the picture and stuff which, which is important too because I think that can be embedded within a brand don't mean normally invest in celebrity and sort of account and within McDowell's account for that matter, as long as it's

00:57:07.000 --> 00:57:09.000
constrained and regulated by norms.

00:57:09.000 --> 00:57:19.000
But when, when you think about prices subject naturalism which again I mentioned a few times there's a lot of similarities to what I think.

00:57:19.000 --> 00:57:21.000
Sellers is doing.

00:57:21.000 --> 00:57:25.000
He gets off, he gets off the off the boat.

00:57:25.000 --> 00:57:47.000
And I don't know whether that's because, I mean, I think price would say too. It's not like when you give a functional account in naturalistic terms of what's going on when people are expressively normatively doing the things they do.

00:57:47.000 --> 00:57:52.000
It's not like you're going to be able to dispense with that upper level.

00:57:52.000 --> 00:58:12.000
And so I think I think Brandon could be more ambitiously on the naturalistic side without abandoning the, the, you know, the jack in the thing always guess where I'm where I'm.

00:58:12.000 --> 00:58:18.000
But this is what I think fillers holds is that it's always going to be James, James faced.

00:58:18.000 --> 00:58:36.000
And you're never going to, as it were, reduce to the to the non normative. But I think sellers clearly envisions and like you've been working on an evolutionary says there be an evolutionary account, a causal account name in n g is GC says this, of the,

00:58:36.000 --> 00:58:54.000
of the evolution control. Thank you think a lot interesting could done prior to build is that out of the table Institute norms, but the basic move by Brandon.

00:58:54.000 --> 00:59:08.000
His normative phenomenal ism does he call it I can't remember you know the taking to be. I think there's a similar move in sellers Yeah, does that. That was

00:59:08.000 --> 00:59:12.000
great. Stephanie.

00:59:12.000 --> 00:59:24.000
Thank you for you for your talk. I just had a question about a detailed but a detailed which kept puzzling me like for some time and you're the best person to ask that question.

00:59:24.000 --> 00:59:37.000
And if you do not have any thoughts on that then just, just ignore my question but seller says that, for example, meaning statements they say something like that tuned in German meets doc.

00:59:37.000 --> 00:59:59.000
Yeah, but they convey some further information for example about the uniformity is of the behavior of German speakers and so forth. But, and he often uses this word convey to people when when when they write about centers on that cause your coverage disability

00:59:59.000 --> 01:00:05.000
phases, then they just tend to just also use that word convenient.

01:00:05.000 --> 01:00:13.000
But precisely that does not mean and what precise, what what's the precise relationship between what is said here.

01:00:13.000 --> 01:00:33.000
That would mean stock for example and the information that is conveyed is that say an implication or, because in today's pragmatics you would say okay convey is like when, when I irony, then I say something but I convey, say, the, the contrary, yeah.

01:00:33.000 --> 01:00:41.000
Yeah, it's a certain sense or it was just positive, and maybe have some thoughts about.

01:00:41.000 --> 01:00:50.000
And that would be probably a more intentional sense of convey, you're, you're, you're using.

01:00:50.000 --> 01:01:10.000
Am I am I going against myself is that, okay. It's fine. Anyway, you intent you use irony intentionally to convey the opposite of the thing that you're saying was that I agree that this has to be so this is one of the things I think Brandon spells out well i think it's exactly that that he thinks

01:01:10.000 --> 01:01:15.000
he has his.

01:01:15.000 --> 01:01:22.000
Well, that'll about

01:01:22.000 --> 01:01:27.000
how what we say relates to what we have to do and so on.

01:01:27.000 --> 01:01:36.000
But I think it's a pretty sub oppositional notion it's not an intentional intending to convey by means of doing something.

01:01:36.000 --> 01:01:40.000
So,

01:01:40.000 --> 01:01:45.000
it was the nice example is that just say if you see a red apple.

01:01:45.000 --> 01:01:53.000
You're not clearly not saying anything about the, or if you say that.

01:01:53.000 --> 01:01:57.000
Jones knows Jones sees that there's a red apple.

01:01:57.000 --> 01:02:13.000
You're not saying anything about Jones is being causally affected by the red apple that they're being a reliability relation between Jones Jones is statements I see a red apple and they're being a red apple and so on.

01:02:13.000 --> 01:02:30.000
So, the perceptual statement conveys a lot of information about what has to be in place in the in the naturalistic relations involved, but doesn't say anything about those relations.

01:02:30.000 --> 01:02:33.000
So

01:02:33.000 --> 01:02:41.000
I'm thinking of the exact sort of case the thing that sellers has in mind in relation to perception.

01:02:41.000 --> 01:02:49.000
In this regard, but his broader notion is if he'd say that I'm going to means dog.

01:02:49.000 --> 01:03:06.000
You're not saying that the patterns of inference from one assertion to another, and the responses to dogs and bobbing there as a dog you're not saying all these things that he's going to call semantic uniformity.

01:03:06.000 --> 01:03:09.000
When you assert a meaning claim.

01:03:09.000 --> 01:03:17.000
But the meaning claim conveys that point is doing the same thing that dog does for me.

01:03:17.000 --> 01:03:33.000
And when that carries or conveys a lot of information about the sorts of things you'd know how to do with content without necessarily saying.

01:03:33.000 --> 01:03:44.000
So, I mean, presupposes, isn't it, is it, I think it's a presupposition will notion.

01:03:44.000 --> 01:03:45.000
Yeah.

01:03:45.000 --> 01:03:56.000
We'll take up this suggestion and think about it further, whether that's makes sense yeah in a standard notional presupposition.

01:03:56.000 --> 01:04:11.000
Yeah, I don't know I don't know if it relates to sellers article on on preset supporting that would be a good idea to have a look at it. Yeah, I looked at that once I don't, I don't know

01:04:11.000 --> 01:04:13.000
whether it.

01:04:13.000 --> 01:04:16.000
But the but the.

01:04:16.000 --> 01:04:41.000
The general idea is that semantic rules the espousal of those sort of normative guidance is and rules that were not to say, dog in response to this sort of animal and not that sort of animal, we carry on our lives and the normative I'm beyond supposed

01:04:41.000 --> 01:04:45.000
to be about how to use language.

01:04:45.000 --> 01:04:55.000
What we don't talk about is that that establishes uniformity that the children start responding regularly and reliably.

01:04:55.000 --> 01:05:03.000
Only two dogs when they say dog and no longer to other animals, other similar animals and so on.

01:05:03.000 --> 01:05:11.000
So, the normative uses of the end this is analogous things then with.

01:05:11.000 --> 01:05:28.000
I see the book as pre supposing that I'm related in certain ways to the book that there is a book, and that the book is caused me to have this experience and so on, unless those were in place, you wouldn't be in a person that's able to see a red apple,

01:05:28.000 --> 01:05:32.000
though to know that there is a red up.

01:05:32.000 --> 01:05:35.000
So in semantics or an epistemology.

01:05:35.000 --> 01:05:44.000
All of these normative ought to be that we learn in growing up in the language game.

01:05:44.000 --> 01:05:52.000
Go along with regularities or uniformity so response and of influence and of action.

01:05:52.000 --> 01:06:12.000
And so we don't mention those, but they the normative activities both generate those, and depend on those to be what they are, for perceptual knowledge to be what it is for her to mean, don't want to mean dog in the way that it does

01:06:12.000 --> 01:06:20.000
only have a few minutes maybe we could move on to bill as the last hand that I see.

01:06:20.000 --> 01:06:33.000
I was struck by one of the points you made in one of the slides that implied that if no one ever thinks about about this there is no such thing.

01:06:33.000 --> 01:06:48.000
Um, and that struck strikes me as wildly implausible, I mean even if humans never evolved into linguistic creatures that had a concept of about illness and could therefore, think about about this.

01:06:48.000 --> 01:06:57.000
Um, it still would have been the case that there are ways to explain animal behavior.

01:06:57.000 --> 01:07:13.000
Not that anyone would have been doing that if there were no linguistic creatures around but the ways to explain animal behavior. Still should have would have whatever inverted to the mountainous of animal thoughts right because animals, think about food

01:07:13.000 --> 01:07:13.000
about mates and about predators and safety and things like that.

01:07:13.000 --> 01:07:33.000
about mates and about predators and safety and things like that. Um, so that just struck me as as as an implication if if you will ever really does believe that there is about and it's only if thing people are capable of thinking about about this.

01:07:33.000 --> 01:07:36.000
That just strike, strike is just wrong.

01:07:36.000 --> 01:07:56.000
Yeah, no, so I mean, what I'm going to go on to say is that, absolutely. I think he's got this view of the two kinds of anything being about anything of anything, representing anything it only becomes clear in the mental events article 1981 for anything

01:07:56.000 --> 01:08:04.000
to represent or be about anything, it has to be embedded with some within some wider system.

01:08:04.000 --> 01:08:21.000
That basically establishes a kind of proper functioning, or rule governess of normal activity of two kinds one's a logical space of reasons. And that's what he's talking about when he's talking about humans thinking about about this.

01:08:21.000 --> 01:08:37.000
And the other kind is the sort of proper functioning that natural selection generates and so on. So, and I think he thinks, and I think all this is a fascinating part of his view that, that he didn't get to developing until later when he read a ton of

01:08:37.000 --> 01:08:54.000
in the late 60s and 70s he read a ton of stuff about animal representations such as it was, and so on. So he says there's no problem with an innate representation of something as something, and that all has to do with the story about animal representation.

01:08:54.000 --> 01:09:15.000
And I think a lot of that is exploited by us, of course, in the ways that we recognize faces but even even even once we grow into a logical space of reasons, I think we're always moving about the world in a way that that relies upon our animal heritage.

01:09:15.000 --> 01:09:19.000
But then it would be an interesting question but it's an interesting question how he draws that line.

01:09:19.000 --> 01:09:35.000
And then I Preston would do a much better job than I would on on those sorts of questions he goes for logical representational systems beings with logical operators in their reference repertoire versus animal.

01:09:35.000 --> 01:09:39.000
Okay.

01:09:39.000 --> 01:09:52.000
Thank you again Jim for that talk and thank you again for the discussion.

 

WEBVTT

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Alright, welcome back everybody for the afternoon Shall we get started, it's 115 in.

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On the side, North America so yeah please, let's start recording.

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I will.

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Thanks, Jeremy.

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I will look back everyone. It's my pleasure to introduce Kyle Ferguson. He is currently at the NYU Grossman School of Medicine, where he studies cool stuff like vaccine ethics and global health ethics, but today he is going to talk to us about we intentions

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and how one reports them. So, I want you to take it away.

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All right, thank you very much, Nicholas and thanks everybody for being here. This has been such a joy and I'm really excited to talk with all of you today about this I couldn't imagine a better audience in the world to talk about this, this topic.

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Are you able to see my slides.

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Alright, so I want to start actually with what I think is a real gem that I found in the archives of scientific philosophy amongst sellers papers. It's this postcard that traveled by air mail from Germany to Pittsburgh.

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Has the PhD was image here. Um, but it was sent by Richard warty to sellers. I think this was in 1978.

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And he says, I'm sorry I missed you. Happy New Year, etc. but what I really like about this postcard is the PostScript. So down here you see that already wrote PS.

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I liked Solomon's essay in the synaptic vision very much hope you did too since I shall be advertising it to the Germans, as the Straight Dope, which is a really groovy thing to say, but it also.

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I found it really affirming because I found that essay in of Solomon's incredibly helpful when I was first learning about sellers meta ethics and what I think.

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Solomon does a really good job of is explaining this dialectic between emotive ism and intuition ism and framing sellers own, but ethical view as a third way and alternative to those two isms, so I think of sellers view here as meta ethical intentionalism,

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which is the claim that the moral art in thought and language is to be understood as a special case of Chow, where shall his intention and expressing this framing of sellers view is also sort of indicated by sellers own autobiographical reflections, he

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says, you know, back when I was at Oxford in the 30s. I had this realization that somehow intuition ism and emotive ism would have to be off Gilman into a naturalistic framework, which recognize ethical concepts is genuine concepts and found a place for

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inter subjectivity and truth.

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Sellers himself endorses before it was published endorses.

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Much of Solomon's essay.

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In his letter he says, You've done an excellent job of tracing the dialectical structure of my thinking on these topics. You've been particularly successful in grasping what I was up to in ILO.

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But there's a caveat. The caveat is that that paper stems from the 50s, and that more of its weaknesses than you seem to allow were corrected I believe in the less in diluted papers which following this letter by the way predates or Av.

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But I do think that the, the critiques that Solomon, makes in his own chapter.

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Sellers thought that he had addressed and one one critique I think sellers has in mind here is when Solomon says the following that one has the impression indeed that sellers invokes the notions of we intending, and we consciousness in order merely the

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gesture in the direction where he thinks the ultimate solutions are to be found that that gesturing was towards the essential grouping us of moral discourse. So, what I want to do today is say that sellers did much more than merely gesture towards grouping

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so I do think we have a workout view of we intentions much more developed than Solomon thought.

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But I do think that much of the scholarship is helpful as it has been in the subsequent years, much of it I think gets the grouping is wrong in that there's a trend as I see it, there's a trend of collectivist interpretations of we intentions.

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And I think that those collectivist readings might lead us astray.

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So my aim is to correct the course by offering and ended what I'll call an individualist interpretation.

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And that's an interpretation that emphasizes the radical egocentricity that sellers attributes to re intentions.

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I'm going to focus on the this dimension of. We intentions having interest objective form.

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And I say that rather than as the collectivist interpretation suggests where that's a matter of them being shared. I want to say no, it's actually them being shareable.

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So there's two strategies that I'll adopt here. One is to offer some technical support.

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But then the one I'm more excited about is the strategy of report tutorial ascent.

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And what I mean by that is I want to raise and motivate this question. What do reports of we intentions LOOK LIKE THAT IS WHAT DO self descriptions, rather than expressions of we intentions look like, I think that by reflecting on that question and the

00:06:02.000 --> 00:06:14.000
issues that arise they're sort of tip the scales towards the individualistic reading and against the collectivist interpretation of their we intentions enter subjective form.

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Alright so the plan is to speed through a rehearsal of some basic building blocks here that we find in sellers theory of intentions. And I want to emphasize the egocentricity that he attributes to them.

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In part two. I want to go to inner subjective form and make the case that this is about share ability rather than being shared. And then in part three, it will turn to.

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We, we intention reporting sentences themselves.

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So let's start with one with any other audience I'd have to go slow slowly through this but I think this will be a rehearsal of stuff that all of you are familiar with, in part one here.

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So, the first issue here is the distinction between shall do and shall be intentions.

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And what those look like in their verbal expression. So, shall do intentions are intending to do. We express shall do intentions by saying, I shall do a, and we can regiment that as, shall I do it.

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On the other hand, there are shall be intentions, those are intending that.

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So, we can express the intention to shall be p by altering, it shall be the case that P.

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Right, so these are intention expressing sentences. And there are two types of intention, we can express a shall do intention or shall be potentially.

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The second component here is what I'll call it practicality thesis. So this is the idea that shall be intentions, or intentions that is their practical commitments.

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Only by virtue of their relation to corresponding shall do intentions. So it shall be the case that P is an intention, only insofar as it connects to a, an intending to do, namely the intention I shall do that which is necessary to bring it about the

00:08:13.000 --> 00:08:26.000
P, which I can regiment just add one little bit of notation here the sub p, that says, I shall do that which is necessary to bring in about the case that P.

00:08:26.000 --> 00:08:42.000
Part Three is about reporting. So self describing intentions. And I think that the distinction between shall do and Shelby intentions. That's preserved at the level of reports or self descriptions.

00:08:42.000 --> 00:08:54.000
So I can report, the shall do intention to do a with I intend to do a, and I can report. The shall be intention that P with, I intend that P.

00:08:54.000 --> 00:09:07.000
right so you find in the structure of intention reporting sentences that same that that distinction between Shelby and shall do is sort of refracted at the level of reports.

00:09:07.000 --> 00:09:22.000
The fourth component here is egocentricity thesis, and one way to think about this is, whether we can substitute a second or third person subjects in place of i.

00:09:22.000 --> 00:09:34.000
So, you shall do a yen's shall do a he or she or they shall do a. And can we regiment it the same way that we did the intentions. And the answer is no.

00:09:34.000 --> 00:09:52.000
And that's because when we use show. We're expressing our own intentions, whenever a person uses shell they're expressing his or her own intentions intentions and their expression are inescapably egocentric in this way, they're bound to the first person

00:09:52.000 --> 00:10:01.000
perspective. So if i. So, you shall do a with a second person subject is actually in disguise.

00:10:01.000 --> 00:10:14.000
It's really expressing the speakers shall be intention, it shall be the case that you do a, which via the practicality thesis connects to, I shall do that which is necessary to make the case that you do a.

00:10:14.000 --> 00:10:34.000
So we can't let the surface grammar of this sentence fool us into thinking that you can have non first person subjects and the regimented sentence. So in reality, the intention that's expressed by you shall do a would get reported as I intend that you

00:10:34.000 --> 00:10:35.000
do a.

00:10:35.000 --> 00:10:42.000
So ultimately, the reporting sentences. It seems like they need to have is subject.

00:10:42.000 --> 00:10:47.000
That's a feature egocentricity.

00:10:47.000 --> 00:11:02.000
The fifth and we're not almost done with the sort of inventory here, the fifth point is kind of an obvious one, but it is worth mentioning the mental state that you express by.

00:11:02.000 --> 00:11:19.000
I shall do a is identical to the mental state that you report or self described by saying I intend to do a right so the states that you expressed are the exact same states but get reported in the reporting sentences.

00:11:19.000 --> 00:11:35.000
But that's, that's okay so that's an important thing to keep in mind, but it's also important to keep in mind a non identity thesis. And that's the idea that that which is expressed by intention expressing sentences is distinct from that which is expressed

00:11:35.000 --> 00:11:38.000
by intention reporting sentences.

00:11:38.000 --> 00:11:38.000
So I shall do a that expresses a practical commitment, namely the intention to do it.

00:11:38.000 --> 00:11:56.000
So I shall do a that expresses a practical commitment, namely the intention to do a, but the reporting sentence I intend to do a expresses a docs asset commitment, the belief that or the answer to work thought that I intend to do it.

00:11:56.000 --> 00:12:12.000
Alright, so even though you report, the same states that you express the states expressed by reports are different from the States expressed by expressions.

00:12:12.000 --> 00:12:17.000
Alright so that's the non identity pieces.

00:12:17.000 --> 00:12:20.000
One more point about egocentricity.

00:12:20.000 --> 00:12:34.000
Think about two agents who think the same thought as Watson and homes are both thinking that it's raining here, they're expressing the same thought in terms of the contacts, but these are distinct things as states.

00:12:34.000 --> 00:12:38.000
How does this work at the level of intentions.

00:12:38.000 --> 00:12:43.000
When Watson and homes both intend to butter their bread.

00:12:43.000 --> 00:12:47.000
They express different contents and different states.

00:12:47.000 --> 00:13:06.000
And this isn't just a matter of who's bread is intended to be buttered here. Even if Holmes weirdly intends to butter Watson's bread. There's still a difference and content, and this has to do with the index the quality that Stephanie was discussing this

00:13:06.000 --> 00:13:18.000
morning. So each intends one's own action there are these inimitable de say elements with intending. And in this sense to intend is to be alone.

00:13:18.000 --> 00:13:31.000
You're only able to intend to your own doings. And your expressions of intentions are always those sort of those are those in those attendings.

00:13:31.000 --> 00:13:34.000
But there's

00:13:34.000 --> 00:13:45.000
there's possibility of limited transcendence here and that has to do with the inter subjective form of we intention, so back to this letter to Solomon.

00:13:45.000 --> 00:14:00.000
So, we shall do a has the logical into subjectivity which you correctly point out I was looking for it permits different people to have a strong sense the same intention content.

00:14:00.000 --> 00:14:05.000
So notice that we shall do a need not as some critics type supposed to beat chorused.

00:14:05.000 --> 00:14:10.000
It is a form of practical thought, which can go on and for internal.

00:14:10.000 --> 00:14:24.000
I can think in terms of we, and in this sense, it is a form of life, obviously people need not agree in their logically into subjective intentions. The point is that they literally can agree.

00:14:24.000 --> 00:14:40.000
So this inter subjective form of we intentions, is a design feature that's meant to allow for sameness of content. Despite the index locality issues that we saw in the previous slide.

00:14:40.000 --> 00:14:50.000
And with that and want to turn to enter subjective form as sharing ability.

00:14:50.000 --> 00:15:07.000
So, as, as we all know and as is a wonderful thing. There's this surge of interest in sellers practical philosophy and that's our our our hanging together today is a further instance of that.

00:15:07.000 --> 00:15:18.000
In, in this expanding collection of secondary literature about. We intentions, I see. Really I see two trends, either.

00:15:18.000 --> 00:15:22.000
There's agnosticism about inner subjective form.

00:15:22.000 --> 00:15:25.000
And I think that Solomon is, is the case of that.

00:15:25.000 --> 00:15:32.000
Stephanie I thought your, your recently published paper was a version was a version of that.

00:15:32.000 --> 00:15:40.000
That agnosticism about inner subjective form but today I think you've gone for the agnosticism to atheism.

00:15:40.000 --> 00:15:46.000
The other the other trend is what I'll call collectivism.

00:15:46.000 --> 00:16:06.000
And here are some, some illustrations of that so David bow monsters paper he describes the Enter subjective form of we intentions as a matter of there being shared intentions of members of the community.

00:16:06.000 --> 00:16:17.000
a matter of a social collective bound by shared intentions that that's where that witness of. We intentions comes in, is being shared.

00:16:17.000 --> 00:16:36.000
And Jeremy in is, is an incredibly helpful and valuable book says some things that make me think there's a collectivist reading going on there to where we intentions are described as collective intentions or group attitudes.

00:16:36.000 --> 00:16:44.000
So here's a some quotes from there and individuals re attitude presupposes the corresponding group attitude.

00:16:44.000 --> 00:16:56.000
They, that is, we intentions pre presuppose a group, a group attitude, which itself presupposes either a set of mutual beliefs or expectations.

00:16:56.000 --> 00:17:12.000
So I don't think I've really tightly or precisely defined collectivism, there's a bit of gesturing going on here too. But what I really want to emphasize here is the idea so collective is reading says that inter subjective form is a matter of intentions,

00:17:12.000 --> 00:17:22.000
actually being shared, or being supposed by the agent to be shared.

00:17:22.000 --> 00:17:36.000
All right now, that is different from the interpretation that I want to offer and in which is an individualistic interpretation, and I want to say that, like all intending we intending is to engage in a solitary affair.

00:17:36.000 --> 00:17:51.000
The inner subjective form is not about intentions, actually being shared, or even assuming that they are shared. Instead it's a, it's a form, it's a feature of those of those intentions that make them shareable.

00:17:51.000 --> 00:17:58.000
So this is the capacity to be shared rather than the actuality of being checked.

00:17:58.000 --> 00:18:10.000
Alright, so here's a few pieces of textual support in science and metaphysics sellers writes an individual can have an intention with interest objective form.

00:18:10.000 --> 00:18:21.000
Even if no one else in point of fact shares, and later in that same paragraph, it's possible for a being to think of themselves as a member of a community.

00:18:21.000 --> 00:18:26.000
Even though this community does not actually exist.

00:18:26.000 --> 00:18:37.000
Later, or earlier in that essay from the fact that from the fact that Smith values something as one of us. it doesn't follow that we value it.

00:18:37.000 --> 00:18:43.000
Right. So, what I think that these three passages on their own.

00:18:43.000 --> 00:18:53.000
Suggest or what they really mean is that group, attitudes, aren't necessary for one's own we intended.

00:18:53.000 --> 00:18:56.000
You aren't sort of held hostage by the group.

00:18:56.000 --> 00:19:07.000
You can, there's there's a individualism, that one can exhibit in one's own we intended.

00:19:07.000 --> 00:19:15.000
And here's one of my favorite passages sorry I'll quote it at length. This is from thought and action towards the end.

00:19:15.000 --> 00:19:32.000
Seller says the theme is an alien one and modern dress. The transposition into another key of his concept of objective spirit concerns the relation of we to in postulates a form of thought, which is intending as one of us, or as I put it in our shells

00:19:32.000 --> 00:19:32.000
of we x.

00:19:32.000 --> 00:19:50.000
we x. The point is not the groups can in a legitimate sense be said to intend. It's the more radical one that individuals can intend to sub specie community Tatis lesson an individual can have an intention of the form shots of we x, and the members of

00:19:50.000 --> 00:20:10.000
a group can have common intentions, not only by virtue of the fact that each things under the form of an individual shall sub i, but by virtue of the fact that each things under the form of community shouts of we I and we come into the form, as well as

00:20:10.000 --> 00:20:13.000
as the content of intending.

00:20:13.000 --> 00:20:21.000
We need an expression that is related to we intend that as shall is recognized to be related to I intend back.

00:20:21.000 --> 00:20:26.000
What's exciting about this is this is reporting sentence.

00:20:26.000 --> 00:20:30.000
And this is too but I actually think this was probably the wrong for.

00:20:30.000 --> 00:20:43.000
One of the things I want to say about this passage before moving on the subscript we I don't think sellers at this time, and certainly not in IO had a workout view on what it was doing.

00:20:43.000 --> 00:20:58.000
In the case of shall be intentions, the subscript we signals their status as we intentions with shall do intentions, the subscript we signals that that I intention was derived from a we intention.

00:20:58.000 --> 00:21:13.000
So, the function of the subscript we depends on whether you're looking at a shall be or shall do intention. And that distinction really isn't operating in this passage of thought and action.

00:21:13.000 --> 00:21:28.000
So the upshot of these passages and I know I realize it's just a few passages here but what I take the upshot to be is that rather than a common intention or a communal intention, explaining the inner subjective form of we intentions.

00:21:28.000 --> 00:21:38.000
It's that form, which explains the very possibility of common intentions that form is what makes an intention shareable.

00:21:38.000 --> 00:21:53.000
This to me means that group attitudes presuppose individual intentions, but the collectivist interpretation I think gets it the other way around. I think it gets things backwards.

00:21:53.000 --> 00:22:03.000
Um, how much time do we left, we have left. I'm sorry to ask.

00:22:03.000 --> 00:22:06.000
20 minutes.

00:22:06.000 --> 00:22:11.000
Thank you. no thank you for Thank you very much.

00:22:11.000 --> 00:22:28.000
All right.

00:22:28.000 --> 00:22:32.000
reading you on charitably at all.

00:22:32.000 --> 00:22:47.000
So I your chapter in your book I found incredibly helpful when I was first learning about sellers use here, and you take up this case where Tom and Dec are both intending that the war ends.

00:22:47.000 --> 00:22:56.000
So, these intentions are parallel, that their egocentricity is late and I think that has to do with the index the quality issues we saw before.

00:22:56.000 --> 00:23:16.000
But then the inter subjective form of we intentions allows for transcendence limited transcendence of that egocentricity so that Tom and Deke can intend to the same in when you're characterizing this I believe it's you're talking about how Deke reasons

00:23:16.000 --> 00:23:28.000
from this shall be intention to a while, given that I shall, given that, I'm intending that the war and here's what I can do to chip in right and it gets down to a doable for a deck.

00:23:28.000 --> 00:23:44.000
You write the deck has derived his intention to do what he can see in the war from the fact that we have that intention. Right here's where I'm maybe being on charitable is that I'm putting a lot of weight on this from the fact that right so from the

00:23:44.000 --> 00:24:02.000
fact that that suggests that Deke derives his own we derived I intention from the docs artistic commitment, the belief that his community in terms of certain thing or observing that having some anthropological data that we have the intention.

00:24:02.000 --> 00:24:11.000
But these are classic commitments, the truth valuable, rather than practical commitments rather than expressions of intention.

00:24:11.000 --> 00:24:33.000
So, this would mean that a belief or an assets work thought that that's what's generating dicks. We derived I intention that suggested view where community membership means that you have to defer to communal intentions, rather than offer them.

00:24:33.000 --> 00:24:50.000
It suggested view of we intentions were there, out of the crowd out in the crowd, rather than in the mind of the agent, but as sellers told us in these passages we saw before, it is I think in terms of we.

00:24:50.000 --> 00:25:02.000
So again the pattern of practical influence that we find if we put a lot of weight on the from the fact that as we go from we intend to do a where that's a Doc's asked to commitment.

00:25:02.000 --> 00:25:22.000
I am one of us, therefore I intend to do a, but that's a problem because it's not a practical commitment, what we want is we shall any of us do a and c, I am in C.

00:25:22.000 --> 00:25:28.000
Alright so let's go to part three here.

00:25:28.000 --> 00:25:40.000
This is where we want to think about. We intention reporting sentences as opposed to be. We intention expressing sentences that we might be more familiar with.

00:25:40.000 --> 00:25:53.000
So, the question here is, what do we intention reporting sentences, look like. And before I try to answer. I want to ask why should we care. What who cares about reporting sentences.

00:25:53.000 --> 00:25:55.000
Well I think there are two reasons to.

00:25:55.000 --> 00:26:05.000
The first is that reports are a category of description right there self descriptions, and we need mental state description to do.

00:26:05.000 --> 00:26:09.000
When we describe when we explain to me explain and when we predict behavior.

00:26:09.000 --> 00:26:19.000
Right. So given the in this, I think intersects with Jim's talk before here this is, this is related to that.

00:26:19.000 --> 00:26:31.000
Making making the conveyed a sortable right so we need to know the structure of descriptions in order to do psychology.

00:26:31.000 --> 00:26:44.000
But the one I'm more interested in here, I think, is that is as a strategy for understanding what's reported, so we can understand reports, then we can understand the state that's reported by them.

00:26:44.000 --> 00:26:55.000
So in this case, it would help us to understand the interest subjective form of we intentions were used to seeing them in in their intention expressing sentence mode.

00:26:55.000 --> 00:27:11.000
So we shall any of us do a and c, or it shall so we be the case that P those are we intention expresses. I think we can understand the form better if we ascend to the level of reports.

00:27:11.000 --> 00:27:22.000
So that's the strategy that I am in deploying here. I'll call it report tutorial sent with a tip of the hat coin.

00:27:22.000 --> 00:27:35.000
So, the rationale behind this strategy here is that inter subjective form is a feature of the intending. That is the state, rather than what was intended.

00:27:35.000 --> 00:27:37.000
That is the content.

00:27:37.000 --> 00:27:45.000
Then we can better understand that form by examining the reporting sentences, rather than the expressing sentences.

00:27:45.000 --> 00:27:49.000
This is helpful for thoughts.

00:27:49.000 --> 00:27:59.000
So the performance conditions of buttering p are satisfied. When the truth conditions of, I think that P that is the report are satisfied.

00:27:59.000 --> 00:28:04.000
The simpler way of putting this is that

00:28:04.000 --> 00:28:11.000
asserting P is sincere. When the report that you think that p is true.

00:28:11.000 --> 00:28:16.000
Right, so this sincerity conditions for the expression.

00:28:16.000 --> 00:28:21.000
and the truth conditions for the report overlap.

00:28:21.000 --> 00:28:35.000
And that's not just for assets work, attitudes, right, it works for questions so. Where's Waldo is a sincere question when this wondering description is true.

00:28:35.000 --> 00:28:37.000
Whoops.

00:28:37.000 --> 00:28:48.000
And this works for intention so I shall do a sincere. When I intend to do is true.

00:28:48.000 --> 00:28:52.000
each arc types, or illusionary forces.

00:28:52.000 --> 00:29:04.000
We should try it out for me intentions. So we shall any of us do a and see what its performance condition should look like the truth conditions for a we intention reporting sentence.

00:29:04.000 --> 00:29:14.000
So, this we intention expression is sincere. When whatever the report looks like it's true.

00:29:14.000 --> 00:29:29.000
Alright so what what I based on the first two sections. What I really want in in a reinvention reporting sentence is that it has these two features there needs to capture these two features.

00:29:29.000 --> 00:29:34.000
The first is the egocentricity of intentions.

00:29:34.000 --> 00:29:40.000
And the second feature that the we intention reporting sentence needs to captures the share ability.

00:29:40.000 --> 00:29:45.000
We intentions. So it needs something that makes it.

00:29:45.000 --> 00:29:55.000
That makes it clear that the state ascribed is egocentric, but also that it's shareable, that it has this interest injected form.

00:29:55.000 --> 00:29:59.000
Right. So given that those are what we want.

00:29:59.000 --> 00:30:01.000
How do we get it.

00:30:01.000 --> 00:30:10.000
So I think there are there. There are four ways of constructing the intention sentences that that that come to mind.

00:30:10.000 --> 00:30:22.000
But I think the first three ways fail, but the fourth way I think is the most promising and and it gives us our, our desired features.

00:30:22.000 --> 00:30:33.000
So, the first way is to begin constructing reinvention reporting sentence with. We, there's our first person plural subject intend, there's our mental state.

00:30:33.000 --> 00:30:35.000
Verb.

00:30:35.000 --> 00:30:40.000
So the report looks like we intend to do a or we intend that P.

00:30:40.000 --> 00:30:53.000
And there are places in, including that passage from thought and action where sellers sort of flirts with this or goes with it on a point of first try.

00:30:53.000 --> 00:30:56.000
But I don't think this will work.

00:30:56.000 --> 00:31:02.000
Because we shall that we intention and expression can be sincere.

00:31:02.000 --> 00:31:06.000
Even when we intend is false.

00:31:06.000 --> 00:31:11.000
Right, so here the truth conditions for we intend come apart from the performance conditions for.

00:31:11.000 --> 00:31:15.000
We shall for the intention expressing sentence.

00:31:15.000 --> 00:31:33.000
Another way to put this is that the this formulation or this construction fails the egocentricity test right by having the first person to little subject here, it will miss the independence that we want to have in we infections.

00:31:33.000 --> 00:31:40.000
So the first way is no way to go because it fails egocentricity.

00:31:40.000 --> 00:31:44.000
The second way. Thank you. Okay, thank you very much.

00:31:44.000 --> 00:31:54.000
Excuse me. The second way, sort of, over corrects. So if we were missing independence. In the first way then the second way says All right, make sure we're going to get that.

00:31:54.000 --> 00:31:59.000
So we say, I first person singular, I intend.

00:31:59.000 --> 00:32:02.000
But I don't think this is gonna work.

00:32:02.000 --> 00:32:05.000
I intend as a reporting sentence.

00:32:05.000 --> 00:32:09.000
What that's actually going to report is an AI intention.

00:32:09.000 --> 00:32:14.000
So, I shall make it the case that P. or.

00:32:14.000 --> 00:32:16.000
I shall do a NC.

00:32:16.000 --> 00:32:22.000
So we get the egocentricity, but we lost share ability.

00:32:22.000 --> 00:32:32.000
So I intend leaves out the inter subjective form that we said we wanted. In, we intention, reporting sentences.

00:32:32.000 --> 00:32:38.000
Alright, so there's this there's this tension between preserving independence, but also capturing chair ability.

00:32:38.000 --> 00:32:50.000
How do we get both how do we get egocentricity and share ability refracted in our reinvention and reporting sentences.

00:32:50.000 --> 00:32:52.000
So here's the third way.

00:32:52.000 --> 00:33:02.000
The third way is to modify the verb. So here we have, I we intend that P or I we intend to do a and c.

00:33:02.000 --> 00:33:19.000
And this is good, in the sense that they're stuck there in the sentence that seems to capture egocentricity and share ability, the egocentricity here in first person singular subject and the share ability and this modified.

00:33:19.000 --> 00:33:23.000
Verb.

00:33:23.000 --> 00:33:30.000
Right. We wanted to use we intention reporting senses, as a way to understand we attempt.

00:33:30.000 --> 00:33:36.000
Just saying we intend doesn't help it doesn't help us understand what what we intentions are.

00:33:36.000 --> 00:33:39.000
Right. So, even though it's a step in the right direction.

00:33:39.000 --> 00:33:43.000
It doesn't take us far if, if at all.

00:33:43.000 --> 00:33:50.000
So, the fourth way then, and it's something along these lines that I think is the right way to do this.

00:33:50.000 --> 00:33:54.000
The fourth way

00:33:54.000 --> 00:33:59.000
goes something like this so I asked one of us, intend.

00:33:59.000 --> 00:34:05.000
So that's the beginning of a we intention reporting sentence.

00:34:05.000 --> 00:34:14.000
So, again, the, the first person singular being a subject here that captures the egocentricity that we want to

00:34:14.000 --> 00:34:15.000
thank you.

00:34:15.000 --> 00:34:23.000
And then the adversarial phrase as one of us captures the share ability.

00:34:23.000 --> 00:34:43.000
Now the thing to emphasize here is that the as one of us at the level of reports, that's making explicit something that is implicit in the expressing sentence, it's referring to feature of the state, namely that form.

00:34:43.000 --> 00:34:46.000
It's a feature of the intending, it's a manner of intended.

00:34:46.000 --> 00:35:01.000
And that's made explicit when you go to the level of. We intention reporting sentences. At least that's what it's attempting to do.

00:35:01.000 --> 00:35:03.000
All right.

00:35:03.000 --> 00:35:09.000
Now, recall the distinction between Shelby and shall do intentions.

00:35:09.000 --> 00:35:13.000
you find that distinction not the level of we intentions.

00:35:13.000 --> 00:35:20.000
And I think that the fourth way as we've stated it thus far does just fine when talking about.

00:35:20.000 --> 00:35:29.000
We intend things that that is shall be we intentions. So those reports look like I as one of us intend that P.

00:35:29.000 --> 00:35:41.000
So that reports shall sub we BP, but I worry that when we take this template over to. We intending to.

00:35:41.000 --> 00:35:44.000
That is shall do we intended.

00:35:44.000 --> 00:35:54.000
I worry that it doesn't work. I worry that I as one of us intend to do a and c is actually reporting this, we derived I intention.

00:35:54.000 --> 00:35:58.000
Shall sub we. I do a and c.

00:35:58.000 --> 00:36:01.000
So that is an AI intention.

00:36:01.000 --> 00:36:15.000
That's derived from or has its influential origins in a shall do we intention. That is, it sounds like the conclusion of a moral moral reasoning where I, because I'm one of us.

00:36:15.000 --> 00:36:20.000
And the universe reliable content applies to me, intend to do a and c.

00:36:20.000 --> 00:36:29.000
So that I think I worry that the as one of us reflects the subject of content, rather than the form of. We intentions.

00:36:29.000 --> 00:36:34.000
And what I'm

00:36:34.000 --> 00:36:43.000
struggling to work out now is how to make it clear that that's not what this form of we intention reported sentences doing.

00:36:43.000 --> 00:36:50.000
So one way to refine that is to amend is one of us intend to do a and see.

00:36:50.000 --> 00:36:57.000
So that it so that it becomes is one of us intend to any of us to do a in see.

00:36:57.000 --> 00:37:05.000
And that would be a report of the shall do we intention.

00:37:05.000 --> 00:37:09.000
Shall we any of us do a MC.

00:37:09.000 --> 00:37:17.000
So really what this amendment involves is making explicit the inner subjective form here with the as one of us.

00:37:17.000 --> 00:37:28.000
And the universal sizable content. This is the entire subject of content, we intentions, be any of us, So you have

00:37:28.000 --> 00:37:40.000
you have devices here in this, we intention reporting sentence that keep separate books on the form, and the content. The as one of us is a matter of form that's a feature of the intending.

00:37:40.000 --> 00:37:54.000
The any of us is the content of the we intention, and both of those show up in the we intention reporting sentence.

00:37:54.000 --> 00:38:07.000
Um, I just made that point here the any of us is about a better form, while the as one of us as a matter of inner subjective form while the any of us as a matter of inner subjective content.

00:38:07.000 --> 00:38:11.000
The only, I think this is, this is an improvement.

00:38:11.000 --> 00:38:17.000
I'd be willing to settle on this, But I do worry about some auditory discomfort.

00:38:17.000 --> 00:38:29.000
When I hear is one of us intend any of us to do a and see. I wonder what sort of grammatical the judgments people are having there.

00:38:29.000 --> 00:38:33.000
And so if we take those worries seriously.

00:38:33.000 --> 00:38:37.000
There are a couple there are a few possibilities.

00:38:37.000 --> 00:38:42.000
If five minutes remaining six minutes.

00:38:42.000 --> 00:38:52.000
Six minutes. Okay, so the first possibility is, is one of us intend as any of us to do a NC.

00:38:52.000 --> 00:38:59.000
I don't know you add in as and add some comments I don't know if that handles the auditory discomfort and you might be experiencing.

00:38:59.000 --> 00:39:09.000
But this is just to say that the as one of us is about form, and the any of us is about the content. I don't know if it solves the problem.

00:39:09.000 --> 00:39:14.000
Another possibility is that

00:39:14.000 --> 00:39:26.000
the there's sort of a compound or complex of intentions here, or someone is simultaneously committed in the following ways. So one would be a shall do intention.

00:39:26.000 --> 00:39:30.000
But reported as I as one of us intend to do a and c.

00:39:30.000 --> 00:39:38.000
And then there's the shall be intention is one of us intend that any of us do a in see.

00:39:38.000 --> 00:39:51.000
So, this that this, this becomes of that. An intending that because of the other person subjects that are involved in any of us.

00:39:51.000 --> 00:40:06.000
If you recall the example from Solomon's letter which Stephanie brought up today. Any of us shall scratch my back if it itches that any of us there is the universe sizable content.

00:40:06.000 --> 00:40:16.000
But this is actually a disguised shall be intention, it shall be the case that anyone, any of us scratch my back if it is.

00:40:16.000 --> 00:40:26.000
So because of that other person this involved in any of those, you might need an intending that.

00:40:26.000 --> 00:40:35.000
The third possibility is that we just go back to what we had before. I as one of us intend to do a and c.

00:40:35.000 --> 00:40:44.000
But in this case, we insist we stipulate that the as one of us is playing a dual role that it at the level of reports.

00:40:44.000 --> 00:40:50.000
As one of us is handling both form and content.

00:40:50.000 --> 00:41:01.000
I'm not, I'm not settled on any of these, and we only need to settle if you share any worries about the refined fourth way.

00:41:01.000 --> 00:41:11.000
But one thing that I think is interesting is that the we intention, expressing expressing, and the we derived I intention, expressing.

00:41:11.000 --> 00:41:15.000
They have the same performance conditions.

00:41:15.000 --> 00:41:27.000
So we shall any of us do a and see, just like I shall sub we do a NC either of them are sincere. When is one of us intend to do a and c is true.

00:41:27.000 --> 00:41:36.000
There's a passage ahead Forgive me for not looking up where it's found where seller says, you only really have a we intention.

00:41:36.000 --> 00:41:40.000
If it's reflected in your eye intentions.

00:41:40.000 --> 00:41:47.000
You're only you only sincerely have this commitment, if it shows up in what you can do.

00:41:47.000 --> 00:41:54.000
And I think it's interesting that these two would have the same performance conditions.

00:41:54.000 --> 00:42:11.000
So what I want to conclude is that the fourth way, even when it's refined, or even when we settle on some most refined version isn't perfect, but the puzzles about we intention reporting sentences are important.

00:42:11.000 --> 00:42:17.000
And we haven't done enough to for work work that out.

00:42:17.000 --> 00:42:26.000
It's worth working that out because this strategy I think is a promising one for understanding the intentions in particular. They're into subjective form.

00:42:26.000 --> 00:42:41.000
What I think is going to be right about these is that we have to place egocentricity at the core, rather than the periphery of our understanding of we intentions, and that should show up and how we construct the intention reporting sentences.

00:42:41.000 --> 00:42:48.000
The individualized interpretation that I was offering today, it comes at the expense of certain divisions of groupings.

00:42:48.000 --> 00:42:53.000
Namely, those that I called collectivist interpretations.

00:42:53.000 --> 00:43:07.000
Earlier, but that's okay, because the we have, we shall. It's communal inform. That's the group Enos, but it's a feature of the individuals, intending.

00:43:07.000 --> 00:43:10.000
And I think this might be.

00:43:10.000 --> 00:43:26.000
Perhaps something sellers had in mind in psi am towards the very end when he tells us that we in its communal most embracing non metaphorical use is equivalent to the French or the English one.

00:43:26.000 --> 00:43:37.000
And that singularity of subject I think is important to get right in how we construct. We intention reporting sentences.

00:43:37.000 --> 00:43:52.000
So thank you very much.

00:43:52.000 --> 00:43:55.000
Okay, we've got some hands up already.

00:43:55.000 --> 00:43:58.000
Jeremy I think you went up first.

00:43:58.000 --> 00:44:06.000
So, I think POW already knows what I'm going to say it, the individuals readings of.

00:44:06.000 --> 00:44:21.000
We intentions are seem to be pretty popular here at the, at this workshop. And so I want to push back a little bit and try to defend the collectivist interpretations against the sea of dissent possibly.

00:44:21.000 --> 00:44:33.000
So, you know, I was one of the arguments I'm seeing a lot for the individualist interpretation is you know for example that you know seller says again and again and again that you can have a we intention that nobody else shares.

00:44:33.000 --> 00:44:48.000
And I guess the, the view that I want it that I want to defend and I think this is ultimately sellers this view is that it's possible for you to have the intention that nobody else shares, but for you to have an unshared we intention presupposes, the

00:44:48.000 --> 00:44:58.000
existence of a ton of shared we intentions. And so, you know, Ronald and I were talking about this, I'm not sure if Ronald and I agree or disagree on this.

00:44:58.000 --> 00:45:03.000
So you know if, just to give an example and,

00:45:03.000 --> 00:45:16.000
you know, sort of a positive example I like one of the ones I give my book, you know it suppose everybody thinks that Smith has been elected president to the Faculty Senate, but maybe you are the one person who thinks that Smith is not the legitimate

00:45:16.000 --> 00:45:29.000
president maybe you think that there wasn't a quorum president or whatever, right so you can believe quad member of the faculty senate that Smith is not the legitimate president of the faculty senate and so that attitude can be unshared, but it can still

00:45:29.000 --> 00:45:40.000
count as a belief quad member of the faculty senate but it only counts is the belief is such a belief, you know, quantum member of the faculty senate because you share a ton of other beliefs, with other members of the faculty senate you know beliefs about

00:45:40.000 --> 00:45:50.000
know what the bylaws are you know what the procedure is for electing the president beliefs about quorum beliefs about the institution of the university, blah blah blah blah blah.

00:45:50.000 --> 00:46:00.000
So it seems to me that the, the ability to have an unshared we attitude is actually parasitic on on having a ton of shared. We attitudes.

00:46:00.000 --> 00:46:15.000
And so it. And I think that that sellers actually has I think this is actually sellers as view. So at the very end of on reasoning about value. You know when he's talking about the whooping cranes society, he says, For there even to be a whooping cranes

00:46:15.000 --> 00:46:29.000
society they have to share this founding intention shall each of us we've been praying society members promote the survival whooping cranes. Once they share this intention, then they can go on to argue about what intentions follow from that then they

00:46:29.000 --> 00:46:45.000
can have unshared we intentions but they have to have that original founding intention that they all share. Otherwise, there isn't any whooping crane society, and he asks, in you know in a couple of paragraphs later he says, Is there a similar intention

00:46:45.000 --> 00:46:59.000
for the moral community is there an intrinsically reasonable we referential action intention, which stands to the moral community, as the intention to promote the survival of the whooping crane stand to the members of the whooping crane society.

00:46:59.000 --> 00:47:15.000
And so it seems like sellers his position is for there to be a moral community people in fact have to share the founding intention, and then we can go on and disagree, you know and have our unshared we intentions, but only on the condition that we share

00:47:15.000 --> 00:47:29.000
the founding intention, just like, you know, members of the whipping crane society can disagree about how to promote the interest of whooping cranes, but only if they have, they actually, in fact, share the founding intention.

00:47:29.000 --> 00:47:43.000
So that's my long, comment, and, you know, sort of trying to argue for the collectivist view that actually, you have to have all the shared we intentions, before it even makes sense to talk about an unshared intention as being a we intention in the first

00:47:43.000 --> 00:47:48.000
place.

00:47:48.000 --> 00:47:51.000
Thank you. Thank you, Jeremy.

00:47:51.000 --> 00:48:09.000
Yeah that's super interesting and I'll have a lot to think about and I'll need to think about this for a long time. But here's some initial thoughts so I made them My, my, my rhetoric.

00:48:09.000 --> 00:48:15.000
The idea you intend alone. This is the solitary affair.

00:48:15.000 --> 00:48:31.000
Might be might be misleading, in the sense that there's a community presuppose in your having been brought up and learn a language and acquired all these concepts right so there's the community's role in.

00:48:31.000 --> 00:48:38.000
In, and there's interest subjectivity just in the ability to think and and inform intentions in the first place.

00:48:38.000 --> 00:48:45.000
So I don't, I don't mean totally like feral child who's kind of kind of thing.

00:48:45.000 --> 00:48:51.000
by by saying that we can intend alone.

00:48:51.000 --> 00:48:54.000
What I would wonder about what I wonder about with these.

00:48:54.000 --> 00:49:12.000
These formative intentions The, the, sort of founding intention that creates a creates a group or creates a community in the first place, is that that seems like something that seems like an actualization right so the state of affairs where people do

00:49:12.000 --> 00:49:28.000
have that community intention. I think there needs to be something disposition there to have explained that the actualization right and so what I, what I'm trying to say about the inner subjective form is that it's a, it's a potential reality.

00:49:28.000 --> 00:49:36.000
And so what I wonder about the founding intention that you bring up

00:49:36.000 --> 00:49:45.000
is how that could have been actualize without already without the disposition of being already being there.

00:49:45.000 --> 00:49:54.000
out that's not true disappointing an answer, but I want to, I want to thank a lot more about the rest of what what you said and what you've written.

00:49:54.000 --> 00:50:02.000
Preston is up next.

00:50:02.000 --> 00:50:07.000
You're still muted Preston.

00:50:07.000 --> 00:50:19.000
Can you hear me. Yes. Okay, thanks Carl, I think you've got a great project here and I think you're really onto something interesting in terms of both sellers Xg system the methodology.

00:50:19.000 --> 00:50:38.000
So let me, I want to ask you a question. And then, I'm raising objection. So what's the question. The question is, Are you familiar with Remo to Melis stuff on pro group I mode versus we mode intentionality not well enough to answer the question, you're

00:50:38.000 --> 00:50:52.000
going as well. Well then I would suggest this The question is kind of related but I would suggest this would be one place to look because. So Bradman right up to mela is a mode account theorists have shared intentionality Bratman is a content account

00:50:52.000 --> 00:51:03.000
there is he thinks it's all in terms of individual intentions that are interlocking the right way. And to mellows distinction between pro group I mode, and we mode is supposed to show that Bradman's account isn't going to work.

00:51:03.000 --> 00:51:08.000
And the argument turns on different success conditions. So, if I have a pro group.

00:51:08.000 --> 00:51:21.000
I mode intention to paint a house, then that's an intention can be successful if I do my part. But if I have the remote intention to paint a house with the rest of you that have a house doesn't get painted, or if we all don't show up, then that's not

00:51:21.000 --> 00:51:25.000
going to be successful at least this is to Melis claim so that's at least something to think about.

00:51:25.000 --> 00:51:37.000
And then to turn to the objection then, and it turns its kind of turns on a similar thing so I like what you did by looking at sincerity conditions, that's an interesting way of linking the expression with the report, but I want to put pressure on the

00:51:37.000 --> 00:51:51.000
claim that the identity thesis is something you can maintain, because you were claiming that the mental states of the expression and the intention are identical, but the commitments are distinct terms of dogs plastic or practical.

00:51:51.000 --> 00:52:02.000
But if you think that mental states are to be accounted for in terms of commitments, then you might wonder whether there's space to say that commitments are distinct but their mental states are identical.

00:52:02.000 --> 00:52:11.000
Now, putting that aside, because you don't even have to be influential as to accept what I take to be the substance of objection here. They have different success conditions.

00:52:11.000 --> 00:52:22.000
So if I say, I shall do a II, the success condition for that is doing it, but if I say I intend to do a that can be true even if I don't actually do it.

00:52:22.000 --> 00:52:29.000
So I think even independent of inferential ism you the identity thesis can't be maintained.

00:52:29.000 --> 00:52:38.000
I don't know if that affects your, your project actually I'm not sure that that matters, but it just occurs to me that that's something that you don't, you can't, it doesn't it doesn't look at me like That's right.

00:52:38.000 --> 00:52:39.000
All right.

00:52:39.000 --> 00:52:55.000
Thank you Preston very much. Um, so one thing I think it's interesting to think about the, I hadn't thought about this success conditions for intentions I only thought about the sincerity conditions and performance conditions for expressing them.

00:52:55.000 --> 00:53:00.000
Right, or the truth conditions for for for reporting them.

00:53:00.000 --> 00:53:19.000
I think that sort of articulating the satisfaction or success conditions of an intention is all about content is all about content, whereas the sincerity conditions, or the true conditions for the report, have an intention.

00:53:19.000 --> 00:53:33.000
Those aren't going to be just about the content of the tentative the intention, but also the form. But I want to think through how looking at success can success conditions in addition to sincerity conditions, and the truth conditions of reports would

00:53:33.000 --> 00:53:35.000
maybe change my mind.

00:53:35.000 --> 00:53:41.000
The identity thesis that I mentioned in part one.

00:53:41.000 --> 00:53:44.000
I would go to. I love that.

00:53:44.000 --> 00:53:53.000
So independent of its relevance to sellers and we intentions I want to stand by that. So, when I say P.

00:53:53.000 --> 00:53:56.000
And I'm going to say I think that P.

00:53:56.000 --> 00:54:06.000
The state I express by saying P is the same state, that I ascribed to myself, when I report that.

00:54:06.000 --> 00:54:15.000
So, it's about the state that you're expressing and the state that you're subscribing. That's the one in the same state. Even though, according of non identity.

00:54:15.000 --> 00:54:17.000
When I.

00:54:17.000 --> 00:54:24.000
The, the state that I express in a mental state reporting sentence. So as I think that P.

00:54:24.000 --> 00:54:29.000
That's different from thinking that D, and this goes back to.

00:54:29.000 --> 00:54:32.000
Moore's paradox.

00:54:32.000 --> 00:54:36.000
Right, so it's raining but I don't think it is.

00:54:36.000 --> 00:54:41.000
Those two conjunct.

00:54:41.000 --> 00:54:46.000
Yeah, it's only an apparent contradiction not a real one.

00:54:46.000 --> 00:54:52.000
Right, those up next.

00:54:52.000 --> 00:55:10.000
Um, I just think this is quick, you know, you seem to think that with your fourth formulation, um, I am I, as any as one of us is one of us attend any of us do a and c.

00:55:10.000 --> 00:55:16.000
And you thought that was grammatically suspect I didn't have any problem with the grammar there.

00:55:16.000 --> 00:55:42.000
So I did think that when I thought about it I in sort of implicitly inserted of that, so that it was, I read it as I as one of us intend that any of us do AMC and that seems to me actually right because I cannot directly bring about any of us doing AMC,

00:55:42.000 --> 00:55:51.000
I can do about bring about my doing a and c but not any of us doing a and c so it's I intend that P where the P isn't any of us doing a and c.

00:55:51.000 --> 00:55:53.000
And that seems to me.

00:55:53.000 --> 00:56:06.000
Right, right. So, you're further worries about for sort of left me cold because I just don't think that there's need to worry further about it.

00:56:06.000 --> 00:56:11.000
Thank you. So thank you very much.

00:56:11.000 --> 00:56:27.000
One thing I, one thing I wonder about, then, is are there we and we intending to right so if if the only acceptable report of the week intention.

00:56:27.000 --> 00:56:31.000
Makes it a intending that makes it a shall be intention.

00:56:31.000 --> 00:56:44.000
Then what's the practical reasoning look like from there. It seems like it would be shall sub we BP right so that's

00:56:44.000 --> 00:57:00.000
it shall sub we be the case that P, and you go directly from there to the individual action that it entails for you. So I child sub we. I do some pi do that which is necessary to make it against the P.

00:57:00.000 --> 00:57:07.000
So then you would never have a role for we intending to

00:57:07.000 --> 00:57:11.000
right Stephanie, it's your turn.

00:57:11.000 --> 00:57:26.000
And thank you for that. Talk. I found the picture, really clear. And amazingly clear like untangling all these things and putting it in such an accessible way.

00:57:26.000 --> 00:57:33.000
And I wasn't sure what you meant about me beginning he says now but I agree.

00:57:33.000 --> 00:57:41.000
Almost everything you said. So, I agree on the shareable shirts thing and I agree on the individualism thing.

00:57:41.000 --> 00:57:45.000
So, maybe, if you are an atheist and I am an atheist too.

00:57:45.000 --> 00:57:59.000
But anyway, I had a comment and then maybe a suggestion or just a common that's really interesting this thing and thought and action that he thinks that the right report for the intention is we intend.

00:57:59.000 --> 00:58:00.000
Yeah.

00:58:00.000 --> 00:58:16.000
I think that is a rescue maybe from intent imperatives intentions and the logic of odd where he also talks in that way. Yeah. And for an action is somehow like really in between as far as the content is concerned between,

00:58:16.000 --> 00:58:33.000
between IO, and science and metaphysics later. And it's interesting that like for an extra is 1965 66, something like that. Yeah, it's interesting in science and metaphysics he seems to get these reports.

00:58:33.000 --> 00:58:50.000
Right, yeah that during that year that seems to have shifted. He says in its seventh chapter and it's paragraph, 123 and 24. He speaks about values and you had a quotation from that area to in the talk.

00:58:50.000 --> 00:59:08.000
He speaks about valuing things and he he speaks about finding the right counterpart for descriptions of values and there he speaks about Smith and how we ascribe value to him and he there he writes, as one possibility Smith values from a personal point

00:59:08.000 --> 00:59:12.000
of view, that would be one record. Yeah.

00:59:12.000 --> 00:59:22.000
I value. Yeah. And then the other would be Smith and values from a moral point of view, and that would be the. We welcome you.

00:59:22.000 --> 00:59:24.000
We value most.

00:59:24.000 --> 00:59:33.000
So he seems to get it exactly at least quite close to the way that which you said was thrived when he made that move in that years.

00:59:33.000 --> 00:59:35.000
Yeah.

00:59:35.000 --> 00:59:38.000
So, So that's just interesting.

00:59:38.000 --> 00:59:41.000
Yeah. and then my suggestion.

00:59:41.000 --> 00:59:54.000
Why do we have to struggle about the reporting of the shell do's when it's a real intention. Yeah. And what I've put everything into one say one thing.

00:59:54.000 --> 01:00:03.000
Second, why don't you just go for a comb compound like I intend us to do a and c.

01:00:03.000 --> 01:00:17.000
And I intend so because I am one of us yeah Yv if you have a problem of the chromatic ality and not pronounce it and so forth, but just just just disentangled is a good one.

01:00:17.000 --> 01:00:18.000
Thank you.

01:00:18.000 --> 01:00:20.000
Right.

01:00:20.000 --> 01:00:24.000
Thank you very much. Definitely. Thank you.

01:00:24.000 --> 01:00:27.000
I'm

01:00:27.000 --> 01:00:30.000
on that on valuing.

01:00:30.000 --> 01:00:51.000
It's weird that the valuing expressing sentences, the value expressing sentences are already going to have the subjects there. Right. It's like I would, I would that we would that.

01:00:51.000 --> 01:00:56.000
There's also interesting stuff there about, you know, valuing as desire.

01:00:56.000 --> 01:01:08.000
And then, desiring being kind of like a disposition or intention disposition to intend. So there's a close connection there that needs to be that needs to be worked out.

01:01:08.000 --> 01:01:12.000
And then as far as the compound.

01:01:12.000 --> 01:01:25.000
I don't know I, this might be like a weird kind of style or preference thing on my part is that I want. I want sort of clean.

01:01:25.000 --> 01:01:33.000
One to One mental state and expect verbal expression relations,

01:01:33.000 --> 01:01:38.000
or I want to leave it to influential.

01:01:38.000 --> 01:01:43.000
And I feel like doing the doing a conjunction.

01:01:43.000 --> 01:01:47.000
Like violates both of those preferences.

01:01:47.000 --> 01:02:08.000
But I don't have a principal reason to to rule it out. But I think, I think that that your suggestion looks a lot like possibility to on my penultimate slide where it's compound or you're simultaneously committed to a child you Anna shall be.

01:02:08.000 --> 01:02:22.000
I'm sorry about atheism thing what what I meant to say was in your paper you said you know sellers isn't isn't precise about this, it isn't really clear what he means about the interest objective form, but then I think today the way I took us to be saying

01:02:22.000 --> 01:02:27.000
that there isn't there isn't any by the end of it.

01:02:27.000 --> 01:02:31.000
Yeah, that's the that's the God is dead moment.

01:02:31.000 --> 01:02:45.000
Yeah, I think he's not quick you're into subjective format. I think that's still but yeah I just had no space to go into that question in that sense, but was not concerned, so much interest.

01:02:45.000 --> 01:02:47.000
Totally agree with you on that.

01:02:47.000 --> 01:02:51.000
Alright, cool. Thank you. Thank you.

01:02:51.000 --> 01:02:54.000
Zach is next.

01:02:54.000 --> 01:02:55.000
Alright.

01:02:55.000 --> 01:02:57.000
Thanks, this is a really interesting talk Kyle.

01:02:57.000 --> 01:03:08.000
I think maybe just a pretty simple minded suggestion just about on the the awkwardness of number formulation number for.

01:03:08.000 --> 01:03:12.000
That is one of us intend to any of us to do a and c.

01:03:12.000 --> 01:03:33.000
So is it important that the word be any rather than each or all, because just, if not like to my ears right is one of us intend each of us to do a fancy, or all that all of us do a fancy both ring less awkwardly in my ears and just to support that.

01:03:33.000 --> 01:03:44.000
Consider saying I propose that each of us do a NC or all of us do it and see what sounds to me better than I propose each of us

01:03:44.000 --> 01:03:53.000
are rather, it sounds better to me then I propose that any of us do Hz, so just doesn't make a difference to do you to substitute.

01:03:53.000 --> 01:03:55.000
Each are all, as opposed to any.

01:03:55.000 --> 01:04:04.000
I'm fine with each replacing any, but I don't like all.

01:04:04.000 --> 01:04:15.000
I don't like all and I think and i think that you know in earlier essays. He used all for the universe reliable form but it ends up being each.

01:04:15.000 --> 01:04:19.000
Because he

01:04:19.000 --> 01:04:29.000
sorry you're breaking up.

01:04:29.000 --> 01:04:36.000
Can you hear me.

01:04:36.000 --> 01:04:43.000
If you froze, but

01:04:43.000 --> 01:04:51.000
sometimes it can be.

01:04:51.000 --> 01:04:52.000
Okay.

01:04:52.000 --> 01:04:53.000
Hello.

01:04:53.000 --> 01:04:55.000
Yeah.

01:04:55.000 --> 01:05:10.000
Hi. Sorry, I was saying in earlier essays, he uses all for the universalised content but in there, he moves, he moves to each

01:05:10.000 --> 01:05:26.000
other and sorry just like very quick follow up and what is supposed to be the deficient about all or.

01:05:26.000 --> 01:05:30.000
Well I think there are cases where

01:05:30.000 --> 01:05:39.000
there's a division of moral labor and individual acts are entailed.

01:05:39.000 --> 01:05:50.000
But we intention commitment, sort of, tailored to do each person so like my specific duties are going to look different from yours.

01:05:50.000 --> 01:05:52.000
Once one one.

01:05:52.000 --> 01:05:57.000
Yeah, there's there's a division of labor are not aligned to this.

01:05:57.000 --> 01:06:01.000
The same actions

01:06:01.000 --> 01:06:02.000
that that.

01:06:02.000 --> 01:06:15.000
Well I'm just wondering, wouldn't that be packed into the circumstance can like the the conditional ization on circumstance.

01:06:15.000 --> 01:06:30.000
Yeah, um, yeah i would i would think that feeling of duty sort of falls out from the fallout from the circumstances.

01:06:30.000 --> 01:06:34.000
As I'm sorry I need to think more about this. Okay, thanks.

01:06:34.000 --> 01:06:39.000
All right, we got three minutes left Ronald once you ask a question.

01:06:39.000 --> 01:06:47.000
Yeah, I will ask a quick question but Zach you just brought it up and you guys were kind of at an impasse I think I had something to say about that too just real quick.

01:06:47.000 --> 01:07:03.000
I'm just throwing it out and then asked my question, which will be a very simple one, but maybe he has a scenario where the any really is crucial. So think about this famous single case child drowning in the pond right and and so they have a moral duty

01:07:03.000 --> 01:07:05.000
to save the child.

01:07:05.000 --> 01:07:13.000
So if it's all of us save a child when we are around the point.

01:07:13.000 --> 01:07:27.000
If two dozen people are around the bond point, we all should rate in rate into the pump to save a child, which would be a mess. So maybe the any say a smell one of us is enough to.

01:07:27.000 --> 01:07:41.000
And then of course the question is who is it and we are going to juggle around who makes the first move right or moment but but maybe the any versus all could make a crucial difference in that case, I don't know, just throwing this out, brief question

01:07:41.000 --> 01:08:00.000
and this is just lack of understanding so this distinction between Shelby, and shall do. I've always, I mean I accept that distinction, working within the context of sellers world but I'm just indicating my ignorance here.

01:08:00.000 --> 01:08:09.000
Isn't that a merely a superficial grammatical distinction, I mean doesn't really indicate that there are two kinds of intentions to shell to wells is Shelby.

01:08:09.000 --> 01:08:29.000
And so, of course I say things like, well, I intend to make coffee now or, I showed a coffin make coffee now that's be a shell do, and Shelby would be I intend that the house, he will be built by that there'll be a Shelby, but couldn't it be that those

01:08:29.000 --> 01:08:38.000
those shall do intentions also have full propositional content actually so that actually the intention when I do coffee maybe even an intention in action.

01:08:38.000 --> 01:08:43.000
The intention is that I'm doing the coffee now.

01:08:43.000 --> 01:08:52.000
And so I wouldn't be a Shelby, and maybe this expresses ignorance, but I don't know whether you have a thoughts on that.

01:08:52.000 --> 01:09:09.000
Why there is a principal reason for for making up this thing she deeper on all right yeah thank thank you, um yeah I've wondered about that it seems like you could translate in and out of them, depending on on mood, but what I take to be most important

01:09:09.000 --> 01:09:15.000
about shall do intending is there.

01:09:15.000 --> 01:09:23.000
They're sort of intimate relation to action like they can they can ripen into wings.

01:09:23.000 --> 01:09:29.000
And then when things are sort of the initial stage but shall shall be intentions. Can't do that they need to.

01:09:29.000 --> 01:09:45.000
So I almost thinking about like this, productivity thing like getting things done. But he sort of start with the state of affairs that you that you intend to bring about, then you have to break that up into, into doings you have to break that up into

01:09:45.000 --> 01:09:46.000
actions.

01:09:46.000 --> 01:09:53.000
Right, so I think about it, I think about it like that it's almost like the level of abstraction.

01:09:53.000 --> 01:10:09.000
But as you say with the coffee example, like, I shall bruise some coffee. It shall be the case that coffee is brewed by me right you can translate. You can transpose from one key to the other, if you like, or maybe even putting a first person index finger,

01:10:09.000 --> 01:10:12.000
index into the current and.

01:10:12.000 --> 01:10:18.000
Shall I am brewing coffee.

01:10:18.000 --> 01:10:20.000
Right.

01:10:20.000 --> 01:10:32.000
Right. We shall be intention then right yeah and what you know and one thing that complicates things here as sellers, more historical development right on what goes in.

01:10:32.000 --> 01:10:39.000
What the shell operator is operating on, sometimes it's infinitive. Sometimes it's like Darren's.

01:10:39.000 --> 01:10:42.000
Sometimes it's indicative.

01:10:42.000 --> 01:10:44.000
So there's not a.

01:10:44.000 --> 01:10:53.000
It's hard for me to keep track of what the shop writers operating on like what kind of sentence form goes in there.

01:10:53.000 --> 01:11:02.000
But it's also going to be important for him to keep that distinction right because he wants to be able to distinguish between ought to do's and ought to be.

01:11:02.000 --> 01:11:22.000
Yes, where the arts come out of the attendings. And so the activities which enable you to evaluate anything, have to be connected to the Shelby's because the, you know, you can have intentions about things that you couldn't possibly have any hand in.

01:11:22.000 --> 01:11:30.000
Right. I intended to be the case that we reach Mars or Jupiter by 2050.

01:11:30.000 --> 01:11:43.000
I couldn't do it anyway I'm not a rocket scientist, and there's not much I could do to realize that but I could still value, reaching Jupiter sooner rather than later.

01:11:43.000 --> 01:11:46.000
I don't but that's different.

01:11:46.000 --> 01:11:49.000
Yeah, that's, that's helpful reminder.

01:11:49.000 --> 01:11:54.000
So we're out of time, I guess my question and I'll talk to you later Kyle.

01:11:54.000 --> 01:11:56.000
Okay, thanks.

01:11:56.000 --> 01:12:00.000
Sorry didn't mean to jump in and.

01:12:00.000 --> 01:12:03.000
So let's take care of everybody.

01:12:03.000 --> 01:12:09.000
Thanks everybody.

01:12:09.000 --> 01:12:22.000
Alright folks, we are at the end of the program today so what we originally planned is just split ourselves up into into smaller rooms and, I mean, first of all, I mean, so, socializing right officially on the program.

01:12:22.000 --> 01:12:26.000
Everybody is invited to join us.

01:12:26.000 --> 01:12:42.000
But I'm thinking I don't know what you think, Jeremy Ralph, you were mean if 60 or 70% of you prefer that we all stay together we can do that or shall we shall we do a quick boat, smaller groups all together.

01:12:42.000 --> 01:12:46.000
Does that sound good.

01:12:46.000 --> 01:12:50.000
Yeah, there aren't many of them. Yeah, exactly.

01:12:50.000 --> 01:12:56.000
who would prefer that we hang out together here.

01:12:56.000 --> 01:12:59.000
Who would do.

01:12:59.000 --> 01:13:03.000
Can you raise your hands again but I think it's the majority is

01:13:03.000 --> 01:13:06.000
fine either way.

01:13:06.000 --> 01:13:11.000
Yeah, who is a powers.

01:13:11.000 --> 01:13:15.000
All right, let's hang out together.

01:13:15.000 --> 01:13:45.000
Shall we give ourselves a five minute break just to bathroom break, grab a drink. Yeah, sure.

01:18:11.000 --> 01:18:14.000
Oh, Jeremy we already three days in here.

01:18:14.000 --> 01:18:20.000
I know exactly going so fast.

01:18:20.000 --> 01:18:23.000
Yeah.

01:18:23.000 --> 01:18:33.000
This makes me very nervous that my computer decided to crap out mid session.

01:18:33.000 --> 01:18:46.000
Something I can share that may make you comfortable, large parts of Grand Rapids have a power outage for the last three days. Oh no, that makes me even more than

01:18:46.000 --> 01:19:00.000
that doesn't make us nervous me it's like five blocks away from where I'm living, and I'm out of my out of my place. I mean, we had backup plans right Jeremy I mean in case of some something like that happen but yeah.

01:19:00.000 --> 01:19:16.000
Not everybody on here. Yeah, well my problem is that I don't have another computer and I don't have an iPad. So, I mean I guess I can run the presentation from my iPhone I guess you can present a PowerPoint from an iPhone, although I assume that's a super

01:19:16.000 --> 01:19:23.000
sub optimal plan but I think I need to have a plan B for tomorrow.

01:19:23.000 --> 01:19:34.000
Just in case my computer decides to have another tantrum.

01:19:34.000 --> 01:19:37.000
Yeah I'm going full risk.

01:19:37.000 --> 01:19:45.000
If things break down eo then I'll send you an email with my paper.

01:19:45.000 --> 01:19:51.000
Right. Right.

01:19:51.000 --> 01:19:58.000
back. Yeah. Hey Bill.

01:19:58.000 --> 01:20:02.000
Okay.

01:20:02.000 --> 01:20:17.000
So Preston you decided to utilize the Wi Fi of some local coffee shop. Yeah, I came into town. I came into town and, and I'm sitting at my, my favorite little coffee shop here and listen so looks nice.

01:20:17.000 --> 01:20:25.000
Yeah it is. It's great. I wish you could see the mountains better I the glares too much but we've got Livingston peak in the background. No, no, No, we're good question.

01:20:25.000 --> 01:20:41.000
We're. It's a Livingston Montana. So western Montana about 90 miles north of Yellowstone Park with Mars a real bad this, this time of year so there's a lot of smoke in there but yeah, you know.

01:20:41.000 --> 01:20:49.000
Unfortunately I'm right in the Blair so I don't maybe if I switch seats.

01:20:49.000 --> 01:21:04.000
Kyle You look like you're in a pleasant locale also yeah I'm in, I'm in Santa Fe, New Mexico. Oh, nice. Yeah, and I was showing this to Preston and Bill yesterday and I'm under grapes right now.

01:21:04.000 --> 01:21:10.000
Guys growing grapes in his backyard and you know that they're ready to eat when the bird start eating them.

01:21:10.000 --> 01:21:26.000
Yeah. And then you have to move fast. Yeah, you living in Santa Fe or just visiting I'm visiting my college roommate is getting married tomorrow, and he decided to do that here.

01:21:26.000 --> 01:21:30.000
That's pretty neat. Yeah.

01:21:30.000 --> 01:21:36.000
So as long as we're back Kyle maybe I'll ask you the question didn't have a chance to ask.

01:21:36.000 --> 01:21:43.000
Couldn't there be actions that can only be performed by a group as a whole and couldn't somebody.

01:21:43.000 --> 01:21:53.000
We intend that the group do it so like if you got a science lab and there's somebody who's like supposed to work with the Bunsen burners and somebody's supposed to work with a test tubes and so everybody has their own job.

01:21:53.000 --> 01:22:08.000
And like the lab director might wake up in the morning and we intend the lab do the experiment, but nobody in the lab does the experimental it takes everybody to do it, so you can't have, you know, any of us or each of us or even all of us do it because

01:22:08.000 --> 01:22:17.000
it's something that everybody has to do something different in order for the collective to do it. Yeah, definitely. There are group actions in the letter to Solomon.

01:22:17.000 --> 01:22:41.000
His example is dispersing right so only a group can disperse with that will have implications for what each of us do. Right. So like, I shouldn't impede the dispersal so the group disperses when I go north you go south, he goes East she goes West.

01:22:41.000 --> 01:22:43.000
I heard there was a.

01:22:43.000 --> 01:22:51.000
Was it like the G seven or something in Pittsburgh, one year a bunch of protesters were arrested for failure to disperse.

01:22:51.000 --> 01:23:02.000
And they had a really smart lawyer who argued that the command that each of them disperse couldn't be satisfied by

01:23:02.000 --> 01:23:06.000
the charges were dismissed.

01:23:06.000 --> 01:23:09.000
That's pretty good.

01:23:09.000 --> 01:23:27.000
That's a lawyer who was a philosophy major

01:23:27.000 --> 01:23:38.000
related thought, and where I think this is going is pushing on the, the formulation.

01:23:38.000 --> 01:23:46.000
I intend that any of us do a and c, right, because

01:23:46.000 --> 01:23:58.000
you know I think next point is that any of us can't do the experiment you know it takes the collective of all of us to do the experiment.

01:23:58.000 --> 01:24:11.000
and a related example.

01:24:11.000 --> 01:24:12.000
right.

01:24:12.000 --> 01:24:20.000
Well I don't take it that he means every last British citizen is going to fight in all of those locales right.

01:24:20.000 --> 01:24:27.000
He means that some folks are going to fight on the beaches and some folks are going to fight in the fields and, you know, wherever is opportunity.

01:24:27.000 --> 01:24:33.000
And so, and that's kind of that moral division of labor that I think that you mentioned earlier, right.

01:24:33.000 --> 01:24:36.000
So,

01:24:36.000 --> 01:24:52.000
do you see either of those examples as pushing against the, I guess what you might call the universalised ability formulation that any of us do a NC.

01:24:52.000 --> 01:25:02.000
Well I think both, I think the group actions, that's a matter of what the sort of a content is right.

01:25:02.000 --> 01:25:10.000
So if it's declaring corporate bankruptcy or dispersal then it's necessarily an action that only that only a group.

01:25:10.000 --> 01:25:13.000
I know that only a group can do.

01:25:13.000 --> 01:25:19.000
And you can have, you can have I intentions,

01:25:19.000 --> 01:25:29.000
where the content is has to do with a with a group, only like a group performance goal action.

01:25:29.000 --> 01:25:38.000
But they would, it would be intending that I think right so I intend that these companies declare corporate bankruptcy.

01:25:38.000 --> 01:25:41.000
When it's beneficial to my bottom line or something.

01:25:41.000 --> 01:25:48.000
Right, so it could be an i intention, even though the, the, The action is a group of group action.

01:25:48.000 --> 01:26:04.000
Yeah, I was worried about the phrase any of us, right, it doesn't doesn't seem to apply in that case, I mean I think I remember working through this one time you'd have to add sub scripts to talk about whether it's a distributed we or collective we right

01:26:04.000 --> 01:26:28.000
and then the any of us would like whether the any of us, like any of us, corporate actors or any of us, individual persons would just like by Aphra refer refer back to like this the distributed We are the collective we

01:26:28.000 --> 01:26:48.000
yeah i mean i don't know i still don't see how it deals with maybe a stolen car deals with the collective, we issue because it does seem maybe your intuitions here a different but it does seem like somebody can intend on behalf of the group, or we intend

01:26:48.000 --> 01:26:50.000
that the group.

01:26:50.000 --> 01:26:55.000
Do the perform the group action.

01:26:55.000 --> 01:27:23.000
But that's not.

01:27:23.000 --> 01:27:31.000
If so, we're so we're a group. Let's say we each of us here like members of a group.

01:27:31.000 --> 01:27:36.000
I can intend to that the group disperse.

01:27:36.000 --> 01:27:46.000
But as an intention that it's an intention only insofar as it like generates a shall do for me on my part.

01:27:46.000 --> 01:27:53.000
Right, so even though the group action that I intend is only perform bubble by a group.

01:27:53.000 --> 01:28:03.000
All that I really have in my power is like my, my share of that labor which is a goat which is like going north.

01:28:03.000 --> 01:28:06.000
Does that make sense does that make sense.

01:28:06.000 --> 01:28:14.000
I don't know is that, that's just what you're. I mean I follow I'm not happy with it but I follow.

01:28:14.000 --> 01:28:28.000
Yeah, but I think me I'm kind of, I think I'm on Team Nicholas here because you know i, you think about, you know, actually I think about this kind of via the sorts of example that was given earlier, you know I'm thinking about, you know, something like,

01:28:28.000 --> 01:28:37.000
Jonathan Hardwick's article epistemic dependence where he talks about, you know, these physics papers where they have like, you know, 100 or 200 authors.

01:28:37.000 --> 01:28:45.000
And so it's true that you know everyone has subsidiary intentions like you know I know

01:28:45.000 --> 01:28:49.000
that was

01:28:49.000 --> 01:29:02.000
like every everybody, oh there's two Kyle's now everybody has, you know, each person has a subsidiary intention, you know, you know, one person's attention is I'm going to do this, and the other person is I'm going to do this and I'm going to do this,

01:29:02.000 --> 01:29:16.000
but each, each subsidiary intention is subsumed under the larger intention. We're going to perform, you know this experience that we're going to prove the existence of the Higgs boson or whatever, right, and each person knows that they are not themselves

01:29:16.000 --> 01:29:27.000
doing that because of course you can't do that by yourself but your, your subsidiary intention only make sense within the scope of the larger group intention to, you know, prove the existence of the Higgs boson or whatever.

01:29:27.000 --> 01:29:37.000
And that's why you know your scientific article has 200 authors because each person is, you know, and you're doing this action doesn't even have any purpose or point.

01:29:37.000 --> 01:29:52.000
When, when considered an isolation from the subsuming group intention. So, these are the kinds of this is this is what makes me you know more of a collectivist I think

01:29:52.000 --> 01:29:59.000
you're muted. you're muted muted Co.

01:29:59.000 --> 01:30:00.000
Hello.

01:30:00.000 --> 01:30:01.000
Yeah.

01:30:01.000 --> 01:30:06.000
Hi, I'm sorry I had to switch to my phone, my computer.

01:30:06.000 --> 01:30:18.000
I'm just trying to keep separate the predicates that assign actions to groups, and the predicates that assign mental states two groups.

01:30:18.000 --> 01:30:26.000
Then, what I'm trying to say is that group action and find with the signing like

01:30:26.000 --> 01:30:31.000
Coca Cola declares corporate bankruptcy. Right.

01:30:31.000 --> 01:30:40.000
But I think there's a way to understand that group action without assigning a group intention.

01:30:40.000 --> 01:30:45.000
And that it could be each member of the group

01:30:45.000 --> 01:30:54.000
intends that shall be up for the P is like the group disperses or the group performs the experiment.

01:30:54.000 --> 01:31:21.000
And then from there, from that shall BP, you can get the individual assignments that when each of them is discharged creates the, the group action, dancing and walls.

01:31:21.000 --> 01:31:22.000
Jeremy.

01:31:22.000 --> 01:31:35.000
So one thing that worries me about your view is that you just have to say that there are some intentions. I mean, speaking of ethics and as a lousy and vain, there are so many tensions that all of humanity, the fact of shares.

01:31:35.000 --> 01:31:45.000
And that we even mutually recognize each other sharing you isn't that what you're committed to run that by me again I was, I was mid comment typing.

01:31:45.000 --> 01:31:49.000
Oh, I'm sorry. No, that's, that's cool.

01:31:49.000 --> 01:31:51.000
So, one more way.

01:31:51.000 --> 01:32:05.000
I have about your view if I if I understand and remember is that you are to, to develop a moral theory in a philosophy and vain, I mean, vain in your way.

01:32:05.000 --> 01:32:11.000
commit your you are committed to saying that that all of humanity.

01:32:11.000 --> 01:32:18.000
In fact de facto share certain intentions and mutually recognizes each other.

01:32:18.000 --> 01:32:32.000
Isn't that what you're committed to. Well I mean I think sellers has a kind of highly idealized version of that view but I think in practice. No, but I mean, I mean I think that.

01:32:32.000 --> 01:32:44.000
But I think, and we've talked about this before a little bit, although I don't know if you found my view on it plausible that you know I think sort of a generic sort of pragmatists social practice view is that.

01:32:44.000 --> 01:32:59.000
Yeah, I mean, you know, to, to, to, to consider someone as part of the we need to engage in argumentation with them presupposes that you have some commitments in common, but I you know I actually don't think that that's, You know, I actually think that's

01:32:59.000 --> 01:33:14.000
a pretty low, low hurdle, because you know I think it's actually really hard to imagine someone, you know, a rational agent with whom you had no common commitments.

01:33:14.000 --> 01:33:28.000
But okay so any any two of us, or in sofa as we interact with each other we need to share some commitments perhaps or maybe even a thick background of commitments or in some kind of David sodium vein.

01:33:28.000 --> 01:33:34.000
But that doesn't mean unrestricted Lee all of us.

01:33:34.000 --> 01:33:42.000
Just wherever you have social interaction and

01:33:42.000 --> 01:33:49.000
joined agency or maybe maybe a discussion with with others about what we ought to do.

01:33:49.000 --> 01:34:00.000
They have to be shared commitments within that group right i mean i different groups Michelle different commitments.

01:34:00.000 --> 01:34:17.000
Oh, absolutely. Yeah, I mean yeah of course there's going to be disagreement. But, but you know I think the larger point, that, that I would, I would urge is that to even characterize it as disagreement presupposes that there is some that there's a, some

01:34:17.000 --> 01:34:21.000
background of agreement.

01:34:21.000 --> 01:34:30.000
Otherwise he wouldn't it wouldn't even be disagreement, it wouldn't even be pertaining to the same subject matter.

01:34:30.000 --> 01:34:46.000
Yeah into far as we're talking about the, you know, Kingdom events are the least, the realm of rational beings. If they're all rational beings there. I mean, we can actually argue you know as McIntyre did who's rationality.

01:34:46.000 --> 01:34:52.000
Right. But there do seem to be some sort of if you're not avoiding contradictions.

01:34:52.000 --> 01:34:56.000
I'm not going to know what to make out of you.

01:34:56.000 --> 01:35:11.000
And there are some, you know, some very, I guess, then in some ways, commitments that I would expect any rational being to make yeah yeah and I agree, some of these are going to be super fan and and you know of course that the idea that you're going to

01:35:11.000 --> 01:35:22.000
get rational resolution of disputes out of this is a pipe dream. And I think you're in all cases going to get rational resolute resolution of disputes, but nevertheless.

01:35:22.000 --> 01:35:30.000
You know I think from a sourcing perspective it's, it's at least enough to bring everybody into the week.

01:35:30.000 --> 01:35:35.000
You seem deeply dissatisfied Ronald.

01:35:35.000 --> 01:35:57.000
Yeah Don't Don't you need background of share practical commitments amongst all human beings time when Bill just mentioned, logical commitments right i mean and also shared beliefs all right shelf shelf commitments to maybe even material influencers for

01:35:57.000 --> 01:35:59.000
humanity.

01:35:59.000 --> 01:36:16.000
But don't you need shelter practical commitments, or just talking about humanity then there are there are at least some commitments in terms of, we recognize what you know what it takes to survive.

01:36:16.000 --> 01:36:28.000
No food and shelter and that everyone needs food and shelter and usually desires companionship maybe the needs in some way.

01:36:28.000 --> 01:36:45.000
Even though each of those is fulfilled in very different ways i mean you know different cultures have different cuisines. And you know what you consider a wonderful meal I may consider a disgusting, an awful.

01:36:45.000 --> 01:36:50.000
The other their housing differences may be significant.

01:36:50.000 --> 01:36:58.000
What counts is companionship may be different, but, but we all do have some basic shared need

01:36:58.000 --> 01:37:00.000
that enough.

01:37:00.000 --> 01:37:03.000
Yeah. For now, it actually is.

01:37:03.000 --> 01:37:18.000
But honestly I don't see what the alternative is such an account but be I mean you know unless you think that reasons come to us from outside of our, you know, social practice, then you're going to have to.

01:37:18.000 --> 01:37:27.000
You're going to, at the end of the day, you're going to have to have some version of a story on which

01:37:27.000 --> 01:37:40.000
communities are going to have to have at least something in common, on a social practice level for there to be any kind of meaningful agreement or disagreement between them.

01:37:40.000 --> 01:37:59.000
And so, you know, I think, I mean I just the way I see it is you have two alternatives you either have some, you know, radical version of the given about reasons, where reasons just come to us from from from without, or you have, you know, some kind of

01:37:59.000 --> 01:38:12.000
at least some kind of social practice account, you know, like this one, where you know some some level of, of, of commonality is presupposed among communities for the meeting to carry on any kind of discussion at all.

01:38:12.000 --> 01:38:24.000
And it doesn't mean that every single person on the earth has to share some single commitment, but it just means any two communities have to share some commitments for them to be able to engage and fruitful discourse, or any kind of discourse, or even

01:38:24.000 --> 01:38:28.000
to, to be able to do anything that counts as having discourse.

01:38:28.000 --> 01:38:32.000
So and I see those that I see those as exhaustive options.

01:38:32.000 --> 01:38:36.000
How are you going to get a moral point of view out of this.

01:38:36.000 --> 01:38:45.000
I mean, these, these practical commitments, sure. But, don't we want a moral point of view sellers once a moral point of view.

01:38:45.000 --> 01:38:51.000
Yeah. how are you going to get there from here.

01:38:51.000 --> 01:38:53.000
Well,

01:38:53.000 --> 01:38:57.000
I give the 10 cent version of that story tomorrow.

01:38:57.000 --> 01:39:02.000
How's that promissory note.

01:39:02.000 --> 01:39:10.000
Give us a little bit right now.

01:39:10.000 --> 01:39:17.000
I always have trouble remembering my own view, probably a bad sign.

01:39:17.000 --> 01:39:27.000
Well, I mean it. Oh, go on Preston, well I on this point I actually wanted to ask Danielle about her talk yesterday, some of the reviews.

01:39:27.000 --> 01:39:41.000
So if you don't mind me. Maybe we could pivot at that at that point, because it sure this this seems to be exactly the. I was thinking about your paper all day yesterday Daniel, and I wanted to ask you.

01:39:41.000 --> 01:39:56.000
I mean I'm totally on board with the thought that there's something that goes missing if we don't take what you might call our embodied existence is an important part of the story about what makes us into mortal beings, but I was at a but but at the same

01:39:56.000 --> 01:40:04.000
time, I am drawn to this reading of sellers that I that I think you'd be criticizing this idea of a, of a universal way as being something that's really important.

01:40:04.000 --> 01:40:22.000
And I was so I'm trying to make sense of these two things, and I wanted to ask you about what you meant by focusing on the individual, because one of the ways you might try to bridge the connection between parochial concerns, and you know the universal

01:40:22.000 --> 01:40:36.000
Kingdom events is by emphasizing the emotional attachments that we have in our parochial identity. so I was at a sorry there's a truck.

01:40:36.000 --> 01:40:40.000
One One problem without being outside, you get a lot of diesel trucks.

01:40:40.000 --> 01:40:54.000
So, I was, I was at a music on made in Bozeman last night, and there's a big. It's one of the things they do in the summers, they shut down Main Street, you can go drink in main street you can have live music and so there's always people singing along,

01:40:54.000 --> 01:40:57.000
and in the band comes on for an encore and they're singing.

01:40:57.000 --> 01:41:02.000
They did a time after time by Cyndi Lauper.

01:41:02.000 --> 01:41:10.000
Like most of the people there I'm sure we're not alive when that song came out everyone singing the song, and they're just going on.

01:41:10.000 --> 01:41:21.000
And I've seen this a bunch in the Czech Republic, with country roads Take me home, the number of people that know that song, I was at. I was at a bar in India, and there was two floors in this bar and a live band was singing that song and everybody was

01:41:21.000 --> 01:41:23.000
singing it.

01:41:23.000 --> 01:41:35.000
And so to me, those are like music is one of these things that draws out an emotional attachment to us that's local, but it seems to me it has this potential to expand our sense of community.

01:41:35.000 --> 01:41:50.000
And so I wanted to ask you, what what's what. How do you see that that individualistic or I just, I just didn't understand what you were positioning it as a as a as an alternative to what sellers are doing so I sorry if that's not coherent but I had all

01:41:50.000 --> 01:42:04.000
these thoughts and I wanted to pick your brain about it. Well I guess I so they're, they're the two sides of it, there's, there's the worry that you can't.

01:42:04.000 --> 01:42:11.000
You can't just appeal to rationality. I mean, somebody mentioned MacIntyre's who's rationality.

01:42:11.000 --> 01:42:28.000
I don't actually know that piece but but it certainly sounds relevant to the way that I'm thinking that, that there can be radical incremental abilities even in principle I don't even I didn't even mind if sort of they're not, in fact, but but the very

01:42:28.000 --> 01:42:41.000
idea that there could be radical incremental abilities in how people think, so that i mean i think i think more and more as I've been thinking about this that the content.

01:42:41.000 --> 01:42:56.000
Absolutely formal, there is a form of constraint. It's like the the cynic one on of larger fine, you know, so but that's only negative that's not going to fund, any actual intentions.

01:42:56.000 --> 01:43:16.000
And what I'm worried about is that sellers tries to have two things that that I don't I'm not sure he can have both of. and so one of the ways I was thinking about it was, we find a very natural I find a version control to, to put truth.

01:43:16.000 --> 01:43:18.000
At the center.

01:43:18.000 --> 01:43:23.000
Suppose, there were people who end and then everything else sort of comes after.

01:43:23.000 --> 01:43:31.000
Suppose there is a no no, its beauty that comes first, and truth comes after.

01:43:31.000 --> 01:43:38.000
And they just disagree about the nature of rationality and that fundamental way.

01:43:38.000 --> 01:43:55.000
And that seems to me the possibility of meaningful discussion and I mean, those of you who know my, my work on natural truth, you might think, Well, wait a minute, your whole thing with natural truth was we can always figure this out.

01:43:55.000 --> 01:44:01.000
And I think, on the side of truth. Yes, but I'm worried about on the side of practical reasoning.

01:44:01.000 --> 01:44:15.000
Not necessarily. I just don't see it I think, I think it's question begun to say, No, no, but in the end we're all committed to the same rationality. That's because we're all part of this European community.

01:44:15.000 --> 01:44:32.000
I mean, I. That's what it seems like to me, but I can easily understand I can easily recognize the possibility. I lived in Hawaii for three years when I was a graduate student, and on Sunday mornings, we would all go to the beach and drink beer.

01:44:32.000 --> 01:44:43.000
And we would argue about the role of the aesthetic in sort of one's conception of a good life, and it never made sense to me.

01:44:43.000 --> 01:44:52.000
But, but the very idea that it might make sense to somebody, as a primary value.

01:44:52.000 --> 01:45:01.000
I think makes the project that sellers had had really problematic.

01:45:01.000 --> 01:45:07.000
Um, so, so a formal universality.

01:45:07.000 --> 01:45:19.000
And I don't, I don't see a problem with that. But that's not going to be able to give you any substantive intentions

01:45:19.000 --> 01:45:31.000
and and so that, so this doesn't particularly have anything to do with the body mind or anything, it's it's really an in principle argument.

01:45:31.000 --> 01:45:45.000
The turn to the individual is just a trying to think of a different way of being serious about living one's life, that doesn't involve this idea of universality.

01:45:45.000 --> 01:46:03.000
I mean, I think, if you take truth. If you take, for example the practice of mathematics, what are the values in mathematics. It's that we can make everything explicit, we can, we can resolve our disputes, right that idea if we dispute, to let us calculate.

01:46:03.000 --> 01:46:07.000
Not everything's like that.

01:46:07.000 --> 01:46:21.000
So, this, this value of making the universe allies ability, the criterion of validity is possible here really bad idea.

01:46:21.000 --> 01:46:37.000
And yet I still want to say, you know, just because God is dead doesn't mean anything is permitted, how we live our lives is really important. So the question is what substance can you give to that, you know, how do I live my life, some pause.

01:46:37.000 --> 01:46:43.000
But isn't it isn't the solution.

01:46:43.000 --> 01:46:59.000
Point not that there is some fundamental you made it sound in your talk like you thought sellers was looking for some kind of practical given, not as the radical given but are practical do and that seemed to me, that's not really.

01:46:59.000 --> 01:47:23.000
Right, that what he's pointing us towards is again, that sort of ongoing dialectic that indeed points towards some kind of universal agreement. But, but doesn't assume that it's as it were hiding somewhere in a box and we only need to uncover it and there

01:47:23.000 --> 01:47:31.000
it is. It's something that we have to make, not something we have to find.

01:47:31.000 --> 01:47:40.000
I'm not sure that that's compatible with his account of the moral point of view in terms of the intentions.

01:47:40.000 --> 01:47:54.000
That's my worry, you can't make that part of the project. If you're going to analyze the world point of view, in terms of we intentions.

01:47:54.000 --> 01:48:05.000
I mean, you know, the idea that we should worry about who we are sure that's good I agree with that that is a good thing to worry about is that compatible with his understanding of the world.

01:48:05.000 --> 01:48:07.000
That's what I'm.

01:48:07.000 --> 01:48:10.000
That's what I'm doing.

01:48:10.000 --> 01:48:30.000
I guess I don't see the. I don't see anything to rule that out. Now whether I can construct an argument to guarantee that it is there that I'm not nearly so sanguine about but I don't see anything that rules it out just just as we have to find out what

01:48:30.000 --> 01:48:38.000
the methodologies are that lead us to better and better truth, come more and more truth if you like.

01:48:38.000 --> 01:49:01.000
Because the methodologies themselves are not given the ways in which we have to work towards finding you know some universality finding points of agreement finding ways of cohabiting with our interlocutors is something that we have to find out that I

01:49:01.000 --> 01:49:05.000
mean to be worked out not something that's already given.

01:49:05.000 --> 01:49:13.000
I don't think I don't think that's a good parallel because of the way with truth.

01:49:13.000 --> 01:49:19.000
I'm on the side of on the side of theory I mean for one thing.

01:49:19.000 --> 01:49:33.000
Again, this is something that I discussed in the natural tooth papers. I'm, you know, we, we are sufficiently alike. In our experience of the world.

01:49:33.000 --> 01:49:48.000
It's just not clear that we are sufficiently like in our valuations. So, so one of the, one of the arguments that I mean, so this is connected to the, you know, it isn't just a matter of, you know, I like chocolate ice cream and you like vanilla, and

01:49:48.000 --> 01:49:59.000
then the moral point of view, the universal. Um, there's, there is, there is an intermediate with

01:49:59.000 --> 01:50:06.000
with perceptions, we can learn to perceive the way other people perceive and I think that's really important.

01:50:06.000 --> 01:50:18.000
It's not clear to me that you can just learn to value the way someone else values, if you just have a sufficiently goodwill. Can you inhabit.

01:50:18.000 --> 01:50:22.000
Their

01:50:22.000 --> 01:50:28.000
valuation orientation in the world, and that's that's not that's not clear to me.

01:50:28.000 --> 01:50:48.000
And I think sellers needs something like that and that's the sense. I mean, my understanding is he doesn't want to just be a formalist. The point of going to we intentions and this notion of general welfare is to give some substance to what in college

01:50:48.000 --> 01:50:50.000
is merely portable.

01:50:50.000 --> 01:51:06.000
But as soon as you try and give it substance, then I think you have the tribalism problem and it's a problem because you have to presuppose content that you aren't entitled to.

01:51:06.000 --> 01:51:21.000
And that's why, that's why I think you can't just say oh well we'll work it out. No, you've already, you've already tried to make your moral visit Oh, we'll work it out sounds like you know someone's pushing it off and blowing blowing it off.

01:51:21.000 --> 01:51:31.000
And that's precisely not what's the problem right The problem is, we have to work it out. And that's actually a serious commitment.

01:51:31.000 --> 01:51:45.000
That's actually not a, not, not empty. It's not a, you know, and it's not necessarily you know postponing things into some

01:51:45.000 --> 01:51:46.000
other world.

01:51:46.000 --> 01:52:04.000
It is a commitment to do something here now that then you're going to cut your ability to give a certain kind of analysis of one, what it means to take the moral point of view, well, why not think that you can build some kind of thin notion of welfare

01:52:04.000 --> 01:52:17.000
that that has some kind of universality i mean you know like Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have, have you know put a lot of effort into developing something like the capabilities approach with a, which they themselves argue is actually you know gives

01:52:17.000 --> 01:52:19.000
a pretty.

01:52:19.000 --> 01:52:27.000
You know, universal definition of what it is to function well as a human being.

01:52:27.000 --> 01:52:33.000
I mean, you know, it's not. I mean I.

01:52:33.000 --> 01:52:47.000
It's is is there a reason to think that there's, like, and and you know one of the one of the advantages of such approach is that as this kind of multiple realized ability right it says you know hey there's you know there are these goods like like socio

01:52:47.000 --> 01:52:59.000
ability and play and learning and of course they realize differently different cultures, but you know people from different cultures all realize that these are parts of the good life and so why not, you know, does it seem like, in principle, impossible

01:52:59.000 --> 01:53:06.000
that we would be able to develop, you know, some kind of thin notion of welfare like this.

01:53:06.000 --> 01:53:24.000
That could, you know, instantiate this this this material end of morality, you know that that sellers. So wants, because as you say you know he does want to build a sort of teleology this teleological bit into the downtown ology yeah i mean i agree that

01:53:24.000 --> 01:53:35.000
that there's there's got to be, there's got to be some, some content there in this view that and that that's that's a really crucial part of it.

01:53:35.000 --> 01:53:39.000
He doesn't even try to fill it in right.

01:53:39.000 --> 01:53:46.000
That's because I think he thinks it's sort of obvious, and I'm saying No really.

01:53:46.000 --> 01:54:04.000
Donald Davidson do this work for us. Davidson Davidson argues, if you're going to understand anybody. You're going to have to attribute to the agreement on a big background of beliefs and also agreement on a big background of values because radical interpretation

01:54:04.000 --> 01:54:09.000
as a matter of attributing a comprehensive set of beliefs and desires to someone.

01:54:09.000 --> 01:54:16.000
And if Davidson Davidson's arguments or any good. There's got to be universal desires.

01:54:16.000 --> 01:54:24.000
At least with anybody you can understand his do, is doing exhibiting rational behavior at all.

01:54:24.000 --> 01:54:47.000
My the concern is, yeah and so it's, it's all too easy to not recognize someone who actually is possibly perfectly rational just by a very different structural rationality than anything you recognize and you just know you you you discount them.

01:54:47.000 --> 01:55:07.000
I mean, suppose I was happens all the time. Yeah. But, but it's wrong, is, is, is, is part of the issue, maybe that like the solar ASEAN view takes sort of like the first thing that you're supposed to be making a normative assessment of something like

01:55:07.000 --> 01:55:24.000
a rule for action, rather than something like the form of a life because I sort of get that you're going to have disputes that are probably going to be intractable if what you're going to, if all that you're trying to do is sell them is, is explicit take

01:55:24.000 --> 01:55:29.000
your first principles and, you know, gotta go guys, against each other.

01:55:29.000 --> 01:55:39.000
But if what you're trying to do is if instead, the way that you try to

01:55:39.000 --> 01:55:44.000
figure out make sense of

01:55:44.000 --> 01:56:02.000
achievement some kind of consonants with the person who puts beauty instead of truth that the center of rationality is to imagine the kind of life that a person might lead that would lead them to

01:56:02.000 --> 01:56:06.000
lead them to lead them to think in that way.

01:56:06.000 --> 01:56:20.000
And if this is reciprocal have them imagine, sort of the kind of life that that you might have led that have been that is inculcated you with the kind of conception of rationality you have, you know, might you achieve my principal be possible to achieve

01:56:20.000 --> 01:56:36.000
that kind of mutual understanding by sort of empathy directed, not at particular situations but more broadly at, at, you know, at ways of life, and isn't this something that we, you know, we do make, we do make progress on and you know things like good

01:56:36.000 --> 01:56:55.000
literature really help us with and haven't Haven't we made made progress on this just, you know, based on the fact that, you know, we now. We now recognize that it's it's absurd to think that just because you know people organize are socially organizing

01:56:55.000 --> 01:57:11.000
and live in radically different ways and we do. We think it's absurd to take that as a basis to think that they're barbarians and we can in fact talk to people with radically different cultures and, and, you know, I wonder if this isn't.

01:57:11.000 --> 01:57:26.000
I mean I made a distinction in the paper that that can seem sort of, who cares but I think it's actually really important between practical questions and the theoretical question of understanding the nature of the moral point of view, I think sometimes,

01:57:26.000 --> 01:57:39.000
you know, we have practical problems we need to get along we need to, you know, we need to carry on. And it might be that we can get sufficient understanding for that project.

01:57:39.000 --> 01:57:55.000
Um, but I take that to be a practical project that sellers is is a theoretical project sellers is a project about understanding the moral point of view, and it's not clear to me that you can can just assume that you're going to understand well enough

01:57:55.000 --> 01:58:12.000
somebody else's system of values to make sense of that I seen as i say i, this seems to be different from the notion of natural truth that that values function in a different way.

01:58:12.000 --> 01:58:30.000
And this has to do with the difference between rules and representations. So, so it the fact that we need for practical reasons to have these conversations doesn't sell anything for me.

01:58:30.000 --> 01:58:41.000
There's stuff in science and ethics where sellers is talking about the way the anthropologist approaches, like moral consciousness as opposed to the philosopher.

01:58:41.000 --> 01:58:48.000
And I think that he

01:58:48.000 --> 01:58:56.000
is at least lays out like a method or what it would be to understand the values of another group of people or another person.

01:58:56.000 --> 01:59:14.000
And you know these all these formulations that that we're working with are radical oversimplifications of what what the moral consciousness like of another person or another group, really, really looks like.

01:59:14.000 --> 01:59:31.000
But yeah, I always I always thought that the I agree with you i always thought he was doing the theory and not really any of the like first order moral stuff so I always looked at the intending, the general welfare of the community I was just looked at

01:59:31.000 --> 01:59:36.000
that as like a placeholder and thought like for a theory of value that someone could put him.

01:59:36.000 --> 01:59:45.000
Never thought there was anything substantive to the view like you wouldn't get any first order more stuff from us.

01:59:45.000 --> 01:59:56.000
But if it's strictly formal Then why don't we just stay with the categorical imperative.

01:59:56.000 --> 02:00:16.000
Because it's an imperative.

02:00:16.000 --> 02:00:27.000
the imperatives are always talking to about intentions can be thought out loud.

02:00:27.000 --> 02:00:33.000
So, so you want to say that it is just formal, I mean I have to admit I hadn't thought of that.

02:00:33.000 --> 02:00:43.000
I mean it doesn't see that's not how I read the sellers, and I think other people agree with me on that that it's supposed to be something.

02:00:43.000 --> 02:00:49.000
Again, not just a negative principle, but a positive principle.

02:00:49.000 --> 02:00:55.000
It's supposed to give you something that will help guide you,

02:00:55.000 --> 02:01:05.000
but not very much right so i mean the difference between something that's first order but really thin and incomplete and something that's fairly formal isn't huge difference.

02:01:05.000 --> 02:01:11.000
Like there's no real substantive account of what the general welfare is.

02:01:11.000 --> 02:01:32.000
It is soon as it has any content, there's a problem.

02:01:32.000 --> 02:01:43.000
Can I ask, Daniel what's wrong with something like the golden rule. Do unto others as you'd have them do unto you. That's sort of so rz and imagine putting yourself into their point of view.

02:01:43.000 --> 02:01:48.000
It also involves a kind of second personal relationship or at least it's.

02:01:48.000 --> 02:01:51.000
It involves an expansion of itself.

02:01:51.000 --> 02:02:09.000
I think if you put it in the negatives, as it would that just is that that is not treating people or, I don't want to generalize it more but, yeah, you know, don't treat people as as means.

02:02:09.000 --> 02:02:20.000
But it's always it's always a don't it's not never a do that sometimes called the silver rule. Don't do unto others what you wouldn't have them do unto you, I think it's in confusion thought,

02:02:20.000 --> 02:02:25.000
well, and that's a way of thinking about categorical imperative.

02:02:25.000 --> 02:02:38.000
It's a don't rule not a Do you know like don't believe contradictions, but logic doesn't tell you what you should believe it just tells you what you can't.

02:02:38.000 --> 02:02:40.000
That's what makes it affordable Oh, I see. Okay.

02:02:40.000 --> 02:02:56.000
I see, okay, Good.

02:02:56.000 --> 02:02:59.000
Let me just put something out here.

02:02:59.000 --> 02:03:04.000
It says sort of along the same lines, but it's a thought I've been having.

02:03:04.000 --> 02:03:12.000
And it has to do with the putative overriding this of morality, or the moral point of view.

02:03:12.000 --> 02:03:21.000
I'm a member of a lot of groups, and I have a lot of practical duties or imperatives.

02:03:21.000 --> 02:03:31.000
With respect to those groups I'm a professional in my philosophy department and I have some duties with that and I have a father and a husband and I have some duties with that.

02:03:31.000 --> 02:03:36.000
And sometimes these things conflict, and you have to make choices.

02:03:36.000 --> 02:03:41.000
Sometimes I do one thing sometimes I do the other.

02:03:41.000 --> 02:03:51.000
And it is not generally the case that the larger or more encompassing group takes priority.

02:03:51.000 --> 02:04:00.000
I awesome thanks to my immediate family I awesome thanks to my extended family, and generally speaking my immediate family gets priority over my extended family.

02:04:00.000 --> 02:04:13.000
So even if you started, even if you went a pretty far ways with sellers and you said look, all right, I am a member of the community of rational beings taken as this extremely large set of agents.

02:04:13.000 --> 02:04:23.000
It wouldn't stop being the case that I have all sorts of other practical imperatives deriving from my membership and other smaller groups subsets.

02:04:23.000 --> 02:04:32.000
And why should I think that the moral obligations are

02:04:32.000 --> 02:04:51.000
overriding or even very important, right, I wouldn't take my obligations to my 10th cousin to be very important. Why should I take my obligations to the Bangladeshis to be very important, or you know whatever

02:04:51.000 --> 02:04:54.000
that may be that as it.

02:04:54.000 --> 02:05:01.000
So even if we had a moral point of view and even if sellers could justify it Why would you think it should count very much.

02:05:01.000 --> 02:05:05.000
That was my paper was about.

02:05:05.000 --> 02:05:19.000
And so my answer on sellers behalf means not anyways my answer was that, because to do otherwise is to deny that you're really a person to deny that you're actually a rule follower.

02:05:19.000 --> 02:05:34.000
Okay may or may not be moved by that. But why should take priority over your publications to smaller groups, because you can violate your obligations to smaller groups without denying your essential nature.

02:05:34.000 --> 02:05:46.000
All right, well here. Here was a thought I had when I heard your paper, and it came up just a minute ago too so

02:05:46.000 --> 02:05:52.000<