

1-1-2009

The Divide of the Coca Leaf: National Culture and the Drug Policies of Bolivia and the United States

Megan Koops

Follow this and additional works at: <http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/spnareview>

Recommended Citation

Koops, Megan (2009) "The Divide of the Coca Leaf: National Culture and the Drug Policies of Bolivia and the United States," *SPNA Review*: Vol. 5: Iss. 1, Article 3.

Available at: <http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/spnareview/vol5/iss1/3>

THE DIVIDE OF THE COCA LEAF: NATIONAL CULTURE AND THE DRUG POLICIES OF BOLIVIA AND THE UNITED STATES

Megan Koops

Grand Valley State University

While the United States and Bolivian cultures have different values, attitudes and norms, these differences have not been a major factor in determining the aid Bolivia receives from the United States (US). Now, President Morales, a former union leader for coca leaf growers, has refused to comply with US foreign policy to eradicate the coca leaf, creating political and cultural tension. This paper examines the US and Bolivian relationship as a case study through Schein's organizational cultural theory and Adler's culture theory to determine how Bolivia's battle to save the coca leaf may affect the aid it receives from the US government and nonprofits.

INTRODUCTION

For centuries, Bolivian culture has drawn a strict distinction between the unprocessed coca leaf and cocaine (Andreas & Youngers, 1989). However, in the United States, many equate the coca leaf with cocaine addiction and dangerous narcotics, and thus believe that it must be eliminated as part of the war on drugs. Conversely, Bolivians view the United States' zero coca policy as an imperialistic effort to dominate Bolivian culture. This paper explores whether Bolivia's cultural values and attitudes regarding the coca leaf affects the aid it receives from the US government and nonprofits.

To examine these cultural differences, the author first provides definitions of key terms associated with Adler's cultural theory and Schein's theory of organizational culture. Second, the paper explores organizational cultural theory based on Schein's and Adler's research. Third, an overview of the United States and Bolivian foreign relations is provided. Fourth, the methodology for analyzing the data is presented. Fifth, using a case study method, the paper applies the organizational cultural theory to the Bolivian and United States relationship. The paper concludes with suggestions for stronger cultural understanding using Trice and Beyer's cultural change model to assist the United States in its reevaluation of its policy supporting the eradication of the coca leaf.

Culture, Organization and Organization Culture Defined

Culture

Adler's (1991) research helps to explain why conflict arises within the interaction between two significantly different cultures like Bolivia's and the United States'. It is critical to have a solid comprehension of an anthropological definition of culture, such as Kroeber and Kluckhohn's; theirs is a definition that is the most comprehensive and generally accepted:

Culture consist of patterns, explicit and implicit of and for behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, including their embodiment in artifacts; the essential core of culture consist of traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture system may, on the one hand be considered as products of action, on the other, as conditioning elements of future action. (1952, p.181)

It is from Kroeber and Kluckhohn's definition that Adler draws the elements required for a culture to flourish and develop. Furthermore, her theory explains how for a cultural outsider to successfully work in a different culture a solid comprehension of the culture is required. To do this, an individual needs to understand how behavior, values, and attitudes create a culture; see Figure 1 as to how these three elements are interwoven.

First, behavior is any form of human action that is perceived normal within a culture (Adler, 1991). In the United States, employing governmental policy to eliminate a drug and its origins has become the normal course of action. The belief is that eliminating the source of the drug will eliminate the problem. Within the government, there are not strong dissenting voices regarding US drug policy, and the public hears from the government a single narrative of how the only viable solution to eliminating cocaine addiction is through vigorous law enforcement and the eradication of the coca leaf (Gamarra, 1997).


Second, according to Adler (1991), values are general beliefs that define what is right, wrong and general preferences within a culture. Research demonstrates that personal values affect all forms of organizations' policies and that managerial values affect all forms of organizational behavior, group leadership, behavior, conflict levels

Koops/The Divide of the Coca Leaf

and communication. For example, Bolivians consider the coca leaf harmless unprocessed (Léons and Sanabria, 1997), like before processing poppy seeds into heroin. In the United States, the culture developed the general belief that the coca leaf itself causes cocaine to be a dangerous and addictive drug (Gamarra, 1997).

Finally, attitudes are constructed to express values and dispose individuals to act or react in a certain way toward something. Attitudes are present in relationships between a person and an object. In Bolivia, preserving the coca leaf is an attempt at preserving pre-European colonization Bolivian culture. A vast majority of modern Bolivian culture developed because of the imperialistic ideals of the Spaniards toward suppressing and eliminating indigenous culture (Léons and Sanabria, 1997). Currently, President Evo Morales is working to revise indigenous culture, and part of this work is attempting to educate the Western world about the truth and the importance of the coca leaf to Bolivian culture.

Figure 1:



Adler 1997

Organizations

Cultures form within groups. Thus, Adler's definition of an organization is any group with a stable membership (i.e. citizens of a country or membership with a nonprofit) and a history of collectively working toward the same goals (1997). Furthermore, the definition of an organization is very similar to that of cultures. Group identity forms through organizations and cultures. Without group identity, a culture cannot exist, rather only an aggregate of people. Schein frequently notes that organizations are difficult to define in time and space. They are themselves open systems with constant interaction with multiple environments and subgroups. Finally, the definitions of organizations and culture intertwine inextricably because to have a culture, there has to be an organization and vice-versa (Schein, 1992).

Organizational Culture

Schein explains organizational culture through four elements: artifacts, beliefs, norms, and values. These elements are the same as presented by Kroeber and Kluckhohn in their anthropological definition of culture. Adler uses this as a basis for her culture theory.

First, artifacts are the visible manifestations of the culture (Schein, 1992), such as the coca leaf for Bolivians. For Bolivians, it is an herbal substance used in a variety of products from teas to shampoos and represents their pre-colonization culture (Andreas & Youngers, 1989).

Second, beliefs are the ideas, knowledge, and superstitions specific to each individual organization or culture. Beliefs are what motivate an organization's cultural decision-making processes (Schein, 1992). For example, the United States government's belief that the coca leaf is a crucial factor in the development of the drug epidemic led the US to create the zero coca policy. Conversely, the Bolivian government considers the coca leaf as part of their culture, and the United States zero coca policy as imperialistic. Because of these conflicting ideas, the United States government spends more to promote US foreign policy of coca eradication rather than providing aid to alleviate the Bolivian socio-economic problems (Andres & Youngers, 1989). For example, the Cash Compensation Program only provided monetary assistance to coca farmers to stop growing the coca leaf and did not consider what skills the farmers would then use to support their families once the money was gone. Thus, once the assistance ended, the farmers reverted to growing coca leaves in order to survive (General Accounting Office, 2002).

Third are the norms in an organization. These are the unwritten rules members of an organization follow (Schein, 1992). For the United States government, the norm is not to provide aid to persons who have goals that are contradictory to United States foreign policy (i.e. the war on drugs). The Bolivians' norm is that the unprocessed coca leaf is not harmful to the central nervous system when drinking tea or chewing it (Andres & Youngers, 1989). From these two different norms stems a conflict between the two different organizational cultures.

Fourth are the values formed from members' beliefs and principles shared by members in an organization's culture (Schein, 1992; Champy, 1995). For the Bolivian government, the shared belief is the coca leaf is not an illicit drug, but a traditional plant that has cultural significance (Vellinga, 2006). The United States government does not respect Bolivian values because of its narrowly defined values concerning the coca leaf.

Organizational Cultural Theory

As noted earlier, Schein is a leading figure in the study of organizational cultural theory. He finds the concept of culture useful for explaining some of the seemingly incomprehensible and irrational aspects of organizations such as one government bullying another sovereign government (Schein, 1992). Using Adler's theory of culture in conjunction with Schein's organizational culture theory allows for a better understanding of how the Bolivian government and US government formed their organizational cultures' ideas regarding the coca leaf. Because of these different organizational cultures, conflicts developed regarding the coca leaf. Adler notes organizational cultures with a parochialism perspective are dangerous because they do not recognize others' ways of living and working as legitimate. Similarly, they do not appreciate how disregarding differences between cultures can have serious consequences (1997). This is a danger facing both the Bolivian and United States governments. If Bolivia refuses to address the concerns of the United States, the aid it receives will diminish. Moreover, if the United States continues ignoring the Bolivian government's position on the coca leaf, it will lose an ally in the war on drugs. The Bolivian government, like the US government, desires to diminish the affects of cocaine on its population and eliminate the power of drug lords (Gamarra, 1997).

In an attempt to resolve the differences between the Bolivian and United States governments, the issue of the coca leaf first must be deconstructed through a prism of organizational culture. Stein's organizational culture theory and Adler's culture theory provide the prism to determine cultural differences that create friction between the US and Bolivian governments.

This section of the paper explores the five essential points of Schein's organizational culture theory in conjunction with Adler's culture theory. The first point is that culture is learned, and it is a human creation. Humans are not born with an in-depth understanding of values, beliefs and norms of a culture (Schein, 1992; Adler, 1997). Culturally, people are wax tablets, ready for different experiences to imprint on our minds and determine cultural perception (Locke, 1961). For example, because of the Bolivian government's attitude, the citizens understand a difference exists between coca leaves and cocaine. Alternatively, the attitude of the United States government draws no distinction between the two. This attitude is how many US citizens determine their position regarding the coca leaf (Gamarra, 1997).

Second, culture is shared collectivity. Shared behaviors, values and attitudes are what bind members to an organization because it creates unity (Schein, 1992; Adler, 1997). Within a government, this would be the values and beliefs developed by the organizational culture. The shared values and beliefs are why the US will only provide monetary assistance to Bolivians if they create a policy to eradicate the coca leaf. Because a collectively shared value among US governmental departments is to win the war on drugs, policies must be developed and enforced to encourage the eradication of the coca leaf (U.S. Aid to Bolivia, All Programs, 2008).

Third, culture within organizations influences behavior, which serves as coordinator for part of the organization as well as associated with it. This allows a government to coordinate beliefs, norms and values throughout its departments and offices (Schein, 1992; Adler, 1997). However, problems may develop because as Framer (2002) notes, even though a coordinating behavior can be beneficial, if there is no descent, groupthink may occur (Painter, 1994). If a government does not consider others' values, behavior and attitudes, the organization could develop a parochial perspective. Parochialism can lead to conflict between two organizations and the relationship could disintegrate (Adler, 1997).

Fourth, cultural symbols are physical representations for organizational cultures (Schein 1992). For Bolivians, this is the coca leaf. Coca leaves have been part of the Bolivian culture for centuries. Until the United States began its war on drugs, the Bolivian government (prior to President Moral) did not consider eradicating the coca leaf as a viable solution to eliminating cocaine (Léons, 1997). The coca leaf is part of their cultural identity. Eradicating the coca leaf will eliminate part of Bolivian culture.

Koops/The Divide of the Coca Leaf

Schein's final point is that organizational cultures incorporate expressive elements (1992). Expressive elements allow members in an organization to follow the *rules* of an organization, but also have their own ideas. An example would be a nonprofit where most of its budget focuses on programs promoting eradication. The expressive point happens when an individual within the nonprofit works to change the focus of the budget towards a better understanding of values, behavior and attitudes of the Bolivian government and citizens regarding the coca leaf. These small changes may create a better understanding between the two cultures.

Individuals in Culture

Organizational cultures develop when individuals collaborate because they share the same values (Schein, 1992; Adler, 1997). A comprehensive understanding of an organization's culture requires recognizing the role of individuals within it. For successful changes to occur in an organization's culture, the group mentality must change (Schein, 1992). An individual within the culture may want to alter it, but change will not occur if the group as a whole does not support the transformation.

Schein's and Adler's research provides comprehensive explanation of cultural theory and organizational cultural theory. First, the theory explores how culture is learned. Second, learning a culture involves members willing to work collectively with others in the culture. Third, having a comprehensive understanding of the beliefs and values allows members to learn what specific symbols are interrelated into the identity of the organization (1992). Lastly, the expressive elements allow members in an organization to follow the *rules* within an organization, but express personal ideals.

Overview of Relationship between US and Bolivia: The Divide

To understand how Schein's and Adler's research applies to Bolivia and the United States, the history of their relationship requires exploration. Since the Monroe Doctrine, the United States government has acted as the protector of the Western Hemisphere. In 2008, United States foreign policy fails to recognize the Monroe Document is obsolete, and continues to force its own agenda regarding the war on drugs on the Bolivian government (Bary & Honey, 2001; Walker III, 1994; Kutan & Cespedes, 2006). Until the election of Evo Morales in 2006, presidents from Bolivia complied with the United States' policy of eradication of the coca plant (Browne, 2006). With the election of President Morales, a split between the United States and Bolivia began because of Morales's advocating for retaining the coca leaf and its growers. When Morales legalized the cultivation of the coca leaf it became difficult for the American public to determine if use of their donations were for developing programs to combat Bolivia's socio-economic problems, or used to support drug production. In addition, United States residents are required to be more diligent about organizations to which they donate. Since the declaration of war on terror, if individuals give to the *wrong group* they may be suspected of aiding terrorism. This may occur when donating to nonprofits that provide aid in Bolivia. Donors and nonprofits may be considered to be providing aid to Bolivian drug lords who are considered threats to US national security.

The conflicting organizational cultures caused a political split, creating problems for Bolivians. Bolivia's socio-economic situation remains characterized as chronically underdeveloped, placing Bolivia on the Human Development Index rating lower than any other South America State. Additionally, unemployment is at 7.8% in urban areas with widespread underemployment throughout the remainder of the State (2006 est.). Sixty-four percent of Bolivians live below poverty level (est. 2004). The per capita income is \$900 US per year, or in purchasing power terms, \$2,460 US per year (Human Development Report from Bolivia: Situational Analysis). From the 2006/2007 *Human Development Report*, Bolivia ranked 117th out of 177 countries for adult literacy (ages 15 or older) (Human development Index: Adult Literacy Rate, 2008).

Furthermore, there are problems with transparency and accountability with NGOs in Bolivia. Bolivians feel NGO employees work to promote US foreign policy values and beliefs rather than developing programs to alleviate socio-economic problems (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Protection Information Section 2005). Even with donors who provide aid to Bolivians, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Protection Information Section finds many donors use the carrot and the stick approach. Moreover, with President Morales not eradicating the coca leaf, Bolivia is receiving less monetary assistance from large donors such as United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (2005).

METHODOLOGY

The United States and Bolivian governments' relationship is examined as a case study through Schein's organizational cultural theory and Adler's culture theory. The case study will explore the five points of organizational cultural theory in relationship to the organizational cultural differences between Bolivia and the United States.

Explorative

Through organizational culture theory, the author looks to determine if the Bolivian government receives less monetary assistance from the United States government and nonprofits because it does not comply with US drug policy. By applying the organizational cultural theory and cultural theory this paper examines what creates the cultural divide, and it affects the relationship between Bolivia and United States. Will the current cultural divide over the coca leaf affect the monetary aid Bolivia receives from the US government and US nonprofits?

ANALYSIS

Culture is Learned

As noted earlier, there are five elements in Schein's theory for organizational culture. First, within an organization's culture individuals learn beliefs, norms and values (Schein, 1992). The citizens of these two states have matured in different cultures learning opposing ideas for what the coca leaf represents. United States citizens make assumptions about Bolivian culture by learning about *Bolivian culture* through US media influenced by US governmental culture. One way United States citizens' norm develops about Bolivian culture is from the US government emphasizing Bolivia as a large drug producer. For example, the Central Intelligence Agency's website describes Bolivia as the third largest producer of cocaine. However, the CIA does not provide an explanation regarding the high unemployment and low literacy rate. Although the website is supposed to provide unbiased facts, its greater explanation of one statistic over others creates an inherently biased website (Bolivia, 2008).

Maletz and Herbel (2000) note it is difficult to make changes to US citizens' beliefs when government officials' perceptions do not change. Because of this negative perception, the public receives only one standpoint regarding the coca leaf (Vellinga, 2006). Additionally, the attitude of the US government is that only a policy that supports eradication can solve the drug problem. Because of these policies, some United States-based nonprofits, such as the Center for International Policy, have followed the norm to encourage eradication of the coca leaf. Conflict arises because of the Bolivian government's cultural attitude that the unprocessed coca leaf is harmless, and has nutritional and medical uses. Furthermore, the coca leaf is valued because of its cultural significance to pre-colonization Bolivian identity (Barry & Honey, 2001; Falco, 1995).

Culture is Shared Collectivity

Even if elements of a culture are learned, a culture will not form if individuals do not share artifacts, beliefs, norms, and values (Schein, 1992; Adler, 1997). The idea that the coca leaf is a natural resource as well as an ingredient to cocaine is a belief shared collectively in Bolivia. Bolivians view the coca leaf as an artifact that is part of their history considering 30% of Bolivians are Quechua and 25% Aymara; both indigenous groups from Bolivia (Bolivia, 2008). This cultural value conflicts with the collectedly shared belief within the United States government that the easiest way to control cocaine is through eradication of the coca leaf. The attitude is to treat the drug problem like a tumor, to cut out and eliminate the source (coca leaf), hence eliminating the problem. Additionally, the United States government and nonprofits elevated the war on drugs to an international crusade. This creates the sentiment that if a state does not work towards eradicating the sources of the drug, then states like Bolivia are against the war on drugs (Andreas & Youngers, 1989; Barry & Honey, 2001; Nadelmann, 2007).

For Bolivians, the coca leaf represents an aspect of their culture untouched by Spanish colonization. For centuries, native Bolivians were oppressed by the Spaniards, who imposed their norms, beliefs and values. Bolivians with Quechua, Aymara and poor socio-economic backgrounds believe they finally have a voice of representation with President Morales because of his support for the coca leaf (Vera-Zavala, 2005). Because of the United States government's cultural attitude regarding the coca leaf, it believes with President Morales supporting coca cultivation an influx of cocaine will occur. The norm for the US is to fight the influx. One way the US fights the Bolivian government's policy change is to withdraw monetary aid and encourage US nonprofits like The Carter Center not to

Koops/The Divide of the Coca Leaf

provide services to Bolivians unless they support eradication (Browne, 2006; Financing Democracy in the Americas; Political Parties, Campaigns, and Elections, 2003).

Culture Influences Behavior

Organization's members share culture collectively; it also influences the behavior within an organization's culture (Schein, 1992; Adler, 1997). The governmental cultures of the United States and Bolivia influence how the two States react to different events. For example, a shift occurred in the United States aid because of 9/11. After 9/11, the funding for Central and South America was cut and more money was allocated to the war on terror. From the USAID report on funding for Bolivia there was a 21.7% decrease in the budget for economic opportunities and overall there was a 13.5% decrease in the program budget from 2004-2007 (Bolivia, 2007). Overall, a decrease occurred in the program budget for the socio-economic aid in the same years. Table 1 may be an indication of how 9/11 influenced the change in aid provided for Bolivia.

Table 1

Program Budget by Sector and Account		FY 2004 (\$000)	FY 2005 (\$000)	FY 2006 (\$000)	FY 2007 (\$000)	Percent Change FY 04-07
Basic Education	DA	1,000	891	882	900	-10.0%
Agriculture and Environment	ACI	26,340	1,000	1,700	1,680	-93.6%
	DA	5,273	2,226	4,665	5,784	9.7%
Higher Education & Training	ACI	120	0	0	0	N/A
Economic Growth	ACI	10,250	32,312	30,560	27,320	166.5%
	DA	4,050	2,970	1,970	850	-79.0%
Democracy and Governance	ESF	8,000	2,000	2,475	2,900	-63.8%
	ACI	4,030	5,402	3,370	2,000	-50.4%
	DA	1,709	2,099	2,574	2,466	44.3%
Family Planning / Reproductive Health	ESF	400	5,936	3,465	3,100	675.0%
	ACI	0	200	0	0	N/A
HIV / AIDS	CSH	7,611	7,722	7,227	5,704	-25.1%
	CSH	900	893	990	1,000	11.1%
Child Survival and Maternal Health	ACI	300	800	1,000	0	N/A
	CSH	4,475	4,752	5,787	5,500	22.9%
Other Infectious Diseases	ACI	700	0	0	0	N/A
	CSH	1,584	3,128	2,475	2,485	56.9%
PL 480 Title II		22,276	12,607	15,699	24,000	7.7%
Total		99,018	84,938	84,839	85,689	-13.5%

Source: USAID: Bolivia

<http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2007/lac/>

Furthermore, the United States government orchestrated a public relations campaign around drug issues, so the US public supports sanctions the government implements against states that did not comply with the war on drugs through public service announcements, drug prevention programs (i.e. D.A.R.E), etc. (Andreas and Youngers, 1989). As the US works to discourage the use of cocaine through public relations, the Bolivian government is focused on shoring-up its economy. One way to bolster the economy is by having the coca leaf no longer deemed a poisonous species by the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (United Nations, 1972). Bolivia can then export coca leaf tea to increase its exportations. To Bolivians, they should always have been able to export coca leaf tea and receive aid from US nonprofits and government to solve their socio-economic problems. The cultural norm of the coca leaf influences the Bolivian government's avocation for the legalization of the coca leaf.

Cultural Symbols and Meanings are Interrelated

Bolivians fight to legalize the coca leaf because it is a symbol of their culture. Artifacts give important meanings to cultures because they provide visual representation of the culture's values, behaviors and attitudes (Adler, 1997). Symbols also represent the beliefs, values and norms cultures deem significant (Schein, 1992). This is why the coca leaf is an important symbol and artifact because it represents Bolivian culture pre-Spanish colonization. In the United States, residents consider anything associated with cocaine as hindering the crusade against drugs (O'Shaughnessy, 2007). Furthermore, as a powerful member of the United Nations, the United States supports the

1961 convention declaring the coca leaf as a poisonous species to be eradicated (Barry & Honey, 2001). However, if President Morales succeeds in convincing the UN the coca leaf is not dangerous it would change the structure of the debate, providing Bolivia with further evidence why the zero coca policy is obsolete.

Nonetheless, the coca leaf as a symbol represents two different things to the two cultures. Because of these differences, both sides create premonitions about the other's cultural values and attitudes, creating problems for nonprofits that want to help Bolivia. If US attitudes do not change regarding the coca leaf, then nonprofits will not receive government support, and in turn cannot assist Bolivians.

Incorporating Instrumental and Expressive Elements Into a Culture

Within a culture, expressive elements allow for the creation of new beliefs, attitudes, values, behaviors and norms (Schein, 1992; Adler, 1997). Money is an expressive element because it provides the support for the continuation and promotion of cultural values, beliefs and norms. Problems arise for US nonprofits, like the Center for International Policy and the Drug Free America Foundation, Inc., who want to provide monetary aid to Bolivia but do not do so since they draw no distinction between the unprocessed coca leaf and cocaine, thus believing their funds support drug lords. Supporting drug lords contradicts the values and attitudes of United States nonprofits such as Drug Free America Foundation, Inc., which works to eliminate narcotics. Organizations, like those mentioned above, oppose the idea of providing monies to a culture that does not support their beliefs. Conflicts arise because many US nonprofits do not understand the distinction Bolivians draw between the coca leaf and cocaine. Additionally, many US citizens believe that since the Bolivian government and citizens support coca leaf cultivation that nonprofit programs and aid support drug dealers. These cultural differences create the biggest divisions between the two. Moreover, since the attitude of the US government is that its norms and values are superior, some nonprofits adopt this view and force US norms and values on Bolivians.

Because of this lack of cultural comprehension, many US nonprofits do not understand the value of the coca leaf to Bolivian culture. Nonprofits must be wary of their definition of assistance versus their constituents' definition. Currently, nonprofits use money as a *poisonous* carrot because it forces US values and beliefs on Bolivians. The monetary donations are expressive of either the nonprofit or donors' beliefs and values. Furthermore, when US nonprofits like the Center for International Policy provide financial aid to Bolivians they only spend the funds on short-term programs like the Cochabamba Regional Development Project (CORDEP). CORDEP "worked to promote increased investment, productivity, and employment in legal economic activities for Bolivians..." but it did not start cultural change in Bolivia (Farthing and Kohl, 2005, p. 186). By not working towards a cultural shift, changes do not occur within the cultural infrastructure. Moreover, programs implemented like CORDEP were developed to promote eradication rather than socio-economic development (Farthing and Kohl, 2005). In addition, Andres and Youngers found the State Department's International Narcotics Matters spends 3.6% on crop substitution and development assistance versus the 45% for coca eradication. Priorities must adjust even if the US still has a zero coca policy because nothing will change if there are no viable alternatives.

For Bolivians an expressive element of their culture is the coca leaf because it represents survival. Cultivation of the coca leaf is the only option for some Bolivians because it is the only crop that grows in the low quality soil. Alternative crops, such as bananas, do not grow in the poor soil. Therefore, if US nonprofits want to make changes in Bolivian culture, they must create effective and plausible alternatives for personal sustainability (Andreas & Youngers, 1989). For example, Aid to Artisans promotes alternative skills by buying traditional pottery, textiles, baskets, etc. from farmers in the Chapare Valley (the dominate coca growing region) to promote a different economy (Failla, 2004).

CONCLUSION: CULTURAL CHANGES

The lack of understanding between the two cultures is a problem. For any progress with the war on drugs and improving the socio-economic issues, Bolivians, US nonprofits, the US government, and the Bolivian government must work for changes in their organizational cultures. To determine how to transform the cultures, Trice and Beyer's model is used (1993). The model's three forms of change are: revolutionary/comprehensive, subunit/subculture, and cumulative comprehensive reshaping. Utilization of all three forms of changes offers a better chance of success.

Four dimensions are associated with each type of cultural change. First is pervasiveness, the number of members of the culture expected to change their behavior. Magnitude is second, which defines how drastically the status quo will be disturbed regarding status, power and other resources. Third is innovativeness, or the ideas and behaviors that must evolve. Finally is duration, the time period required for change. Table 2 provides the different

Koops/The Divide of the Coca Leaf

dimensions' levels associated with each type of cultural change. For an effective cultural shift in the Bolivian and United States cultures, elements from each of the cultural models' dimensions need to be used.

Trice and Beyer's first form of cultural change is revolutionary and comprehensive, requiring change of the entire organization (1993). In this model, pervasiveness must be significant. Thus, the Bolivian and US governments need to change their perceptions of one another (See Table 2, box 1, line 1). Changing perspectives allows for a better comprehension of the other government's culture. Drawing a distinction between cocaine and the coca leaf in D.A.R.E could allow this to happen in the US. Second, the status quo must change; making magnitude high in this model, with the end result of a relationship of mutual respect between the United States and Bolivia, rather than the US dictating policy (Vellinga, 2006). Alternatively, a more radical change would be legalizing drugs, giving both governments more control over narcotics. Furthermore, legalizing drugs like cocaine allows the focus of drug addiction to shift into a health issue, like that of alcoholism (Nadelmann, 2007). Both innovativeness and duration are variable for the revolutionary/comprehensive model. However, for drastic changes to occur, citizens in both States must have innovative ways for the cultures to develop a consensus. Finally, as this model challenges the status quo, there is not a solid predictor for how long the changes would take.

Secondly, incorporating revolutionary changes to subcultures acknowledges that substantial administrative change begins gradually, requiring patience, thus allowing for low pervasiveness (Trice & Byer, 1993; Avery 1965) (See Table 2, box 2, line 1). However, magnitude is high. Bolivians from grassroots organizations to the federal level must work to change United States attitudes and beliefs about the coca leaf. In addition, nonprofits would need to explain to the coca growers why individuals in the United States want the leaf eradicated. This allows for nonprofits and US citizens to see change occurring and that both sides are working towards a better cultural understanding (Barry & Honey, 2001). Again through this type of cultural change innovativeness and the duration are variable for the same reasons as noted in the previous paragraph.

The final model of cumulative comprehensive reshaping is the gradual and incremental changes that work towards a comprehensive reshaping of an entire organization's culture. For this model, pervasiveness must be high (Trice & Beyer, 1993) (See Table 2, box 3, line 1), requiring US nonprofits to work for change in Bolivia and be hesitant in their posture about imposing US values, beliefs and attitudes about the coca leaf on Bolivians (Farmer, 2002). Acting hesitantly allows both cultures to pause and remember the effectiveness of good communication (Strodtzoff, 2006). To construct a new culture, communications must be open. When a culture uses open communications to understand what motivates another culture, it creates a desirable situation since it must have moderate magnitude to succeed. Innovativeness needs to be moderate so members of these cultures see how changing their cultural attitudes and values benefit the overall culture. Finally, duration is high in this model so a more productive relationship develops between the United States and Bolivia.

Table 2: Types and Dimensions of Culture Change

Types of Culture Change	Placement on Dimensions
1) Revolutionary, comprehensive	Pervasiveness: high
	Magnitude: high
	Innovativeness: variable
	Duration: variable
2) Subunit or subculture	Pervasiveness: low
	Magnitude: moderate to high
	Innovativeness: variable
	Duration: variable
3) Cumulative comprehensive reshaping	Pervasiveness: high
	Magnitude: moderate
	Innovativeness: moderate
	Duration: high

Source: Trice & Beyer 1993

The three different types of cultural changes presented by Trice and Beyer: Revolutionary/ comprehensive, subunit/ subculture, and cumulative comprehensive reshaping, are all important to consider when evaluating a structural change of an organization's culture. It is also vital to consider the level the dimensions are to determine if

that specific cultural change meets the requirements. Furthermore, the United States needs to respect Bolivia's sovereignty in order for change to happen.

Policy Change

In determining policy changes, the author used all three of Trice and Beyer's change models. First, the United States must no longer attempt to interfere with Bolivian policies, especially regarding its drug policy. The US government's attitude needs to change within the first year of the president-elect's term in office. Second, within President-elect Obama's term of presidency, he must have the United States advocate for the removal of the coca leaf from the United Nations poisonous plants convention. The United States must also seek allies from other powerful members to ensure the convention changes when brought before the General Assembly. Third, a monetary shift must occur, so 80% of the aid sent to Bolivia is for programs to help alleviate Bolivia's socio-economic issues. This budget change should occur in the United State's next budget. Lastly, the US government will not provide grant assistance to nonprofits that promote eradication within any of their programs. Allocations of grant monies will go to nonprofits that propose long-term programs to assist Bolivians to combat issues that create its socio-economic situation. This policy change should occur within the first two years of President-elect Obama's term.

These changes in policies will help change both the Bolivian and United States governments' culture, so the relationships can move to one of respect. For success, the Bolivian government needs to see what drives the United States to invest so much in the zero coca policy. Once both sides have a better understanding of the other's culture there is a significant chance the two cultures will find more similarities than differences. Both want to combat the social problems created by the use and sales of drugs. There needs to be a better distinction created in the United States between the coca leaf and cocaine so donors realize Bolivians are not fighting to keep an illicit drug, but rather something that is less harmful than tobacco and that has been part of the culture for centuries. Bolivians want help, they just do not want US nonprofits or the US government forcing them to change the values, beliefs and norms that are important to Bolivian culture.

REFERENCES

- Adler, N.J. (1991). *International Dimensions of Organizational Behavior, Second Edition*. Boston: PWS-KENT Publishing Company.
- Andreas, P. & Youngers, C. (1989). U.S. drug policy and the Andean cocaine industry. *World Policy*, 6(3), 529-562.
- Avery, R. S. (1965). Improving public administration assistance to developing nations. *International Review of Administration Sciences*, 31, 222-226.
- Barry, T. & Honey, M. (2001). Coca eradication. *Foreign Policy in Focus*, 6(7), 1-6.
- Bolivia. (2007). In *USAID: Budget*. Retrieved from <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2007/lac/>
- Bolivia. (2008). In *CIA Factbook*. Retrieved from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bl.html>
- Browne, S. (2006). *AID & Influence: Do Donors Help or Hinder?*. Sterling: Earth Scan.
- Champy, J. (1995). *Reengineering Management: The Mandate for New Leadership*. New York: HarperBusiness.
- Failla, K. S. (2004). Aid to artisans exhibits crafts from Bolivia. Retrieved from <http://www.interaction.org/newswire/detail.php?id=3258>
- Falco, M. (1995). Passing grades: Branding nations won't resolve the U.S. drug problem. *Foreign Affairs*, 75(5). Retrieved from <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19950901facomment5062/mathea-falco/passing-grades-branding-nations-won-t-resolve-the-u-s-drug-problem.html>
- Farmer, D. J. (2002). P.A. Eth-Talk: Is it ethical?. *Public Administration & Management: An Interactive Journal*, 7(1), 71-82.
- Farthing, L. & Kohl, B. (2005). Conflicting agendas: The politics of development aid in drug-producing areas. *Development Policy Review*, 23(2), 183-198.
- Financing Democracy in the Americas; Political Parties, Campaigns, and Elections. (2003, March). In *The Carter Center Conference*. Retrieved from <http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/1487.pdf>
- Gamarra, E.A. (1997). Fighting drugs in Bolivia: United States and Bolivian perceptions at odds. M.B. Léons & H. Sanabria (Eds.), *Coca, Cocaine, and the Bolivian Reality* (pp.243-252). Albany, New York: State University of New York Press.

Koops/The Divide of the Coca Leaf

- Gazell, J. A. (2002). The provenance and development of a global ethic. *Public Administration & Management*, 7(1), 26-55.
- General Accounting Office. (2002). *DRUG CONTROL: Efforts to Develop Alternatives to Cultivating Illicit Crops in Colombia Have Made Little Progress and Face Serious Obstacles*. Washington, D.C., Superintendent of Documents. Retrieved from <http://www.csdp.org/research/d02291.pdf>
- Halachmi, A (1997). Communication, productivity, and administrative reforms. In Gannett, J. L., & Kouzmin, A. (Eds.), *Handbook of Administrative Communication* (471-496). New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc.
- Human Development Index: Adult Literacy Rate. (2008). In *United Nations: Human Development Reports*. Retrieved from, <http://hdrstats.undp.org/indicators/3.html>
- Kroeber, A.L. & Kluckhohn, F. (1952). *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions*. Cambridge: Peabody Museum.
- Kutan, A. M. & Cespedes, J.L (2006). Socio-political determinants of bank spreads and deposit growth: The case of Bolivia. Retrieved from http://www.siue.edu/business/econfin/pdf/Microsoft_Word_-_Kutan_JMCB_07-24-2006.pdf
- Léons, M.B. (1997). After the boom: Income decline, eradication, and alternative development in the Yungas. M.B. Léons & H. Sanabria (Eds.), *Coca, Cocaine, and the Bolivian Reality* (pp.169-194). Albany, New York: State University of New York Press.
- Léons, M.B. & Sanabria, H. (1997). Coca and cocaine in Bolivia: Reality and policy illusion. M.B. Léons & H. Sanabria (Eds.), *Coca, Cocaine, and the Bolivian Reality* (pp.1-47). Albany, New York: State University of New York Press.
- Locke, J. (1961). *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (J. W. Yolton, Ed). New York : Dutton.
- Maletz, D. J. & Herbel, J. (2000). Beyond idealism: Democracy and ethics reform. *American Review of Public Administration: An Interactive Journal*, 30(1), 19-45.
- Nadelmann, E. (2007, September/October). Drugs. *Foreign Policy*, 162, 24-30.
- Narayanan, V.K. & Nath, R. (1993). *Organizational Theory: A Strategic Approach*. Boston, Irwin.
- O'Shaughnessy, H. (2007, May 27). Why the US is losing its war on cocaine. *The Independent*, Retrieved from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/why-the-us-is-losing-its-war-on-cocaine-50586.html>
- Painter, J. (1994). *Bolivia and Coca: A Study in Dependency*. Bolder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
- Schein, E. H. (1996). Defining organizational culture. In J.M. Shafritz & J.S. Ott (Eds.), *Classics of Organization Theory* (pp. 430-441). United States: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
- Schein, E. H. (1992). *Organizational Culture and Leadership, 2nd Ed*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
- Strodthoff, I. (2006). Political economy of communication, human security and development: The first 100 days of Evo Morales's Government in Bolivia. *Global Media Journal*, 5(9), 1-9.
- Trice, H.M. & Beyer, J.M. (1996). Changing organizational cultures. In J.M. Shafritz & J.S. Ott (Eds.), *Classics of Organization Theory* (pp. 473-483). United States: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
- United Nations. (1972). *Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961: As Amended by the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961*. Retrieved from http://www.incb.org/pdf/e/conv/convention_1961_en.pdf
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Protection Information Section (DIP). (2005). *Bolivia: A Situational Analysis*. New York: United Nations.
- U.S. Aid to Bolivia, All Programs. (2008). In *Just the Facts*. Retrieved from <http://justf.org/Country?country=Bolivia>
- Vellinga, M (2006). Cambiar las reglas: Una reflexión sobre la industria de las drogas. *Trayectorias*, 8(22), 66-79.
- Vera-Zavala, A. (2005, December 18). Evo Morales has plans for Bolivia. *In These Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/2438/>